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 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a systematic methodology to estimate risk in complex 
technological systems. PRA has been utilized by both the nuclear industry and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to enhance Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety. In resolving emergent regulatory 
requirements (e.g., the ones created in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident), the existing classical PRAs 
of NPPs were found to have limitations in generating the required realism for plant risk estimations. This 
research develops an Integrated PRA (I-PRA) methodology that explicitly incorporates the underlying 
science of accident causation into plant risk scenarios and provides a feasible solution for adding realism 
to the plant risk estimations. In I-PRA, the underlying failure mechanisms associated with the areas of 
safety concern in NPPs are simulated in separate modules and are integrated with classical PRA through a 
probabilistic interface methodology. Although the I-PRA is applicable for various NPP safety challenges 
of concern, this research focuses on the risk assessment for internal fires and makes the following 
methodological and practical contributions: 
1. Develops an I-PRA methodological framework for Fire PRA:  
a. Provides a unified, multi-level probabilistic integration starting with the underlying failure 
mechanisms, connecting them to the component-level failures, and then linking them to the 
system-level risk scenarios in classical PRA; 
b. Integrates a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)-based fire model, the Fire Dynamics 
Simulator (FDS), with classical PRA through a probabilistic interface that is equipped with 
uncertainty quantification, dependency modeling, and Bayesian updating. To alleviate the 
challenges associated with the high computational cost and large volumes of data, a parallel 
simulation using the MPI, along with (i) convergence studies on mesh resolution and (ii) 
convergence studies on uncertainty quantification, is utilized; 
c. Explicitly models the interactions between fire progression and manual fire suppression. This 
explicit interface is created by modifying the Heat Release Rate (HRR) curve of the fire source, 
which is one of the inputs to the FDS code, based on the key timings associated with the 
performance of manual suppression. 
d. Applies the I-PRA to a realistic fire scenario at NPPs. The case study shows that, as compared 
to the current Fire PRA methodology, the I-PRA methodology reduces the core damage 
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frequency estimate by 50%. Improving the realism of PRA can contribute to more efficient risk 
applications in commercial NPPs by: (i) generating a more accurate and stable categorization 
of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) (e.g., for the 10 CFR 50.69 process) and (ii) 
providing NPPs with more design alternatives that can satisfy the risk acceptance criteria.  
2. Develops a Global Importance Measure (Global IM) method for the I-PRA framework to generate the 
ranking of the underlying risk-contributing factors. This Global IM method is capable of accounting 
for (i) uncertainty of the input parameters, (ii) nonlinearity and complex interactions in the model, and 
(iii) uncertainty of the model output. The credibility of the Global IM method is demonstrated by 
conducting several case studies, including reduced-order I-PRA frameworks developed for Generic 
Safety Issue 191 and Fire PRA. The Global IM analysis helps identify the critical risk-contributing 
factors that are closely related to the controllable design parameters at the level of failure mechanisms; 
thus, making a contribution toward more effective accident prevention.  
3. Develops the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology for Common Cause Failure (CCF) modeling. 
The objectives of this new CCF methodology are twofold: (i) to create a quantitative relationship 
between the results of simulation modules in I-PRA and the existing data-driven CCF methods of NPPs 
and (ii) to advance the CCF modeling and quantification in the existing PRA of NPPs. This research 
develops a computational algorithm to operationalize the new CCF methodology in the Interface 
Module of I-PRA. In this computational algorithm, Bayesian updating is used to consider all available 
sources of data related to the results of simulations. The epistemic uncertainty associated with the 
estimated probabilities are also analyzed in order to execute a probabilistic validation. The new CCF 
methodology is applied for the emergency service water pumps at an NPP, and the results demonstrate 
that, by updating the existing plant-specific CCF parameters with the simulation-based estimates, the 
degree of uncertainty associated with the resultant core damage frequency can be reduced significantly.  
4. Develops the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)-based method for human performance modeling in 
manual fire suppression module of the I-PRA framework. Compared to the previous studies, this 
research advances the HRA-based manual suppression analysis by (i) using a CFD-based fire 
progression model to define the success criteria; (ii) addressing the HRR reduction during the manual 
suppression phase using the empirical water suppression model; and (iii) quantifying the times to 
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complete individual tasks. The HRA-based manual suppression model is applied for the fire brigade 
data from two NPPs, and the results indicate that the performance of manual suppression can be strongly 
influenced by the plant-specific contextual factors (e.g., plant geometry, fire location, and fire brigade 
procedure); therefore, relying on the industry-wide historical fire event records to derive the industry-
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CHAPTER 1: STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
For the past four decades, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency in nuclear power plant (NPP) 
safety, both the nuclear industry and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have promoted the 
use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). PRA is a systematic methodology to estimate risk in complex 
technical systems by assessing the “risk triplets”: what can go wrong, how likely it is, and what its 
consequences are [1]. The theoretical and methodological foundations of classical PRA were established in 
1975 for NPPs [2], and this classical PRA has been gradually incorporated into Risk-Informed Regulation 
by the U.S. NRC [3].  
While classical PRA has been widely used in various risk-informed applications by the nuclear 
industry and the U.S. NRC, it is recognized that classical PRA may generate inaccurate plant risk estimates 
and misleading risk information if the initiators and scenarios being analyzed involve a highly dynamic and 
location-specific progression of underlying failure mechanisms and system responses. To overcome these 
limitations, a dynamic PRA (also referred to as a simulation-based PRA) has been developed [4-16]. 
Although a fully-dynamic PRA could generate more realism for PRA, it would not be economically 
efficient or practical in the short term for existing commercial NPPs because (i) classical PRA is widely 
utilized by both the nuclear industry and the regulatory agency and a significant amount of time and 
resources would be required for a transition to a fully-dynamic PRA, and (ii) the need for reaching the 
degree of realism that a fully-dynamic PRA could generate has not yet been scientifically justified for either 
the nuclear industry or the regulatory agency. As a more practical solution for the nuclear industry and the 
regulatory agency, this research develops an Integrated PRA (I-PRA) methodology that explicitly 
incorporates the underlying science of accident causation into plant risk scenarios. In I-PRA, the underlying 
failure mechanisms associated with the areas of safety concern in NPPs are simulated in separate modules 
and are integrated with the classical PRA of NPPs through a probabilistic interface methodology that is 
equipped with uncertainty quantification, dependency modeling, and Bayesian updating.  
Although the I-PRA methodological framework developed in this research is applicable for various 
NPP safety challenges of concern, this research mainly demonstrates the development and implementation 
of the I-PRA methodological framework in the context of risk assessment for internal fires, called Fire PRA, 
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to meet a long-standing challenge for the nuclear industry and the U.S. NRC. Internal fires can be the 
initiating events for cascading failure throughout the NPP system, compromising the existing physical 
barriers and redundant safety systems. After the major fire at the Browns Ferry NPP in 1975 [17], fire 
protection at NPPs emerged as a controversial and complicated area of nuclear safety [18-21]. Until 2004, 
no PRA technique for fire hazard, or Fire PRA, had been officially approved by the U.S. NRC and, even 
now, it has not yet become well established in the nuclear community and remains an area of active research. 
Experts have pointed out that the main gap in the current Fire PRA methodology is the overestimation of 
risk due to the excessive conservatism that is introduced in the input parameters and modeling assumptions 
[20, 22-31]. A literature review identifies five major sources of excessive conservatism in the current Fire 
PRA methodology: (1) Fire ignition frequency, (2) Fire progression and damage modeling, (3) Interaction 
between fire progression and manual suppression, (4) Circuit failure analysis, and (5) Post-fire Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA). The I-PRA methodological framework developed for Fire PRA in this research 
generates a more accurate and realistic estimation of fire-induced plant risk by improving the realism in 
areas #2 and #3.  
The roadmap of this research is summarized in Figure 1.1. This thesis is developed by incorporating 
material from journal manuscripts [32-35] and conference papers [36-42] by the author. Chapter 2 (Step 5 
in Figure 1.1) uses material from References [33-36, 38-40]. Chapter 3 (Step 6 in Figure 1.1) is primarily 
based on References [32, 37, 41] and uses one case study from Reference [35]. Chapter 4 (Step 7.a in Figure 
1.1) is based on References [34, 42]. Chapter 5 (Step 7.b in Figure 1.1) is based on the author’s conference 
paper [40] and the journal manuscript [43]. The author’s research contributions are covered in the main 
chapters of this thesis (Chapters 2 through 5), while the background, literature reviews, and other supporting 
materials are presented in appendices. Chapter 6 highlights potential future work for this research.     
An analysis, revealing the gaps in the classical PRA technique and the existing Fire PRA 
methodology used for NPPs in the U.S., established the motivation for this research. Appendix A of this 
thesis provides background on the classical PRA technique, including its high-level elements, its application 
in the Risk-Informed Regulation by the U.S. NRC, and the gap analysis (Step 1 in Figure 1.1). Appendix B 
of this thesis provides a background on fire protection in NPPs, including the safety significance and 
historical development (Step 2 in Figure 1.1), and identifies the key challenges in the existing Fire PRA 
methodology which require methodological advancements to improve the realism in Fire PRA (Step 3 in 
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Figure 1.1). The methodological and practical contributions of this research are categorized into four groups, 
explained briefly in the following sub-sections, and are mapped to the Steps of Figure 1.1 as well as to the 
thesis chapters. 
 
Figure 1.1 Research roadmap of this thesis.  
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1.1 Methodological and Practical Contributions in Developing the I-PRA Framework for Fire PRA    
The first category of methodological contributions of this research relates to the development of 
the I-PRA framework for Fire PRA. In Steps 4 and 5 in the thesis roadmap (Figure 1.1), the I-PRA 
methodological framework for Fire PRA is developed and implemented to improve the realism of Fire PRA 
by addressing those key challenges in the current Fire PRA methodology identified in Step 2. First, the 
theoretical foundation of the I-PRA methodological framework (Step 4 in the roadmap) is analyzed. Based 
on this theoretical foundation, Step 5.a in the roadmap develops the I-PRA methodological framework for 
Fire PRA in NPPs. This I-PRA framework for Fire PRA is developed by the probabilistic incorporation of 
simulation-based models of underlying physical phenomena into the classical PRA model. In this context, 
a "simulation-based" model is defined as a mechanistic or phenomenological model of the underlying 
failure mechanisms that numerically solves the physical governing equations and has the capability to 
capture the spatio-temporal progression of underlying physical phenomena. The temporal aspect is 
important in Fire PRA since the progression of the fire-induced scenario and interactions between fire 
physics and plant response are highly dynamic. The consideration of the spatial aspect is also crucial in Fire 
PRA since the fire-induced adverse conditions and equipment damage highly depend on the distance from 
the fire source and the fire compartment geometry. The simulation-based module, called the Fire Simulation 
Module (FSM), is developed by using the state-of-the-art models of underlying physical failure mechanisms, 
i.e., fire initiation, fire progression, and post-fire damage propagation. A quantitative uncertainty 
quantification is conducted to address the uncertainties associated with the input parameters in the FSM 
and to make the deterministic physical models probabilistic so that the interface between the FSM and 
classical PRA model is created. The unique aspects of the I-PRA methodological framework developed for 
Fire RPA are summarized as follows: 
a) The I-PRA methodological framework provides, for the first time, a unified multi-level probabilistic 
integration beginning with the underlying physical failure mechanisms (i.e., the spatio-temporal 
interactions among risk-contributing factors in the failure mechanisms), connecting to the component-
level failures, and then linking them to the system-level risk scenarios in classical PRA. The 
incorporation of physics of failure into PRA is an important area of research. Although the existing 
probabilistic physics of failure (PPoF) methods use physical models for estimating equipment failure 
probabilities [44], this research is the first to utilize them in a unified and multi-level integrated 
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framework of risk assessment for complex technical systems. Linking physical failure mechanisms 
with PRA in an integrated platform (rather than calculating component reliability using physical 
models and passively plugging the results into PRA) allows for a more in-depth parametric study 
where the effects of changes in the parameters associated with the underlying failure mechanisms on 
the system-level risk estimates can be analyzed quantitatively. In addition, this unified and integrated 
risk assessment platform can capture the sources of dependency among two or more components in a 
more explicit and accurate manner by incorporating the underlying failure mechanisms (as explained 
in Sections 2.3.6 through 2.3.8) into the PRA scenarios. 
 
b) This research is the first to integrate a CFD-based model of physical fire phenomena with classical 
PRA. In the I-PRA methodological framework, the fire progression and fire-induced physical 
conditions are simulated using an open-source CFD model, the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), 
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [45], instead of using the 
simpler fire models having lower fidelity and resolution, such as the Fire Dynamics Tool (FDT) [46] 
and CFAST [47] that are commonly used in the existing Fire PRAs. The FDS numerically solves 
Navier-Stokes equations to model the turbulent flow field caused by the fire progression in an 
enclosure. The FDS has the capability of more accurate and explicit modeling of underlying physical 
phenomena and fire-induced effects on the equipment (e.g., cable tray) because physical governing 
equations are numerically solved with higher space and time resolutions, instead of relying on 
engineering correlations for a lumped quantity, averaged in time and space. The FDS has been used 
previously for estimating the probability of fire-induced cable damage in the NPP context [48-51]; 
however, this I-PRA framework is the first to integrate FDS with a system-level PRA model. 
Application of FDS in Fire PRA has not been successful because of a high computational cost and 
large volumes of data. To alleviate these challenges, a parallel simulation using the Message Passing 
Interface (MPI), along with quantitative convergence studies on mesh resolution (Section 2.3.3), is 
utilized in this research to efficiently perform the spatio-temporal fire progression simulations with 
the FDS. 
 
c) This research is the first to generate a probabilistic interface between classical PRA and the FDS. The 
research performs a sampling-based Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) for the FDS code for two 
purposes: (i) to propagate the uncertainties associated with the input parameters, rather than assuming 
conservative values of input parameters, so that more realistic estimates of fire-induced equipment 
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damage probability can be produced and (ii) to make the FDS model probabilistic and to create, for 
the first time, a probabilistic interface between the CFD-based fire model and classical PRA logic. 
The existing Fire PRA uses a simplified uncertainty analysis approach (i.e., severity factor method 
[52]) to consider the uncertainty of input parameters within a limited scope. This research applies a 
sampling-based UQ method for FDS to estimate the fire-induced cable damage probability. To 
overcome a high computational cost and large volumes of data generated by the UQ, quantitative 
convergence studies on uncertainty propagation (Section 2.3.6), is conducted.  
 
d) An explicit modeling of the interactions between fire progression and manual fire suppression is 
developed (Section 2.3.5). The manual fire protection features, such as manual fire detection by the 
fire patrol and manual fire suppression by the fire brigade, are crucial as they are the last layer of fire 
protection and mitigation when the automatic fire protection systems, such as the fixed fire detectors 
and water sprinklers, are not installed or are unavailable. Historically, the Fire PRA for NPPs addresses 
the interaction of the manual fire suppression with fire progression using an “implicit” approach, i.e., 
by using the competition between two time quantities for “time to target damage” and “time to manual 
fire suppression” [52-56]. These two time quantities are independently computed by two separate 
models without considering the interactions between fire progression and manual suppression. This 
“implicit” approach is not capable of addressing the influences of manual suppression activity on the 
fire progression during the time the fire brigade is applying the suppressant on the fire. The magnitude 
of fire progression is influenced by the fire brigade after manual suppression begins; hence, this 
“implicit” approach generates conservative estimates of the fire-induced equipment damage 
probabilities. To improve the realism in Fire PRA, the interactions of manual suppression with fire 
progression should be more explicitly addressed. A literature review revealed that there had been no 
research on developing an explicit interface between a CFD-based fire model and manual suppression 
until recently, when Kloos et al. [57-59] connected the FDS to Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and 
a dynamic event tree representing the manual suppression scenarios. To avoid drastic changes in the 
current practice in the NPP PRAs, this research does not utilize the dynamic event tree. Instead, in this 
research, an explicit interface between the CFD-based fire progression model and manual suppression 
is developed, utilizing an approach similar to the De Sanctis et al. method [60], which developed an 
interface between a correlation-based fire model and manual suppression. To build this interface, this 
research modifies the Heat Release Rate (HRR) curve based on three pivotal timings of manual 
suppression activity estimated by the data-driven probability model: (i) time to fire detection, (ii) time 
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to fire brigade response, and (iii) duration of manual suppression. The treatment of time to fire 
detection and the fire brigade response time is similar to the approach by De Sanctis et al. [60], but is 
tailored for the NPP context based on the availability of empirical data. Meanwhile, this study has 
made a methodological extension with respect to how to account for the duration of manual 
suppression in the modifications of the HRR curve. 
The I-PRA is applied (Step 5.b. in Figure 1.1; Section 2.5.2) to a realistic fire scenario at a representative 
NPP. This case study shows that, as compared to the current Fire PRA methodology, the I-PRA 
methodology reduces the core damage frequency estimate by 50%. Improving the realism of PRA can 
contribute to more efficient risk applications in commercial NPPs by: (i) generating a more accurate and 
stable categorization of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) (e.g., for the 10 CFR 50.69 process) 
and (ii) providing NPPs with more design alternatives that can satisfy the risk acceptance criteria. 
1.2 Methodological and Practical Contributions in Developing the Global Importance Measure for 
the I-PRA Framework  
Step 6 of the roadmap (Chapter 3 of this thesis) develops an advanced IM analysis method for the 
I-PRA methodological framework. The IM analysis is one of the key post-analyses of PRA that helps 
identify the critical risk-contributing factors. Although the terms “sensitivity analysis (SA)” and “IM 
analysis” are sometimes used interchangeably in literature, they are clearly differentiated in the context of 
the I-PRA framework: IM analysis ranks the input parameters based on their influence on the system-level 
risk estimates, while SA ranks the input parameters based on their influence on the intermediate model 
outputs, such as physical performance measures. It should be noted that, to facilitate reasonable risk-
informed decision making, the risk-contributing factors should be ranked based on the system-level risk 
estimates, rather than on intermediate performance measures. This is because the system-level risk is the 
outcome of complex interactions among many sub-systems, components, and underlying failure 
mechanisms; therefore, the input parameters that have a large influence on a specific intermediate 
performance measure are not necessarily important in terms of the system-level risk, and vice versa. To 
obtain the ranking of input parameters associated with the underlying failure mechanisms, the classical 
importance measure (IM) methods, used in the existing NPP PRAs, are not fully applicable for the I-PRA 
methodological framework; hence, Step 6 in the roadmap (Figure 1.1) develops the Global IM method for 
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this I-PRA framework. In literature, both local [61-69] and global SA [65, 66, 70, 71] were conducted for 
physical models of combustion and fire progression to rank input parameters in terms of their influence on 
the physical model outputs, such as temperature and time to ignition. There is, however, no study that has 
developed and utilized a quantitative IM analysis to rank the input parameters of a physical model with 
respect to their contribution to system-level risk estimates. In this research, therefore, a moment-
independent Global IM Si(CDF) [72] is selected and adapted for the I-PRA framework. This Global IM 
method is capable of accounting for (i) uncertainty associated with the input parameters, (ii) nonlinearity 
and complex interactions in the model, and (iii) uncertainty associated with the model output. Step 6.a in 
the roadmap provides the qualitative justifications for the adapted Global IM method based on a literature 
review of the existing IM methods and a theoretical discussion concerning the characteristics of the I-PRA 
methodological framework.  
In Step 6.b of the roadmap, the quantitative justifications are provided by demonstrating the 
credibility and applicability of the Global IM method, selected and tailored in this research for the I-PRA 
methodological framework, using several case studies, including two reduced-order I-PRA frameworks 
developed for the Generic Safety Issue 191 (GSI-191) and Fire PRA. The Global IM analysis helps identify 
the critical risk-contributing factors that are closely related to the controllable design parameters at the level 
of failure mechanisms (e.g., cable material properties, fire characteristics) and, thus, contributes toward 
more effective accident prevention by informing both the nuclear industry and regulatory agency so that 
their resources are efficiently focused on “truly” risk-significant elements of the NPPs protection features. 
1.3 Methodological and Practical Contributions in Developing a New Common Cause Failure 
Analysis for the I-PRA Framework  
Step 7 in the roadmap (Figure 1.1) advances the I-PRA methodological framework to address two 
challenges identified in the previous steps (Steps 1 through 5 in Figure 1.1). The first challenge (addressed 
in Step 7.a) is related to how to consider dependent failures in the interface between classical PRA and the 
simulation-based module. For most of the initiators and scenarios, the existing classical PRA uses a 
parametric model to account for the CCFs, i.e., dependent failures among two or more components due to 
shared failure causes and coupling factors. To create an interface between classical PRA and the simulation-
based module for this category of initiators and scenarios, Step 7.a.1 (Chapter 4 of this thesis) develops the 
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Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology to estimate the CCF model parameters, using the outputs from 
the simulation-based failure mechanism model, and to update the existing data-driven CCF model 
parameters with the simulation-based estimates. Note that the current Fire PRA methodology does not 
utilize the parametric CCF model to capture the dependent failures of more than one component due to the 
shared fire source; hence, this methodological advancement has not been considered in Step 5.a of this 
research (Chapter 2). Meanwhile, this advancement is necessary to develop and implement the I-PRA 
methodological framework for initiators and scenarios where the CCFs are handled by the parametric model 
in classical PRA. As compared to the existing parametric CCF models used in classical PRA [73], this 
research advances the CCF modeling and quantification by incorporating the underlying causalities into the 
CCF model parameters through the simulation of underlying failure mechanisms. In the past decade, to 
extend the consideration of underlying causalities, other advanced CCF approaches have been proposed, 
such as the cause-specific parametric models [74-80], Bayesian Network [81, 82], and Influence Diagram 
[83, 84]. The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology developed in this research differs from these 
existing advanced CCF approaches in that the underlying causalities are incorporated by a simulation-based 
model of failure mechanisms (rather than by using the probabilistic causal models as do other advanced 
CCF approaches). The strength of causalities (e.g., how the change in one of the cause conditions influences 
the CCF event probability), therefore, is quantified by the simulation of underlying failure mechanisms 
(rather than by relying on empirical data and engineering judgment as do the other advanced CCF 
approaches).  
This research provides a computational algorithm that can be used (i) to operationalize the Spatio-
Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology in the interface of the I-PRA framework and/or (ii) to advance 
the CCF analysis for the existing NPPs. In this computational algorithm, Bayesian updating is used to 
consider all available sources of data related to the results of simulations.  The epistemic uncertainty 
associated with the estimated probabilities are also analyzed to allow for a probabilistic validation. The new 
CCF methodology is applied (Step 7.a.2 of Figure 1.1) for the emergency service water pump at NPPs, and 
the results demonstrate that, by updating the existing plant-specific CCF parameters with the simulation-
based estimates, the degree of uncertainty associated with the resultant core damage frequency can be 




1.4 Methodological and Practical Contributions in Developing the Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA)-Based Method for Manual Fire Suppression Module in the I-PRA Framework 
To improve the realism in the modeling of interactions between fire progression and manual 
suppression, Step 5 of the research roadmap creates an explicit interface between the CFD-based fire model 
and the data-driven manual suppression model.  Step 5 of this research, however, has gaps concerning the 
data-driven manual suppression model: (i) it does not provide sufficient time resolution, (ii) in-depth IM 
analysis is not possible, and (iii) due to lack of historical fire event data, it is difficult to develop a scientific 
justification for the plant-specific estimation of the data-driven parameters. To overcome these limitations, 
Step 7.b.2 in the roadmap (Chapter 5 of this thesis) develops an HRA-based model for analyzing the 
performance of manual suppression by the fire brigade. This research uses the HRA-based method in 
NUREG-2180 [85], originally developed for analyzing the human performance in the prompt detection and 
suppression in response to the Very Early Warning Fire Detection (VEWFD) systems in NPPs and advances 
it for manual suppression by the fire brigade. Compared to the NUREG-2180 method [85], this research 
makes advancements by (i) using a CFD-based fire progression model to define the system time window 
(i.e., the time available for manual suppression before fire-induced equipment damage occurs); (ii) 
considering the dependency of the human performance on the fire severity in the HRA event tree logic; and 
(iii) explicitly addressing the influences of manual suppression by the fire brigade on fire progression using 
the correlation-based water suppression model [86]. This HRA-based model is then extended to estimate 
two pivotal timings associated with the fire brigade performance that are used to create an explicit interface 
between fire progression and manual suppression in the Fire I-PRA framework. In addition, a method for 
combining the existing data-driven non-suppression curve in Fire PRA of NPPs with the results of the 
HRA-based manual suppression model (developed in this research) is proposed, utilizing the scenario-
specific adjustment factor.  
The HRA-based manual suppression model is applied (Step 7.b.2) for the fire brigade data from 
two NPPs, and the results indicate that the performance of manual suppression can be strongly influenced 
by the plant-specific contextual factors (e.g., plant geometry, fire location, and fire brigade procedure); 
therefore, relying on the industry-wide historical fire event records to derive the industry-average fire 
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CHAPTER 2: FIRE INTEGRATED PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter relates to Step 5 in the roadmap of the research presented in Figure 2.1. The content 
of this chapter is based on the conference papers [1-4] and the journal manuscript [4-7] by the author. 
 
Figure 2.1 Research Roadmap.  
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Step 2 of the roadmap provides background on fire protection and Fire PRA in NPPs (in Appendix 
B) and states that concerns have arisen about excessive conservatism in the current Fire PRA methodology 
[8-18]. Step 3 of the roadmap (Appendix B) identifies the five areas for improving realism in Fire PRA: (1) 
fire ignition frequency, (2) fire progression and damage modeling, (3) modeling of interactions between 
fire progression and manual suppression, (4) circuit failure analysis, and (5) post-fire HRA. To improve the 
realism in the second and third areas, this chapter develops the I-PRA methodological framework for Fire 
PRA in NPPs.  
Section 2.2 provides the theoretical foundation of the general I-PRA methodological framework. 
Although this chapter mainly focuses on development and implementation of the I-PRA framework for Fire 
PRA in NPPs, the I-PRA methodological framework introduced in this chapter can be applied for diverse 
complex systems and multiple safety concerns. For instance, the concurrent research projects at the UIUC 
SoTeRiA Laboratory have proposed and developed the I-PRA methodological framework for areas beyond 
Fire PRA, including the risk-informed resolution of GSI-191 [19, 20], incorporation of organizational 
factors into PRA [21-23], seismic PRA [24], and risk-informed emergency response [25-28]. The 
theoretical foundation in Section 2.2 establishes grounds for the development and implementation of the I-
PRA methodological framework in a general context. 
Section 2.3 describes the I-PRA methodological framework for Fire PRA in NPPs. The overall 
structure, as well as the methodology for developing and implementing each module and submodule, are 
explained.   
Section 2.4 provides a small-scale case study to demonstrate the feasibility and implementation of 
the Fire I-PRA methodological framework for NPPs. In this small-scale case study, a switchgear room fire 
scenario selected from the U.S. NRC regulatory document is used as a realistic example of an NPP fire 
compartment, while it uses a simplistic and hypothetical PRA model for plant system response.  
Section 2.5 demonstrates the value of the Fire I-PRA methodological framework with respect to 
improving realism in Fire PRA. This is done by making (i) a qualitative comparison of the Fire I-PRA 
framework with the current Fire PRA methodology to highlight the methodological advancements made in 
this research (Section 2.5.1) and (ii) a quantitative comparison using a realistic case study for an NPP 
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(Section 2.5.2) that applies the Fire I-PRA framework for a selected fire-induced scenario at a representative 
NPP to evaluate the amount of improvement in realism (i.e., reduction of plant risk estimate). For this 
purpose, three Fire PRA methodologies, (a) “full compartment burn” screening approach, (b) the current 
Fire PRA methodology, and (c) the Fire I-PRA framework, are applied to a selected critical fire scenario at 
a representative NPP, and the estimates of the core damage frequency are compared.  
2.2 Theoretical Foundation of the Integrated PRA Methodological Framework 
I-PRA is a multi-level risk assessment framework, representing the multiple levels of causal factors 
and their paths of influence leading to failure of an entire system (Figure 2.2). In I-PRA, the underlying 
science of accident causations (i.e., physical and social failure mechanisms) is incorporated into risk 
scenarios in classical PRA (i.e., the Plant-Specific PRA module; module ‘d’ in Figure 2.2) to explicitly 
address the challenges associated with specific areas of safety concern for the nuclear industry and the 
regulatory agency, such as internal fires and GSI-191.  
The system- and component-level accident causations are represented by the Plant-Specific PRA 
module, consisting of classical Event Tree (ET) and Fault Tree (FT) models. In the example in Figure 2.2, 
the hypothetical ET model (‘#6’ in Figure 2.2) represents the system-level accident scenarios and associated 
end states of interest, where the failure of both the SYS1 and SYS2 frontline systems leads to the core 
damage end state. The pivotal events in the ET, representing the frontline systems, are typically 
decomposed into smaller pieces of hardware components (e.g., pumps, valves) and their associated 
functional failure modes, using the FT models. In this context, the functional failure modes are defined by 
how individual hardware components, in relation to their desired functions, can functionally fail, e.g., 
failure to start or to run. In typical NPP PRAs, the classical PRA model covers the accident causations 
ranging from the functional failure modes, represented by the basic events in the FT models, to the system-





Figure 2.2 Integrated Probabilistic Risk Assessment (I-PRA) Methodological Framework. 
The I-PRA framework incorporates the physical and social causations that underlie the basic events 
in classical PRA and lead to accident initiation and progression by integrating the simulation-based model 
of failure mechanisms. The I-PRA is developed based on the following concepts: 
 
• Each functional failure mode of the hardware component is caused by physical failure modes (e.g., 
a crack in the shaft coupling, leak from the shaft seal), defined as an observable and measurable 
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physical damage state of a hardware component and its individual parts. Note that, to define 
physical failure modes, individual parts of hardware components may need to be more specifically 
considered; for instance, for a pump failure, a crack in the “shaft coupling” or a leak from the “shaft 
seal”. 
 
• Physical failure modes of hardware components are caused by a spatial and temporal progression 
of underlying physical failure mechanisms. The conditions that initiate and accelerate progression 
of the physical failure mechanisms can be induced by the deep causal factors, e.g., environmental 
conditions, maintenance errors, installation errors, and inadequate designs. In this study, the 
physical failure mechanism is defined as the cause-and-effect chain of causal factors that underlie 
the PRA basic events that explain how these deep causal factors propagate through the system and 
result in the observable physical failure modes. 
The physical failure mechanisms leading to the physical failure modes are explicitly incorporated 
into PRA by the Simulation Module (module ‘b’ in Figure 2.2). The Simulation Module predicts how the 
physical failure mechanisms propagate in time and space and lead to the system and component failures by 
solving a phenomenological or mechanistic model of underlying physical phenomena considering the 
influences of physical, human, and organizational deep causal factors through the variability of input 
parameters. The input parameters provided by the Input Module (module ‘a’ in Figure 2.2) form the 
borderline between the causalities “explicitly” incorporated by the Simulation Module and those “implicitly” 
embedded by the data-driven approach. These input parameters define the initial and boundary conditions 
for the physical failure mechanism models in the Simulation Module, such as initial geometry, material 
properties, and environmental conditions. The uncertainties associated with these input parameters are 
represented by probability distributions derived from data analysis. Stochasticity of these input parameters 
reflects the randomness induced by the accident causations below this borderline, such as the operational 
conditions and installation, maintenance, and manufacturing errors. In other words, the I-PRA framework 
is a hybrid approach, where the accident causations leading to the system end states are treated by a 
combination of the explicit failure mechanism models in the Simulation Module (for the causalities above 
the explicit-implicit borderline) and the data-driven approach for input parameters (for the causalities below 
the explicit-implicit borderline). The location of the borderline should be determined by the analyst, taking 
several aspects into account: (i) availability of empirical data to support the estimation of input parameters, 
(ii) the desired level of accuracy and resolution at each level of accident causation, (iii) available resources 
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(e.g., budget, staff, computational facility), and (iv) the state of knowledge about the underlying physical 
and social phenomena.  
The Simulation Module predicts the Key Performance Measures (KPMs), i.e., measurable 
indicators of the damage state of each hardware component or its individual parts. The damage state of each 
hardware component is determined by comparing the KPM with the predefined damage threshold. Through 
the Interface Module (module ‘c’ in Figure 2.2), the Simulation Module is connected to the physical failure 
modes and, ultimately, to the functional failure modes in the Plant-Specific PRA Module. With the Interface 
Module, the stochasticity of the input parameters, representing the influences of the implicit causal factors, 
are characterized and propagated by the Monte Carlo simulation (element #1 of module ‘c’ in Figure 2.2) 
to make the Simulation Module probabilistic and, therefore, ready to be connected to the Plant-Specific 
PRA module. The Probabilistic Validation (#2 in Figure 2.2) identifies, characterizes, and propagates all 
sources of epistemic uncertainty associated with the Input, Simulation, and Interface Modules to generate 
the uncertainty bounds (or interval estimates) for the simulation-based probability estimates generated by 
the Uncertainty Propagation. The resultant uncertainty bounds indicate the degree of accuracy of the 
simulation-based probability estimates. Following the Probabilistic Validation, the Interface Module 
generates the estimation of the Minimal Cut Set (MCS) probability in consideration of dependent failures 
(element 3 of module ‘c’ in Figure 2.2) based on the probability that the KPM associated with each physical 
failure mode will exceed the predefined damage thresholds. Note that, depending on the commercial PRA 
software used by the plant and the I-PRA application of interest, another form of PRA inputs, in addition 
to the MCS probability, might be necessary. For instance, the Interface Module developed for the Fire I-
PRA framework, which will be shown in Section 2.5.2, generates the marginal and conditional component 
damage probabilities, whereas the one developed for the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology 
(in Chapter 4) is designed to estimate the CCF model parameters. The Interface Module, developed in this 
research, has the flexibility to generate the desired PRA inputs from the simulation-based MCS probability 
estimates. The Bayesian integration (#4 in Figure 2.2) updates the existing empirical data concerning the 
MCS being analyzed (e.g., historical failure event database) with the simulation-based MCS probability 
estimates to enhance the validity of the resultant plant risk estimates.  
It is worth emphasizing that the objective in this research is to apply this new I-PRA methodological 
framework for the existing commercial NPPs, without requiring significant modifications to their existing 
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plant-specific PRAs. In other words, the Simulation Module is developed as a separate module that can be 
smoothly connected to the existing classical PRAs through the Interface Module. With the Interface Module, 
location-specific and time-dependent information on the underlying failure mechanisms is transferred to 
the static classical PRA logic, considering dependencies among the events in the PRA scenarios. The I-
PRA methodology, therefore, takes advantage of a portion of the existing plant-specific classical PRA for 
construction of system- and component-level accident scenarios while overcoming the deficiencies of 
classical PRA by advancing the failure probability quantification using additional simulation-based 
modules. More detailed methodological and computational explanations of the modules in the I-PRA 
framework are included in Section 2.3, where they are explained in the context of Fire PRA.  
2.3 Integrated PRA Framework for Nuclear Power Plant Fire PRA 
Figure 2.3 shows the overall structure of the Fire I-PRA methodological framework. The following 
subsections cover the methodological and computational details related to the modules in Figure 2.3. 
Compared with the generic structure of the I-PRA methodological framework (Figure 2.2), the Fire I-PRA 
has the following differences: (i) the Manual Fire Suppression Module has been added to address manual 
fire suppression, which is one of the most crucial mechanisms to prevent and mitigate the adverse 
consequences of fires in NPPs; and (ii) the Scenario-Based Damage Model has been added in the Interface 
Module to create a connection between the cable-level damage probability and the component-level failure 





Figure 2.3 Integrated Probabilistic Risk Assessment (I-PRA) for Fire PRA of Nuclear Power Plants.  
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2.3.1 Input Module (Module ‘a’ in Figure 2.3)  
The Input Module provides the inputs for the FSM and the Plant-Specific PRA module and includes 
the following information: (a) Plant boundary and partitioning (related to “Task 1: Plant Boundary 
Definition & Partitioning” in NUREG/CR-6850 [29]); (b) Post-fire HRA outputs (related to “Task 12: Post-
Fire Human Reliability Analysis” in NUREG/CR-6850 [29]), which provide the Plant-Specific PRA 
Module with the human error probabilities associated with the human interventions against the fire-induced 
abnormal system responses; (c) Fire PRA database containing (i) plant cable and raceway data (e.g., type 
and configuration of electrical cables and their relationship with safety equipment), (ii) Fire PRA equipment, 
and (iii) the input parameters to physical models in the FSM (e.g., physical and chemical properties of 
electrical cable); (d) Input from plant walkdowns (e.g., ventilation features, connected compartments); (e) 
Seismic data (related to “Task 13: Seismic-Fire Interaction” in NUREG/CR-6850 [29]), which are required 
to consider the potential seismic-fire interaction in both initiation and progression models; and (f) 
Qualitative and quantitative information on both the automatic and manual fire protection features, e.g., 
reliability of fire detectors and sprinklers, industry-wide and/or plant-specific fire brigade performance 
records. 
In this I-PRA methodological framework, as stated in the theoretical foundation (Section 2.2), the 
Input Module corresponds to the borderline between the explicit and implicit treatment of underlying 
accident causalities. In other words, the causalities above this borderline are explicitly characterized through 
the explicit modeling of failure mechanisms in the Simulation Module or by using the logic-based 
probabilistic model in the Scenario-Based Damage Model, whereas the causalities below this borderline 
are implicitly incorporated into the risk estimates through the stochasticity of the input parameters in the 
Input Module. In the following, two examples of input parameters that play the role of such a borderline in 
the I-PRA framework for Fire PRA are shown: 
Example #1: In the current scope of the Fire I-PRA framework, the maximum HRR value, which 
characterizes the maximum intensity of the initial fire source, is provided as one of the input parameters in 
the Input Module. The maximum HRR value is the consequence of progression and interaction of both 
physical and human implicit causal factors below the borderline, e.g., physical properties of fuel material, 
environmental conditions in the fire compartment, and the quality of manufacturing, installation, and 
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maintenance for the ignition source equipment. Due to the complexity in the underlying causalities, 
however, the current Fire PRA methodology treats the maximum HRR value as a random input parameter, 
where randomness represents the uncertainty caused by the progression and interaction of the underlying 
implicit causal factors. For instance, NUREG-2178 [30] provides the maximum HRR value for electrical 
enclosures derived from the expert elicitation informed by experimental data and operational experience. 
The probability distribution, representing the uncertainty associated with the maximum HRR value, is 
provided for each category of electrical enclosure based on function, size, content, and ventilation condition. 
The analyst can obtain the probability distribution of the maximum HRR value for a specific electrical 
enclosure being analyzed by consulting the lookup table in NUREG-2178 [30] which shows the parameters 
of probability distributions. This data-driven probability distribution, available in the existing Fire PRA 
methodology, is also used in the current scope of the Fire I-PRA framework.  
Example 2: In the subsequent section, it states that the Manual Fire Suppression Module in the Fire 
I-PRA framework can be developed by using either a data-driven or a model-based approach. If the data-
driven approach is selected, the non-suppression curve, which represents the aleatory uncertainty associated 
with the time to manual suppression and provided in NUREG-2169 [31], can be used. This non-suppression 
curve is given by an exponential distribution, and its constant manual suppression rate, λ [1/minutes], is 
estimated based on the observations in historical fire events at NPPs. In this case, the manual suppression 
rate is an input parameter to the Manual Fire Suppression Module and corresponds to the borderline 
between explicit and implicit treatment of accident causalities. The performance of manual suppression can 
be influenced by both physical and social implicit causal factors that underlie the borderline, e.g., fire-
induced environment inside the fire room and the quality of training and procedures. In the data-driven 
approach, those causal factors that underlie this explicit-implicit borderline are implicitly addressed through 
the data-driven estimation of the manual suppression rate. In contrast, if the model-based approach is 
selected for the Manual Fire Suppression Module, those underlying causal factors are incorporated into the 
Manual Fire Suppression Module by explicit modeling of the underlying work process and human 
performance. Chapter 5 will demonstrate an initial attempt to develop the “model-based” Manual Fire 
Suppression Module in the Fire I-PRA framework. In the model-based approach, the portion of accident 
causalities that are explicitly addressed increases, and the borderline between explicit and implicit treatment 
of causalities moves to a “deeper” level in the causalities.  
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2.3.2 Fire Initiation Model (#1 in Figure 2.3) 
The Fire Simulation Module (FSM) (module ‘b’ in Figure 2.3) simulates the fire-related physical 
failure mechanisms associated with the fire-induced accident scenarios considered in the Plant-Specific 
PRA Module. This module is comprised of three sub-modules, including the Fire Initiation Model (#1 in 
Figure 2.3), the Fire Progression Model (#2 in Figure 2.3), and the Post-Fire Damage Propagation Model 
(#3 in Figure 2.3). The Fire Initiation Model aims to develop a data-driven or a physical model to derive 
the component- and location-specific fire ignition frequency and fire characteristics at the incipient stage 
(e.g., HRR profile, size and shape of the initial fire source). The fire ignition frequency at a certain location 
is a function of the type and amount of the ignition source and the physical and human factors affecting the 
fire ignition process. This model generates the following outputs for each component at a specific location: 
(i) fire ignition frequency that will be used as the initiating event frequency in the Plant-Specific PRA 
Module; and (ii) the information on the characteristics of the incipient phase of the fire that will be used as 
inputs to the Fire Progression Model. The current NPP Fire PRA uses a data-driven method as 
recommended in NUREG/CR-6850 [29, 32, 33], updated in NUREG-2169 [31]. This data-driven method 
derives the generic (i.e., industry-wide average) fire ignition frequency for each category of fire ignition 
source (referred to as the “bins”) based on the historical fire event database. The generic fire ignition 
frequency is defined as the total “plant-wide” ignition frequency (the number of ignitions per year) summed 
up for all components under each bin within an NPP unit. The component-specific fire ignition frequency 
can thus be estimated by dividing the generic fire ignition frequency for the corresponding bin by the total 
number of components within a unit categorized under that bin. At this stage of the I-PRA methodology, 
this data-driven approach is utilized in the Fire Initiation Model.  
2.3.3 Fire Progression Model (#2 in Figure 2.3) 
State-of-the-art models of fire progression are integrated into the FSM platform to simulate the 
spatio-temporal fire progression, fire-induced environmental conditions, and the interaction between fire 
progression and the fire detection and suppression systems. The inputs to the Fire Progression Model 
include: (i) information on the ignition source, such as the HRR curve, size, and shape provided by the Fire 
Initiation Model (#1 in Figure 2.3), (ii) initial and boundary conditions of the fire compartment, such as the 
flow rate of ventilation systems, and (iii) physical properties of the materials, such as electrical cables and 
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combustibles. As an output, this model generates the prediction of physical KPMs associated with the fire-
induced cable damage, i.e., maximum temperature inside the cable jacket (denoted by Tmax) and maximum 
heat flux at the surface of the cable jacket (denoted by q˝max). There are three categories of existing fire 
models for simulating the physical behavior of fire progression: (1) the engineering correlation, (2) the zone 
model, and (3) the CFD model [34]. For the application of NPP fire protection, the U.S. NRC has verified 
and validated five fire models [34, 35] including (a) two engineering correlation models; Fire Dynamics 
Tools (FDT) [36] and Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation Revision 1 (FIVE-Rev1) [37], (b) two-zone 
models; CFAST [38] and MAGIC [39], and (c) a CFD model; FDS [40]. In the Fire I-PRA methodological 
framework, FDS is selected as the Fire Progression Model.  
FDS was developed by NIST for simulating the fire-induced flow fields in a compartment. FDS 
numerically solves the transient governing equations for a low-Mach number turbulent flow. With a low 
Mach number approximation, the resolved pressure, p, is decomposed into two components: background 
pressure, ?̅?𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑡𝑡), and perturbation pressure, 𝑝𝑝�(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑡𝑡): 
 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑡𝑡) = ?̅?𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝑝𝑝�(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑡𝑡) (2.1) 
where z is the spatial coordinate in the direction of gravity. Only the background pressure, ?̅?𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑡𝑡), is 
included in the equation of state, and the perturbation pressure, 𝑝𝑝�(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑡𝑡), driving the fluid motion, is 
included in the momentum equation. The governing equations solved by FDS include continuity, species 
mass fraction, momentum, sensible enthalpy, along with the equation of state for the ideal gas [41, 42]: 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
+ ∇ ∙ (𝜕𝜕𝐮𝐮) = 0 , (2.2) 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
+ ∇ ∙ (𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼𝐮𝐮) = −∇ ∙ 𝐉𝐉𝛼𝛼 + ?̇?𝑚𝛼𝛼′′′, (2.3) 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝐮𝐮
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
+ ∇ ∙ (𝜕𝜕𝐮𝐮𝐮𝐮) = −∇𝑝𝑝� + ∇ ∙ 𝗧𝗧 + (𝜕𝜕 − 𝜕𝜕0)𝐠𝐠 , (2.4) 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
+ ∇ ∙ (𝜕𝜕ℎ𝑠𝑠𝐮𝐮) =
𝐷𝐷?̅?𝑝
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡




 , (2.6) 
where, 𝜕𝜕 is mass density, u is the velocity, 𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼 is the mass fraction of species α, 𝐉𝐉𝛼𝛼 is the diffusive mass flux 
of species α, and ?̇?𝑚𝛼𝛼′′′ is the mass production rate of species α by chemical reactions. In Equation (2.4), 𝗧𝗧 
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and g are deviatoric stress tensor and gravitational acceleration, respectively. ℎ𝑠𝑠, the sensible enthalpy per 
unit mass in Equation (2.5), is defined by the following relations: 
 ℎ𝑠𝑠 = � 𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼ℎ𝑠𝑠,𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼
 , (2.7) 




where 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,𝛼𝛼(𝑅𝑅′) is the temperature-dependent specific heat of species α at a constant pressure. In Equation 
(2.5), the heat release rate per unit volume due to reaction is denoted by ?̇?𝑞′′′, while the heat flux vector due 
to diffusion, conduction, and radiation is denoted by ?̇?𝐪′′. The above equations are approximated by an 
explicit second-order accurate finite difference in spatial grids and solved by a predictor/corrector scheme 
where the size of time step is constrained by the Courant-Friedrichs-Lewy (CFL) condition [42]. The 
turbulence of the gaseous species flow is modeled by the Large Eddy Simulation (LES) method [43], while 
subgrid scales (unresolved scales) are modeled by a variation of Deardorff’s model [44]. More details on 
the governing equations and numerical methods are described in [42].  
There are several reasons for selecting FDS as the Fire Progression Model. First, FDS has a higher 
level of accuracy and more flexibility than the engineering correlations and two-zone fire models since it 
explicitly and numerically solves the physical governing equations such as chemical kinematics and Navier-
Stokes equations. Because the governing physical equations are solved directly and explicitly, rather than 
by relying on empirical correlations and lumped physical quantities, the underlying physical phenomena 
and their interactions with fire protection systems can be more realistically addressed. Second, due to the 
capability of FDS to predict the flow field at each spatial grid, the spatial resolution is higher than that of 
other fire model types. Third, FDS is sufficiently flexible and applicable to a fire compartment that has 
complex boundary conditions such as a complicated shape and a unique ventilation system. This feature 
helps reduce conservatism and facilitates the expansion of Fire I-PRA applications to a wider range of NPP 
fire compartments. 
Despite the advantages of FDS, engineering correlation fire models and zone models have been 
more widely applied in recent NPP Fire PRAs. One of the main challenges in applying the FDS for practical 
Fire PRAs at NPPs is an intensive computational resource demand in terms of computational time, required 
memory, and output processing. For instance, zone models are typically able to produce a solution in 
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seconds to minutes, while FDS requires days to weeks to produce corresponding results. In this research, 
to manage the large computational demand, the FDS code is run using a parallelized computation where 
the whole simulation is divided into parallel processes using the MPI. In addition, the mesh resolution study 
is utilized to find the ‘optimal’ spatial grid cell size with consideration of the balance between the 
computational time and the accuracy of the physical simulation. The following three criteria are utilized for 
mesh resolution in this research:   
 
• Criterion I: Convergence of KPMs, i.e., a qualitative check of convergence for both the maximum 
value and the time-profiles of the predicted KPMs, i.e., maximum cable temperature, Tmax, and the 
maximum cable surface heat flux, q˝max, associated with each damage target. 
 
• Criterion II: Characteristic fire diameter, i.e., the relation between fire size and grid cell size. For 
simulation involving buoyant plumes, non-dimensional quantity D*/δx provides the information on 
the spatial resolution of flow field, where D* represents a characteristic fire diameter and δx denotes 
the nominal size of spatial grid cells [40, 45]. The characteristic fire diameter D*, instead of the 
simple physical diameter, is used as a measure of fire size since, in some cases, the physical fire 
diameter cannot be defined in a straightforward manner (e.g., a fire in a closed compartment) [34, 
40]. The characteristic fire diameter is defined as: 






where ?̇?𝑄 represents the maximum HRR, while the other physical constants are given as follows: 
𝜕𝜕∞ is the ambient density of air (1.2 [kg/m3]), 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 is the specific heat of air (1.012 [kJ/kg/K]), 𝑅𝑅∞is 
the ambient air temperature (293 [K]), and g is the acceleration of gravity (9.81 [m/sec2]). D*/δx 
shows how many numerical grid cells span the characteristic diameter of the fire. In general, the 
more spatial grid cells that cover the fire, the better the resolution of the fire physical phenomena. 
Previous studies suggest that the adequate range of D*/δx is between 4 and 10 [46-49]. The grid 
cell leading to D*/δx > 4, therefore, is considered as the adequate grid cell to obtain a sufficiently 
accurate depiction of underlying physical phenomena in FDS.  
 
• Criterion III: Measure of Turbulence Resolution (MTR), as a posteriori metric for evaluating the 
quality of mesh resolution. The MTR is a local scalar quantity that is defined as: 
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 MTR(𝐱𝐱, 𝑡𝑡) =
𝑘𝑘sgs
𝑘𝑘res + 𝑘𝑘sgs
 , (2.10) 








�𝑢𝑢𝚤𝚤� − 𝑢𝑢𝚤𝚤�� ��𝑢𝑢𝚤𝚤� − 𝑢𝑢𝚤𝚤�� �. (2.12) 
In these equations, ũi represents the resolved velocity and 𝑢𝑢𝚤𝚤��  shows the test filtered at a scale 2Δ 
where Δ is the filter width in LES and is equivalent to the grid cell size in FDS [40, 49]. The MTR 
indicates the fraction of unresolved kinetic energy in LES. The MTR takes the value within the 
range of [0, 1], where MTR = 0 indicates perfect resolution by LES in terms of kinetic energy, 
while MTR = 1 infers poor resolution by LES. The time-averaged MTR, which is considered to be 
a reasonable approximation of the Pope criterion (M) [50], can be generated by FDS. Pope [50] 
suggested M < 0.2 for LES, meaning that the resolution of kinetic energy should be higher than 
80% in the flow field to obtain adequate mesh resolution. Meanwhile, McDermott et al. [49] 
demonstrated that, for the helium plume experiment, the grid size resulting in MTR < 0.2 provides 
an adequate resolution of the physical behavior, such as the vertical flow velocity and concentration 
of chemical species of the buoyant plume. 
2.3.4 Post-Fire Damage Propagation Model (#3 in Figure 2.3) 
This model analyzes the relationship between fire-induced cable damage and fire-induced failure 
of safety-related components (e.g., pump, valve), and estimates the conditional probability of fire-induced 
component failure given fire-induced damage to the associated targets. In the Fire I-PRA, these conditional 
probabilities are obtained from the regulatory document, NUREG/CR-7150 [51, 52], that was developed 
based on experimental data and expert elicitation. In NUREG/CR-7150 Volume 1 [52], the Phenomena 
Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) expert panel, composed of electrical and fire experts, was given 
the task of identifying the circuit configurations that are vulnerable to a spurious operation due to a fire-
induced hot short. The hot short is the circuit failure mode of great concern in Fire PRA because it can 
cause spurious operation of safety-related components. In NUREG/CR-7150 Volume 2 [51], the expert 
elicitation was then conducted with the PRA expert panel in order to derive the conditional probabilities of 
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the hot short-induced spurious operation of components. Those conditional probabilities were given by 
lookup tables based on types of circuit configuration, ground, and cable material.  
In this research, the data-driven method is selected for the Post-Fire Damage Propagation Model 
because (i) the development of a mechanistic model of this damage propagation is complicated due to 
various types and configurations of electrical circuits installed at NPPs and (ii) until recently, there was 
insufficient available data because the fire tests that were conducted, up until the year 2000, mainly focused 
on fire progression and fire-induced damage to the electrical cables and not on the response of circuits and 
components to the fire-induced cable damage [53, 54]. If these probabilities are recognized as important 
contributors to system risk, future research needs to focus on the development of physical models for the 
Post-Fire Damage Propagation Model to obtain more accurate estimates of these conditional probabilities. 
2.3.5 Manual Fire Suppression Module (Module ‘c’ in Figure 2.3) 
For a typical fire scenario at NPPs, there are two possible paths of fire suppression: (1) a fixed, 
automatic fire suppression system (e.g., water sprinklers), and (2) a manual suppression by the onsite fire 
brigade. The fixed and automatic fire suppression systems are automatically activated when the physical 
condition reaches a designated setpoint, e.g., temperature and heat flux. The physical process of activating 
the fixed automatic suppression systems, as well as their performance (e.g., how fast the HRR decreases 
after activation of water sprinklers), can be explicitly modeled inside the FDS simulation [55-57]. In 
contrast, the modeling of manual suppression is more challenging than that of the fixed automatic systems 
because both physical and human failure mechanisms must be considered, and their interface needs to be 
created to account for their interactions. A complete literature review on this topic is provided in Appendix 
C. The manual suppression analysis approach in the Fire I-PRA framework is explained in this section.   
The Manual Fire Suppression Module (module ‘c’ in Figure 2.3) predicts the timings of human 
actions associated with manual fire suppression. According to NUREG/CR-6850 [29], the time from fire 
ignition to manual fire suppression can be divided into three periods: (i) time to fire detection (tdet), 
representing the time from fire ignition to the fire is detected; (ii) the fire brigade response time (tfb), 
corresponding to the time period from the fire detection until the fire brigade team begins to apply the 
suppressant to the fire; and (iii) duration of suppression activity (tfb→sup), representing the time interval 
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between the start of the fire brigade applying suppressant and “fire suppression” (i.e., the situation where 
the fire is extinguished or has been brought under control by the fire brigade in accordance with the 
definition by the U.S. NRC [29, 31]).  
For the fire brigade to begin its fire suppression activities, the fire should initially be detected by 
fixed fire detectors (e.g., smoke detectors) or by a human (e.g., fire watch or operators in the main control 
room). When the fixed, automatic fire detectors are installed in the fire compartment, fire occurrence is 
expected to be detected in a specific time after the ignition. If the fire detectors function properly, the fire 
detector response time (i.e., the time required to activate the fire detectors after fire ignition) can be 
predicted by computing the time when the physical parameter (e.g., temperature, smoke density) around 
the fire detectors reaches the predetermined set point of the fire detectors using FDS [58-60]. In contrast, if 
the automatic fire detectors fail to activate, the fire should be detected either by the fire watch personnel 
present in the fire compartment or by operators in the main control room through the indication of 
component failure. In such a case, the calculation of tdet is not straightforward since many physical and 
human factors need to be considered, including fire progression, generation of an unusual indication in the 
main control room, and action by operators. Although tdet can be predicted by the FDS code, at this stage of 
the methodological development, the typical values suggested by NUREG/CR-6850 [29] are used: tdet = 1 
minute when the automatic detectors are available, while tdet = 15 minutes when the automatic detectors are 
unavailable.  
The time to fire suppression by the fire brigade, tsupp, the summation of tfb and tfb→sup, is related to 
the performance of the fire brigade in manual suppression and is provided by the Manual Fire Suppression 
Module. In this chapter, a data-driven probability distribution, derived from the historical fire event database 
and referred to as “non-suppression curve” in NUREG-2169 [31], is used for the Manual Fire Suppression 
Module, while tfb is assumed to be “7 minutes”, which is a typical value suggested by NUREG/CR-6850 
[29].  
This research advances the modeling of interactions between fire progression and manual 
suppression by creating an explicit interface through modifications to the HRR curve. The HRR curve is 
one of the most influential input parameters in the Fire Progression Model and defines the intensity of the 
initial fire source. In this research, based on two timings associated with manual suppression, tsupp and tfb, 
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predicted by the Manual Fire Suppression Module, the HRR curve under the burnout conditions (i.e., 
without any automatic fire protection systems or manual suppression) is modified as illustrated in Figure 
2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4 The I-PRA approach for modeling the interactions between fire progression and manual 
suppression by modifying the HRR curve. 
This I-PRA approach for creating an explicit interface is based on a concept similar to the De 
Sanctis et al. [61] method, but has advanced their method in the following aspects: (i) the explicit interface 
is created between the CFD-based fire model and the data-driven manual suppression model (vs. between 
the correlation-based fire model and the data-driven manual suppression model in Ref. [61]; (ii) time 
intervals considered in the fire detection and the fire brigade response phases (i.e., between time 0 and tdet 
+ tfb) have been tailored for the NPP context based on the availability of empirical data; and (iii) the HRR 
reduction rate during the manual suppression phase (i.e., between time tdet + tfb and tdet + tsupp) is explicitly 
considered based on the duration of manual suppression, tfb→sup (vs. it was assumed to be identical to that 
under the burnout condition in De Sanctis et al. [61] method). In addition, with respect to the time to 
suppression, De Sanctis et al. considered a “maximal controllable fire area” [61] in order to address a 
threshold for the fire size beyond which the fire brigade action cannot be effective. In the Fire I-PRA 
framework, however, this maximal controllable fire area has not been considered for the NPP context. This 
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is because NPPs are designed under a higher fire protection standard (e.g., fire barriers, control of secondary 
combustibles) than general buildings; hence, a fire spread in NPPs is typically slower than that in general 
buildings, and the fire brigade response is relatively quick. Note that the current Fire PRA methodology for 
NPPs [29] does not recommend considering the maximal controllable area in the fire detection and 
suppression analysis. 
In I-PRA, the “burn-out” HRR curve is used until tdet + tfb when the fire brigade begins discharging 
suppressant on the fire. After the time tdet + tfb, the HRR curve is assumed to begin decreasing until tdet + 
tsupp. In this modification of the HRR curve, it is necessary to consider the physical validity of the resultant 
HRR curve in terms of the relationships between three physical timings of fire growth under the burnout 
condition (i.e., time to growth, duration of the fully developed phase, and time to decay) and the timings 
associated with manual suppression. A full algorithm for modifying the HRR curve, based on the timings 
of manual suppression, is shown in Appendix E. The shape of the HRR curve during manual suppression 
(i.e., between tdet + tfb and tdet + tsupp in Figure 2.4) depends on (a) the physical and chemical interactions 
between the fire and the suppressant and (b) the fire brigade performance. Previous studies [62-67] 
suggested that the HRR during water suppression exponentially decreases with a downward convex 
function of time. Although the rate of exponential HRR reduction during water suppression is estimated 
based on several sets of experimental data for plastic commodities [63-66], wood furnishings [62], and 
liquid fuel [67], there are insufficient experimental data and literature to support the estimation of the 
reduction rate in an NPP fire context. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, this research assumes the linear HRR 
reduction during manual suppression between tdet + tfb and tdet + tsupp.  
This I-PRA approach for explicitly addressing manual suppression has a limitation; how to treat 
the three timings associated with manual suppression (tdet, tfb→sup, and tsupp). Originally, NUREG/CR-6850 
[29], published in 2005, accounted for these three timings separately. NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1 [33], 
however, updated the method so that tfb and tfb→sup are treated as one time interval, i.e., time to manual 
suppression (tsupp), and the non-suppression curves were updated by re-analyzing the historical fire event 
database accordingly; hence, the current Fire PRA methodology does not consider tfb and tfb→sup separately 
and provides a data-driven probability model only for the sum of tfb and tfb→sup. In contrast, the proposed 
method for creating an explicit interface in the Fire I-PRA framework requires tfb and tfb→sup to be assessed 
separately. For the applications developed in this chapter (Sections 2.4 and 2.5), the non-suppression curve, 
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available in NUREG-2169 [31], representing the uncertainty of tsupp = tfb + tfb→sup and given by an 
exponential distribution with a constant rate λ [1/minutes], is used as a probability distribution for tfb→sup 
and is left truncated at tsupp = 7 minutes to consider the constraint that tfb→sup is a non-negative value given 
tfb = 7 minutes. The author recognizes that this treatment is not precise and may introduce systemic errors 
in the Fire PRA outputs. To overcome this limitation, Chapter 5 of this dissertation advances the human 
performance modeling for manual suppression by the fire brigade in the Manual Fire Suppression Module 
in order to improve the resolution of timing information (tdet, tfb, and tfb→sup) [4, 28]. 
2.3.6 Uncertainty Propagation (#4 in Figure 2.3) 
The Uncertainty Propagation submodule (#4 in Figure 2.3) characterizes and propagates the 
uncertainty associated with the input parameters in the FSM and the Manual Fire Suppression Module (i.e., 
input parameters provided by module ‘a’ in Figure 2.3) and estimates the fire-induced cable damage 
probability based on the KPMs associated with the fire-induced cable damage predicted by the Fire 
Progression Model. The probability of fire-induced cable damage is calculated by estimating the probability 
that the key performance measures, Tmax and q˝max, exceed the predefined damage threshold values. The 
Uncertainty Propagation submodule covers five substeps: (i) selection of random input parameters, (ii) 
uncertainty characterization, (iii) input parameter screening, (iv) uncertainty propagation, and (v) 
estimation of cable damage probability. Each substep is explained below.  
 
(i) Selection of Random Input Parameters: As stated in Section 2.3.1, the stochasticity of input parameters 
provided by the Input Module implicitly represents the influences by the implicit causal factors that are not 
explicitly addressed in the FSM and the Manual Fire Suppression Module. The input parameters that are 
treated as random variables should, therefore, be carefully selected so that the influences of dominant 
underlying causal factors are adequately reflected in the plant risk estimates, considering two criteria: the 
degree of variability of each input parameter and the level of influence by each input parameter on the 
KPMs associated with the fire-induced cable damage. In Section 2.4, for a selected NPP fire scenario, this 
research conducts a literature review to select the input parameters that are treated as random variables 




 (ii) Uncertainty Characterization: In this substep, parameter uncertainty associated with the input 
parameters in the Input Module, selected in the last substep, is characterized by assigning probability 
distributions. For each input parameter, an adequate parametric probability distribution (e.g., a gamma 
distribution) is selected, and the parameters of the selected probability distribution (e.g., shape and scale 
parameters for the Gamma distribution) are then estimated. Mathematically, for each input parameter, a 
probability distribution is assigned by: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  ~ 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖;𝛉𝛉), (2.13) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(∙) represents the marginal probability density function of input parameter 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋}, 
while 𝛉𝛉 denotes a vector of parameters to define the selected parametric probability distribution. Note that 
there are two layers of uncertainty associated with the probability distribution in Equation (2.13). The first 
layer of uncertainty is the randomness or stochasticity associated with the value of input parameter 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, 
represented by the probability density function 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(∙). This layer of uncertainty characterizes the variability 
of input parameters caused by the aggregated effects of the implicit causal factors below the explicit-
implicit borderline in the I-PRA framework (Figure 2.2) and is characterized and propagated by the 
Uncertainty Propagation submodule. On the other hand, the second layer of uncertainty is associated with 
the type of the parametric probability distribution 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(∙) and the statistical estimation of the distribution 
parameters 𝛉𝛉. This layer of uncertainty is categorized into epistemic uncertainty, induced by the lack of 
knowledge concerning the parametric probability model 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(∙) and estimation of parameters 𝛉𝛉 based on 
limited data, and is characterized and propagated in the Probabilistic Validation (Section 2.3.7). 
The characterization of uncertainty associated with input parameters in this substep is mostly based 
on empirical data available in literature and collected from the plant being analyzed; for instance, the 
physical input parameters for the FSM are characterized based on experimental data and design 
specifications, while the human-related input parameters for the Manual Fire Suppression Module can be 
characterized based on historical fire event databases and plant-specific fire drill records. Section 2.4.3 
shows an implementation of this substep for a selected NPP fire scenario based on generic data and 
information provided by regulatory documents and academic literature. 
 
(iii) Quantitative Screening of Input Parameters: Before conducting uncertainty propagation for the FSM, 
an input parameter screening is performed to reduce the number of input parameters that are treated as 
random variables. The input parameter that has a negligible influence on the KPMs is fixed at a point value 
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in uncertainty propagation, instead of treating it as a random variable. This can help reduce the complexity 
of the problem and the total number of replications of the FDS runs required for implementing the Fire I-
PRA framework. For the purpose of input parameter screening, this research applies the elementary effect 
method, or the Morris method [68].  
The Morris method uses the elementary effect as a measure of sensitivity of model outputs to input 
parameters. The “elementary effect” is an approximate first derivative of the model output with respect to 
each input parameter and is computed by the individually randomized one-at-a-time design at different 
points in the input parameter space. Suppose that a computational model with output y is expressed as a 
function of nX random input parameters 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋}; 
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋). (2.14) 
For simplicity of description, assume that each input parameter Xi is a random variable between [0, 1]. To 
compute the elementary effect, the state space of each input parameter is discretized into p-level grids so 
that each input parameter Xi may take the values in 0, 1/(p – 1), 2/(p – 1), …, 1. Then, the input parameters 
are randomly sampled from these discretized values. Using two sets of input parameters where Xi has two 
different values, while the others are set to the same value, the elementary effect for the input parameter xi 
is computed as 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =
𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥1,⋯ , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−1, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + ∆, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖+1,⋯ , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋) − 𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥1,⋯ , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−1, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖+1,⋯ , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋)
∆
, (2.15) 
where Δ is an increment in xi and set to a predetermined multiple of 1/(p – 1). The calculation of di (x) is 
repeated with different sets of input parameters that are randomly sampled from the discretized values to 
generate random samples of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for each input parameter. Based on the resultant random samples of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖, 
the mean value and standard deviation of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 are estimated. The mean absolute value of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  indicates the 
main effects of input parameter xi on the model output, i.e., the larger the mean absolute value is, the larger 
the main effects are on the model output. Meanwhile, the standard deviation of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  indicates the influences 
of non-linearity and interaction among input parameters on the model output. If the standard deviation of 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is small, the relationship between the input parameter and model output is thought to be relatively 
linear; otherwise, the level of non-linearity and/or interactions in the model would be high.  
 
(iv) Uncertainty Propagation: The Fire Progression Model generates output files containing the physical 
quantities predicted for each location in the fire compartment and at each time step. Data from these FDS 
40 
 
output files are extracted to develop time profiles of two KPMs associated with fire-induced damage, i.e., 
the maximum temperature Tmax and maximum heat flux q˝max at each damage target, such as electrical cable 
trays and electrical cabinets. The uncertainty associated with input parameters, which has been 
characterized in substep (ii) using the probability distributions, is propagated through the Fire Progression 
Model by Monte Carlo simulation [57, 69-76]. The input parameters (e.g., maximum HRR, concrete 
thermal conductivity, and cable jacket thickness) that have been selected in substep (i) and screened in 
substep (iii), are treated as random variables and randomly sampled from their probability distributions 
using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) [77, 78]. The FDS simulation is then repeatedly run with each set 
of input parameters to generate random samples of the KPMs, Tmax and q˝max. For instance, suppose that the 
fire-induced damage probability of ‘cable tray A’ is of interest, and its KPMs are denoted by TA and q˝A 
respectively. By performing uncertainty propagation for the FDS, a set of KPMs, 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴
(𝑖𝑖)  and 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
′′(𝑖𝑖) , 𝑖𝑖 ∈
{1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, are predicted where 1, 2…, nS refer to the LHS sampling scenarios and nS represents the LHS 
sample size.  
 
(v) Estimation of Cable Damage Probability: The point estimate of the fire-induced damage probability for 
each target is computed based on the random samples of KPMs generated by uncertainty propagation. To 
facilitate the mathematical formulation of this probability estimation, an indicator function is defined to 
represent the binary outcomes associated with the fire-induced cable damage to the target equipment being 
analyzed. For instance, an indicator function for damage target A is defined as follows:  
 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴
(𝑖𝑖)�𝐱𝐱 | AD, AS� = �  1 , if    𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴
(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑅𝑅crt or 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
′′(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑞𝑞crt′′
  0 , otherwise
 ;   𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, (2.16) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴�𝐱𝐱 | AD, AS� refers to the indicator function when the input parameter 𝐱𝐱 is conditional, given 
specific states of automatic detection (AD) and automatic suppression (AS) systems. The indicator function 
has binary outcomes, 0 and 1, indicating the success and failure of the damage target, respectively. The 
point estimate of the conditional probability of cable tray A damage (CBDA) given the states of AD and 
AS, i.e., Pr(CBDA | AD, AS), is obtained by 








To define the conditional indicator function 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴
(𝑖𝑖)�𝐱𝐱 | AD, AS�  for each sampling scenario, the KPMs 
associated with the damage target, 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴
(𝑖𝑖)  and 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
′′(𝑖𝑖) , are evaluated by running the FDS utilizing input 
parameters influenced by specific states of AD and AS. The states of AD influence the time to detection 
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(tdet) that is used to determine the HRR curve in consideration of manual suppression (Figure 2.4). 
Meanwhile, the states of AS are addressed in the FDS simulation by turning on or off the input lines defining 
the automatic suppression systems.   
When the MCS being analyzed is associated with more than one damage target (i.e., a cable tray 
or an electrical cabinet) in a single fire scenario, the Uncertainty Propagation submodule needs to provide 
the Scenario-Based Damage Model (#5 in module ‘d’ in Figure 2.3) with both marginal and conditional 
probabilities of fire-induced damage to each target. In this process, the consideration of dependency 
between two or more damage targets induced by the fire-induced conditions (e.g., exposure to the share fire 
source and the same fire brigade team) is crucial to produce an accurate plant risk estimate. In the current 
Fire PRA methodology, this fire-induced dependency between two or more cables is typically treated by a 
simplified assumption that their joint fire-induced damage probability is equal to the marginal fire-induced 
damage probability for the target farthest from the fire source. In other words, given the fire-induced 
damage to the target farthest from the fire source, the conditional probabilities of fire-induced damage to 
the other targets are assumed to be unity. As this assumption might be overly conservative, this section 
develops a more realistic method to estimate the conditional probability of fire-induced damage based on 
the KPM outputs from the FSM. In this new method, the sources of dependency caused by the fire-induced 
physical failure mechanisms are explicitly addressed by the FSM, instead of being masked by the simplistic 
and potentially conservative assumption. For instance, assume that two cable trays, A and B, are installed 
in the same fire compartment and can be damaged by a single fire source. In this example, the Uncertainty 
Propagation submodule should provide the estimates of (i) the marginal fire-induced damage probability 
for cable tray A, denoted by Pr(CBDA | AD, AS), which can be obtained by Equation (2.17), and (ii) the 
conditional fire-induced damage probability for cable tray B, given fire-induced damage to cable tray A, 
Pr(CBDB | AD, AS, CBDA). Using the definition of conditional probability,  
 Pr(CBDB | AD, AS, CBDA) =
Pr(CBDA ∩ CBDB | AD, AS)
Pr(CBDA | AD, AS)
. (2.18) 
where the denominator on the right-hand side, Pr(CBDA | AD, AS) , has been already obtained using 
Equation (2.17), while the numerator on the right-hand side, Pr(CBDA ∩ CBDB | AD, AS), represents the 
joint probability of fire-induced damage to both A and B cable trays. To obtain the point estimate of this 
joint probability, the concept in Equation (2.17) can be extended to the case where the probability of more 
than one target failure is of interest, as follows: 
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(𝑖𝑖)�𝐱𝐱 | AD, AS� × 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵




where IA(i) × IB(i) = 1 if both A and B cable trays are damaged, and IA(i) × IB(i) = 0, if otherwise. This way, 
the joint probability of multiple component failures due to a shared fire source can be computed based on 
the FDS outputs and is used to compute the conditional probability of one target failure, given the other 
fire-induced target failures.  
The high computational cost is the main challenge in applying a high-fidelity CFD model for Fire 
PRA, especially when the simulation runs need to be replicated many times for uncertainty propagation 
using the sampling-based method. For instance, a case study considered in this paper requires up to 106 
spatial grids and 104 time grids that require 105 core-hours for one set of uncertainty quantification analyses 
for a single fire scenario. To overcome this challenge, on the FDS side, this research utilizes a large-scale 
and high-performance computing facility, provided by the Illinois Campus Cluster Program (ICCP), and 
performs a parallel computation using the MPI, as explained in Section 2.3.3. Meanwhile, on the uncertainty 
propagation side, this research conducts a convergence study to ensure that the selected sample size in the 
Monte Carlo method generates the statistical estimates with the desired level of accuracy. In this research, 
the convergence of the Monte Carlo-based estimates of the fire-induced cable damage probability is 
checked based on two evaluation criteria: 
 
• Criterion I (Qualitative): Variability in the plots of empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
of KPMs (i.e., maximum temperature and heat flux) for each damage target. 
 
• Criterion II (Quantitative): Variability in the point estimate of the fire-induced damage probability 
for each target. To quantitatively assess the extent of statistical variability, given the selected LHS 
sample size, the confidence intervals (CIs) for the estimator of the fire-induced damage probability 
are computed using the replicated LHS method [78-81]. For each probability quantity being 
estimated, denoted by p, the Monte Carlo simulation using LHS is repeated for nR times employing 
independent random seeds. As a result, independent and identically distributed (IID) random 
samples of the point estimate p* of size nR are generated. The point estimate and CIs are computed 
by the bootstrap method for the IID random samples of p* [82], where the point estimate is 
computed by the mean of the IID random samples of p*, while the CIs are estimated by taking the 
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specific quantiles of the IID random samples of p*, e.g., the upper and lower bounds of the 95% 
CIs, are estimated by taking the 97.5th and 2.5th percentiles of the IID random samples of p* 
generated by the replicated LHS method.  
 
In the probability estimation using the Monte Carlo-based uncertainty propagation, caution should be 
exercised when no failure is observed in the LHS sampling scenarios with the selected sample size. In this 
case, the point estimator of the fire-induced damage probability, based on Equation (2.17), is zero. This 
estimator is, however, questionable since we are not able to theoretically exclude the possibility of the fire-
induced damage only based on a limited number of sampling scenarios. The most straightforward solution 
to this issue is to increase the sample size and/or the number of replications in the Monte Carlo simulation 
so that at least one failure is observed. Nevertheless, this solution is not practical when the physical models 
used in the FSM are computationally demanding, as is the case in this research. For the situation where no 
failure data are generated in the uncertainty propagation for the FSM and it is impractical to increase the 
sample size, based on a literature review and an exploratory simulation presented in Appendix F, the author 
suggests the following strategy: 
 
• First, estimate the failure probability of the corresponding equipment by the Bayesian approach 
[83-85]. Use this Bayesian-based estimate of the failure probability for risk quantification in the 
Plant-Specific PRA Module. After risk quantification, perform the classical importance measure 
analysis at the basic event level to identify whether the corresponding component is risk significant. 
If that component is identified as non-significant, the Bayesian-based estimate can be used as an 
approximate value of its failure probability. If that component is identified as risk significant, an 
advancement in the uncertainty propagation is considered below. 
 
• For those components that have been identified as risk significant above, consider either increasing 
the sample size in the uniform LHS or applying the Variance Reduction Techniques (VRTs), such 
as stratified sampling [78], non-uniform LHS [86], importance sampling [87], and subset 
simulation [88]. Future research needs to select an adequate sampling method and develop a 
comprehensive computational procedure for implementing the advanced sampling method in the I-
PRA framework. For this strategy, Appendix  
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2.3.7 Probabilistic Validation (#5 in Figure 2.3) 
Validation is a crucial step in PRA to demonstrate that models and input parameters accurately 
represent the behavior of the as-built, as-operated system being analyzed [89]. For validation of the 
probability estimations from the I-PRA methodological framework, this research proposes the Probabilistic 
Validation approach, which characterizes and quantifies the degree of accuracy of the simulation-based 
failure probability estimates using an “uncertainty” measure. In the previous sections, the outputs from the 
Scenario-Based Damage Model include only the point estimates of the fire-induced component failure 
probabilities. In the Probabilistic Validation, all known sources of “epistemic” uncertainty associated with 
the elements in the Input Module, FSM, and Interface Module are characterized and propagated. As a result, 
the Probabilistic Validation generates the uncertainty bounds (or probability distributions) for the estimates 
of fire-induced component failure probabilities, which represent the degree of confidence/accuracy in the 
simulation-based estimations of those probabilities.  
Based on a literature review and theoretical consideration, five main sources of epistemic 
uncertainty that can influence the degree of accuracy in the MCS probability estimates generated in the I-
PRA framework are identified: (i) probability distributions for input parameters, (ii) failure mechanism 
models, (iii) sampling-based uncertainty propagation, (iv) the selection of KPM and damage threshold, and 
(v) statistical inference method for probability estimation. Each epistemic uncertainty source is explained 
below.  
 
1) Epistemic Uncertainty Related to Probability Distributions for Input Parameters: The probability 
distributions for input parameters in the Input Module, shown in Equation (2.13), characterize the 
stochastic variability induced by the underlying implicit causal factors and are estimated based on the 
empirical data. There is epistemic uncertainty associated with those probability distributions, which 
consists of two components: (i) uncertainty of structural assumptions, i.e., the selection of a parametric 
distribution 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(∙) , and (ii) uncertainty associated with parameter estimation, i.e., the data-driven 
statistical estimation of 𝛉𝛉. The accuracy of the probability distribution type and parameter estimation 
can be influenced by three factors: quality and quantity of data, data relevancy, and the uncertainty 
characterization method. Quality of data refers to the accuracy and reliability of the data that describes 
the input parameters. One typical sub-factor that can affect the quality of data is measurement error 
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[90-92]. Quantity of data refers to the amount of data available to describe input parameters. More data 
available for the input parameters reduce the uncertainty on the selection of distribution type and the 
estimation of distribution parameters [93]. Data relevancy refers to whether the collected data are 
applicable for the specific system being analyzed. For instance, if the input data used to estimate input 
distribution parameters were collected under different conditions from the system and scenario being 
analyzed, uncertainty induced by non-representativeness of the data sources should be addressed [94]. 
The uncertainty characterization method refers to the statistical method used to estimate the probability 
distributions of input parameters, e.g., classical maximum likelihood estimates vs. Bayesian inference.  
 
2) Epistemic Uncertainty Associated with Failure Mechanism Models: In PRA, model uncertainty needs 
to be addressed as one of the main components of uncertainties [89, 95]. In classical PRA, the treatment 
of model uncertainty focuses on the assumptions used to develop and quantify the static ETs and FTs, 
such as success criteria, selection of event sequences in ETs, and the submodels (e.g., HRA, CCF). 
Classical PRA typically assesses the impacts of model uncertainty on risk estimates by a sensitivity 
analysis which quantifies changes in plant risk estimates induced by the alternative models or 
assumptions [95]. In the I-PRA framework, in addition to those sources of model uncertainty considered 
in classical PRA, model uncertainty associated with the physical failure mechanism models used in the 
Simulation Module can impact the accuracy of risk estimates. This source of model uncertainty has two 
main components: model accuracy and the numerical solution method. Model accuracy refers to the 
uncertainties or prediction errors due to the assumptions and approximations used in the process of 
developing the physical model in the FSM. The numerical solution method refers to the uncertainties 
or prediction errors induced by the numerical approximation in the computational solution processes, 
e.g., discretization errors due to finite time and space resolution.  
 
3) Epistemic Uncertainty Emerged from Sampling-based Uncertainty Propagation: This category refers 
to the epistemic uncertainty induced by the sampling-based uncertainty propagation performed by the 
Uncertainty Propagation submodule (element #4 in Figure 2.3). The degree of epistemic uncertainty 
due to this source is influenced by two factors: the magnitude of the probability being estimated and 
the sample size in the Monte Carlo simulation. The magnitude of the probability being estimated is 
inherent in the problem and is beyond the control of an analyst. The sample size in the Monte Carlo 
simulation needs to be selected by an analyst by considering the balance between available 
computational resources and the desired level of accuracy in the Monte Carlo estimation based on a 
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convergence study [96]. When the magnitude of the failure probability being estimated is relatively 
small, the VRTs are applied to improve the sampling efficiency [82, 97]. The LHS design [77, 78, 98] 
is one example of the VRTs commonly used in PRA. In literature, three factors influencing the sampling 
efficiency are identified [99-101]: space-filling property, orthogonality (or spurious correlation 
between input variables), and projective property. These factors are determined by the choice of 
sampling design used in the Uncertainty Propagation. Another factor that requires attention in the 
VRTs is the extension property [100], which refers to whether newly-generated samples can be 
gradually added to the original sample points to increase the sample size. This factor affects the total 
number of simulation runs needed to obtain a meaningful failure probability estimator. For instance, as 
the extension of LHS design is not straightforward, the replicated LHS method [78-81] is used in this 
research.  
 
4) Epistemic Uncertainty Related to KPMs and Damage Thresholds: From the viewpoint of accident 
causations (illustrated in Figure 2.2), the KPMs provide a quantitative bridge between the physical 
failure mode and the underlying physical failure mechanism. The KPM is predicted by the Simulation 
Module, considering the spatio-temporal progression of physical failure mechanisms and the influences 
of implicit causal factors. The predicted KPMs, representing the degree of accumulated damage to the 
component, are then compared with the damage threshold to determine the functional state of the 
component. The causalities from the KPM to the physical failure mode are implicitly treated by the 
selection of KPM and the data-driven estimation of the damage threshold. For instance, in NPP Fire 
PRA, the maximum temperature inside the cable jacket is typically selected as a KPM for the physical 
failure mode of fire-induced electrical circuit failure [29]. This KPM is predicted by a fire model, while 
the associated damage threshold is estimated based on the fire test data, where the physical degradation 
processes governing the causalities between the KPM and the physical failure mode in cable material, 
e.g., void growth and chemical decomposition [102], are implicitly treated by analyzing the fire test 
data. The category of epistemic uncertainty sources, therefore, has two dimensions: (i) adequacy of the 
selection of KPMs in terms of their representativeness of the physical failure mode being analyzed and 
(ii) accuracy of the damage threshold estimation.  
Like the epistemic uncertainty source associated with the probability distributions for input parameters 
(Source I), epistemic uncertainty of the damage threshold consists of two components: uncertainty 
associated with structural assumptions (including whether the damage threshold is given as a single-
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value point estimate or a probability distribution) and uncertainty associated with parameter estimation. 
The accuracy of the structural assumption and parameter estimation is affected by several sub-factors: 
the quality and quantity of empirical data, data relevancy, and the uncertainty characterization method. 
It should be noted that the estimations of input parameters and damage thresholds require different 
sources of data; input parameters require the data related to the progression and influences of the 
underlying implicit causal factors, while the damage threshold requires the data related to the resistance 
of the component against the stress induced by the physical failure mechanisms being analyzed. The 
method for estimating the fire-induced cable damage probability, explained in Section 2.3.6, has 
assumed a single-value damage threshold. In most cases, however, the damage threshold has some 
degree of uncertainty originating from the causal factors that underlie the resistance of the component, 
e.g., geometrical, structural, and mechanical factors [103], which are not explicitly modeled by the 
Simulation Module. When sufficient empirical data are available, stochastic variability of the damage 
threshold can be characterized by fitting a probability distribution to the component resistance data 
[103, 104].  
 
5) Epistemic Uncertainty Associated with Statistical Inference Method for Probability Estimation: The 
accuracy of the failure probability estimation, for both point and interval estimates, is influenced by the 
selection of statistical inference methods. There are two major categories of approaches: parametric 
and non-parametric. The classical parametric approach generates the point and interval estimates using 
distributional assumptions based on the central limit theorem. The adequacy of this assumption can 
have crucial impacts on the estimators, especially when the sample size is relatively small or the 
population distribution is skewed. Bayesian inference usually works better in PRA because (i) 
observational data for highly-reliable systems and components are typically sparse and (ii) it generates 
full probability distributions (rather than CIs) which can then be used as direct inputs for uncertainty 
propagation in PRA [105]. Meanwhile, previous studies [106-108] demonstrated that, for a relatively 
small sample size and skewed data, the non-parametric bootstrap method outperforms the classical 
parametric estimators with respect to the coverage probability and CI width. The choice between the 
Bayesian inference and the non-parametric method should be made based on what types of data are 
available for failure probability estimation. For instance, if the probability estimation is only based on 
the Monte Carlo outputs from the Uncertainty Propagation (which is the case in the Fire I-PRA 
framework developed in this chapter), the non-parametric bootstrap method is more suitable. In contrast, 
if the failure probabilities are estimated based on multiple types of data such as the Monte Carlo outputs, 
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failure event data, and expert opinion (as is the case with the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF 
methodology developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis), the Bayesian approach provides a coherent way to 
consolidate different data types [109]. 
Among these five sources of epistemic uncertainty, the applications shown in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 
of this chapter only cover the one induced by the sampling-based uncertainty propagation. The methods for 
characterizing and propagating other sources of epistemic uncertainty are left to future research. To assess 
the degree of confidence in the simulation-based MCS probability estimates, it is important to construct the 
CIs for the point estimates. This research uses the replicated LHS method [78-81] to generate the CIs of 
each probability estimate. Let 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘∗  be the fire-induced damage probability of target k, 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝒦𝒦, estimated by 
the Uncertainty Propagation submodule, where 𝒦𝒦  represents all damage targets (e.g., cable trays and 
electrical cabinets) in the fire compartment being analyzed and the superscript asterisk indicates the quantity 
estimated by the Uncertainty Propagation. The Monte Carlo simulation using LHS is repeated for nR times 
using independent random seeds. As a result, the IID random samples of the point estimate 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘∗  of size nR 
are generated. The point estimates and CIs are computed by the bootstrap method using the computational 
approach suggested by Janssen [82]. The outputs from this procedure are the point estimate and the lower 
and upper bounds of CIs for the simulation-based estimates of fire-induced target damage probabilities: 
 〈𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝐿𝐿(𝛾𝛾)
∗ ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑈𝑈(𝛾𝛾)
∗  〉;  𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝒦𝒦,  (2.20) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ : point estimate, while 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝐿𝐿(𝛾𝛾)∗  and 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑈𝑈(𝛾𝛾)∗ : the lower and upper bounds of the (1 – γ) % CIs. 
2.3.8 Scenario-Based Damage Model (#6 in Figure 2.3) 
The Scenario-Based Damage Model addresses the various event sequences following fire ignition 
that are due to the stochastic uncertainties associated with: (i) availability of automatic fire detection and 
suppression systems (top events “AD” and “AS” in Figure 2.3); (ii) fire-induced cable damage (top event 
“CBD” in Figure 2.3); and (iii) the component-level failure due to the fire-induced circuit faults (e.g., 
spurious actuation) caused by fire-induced damage to cables, corresponding to the top event “SpA” in 
Figure 2.3. This is an event-tree-based model that is similar to the detection-suppression ET in NUREG/CR-




• In the Scenario-Based Damage Model, the top event corresponding to manual suppression is 
removed, while the one representing fire-induced damage to the electrical cable, represented by the 
event “CBD”, is added. As explained in Section 2.3.5, in this research, manual suppression is 
addressed by creating the explicit interface between the Fire Progression Model and the Manual 
Fire Suppression Module; hence, the effects of manual suppression on the fire-induced target 
damage are already reflected in the top event “CBD” in Figure 2.3.  
 
• A top event representing the fire-induced component failure, e.g., the spurious actuation of a 
hardware component due to a short circuit failure (denoted by the event “SpA” in Figure 2.3), is 
added after the top events representing the fire-induced damage to the electrical cable (top event 
“CBD” in Figure 2.3).  
 
• The end states, originally either “success” or “failure” of timely fire suppression before the fire-
induced damage to the electrical cable, are changed to the fire-induced failure of safety-related 
components. 
Note that the Scenario-Based Damage Model has not been shown in the generic I-PRA 
methodological framework (Section 2.2). This model is necessary in the Fire I-PRA framework because 
the performance of automatic detection and suppression systems and the fire-induced damage propagation 
from the cable level to the component level are treated by an implicit approach, relying on generic 
probabilistic information derived from empirical data, instead of an explicit approach based on the models 
of underlying mechanisms. In other words, with the current scope of the FSM, the Uncertainty Propagation 
submodule generates the probability of fire-induced failure events at the cable level; hence, the Scenario-
Based Damage Model bridges the cable-level damage probabilities generated by the Uncertainty 
Propagation submodule and the fire-induced component failure probabilities that are required as inputs to 
the Plant-Specific PRA Module.  
For example, consider one of the fire-induced damage progression scenarios where the automatic 
fire detection and suppression systems have been successfully activated. The conditional probability of a 
fire-induced component failure (e.g., spurious actuation of a component, denoted by “SpA”), given fire 




Pr(AD����, AS����, CBD, SpA | FR)
= Pr(AD���� | FR) Pr(AS���� | FR, AD����) Pr(CBD | FR, AD����, AS����) Pr(SpA | FR, AD����, AS����, CBD), 
(2.21) 
where Pr (•) represents the probability of the corresponding events, listed as follows: 
FR Fire occurrence, 
AD Failure of automatic detection system, 
AS Failure of automatic suppression system, 
CBD Fire-induced damage of the cable tray of interest, 
SpA Spurious actuation of component induced by the cable tray damage (CBD). 
 
The complement of AD and AS (denoted by an upper bar) stands for the success of the automatic detection 
and automatic suppression, respectively. If we assume that (i) the AD and AS are independent and (ii) the 
event SpA is only conditional on CBD, then the equation is further simplified as: 
 
Pr(AD����, AS����, CBD, SpA | FR) 
= Pr(AD���� | FR) Pr(AS���� | FR) Pr(CBD | FR, AD����, AS����) Pr(SpA | CBD), 
(2.22) 
 
In Equation (2.22), Pr (AD����|FR) and Pr (AS����|FR) are obtained from the generic reliability data, e.g., those 
provided in NUREG/CR-6850 [29]. As explained in Section 2.3.6, the conditional split fractions for fire-
induced cable damage (top event CBD) are computed by the Fire Progression Model (#2 in Figure 2.3) and 
the Uncertainty Propagation (#4 in Figure 2.3), explicitly considering the states of AS and AD in FDS 
inputs. The conditional split fraction for top event “SPA” in Figure 2.3 is provided by the Post-Fire Damage 
Progression Model (#3 in Figure 2.3). The output from the Scenario-Based Damage Model is the 
conditional fire-induced failure probability of the basic event of interface (e.g., component “c” in Figure 
2.3), given fire occurrence, and is used as an input to the Plant-Specific PRA Module. 
2.3.8.1 Treatment of More Than One Fire-Induced Component Failure Event 
If the MCS in PRA includes more than one fire-induced component failure event due to the fire 
scenario being analyzed, each is included in the Scenario-Based Damage Model. For instance, consider an 
MCS consists of two fire-induced and two non-fire component failure events: 




BEaFR, BEbFR: Basic events representing the fire-induced failures of components a and b; 
BEcNF, BEdNF: Basic events representing the failures of components c and d due to non-fire causes; 
𝑁𝑁MCS: Total number of MCSs considered in the Plant-Specific PRA Module; 
 
For this MCS, the PRA inputs for non-fire failure events, i.e., failure probabilities for BEcNF and BEdNF, are 
extracted from the existing plant PRA. On the other hand, the fire-induced component failure events, BEaFR 
and BEbFR, are included as the top events in the Scenario-Based Damage Model. Figure 2.5 shows the 
Scenario-Based Damage Model developed for this MCS in Equation (2.23), including two components (‘a’ 
and ‘b’) as top events. Note that, for simplicity only in illustration, this figure only shows the event 
sequences in which both AD and AS are successfully activated; the similar event sequences need to be 
developed for the other combinations of states of AD and AS. In this figure, the top events ‘CBDa’ and 
‘CBDb’ represent the fire-induced damage to the electrical cables associated with components a and b, 
respectively, whereas top events ‘SpAa’ and ‘SpAb’ represent the circuit failures caused by the fire-induced 
cable damage (e.g., a hot short circuit, causing the spurious actuation of a hardware component) that can 
lead to the fire-induced failures of components a and b, respectively. The end states of Figure 2.5 indicate 
which of the a and b components has failed due to fire-induced circuit failures, where ‘S’ stands for success 
and ‘F’ stands for failure. The logic structure in Figure 2.5 assumes that, if the associated electrical cable is 
not damaged by the fire, there is no possibility of the fire-induced component failure.  
 




As an input to the Plant-Specific PRA Module, this Scenario-Based Damage Model should compute 
the conditional joint fire-induced failure probability of components a and b, given the fire occurrence in a 
fire compartment being analyzed, denoted by Pr(SpAa, SpAb|FR). Considering all possible combinations 
of the states of AD and AS, this conditional probability can be represented by: 
 
Pr�BEaFR, BEbFR|FR� ≜ Pr(SpAa, SpAb|FR) 
= Pr�SpAa, SpAb, AD, AS|FR� + Pr�SpAa, SpAb, AD, AS|FR� + Pr�SpAa, SpAb, AD, AS|FR� 
+ Pr(SpAa, SpAb, AD, AS|FR). 
(2.24) 
 
And, for instance, the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (2.24) can be expanded by accounting 
for the top events ‘CBDa’ and ‘CBDb’ as follows: 
 
Pr�SpAa, SpAb, AD, AS|FR�
= Pr�SpAa, SpAb, CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS|FR�
+ Pr�SpAa, SpAb, CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS|FR�
+ Pr�SpAa, SpAb, CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS|FR�
+ Pr�SpAa, SpAb, CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS|FR�. 
(2.25) 
It should be noted here that, based on the assumption stated above, the circuit failure does not occur when 
the associated electrical cable is not damaged by the fire; hence, the first to third terms on the right-hand 
side of Equation (2.25) are zero. Using the chain rule, the fourth term on the right-hand side of Equation 
(2.25) can be rewritten as 
 
Pr�SpAa, SpAb, CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS|FR�
= Pr�SpAb|SpAa, CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS, FR� Pr�SpAa|CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS, FR� 
× Pr�CBDb|CBDa, AD, AS, FR� Pr�CBDa|AD, AS, FR�Pr�AS|AD, FR�Pr�AD|FR�. 
(2.26) 
 
If we assume that if (i) the AD and AS are independent, (ii) the circuit failure event for each component is 
entirely conditional on the fire-induced damage to the associated electrical cable, (iii) the circuit failure 
events for components A and B are “conditionally independent,” given the fire-induced damage to the 





 Pr�SpAa, SpAb, CBDa, CBDb, AD, AS|FR� 
= Pr(SpAb|CBDb) Pr(SpAa|CBDa) 
    × Pr�CBDb|CBDa, AD, AS, FR�Pr�CBDa|AD, AS, FR�Pr�AS|FR�Pr�AD|FR�. 
(2.27) 
 
Among those probability terms on the right-hand side of Equation (2.38),  
• Pr�AS|FR� and Pr�AD|FR� are obtained from the generic reliability data for automatic detection 
and suppression systems, e.g., NUREG/CR-6850 [29, 32]; 
• Pr�CBDb|CBDa, AD, AS, FR�  and Pr�CBDa|AD, AS, FR�  are estimated by the Uncertainty 
Propagation submodule, as shown in Section 2.3.6; and 
• Pr(SpAb|CBDb) and Pr(SpAa|CBDa) are provided by the Post-Fire Damage Propagation Model, 
as shown in Section 2.3.4. 
 
To obtain the estimate of Pr(SpAa, SpAb|FR), the second to fourth terms on the right-hand side of Equation 
(2.31) are computed using the formulation like that of Equation (2.38). 
2.3.9 Minimal Cut Set Probability Estimation Considering Dependent Failures (#7 in Figure 2.3) 
Based on the joint fire-induced component failure probability computed by the Scenario-Based 
Damage Model, the conditional MCS probability, given the fire occurrence, is calculated. For instance, for 
the MCS consisting of four basic events shown in Equation (2.27),  
 Pr�MCS𝑗𝑗|FR� = Pr�BEaFR, BEbFR|FR�Pr�BEcNF, BEdNF�, (2.28) 
where the non-fire failures of components c and d are assumed to be independent from the fire occurrence 
and, to be consistent with the common practice in the current Fire PRA [29, 32], the fire-induced and non-
fire failure events are assumed to be independent from each other. In Equation (2.28), the joint non-fire 
component failure probability, Pr�BEcNF, BEdNF�, is quantified using the same approach and inputs as used 
for the existing non-fire PRA. On the other hand, as shown in Equations (2.24) through (2.27), the joint 
fire-induced component failure probability, Pr�BEaFR, BEbFR|FR� , is computed from the marginal and 
conditional probabilities of fire-induced cable damage (Section 2.3.7), which are estimated based on the 
KPMs predicted by the FSM interfaced with the Manual Fire Suppression Module (in Sections 2.3.6). As 
explained in part v of Section 2.3.6, the sources of dependency between two or more cables under the fire 
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conditions are explicitly captured through the simulation of underlying fire-induced failure mechanisms in 
the FSM. This helps avoid the underestimation of the MCS probabilities due to dependent failures. 
Depending on the types of initiators and risk scenarios, the existing plant PRA uses the parametric CCF 
model to account for dependency among multiple basic events in the MCS. In this situation, a quantitative 
relationship between the simulation-based MCS probability estimation generated in this section and the 
parameters of the existing CCF models needs to be developed. For this purpose, Chapter 4 of this thesis 
develops the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology in the I-PRA methodological framework. In 
the case of the Fire I-PRA framework, since the current Fire PRA methodology of NPPs does not use the 
parametric CCF model, there is no need for developing the relationship between the simulation-based MCS 
probability estimations and the CCF model parameters. 
2.3.10 Bayesian Integration with Empirical Data (#8 in Figure 2.3) 
As explained in Section 2.2, the Bayesian Integration with Empirical Data updates the data-driven 
estimates of the PRA inputs available in the existing plant PRA, e.g., initiating event frequencies and basic 
event probabilities, with the simulation-based estimates generated by the Interface Module. This Bayesian 
integration aims to combine all sources of information concerning the PRA inputs to improve the accuracy 
and validity of the plant risk estimates computed by the Fire I-PRA framework. The applications in Sections 
2.4 and 2.5 in this chapter do not conduct the Bayesian integration with empirical data, although it is shown 
in Figure 2.3 as a placeholder for future research. For instance, if the Fire Initiation Model is advanced by 
developing an explicit physical and human model for the fire ignition process, the existing data-driven 
estimates of fire ignition frequency, e.g., the component-specific generic estimates available in NUREG-
2169 [31], can be updated with the simulation-based fire ignition frequency by Bayesian integration. 
Meanwhile, the methodology and computational procedure for this Bayesian integration are developed in 
Chapter 4 for the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology.  
2.3.11 Connecting the Interface Module to the Plant-Specific PRA Module 
The Plant-Specific PRA Module (module ‘e’ in Figure 2.3) consists of classical PRA models, i.e., 
static ET and FT models, which are obtained from the existing plant PRA model and tailored to synchronize 
with the scope of the Fire I-PRA methodological framework being developed. The Plant-Specific PRA 
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Module calculates the plant risk metrics (e.g., core damage frequency) for each fire-induced initiating event 
by using the fire-induced failure event probabilities or the MCS probabilities generated by the Interface 
Module. How to connect the Interface Module with the Plant-Specific PRA Module depends on the plant 
being analyzed and the commercial PRA software that has been used to develop, maintain, and update the 
existing PRA model. This connection is created so that major modifications to the existing plant PRA model 
are minimized by tailoring the outputs from the Interface Module for the input parameters required by a 
specific PRA software. For instance, in the RISKMAN® application developed by ABS Consulting [111] 
(which will be used in Section 2.5.2 for a realistic NPP case study), the most convenient way to incorporate 
more than one fire-induced basic event into the FT in consideration of dependency is to use the “conditional 
split fraction” concept. To use this method, the conditional probability that one component fails due to fire-
induced damage, given the fire-induced failure of the other component(s), needs to be generated based on 
the outputs from the Interface Module. For instance, to incorporate the MCS shown in Equation (2.23) into 
the plant PRA model developed in the RISKMAN® application, Pr(SpAa|FR) and Pr(SpAb|SpAa, FR) 
should be computed and provided as PRA inputs. Pr(SpAa|FR) can be estimated by calculating the total 
probability of the end states in the Scenario-Based Damage Model (Figure 2.5) in which only component 
A fails, indicated by {A=F, B=S}. On the other hand, using the definition of a conditional probability, 
Pr(SpAb|SpAa, FR) can be written as follows: 




where, on the right-hand side, the denominator has been obtained above, while the numerator is the joint 
fire-induced component failure probability estimated in Section 2.3.7.  
2.4 An Illustrative Case Study to Apply the I-PRA to a Nuclear Power Plant Fire Risk Scenario 
This section shows an illustrative case study of the Fire I-PRA framework to demonstrate the 
feasibility and quantitative implementation using a realistic NPP fire scenario and a hypothetical plant 
response model. The fire scenario has been selected from NUREG-1934 Scenario D (a motor control center 
panel fire in a switchgear room) [34] as a typical and realistic NPP fire scenario. On the other hand, this 
case study uses a simplistic and hypothetical Plant-Specific PRA Module. The FDS code has been verified 
and validated for this fire scenario in NUREG/CR-1934 [34] using the V&V procedure recommended by 
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the U.S. NRC [47, 112] and NIST [113]. The configuration of the fire compartment being analyzed is 
illustrated in Figure 2.6. 
  
Figure 2.6 FDS and Smokeview plot of the fire compartment in NUREG-1934 Scenario D [34]. 
A concrete wall with a 0.6 m thickness is the boundary of this fire compartment. The material 
properties of the concrete, including thermal conductivity, specific heat, and density, are treated as random 
variables to consider the uncertainty associated with their numeric values. The fire compartment is equipped 
with supply and return vents that have a volume flow rate of 0.735 m3/sec. Two doors of the fire 
compartment are assumed to be closed during the fire. Two electrical cabinets are placed in the fire 
compartment: one of the cabinets is assumed to be a fire ignition source, while the other is a target of fire-
induced damage. In addition, three cable trays (A, B, and C in Figure 2.6) are installed near the ceiling: 
Cable Tray A is placed directly above the ignition source cabinet, Cable Tray B is installed above the other 
cabinet, and Cable Tray C is placed in the right portion of the fire compartment which has a higher ceiling. 
The cable trays are assumed to be filled with cross-linked polyethylene insulated cable with a neoprene 
jacket. Each cable is modeled as a 1.5 cm cylinder with homogeneous physical properties in accordance 
with the Thermally-Induced Electrical Failure (THIEF) method proposed in Reference [114]. The following 
sections demonstrate the implementation of the Fire I-PRA framework for this case study.  
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2.4.1 Fire Initiation Model 
The point estimate of the fire ignition frequency for an electrical cable is f (FR) = 0.03 [1/year], 
based on NUREG-2169 [31]. The initial fire is assumed to start within one of the electrical cabinets (marked 
as “ignition source” in Figure 2.6), modeled by a plane heat source placed on the top surface of the cabinet 
as recommended in [29, 33].  
2.4.2 Fire Progression Model 
The whole compartment is included in the computational domain of FDS. For parallel computation, 
the fire compartment is divided into 39 zones. Each zone is assigned to one computational node, and the 
entire FDS simulation is run using MPI. Each zone is discretized into 0.10 m cubic grid cells. The size of 
the spatial grid is determined based on the mesh resolution study, as explained in Section 2.3.3. The mesh 
resolution study in this research is conducted for a representative set of input parameter values, provided in 
NUREG-1934 [58], as listed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 List of values for random input parameters used in the mesh resolution study.  
 Input Parameters Mesh Resolution Study 
X1 Maximum HRR [kW] 702 
X2 Time to maximum HRR [minutes] 12 
X3 Duration of max HRR [minutes] 8.0 
X4 Time to decay [minutes] 19 
X5 Thermal conductivity of concrete [W/(m K)] 1.60 
X6 Specific heat of concrete [kJ/(kg K)] 0.75 
X7 Density of concrete [kg/m3] 2400 
X8 Thermal conductivity of cable jacket [W/(m K)] 0.20 
X9 Cable jacket thickness [m] 0.0020 
As identified in Section 2.3.7, the numerical solution scheme, including the spatial and temporal 
grid sizes, is one of the factors that influences the validity of the simulation-based probability estimates in 
the I-PRA methodological framework. As a part of the Probabilistic Validation, future study needs to 
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evaluate the sensitivity of mesh resolution to the designated ranges of input parameters to assess whether 
the mesh size has a significant influence on the FDS outputs (e.g., physical key performance measures, such 
as temperature and heat flux). 
Regarding Criterion I of the mesh resolution, the predicted time-profile of the key performance 
measures (i.e., temperature and heat flux at damage targets, computed with three cell sizes) is shown in 
Figure 2.7. The time-profiles of physical outputs by 0.10 m grid cells show a similar trend to those of 0.05 
m grid cells, while the time-profile by 0.15 m grid cells shows large differences for some physical 
performance measures such as temperature and heat flux of the electrical cabinet. The maximum values of 
temperature and heat flux at each damage target computed by three mesh sizes are listed in Table 2.2. The 
relative error of the maximum temperature and heat flux predicted for the 0.10 m grid cell, compared with 
those predicted using the 0.05 m grid cell, is identified within 10%, despite a few exceptions such as the 
maximum temperature of cable tray A (29% overestimation) and maximum heat flux of cable tray C (17% 
underestimation). On the other hand, the 0.15 m grid cell resulted in a relative error higher than 10% for 




Figure 2.7 Comparison of time-profile of key performance measures at each damage target calculated 
with three different spatial grid sizes: 0.15 m, 0.10 m, and 0.05 m. 
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Table 2.2 Maximum value of key physical performance measures at each damage target computed with 
three different mesh sizes: 0.15 m, 0.10 m, and 0.05 m. 
Physical Outputs 0.15 m grid cells 0.10 m grid cells  0.05 m grid cells  
Cable A Temperature   493.2 °C     482.1 °C   518.7 °C 
Cable A Heat Flux   45.5 kW/m2       67.3 kW/m2     52.3 kW/m2 
Cable B Temperature   470.9 °C     433.0 °C   401.7 °C 
Cable B Heat Flux     38.9 kW/m2       32.9 kW/m2     30.3 kW/m2 
Cable C Temperature     64.4 °C       62.7 °C     66.1 °C 
Cable C Heat Flux       2.0 kW/m2         2.1 kW/m2       2.6 kW/m2 
Cabinet Temperature   391.6 °C     299.6 °C   282.0 °C 
Cabinet Heat Flux     29.4 kW/m2       18.9 kW/m2     19.8 kW/m2 
 
With respect to Criterion II of mesh resolution, D*/δx, during the period of maximum HRR, is 
compared to the selected criterion (> 4). The focus is on the time of maximum HRR since the behavior of 
the buoyant fire plume during this period is more critical than at any of the other fire stages. The 0.10 m 
and 0.05 m grid cells resulted in a D*/δx value larger than 4 for all directions, while the 0.15 m grid cell 
resulted in D*/δx < 4 in x-direction. The 0.10 m grid cell and the 0.05 m grid cell are, therefore, identified 
as adequate grid cell sizes. 
Regarding Criterion III of mesh resolution, the time-averaged value of MTR is calculated by 
averaging MTR over 10 seconds of simulation time. Figure 2.8 shows time-averaged MTR on the plane z 
= 2.5 m averaged from 1,200 to 1,210 seconds after the fire ignition. This plane is selected since it is the 
cross section of the fire compartment at the height between the fire source and damage targets, which is the 
most critical space in terms of the depiction of physical phenomena. In Figure 2.8, the grid cells with MTR 
< 0.20 are blue, while those with MTR > 0.20 are shown in other colors. The results indicate the reduction 
in the portion of grid cells with MTR > 0.20 when the grid cell size is decreased. The observation of the 
other planes indicates that 0.15 m grid cells result in a large MTR value in the regions that are important in 
the modeling of the flow field, e.g., around the damage targets and the vent system. Considering these three 
criteria in an integrative manner, 0.10 m is selected as the optimal grid cell size. All the results shown in 




Figure 2.8 FDS plot of the measure of turbulence resolution (MTR) at y = 2.5 m. In these figures, the grid 
cells with MTR < 0.20 are shown in blue, while the grid cells with MTR > 0.20 are illustrated in colors 
other than blue. 
2.4.3 Post-Fire Damage Propagation Model 
In this small-scale case study, it is assumed that (i) component “c” in the Plant-Specific PRA 
Module is a solenoid-operated valve controlled by a double break control circuit for ungrounded AC (with 
individual control power transformers) and may experience the fire-induced spurious operation due to a hot 
short; and (ii) cable tray B, filled with thermoplastic-insulated conductor cables, includes a control cable 
associated with component “c”. NUREG/CR-7150 Volume 2 [51] provides the probability distribution 
which represents the epistemic uncertainty associated with the conditional probability of spurious actuation, 
given the fire-induced damage to the associated cable, i.e., Pr (SPA | CBD) in Equation (2.22). Here, the 
mean value of the probability distribution (0.48) is used as a point estimate of the conditional probability 
of spurious actuation of component “c”, given fire-induced damage to cable tray B. Future research will 
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address the epistemic uncertainty associated with the conditional probabilities of the post-fire damage 
propagation, provided by the lookup tables in NUREG/CR-7150 Volume 2 [51], in the Probabilistic 
Validation. 
2.4.4 Manual Fire Suppression Module 
This case study uses the existing data-driven probability model for the Manual Fire Suppression 
Module to provide the estimates of three timings associated with manual suppression (tdet, tfb, and tsupp) that 
are needed for creating the explicit interface between fire progression and manual suppression.  
In accordance with NUREG-2169 [31], uncertainty associated with the time to manual suppression, 
tsupp, is represented by an exponential distribution (or a “non-suppression curve”) whose probability density 
function is given by: 
 𝑡𝑡supp~𝜆𝜆 exp�−𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡supp�, (2.30) 
where 𝜆𝜆 represents a constant manual suppression rate per minute and is estimated for each category of fire 
scenario based on the historical fire event database in NUREG-2169 [31]. This small-scale case study uses 
the point estimate of 𝜆𝜆  for electrical fires, 𝜆𝜆  = 0.098 [1/minutes]. NUREG-2169 also provides the 
probability distribution for 𝜆𝜆 which represents the epistemic uncertainty associated with the 𝜆𝜆 value; future 
research will consider this source of uncertainty in the Probabilistic Validation.  
As discussed in Section 2.3.5, tdet and tfb→sup are set to the typical values suggested by NUREG/CR-
6850 [29]: tdet = 1 minute when the automatic detectors are available, while tdet = 15 minutes when the 
automatic detectors are unavailable; and tfb = 7 minutes. The non-suppression curve, shown in Equation 
(2.30), is left truncated at tsupp = 7 minutes to consider the practical constraint that tfb→sup is a non-negative 
value given tfb = 7 minutes. Based on these three timings associated with manual suppression provided by 
the Manual Fire Suppression Module, the explicit interface between fire progression and manual 
suppression is created by modifying the HRR curve under the burnout condition, using the procedure shown 
in Section 2.3.5.  
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2.4.5 Uncertainty Propagation 
As shown in Section 2.3.6, the Uncertainty Propagation submodule covers five substeps: (i) 
selection of random input parameters, (ii) uncertainty characterization, (iii) input parameter screening, (iv) 
uncertainty propagation, and (v) estimation of cable damage probability.  
 
(i) Selection of random input parameters: The input parameters listed in the second column of Table 2.3 are 
selected as the ones to be treated as random variables in the uncertainty propagation. These input parameters 
are chosen based on a literature review and engineering judgment because they are considered to have 
potentially significant influences on fire progression and the physical KPMs associated with the fire-
induced cable damage.  
Table 2.3 List of input parameters treated as random variables, and associated uncertainty distributions. 
 Input Parameters Probability Distribution 
X1 Maximum HRR [kW] Gamma (α = 0.7, β = 216) 
X2 Time to maximum HRR [minutes] Uniform (4, 18) 
X3 Duration of max HRR [minutes] Triangular (0, 0, 20) 
X4 Time to decay [minutes] Uniform (10, 30) 
X5 Thermal conductivity of concrete [W/(m K)] Uniform (1.33, 1.95) 
X6 Specific heat of concrete [kJ/(kg K)] Uniform (0.50, 1.13) 
X7 Density of concrete [kg/m3] Uniform (2000, 2400) 
X8 Thermal conductivity of cable jacket [W/(m K)] Uniform (0.01, 0.60) 
X9 Cable jacket thickness [m] Uniform (0.0010, 0.0025) 
 
(ii) Uncertainty characterization: The probability distribution is assigned to each input parameter, as listed 
in the third column of Table 2.3. The current choice of ranges and distributions for input parameters are 
generic, derived from information provided by regulatory documents and academic literature, rather than 
from plant-specific data. Because of limited information, uniform distribution is utilized for most of the 
input parameters with upper and lower bounds being set to the maximum and minimum values found in 
literature. In some cases, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to fit selected distributions (i.e., (i) uniform, 
(ii) triangular, and (iii) exponential). It is assumed that the current choice of probability distributions 
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represents the most typical values of those input parameters at U.S. NPPs. When the proposed method is 
applied to a specific NPP, plant-specific ranges and distributions of input parameters will be obtained by 
conducting a more structured statistical analysis [105], such as Bayesian inference for integrating all 
available information to estimate the parameters and a goodness-of-fit test to determine if the developed 
probability distribution is acceptable. In the Bayesian inference, a prior distribution needs to be carefully 
selected to ensure that all possible ranges of input parameters are covered. 
According to NUREG/CR-6850 [29], the uncertainty associated with the maximum HRR value for 
electrical fires in multiple cable bundles with qualified cable inside vertical cabinets is represented by a 
Gamma distribution with α = 0.7 and β = 216. In this study, the uncertainty distributions for the duration of 
HRR growth, steady HRR, and decay are developed based on the experimental data in NUREG/CR-6850 
[29]. Because there are insufficient experimental data to construct a complex distribution, three types of 
distributions are hypothesized based on the observation of histograms from experimental data: (i) uniform, 
(ii) triangular, and (iii) exponential (only for the duration of peak HRR). The result of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test indicates that both uniform and triangular distributions are not rejected for time to peak HRR 
and time to decay; therefore, uniform distribution is used to represent the uncertainty associated with those 
two input parameters. Meanwhile, for the duration of peak HRR, the uniform distribution is rejected, while 
the triangular distribution is accepted.  
NUREG/CR-7031 [115] refers to the engineering correlations for the upper and lower limits of 
thermal conductivity of concrete material [W/(m K)] applicable in the temperature range of 20 ̊C ≤ T ≤ 
1200 ̊C. Using these correlations, the upper and lower bounds of thermal conductivity of concrete under 
room temperature (i.e., T = 20 ̊C) are calculated as kc_upper = 1.951 [W/(m K)] and kc_lower = 1.333 [W/(m 
K)], respectively. Due to a lack of data to specify the shape of the uncertainty distribution, a uniform 
distribution is assumed with the upper and lower bounds being 1.95 [W/(m K)] and 1.33 [W/(m K)], 
respectively. NUREG/CR-7031 also reviewed several engineering standards in the U.S. and Europe and 
concluded that the specific heat of ordinary concrete at room temperature ranges from 0.5 to 1.13 [kJ/(kg 
K)]. Because no additional data that can be used to specify the shape of distribution is available, the specific 
heat of concrete is assumed to be a uniform distribution, with upper and lower bounds being 1.13 [kJ/(kg 
K)] and 0.5 [kJ/(kg K)]. From NUREG/CR-7031, the density of concrete under room temperature ranges 
from 2.0 to 2.4 [g/cm3]. As there is no additional information that could be used to develop a specific 
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distribution, the density of concrete is also assumed to be distributed as a uniform distribution having upper 
and lower bounds of 2.4 [g/cm3] and 2.0 [g/cm3], respectively. 
Limited information regarding the thermal conductivity of electrical cable materials is found in the 
materials and, therefore, a uniform distribution is used. The lower and upper bounds are set to the minimum 
and maximum values found in literature [34, 57, 74, 116], i.e., a uniform distribution from 0.01 to 0.6 
[W/(m.K)]. As a result of the literature review, the only available information regarding the jacket thickness 
of electrical cables in regulatory documents is found in NUREG/CR-6931 [114]. This document provides 
the material properties of electrical cables used in the CAROLFIRE fire test program, although the number 
of samples is limited. In NUREG/CR-6931 [114], the jacket thickness of electrical cables ranges from 0.89 
[mm] to 1.91 [mm]. Meanwhile, the jacket thickness in the FDS input file used in NUREG-1934 [34] is 2.5 
mm. Based on this information, the jacket thickness is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 1.00 
[mm] and 2.50 [mm]. 
 
(iii) Input parameter screening: For those nine input parameters listed in Table 2.3, the input parameter 
screening is conducted using the elementary effect method proposed by Morris [68]. This aims to identify 
which input parameters have a negligible effect on the KPM predictions by the FDS code (i.e., maximum 
temperature and heat flux at each damage target) and can be fixed at the point estimates, instead of 
performing random sampling in the Monte Carlo-based uncertainty propagation. As a measure of sensitivity, 
the absolute sample mean (𝜇𝜇∗) and the sample standard deviation (𝜎𝜎) of the elementary effects are used. 
For each KPM associated with the damage target being analyzed, 𝜇𝜇∗ and 𝜎𝜎 are estimated by the randomized 
One-At-a-Time (OAT) design. The criterion for determining the influential vs. non-influential input 
parameters needs to be specified by an analyst. In this study, the sensitivity of the KPM to each input 
parameter 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋}, is plotted in the 2-D plane of 𝜇𝜇∗ and 𝜎𝜎; then, if the distance from the origin 
in the 2-D plane is less than 10% of the associated damage threshold value, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is judged to have only a 
negligible influence on the KPM and is screened out from the uncertainty propagation in the following 
substep. The results indicate that all input parameters, listed in Table 2.3, have a significant influence; hence, 
at this stage, no input parameters can be screened out.  
 
(iv) Uncertainty propagation: Before performing the uncertainty propagation using the sampling-based 
approach in this substep, the convergence study is conducted to select an efficient sample size. The 
convergence study in this research uses the replicated LHS method [80, 81] to demonstrate whether the 
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selected sample size (nS = 50) is sufficient for producing statistically stable estimates. The Monte Carlo 
simulation using LHS is replicated three times with independent random seeds, and the statistical estimates 
of interest (i.e., empirical cdf of each KPM, fire-induced cable damage probabilities) are generated for each 
random seed. Note that the FDS simulations in this convergence study are under the burnout conditions and 
do not consider manual suppression. The efficient sample size, identified in this substep, will be used in the 
uncertainty propagation in the next substep where the FDS simulations will be run in consideration of 
manual suppression. As stated in Section 2.3.6, the convergence study in this research is based on two 
criteria: 
 
• With respect to convergence Criterion I, empirical cdfs for individual KPMs are developed based 
on the outputs from replicated LHS using three independent random seeds. The stability of the 
Monte Carlo simulation is pictorially checked, based on the variability between three independent 
estimates of the empirical cdfs. The small variability between empirical cdfs indicates a more stable 
output by LHS; hence, the sample size is considered sufficiently large. Figure 2.9 shows the 
empirical cdfs of KPMs (i.e., maximum temperature and heat flux) at each damage target in the 
fire compartment being analyzed (Figure 2.6), based on the outputs from the replicated LHS. As 
shown in Figure 2.9, three empirical cdfs demonstrate a good convergence for all performance 
measures, indicating that the selected sample size (nS = 50) is large enough to generate statistically 
stable outputs. By inspecting them closely, a small variation among three replicated empirical cdfs, 
around the 80th to 90th quantiles, can be identified for the maximum temperature of cable tray B. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the following section, the computed damage probability based on 
these empirical cdfs converges well. This level of variability in empirical cdfs, therefore, has little 
effect on the result of fire-induced damage probability, indicating that the current choice of sample 
size (nS = 50) is appropriate for this case study. 
 
• With respect to convergence Criterion II: The calculation of fire-induced damage probability is 
replicated with three independent random seeds of LHS to check the statistical stability of the 
estimated probabilities. Table 2.4 shows the 90% CIs of a fire-induced damage probability for each 
target, computed based on three independent LHS replications. The CIs for cable tray C cannot be 
constructed since all three replications produce a zero-damage probability. For the other damage 
targets, the width of a 90% CI of a damage probability is 0.04, indicating that the current choice of 
nS is appropriate to generate statistically stable and converged results. Based on these results, the 
67 
 
current choice of the sample size, nS = 50, is sufficiently large for the generation of a stable and 
reliable statistical estimate of cable damage probability. 
 
Figure 2.9 Comparison of empirical cumulative distribution functions by three random seeds (nS = 50). 
 
Table 2.4 90% confidence intervals of fire-induced damage probability at each damage target computed 
by replicated LHS (nR = 3, nS = 50) without consideration of manual suppression. 
Damage Target E [Pi] 
90% Confidence Interval 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Cable tray A 0.89 0.87 0.91 
Cable tray B 0.23 0.21 0.25 
Cable tray C 0.00 N.A. N.A. 
Electrical cabinet 0.07 0.05 0.09 
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Subsequently, using the sample size selected in the convergence study, the uncertainty propagation 
is conducted in consideration of both automatic and manual fire protection features. The nine input 
parameters listed in Table 2.3 are randomly sampled from the corresponding probability distributions, and 
the FDS code is repeatedly run using each set of input parameters. After the post-processing of the FDS 
output files, random samples of the KPMs of size nS = 50 are generated for each damage target under the 
conditions of each possible state with respect to the automatic detection and suppression systems.  
 
(v) Estimation of cable damage probability: The point estimates of the fire-induced cable damage 
probabilities are generated using the computational procedure explained in Section 2.3.6. To compute the 
marginal fire-induced damage probability for each target, the indicator function in Equation (2.16) is 
calculated based on the random samples of the KPMs generated in substep (iv), and is then plugged into 
Equation (2.17) to compute the point estimate of the conditional fire-induced damage probability of each 
individual target, given the states (i.e., success or failure) of the automatic detection and suppression 
systems. Table 2.5 shows the point estimates of conditional probabilities of fire-induced cable damage 
given success and failure of the automatic detection system, with explicit consideration of manual 
suppression. It should be noted that, in this study, the automatic suppression system is not credited (i.e., AS 
= Failure is assumed).  
Table 2.5 Point estimates for conditional probabilities of fire-induced target damage. AD and AS stand 
for automatic detection and suppression systems, respectively. The state of each system is represented by 
S (success) or F (failure). 
Target Name AD = S, AS = F AD = F, AS = F 
Cable Tray A 0.807 0.893 
Cable Tray B 0.040 0.180 
Cable Tray C N.A. N.A. 
Electrical Cabinet 0.013 0.047 
 
 
Table 2.5 shows that the fire-induced damage probability, given the successful activation of the automatic 
detection system, is smaller than that given the failure of an automatic detection system. This result is 
reasonable, since the successful activation of an automatic detection leads to faster detection of fire; thus, 
there is a higher chance that manual suppression can begin before the fire reaches a fully developed stage 
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and can cause damage to the targets. Note that the point estimates of fire-induced damage probabilities are 
not obtained for cable tray C because no failure is observed in the LHS sampling scenarios generated in the 
uncertainty propagation. The treatment of the zero-failure data in the I-PRA methodological framework is 
further discussed in Section 2.3.6 and in Appendix F.  
2.4.6 Probabilistic Validation 
The Probabilistic Validation constructs the uncertainty bounds for the fire-induced damage 
probability estimates, generated in Section 2.4.5, to quantitatively measure the degree of confidence in the 
simulation-based probability estimates. These uncertainty bounds are constructed by characterizing and 
propagating the epistemic uncertainty sources associated with the Input Module, the FSM, the Manual Fire 
Suppression Module, and the Interface Module. In Section 2.3.7, five main categories of epistemic 
uncertainty sources have been identified: (i) probability distributions for input parameters, (ii) failure 
mechanism models, (iii) sampling-based uncertainty propagation, (iv) the selection of KPM and damage 
threshold, and (v) statistical inference method for probability estimation. Among these sources of epistemic 
uncertainty, this small-scale case study only accounts for the statistical error due to the sampling-based 
probability estimation. This uncertainty source is characterized by constructing the 90% CIs for the fire-
induced cable and cabinet damage probabilities. Note that some of the other sources of uncertainties, such 
as the validity of the choice of probability distributions for input parameters, the FDS model, and the non-
suppression curve, are indirectly addressed by using the data and models that have been published in the 
regulatory documents; however, quantitative characterization and propagation of those uncertainty sources 
are left to future research.  
The 90% CIs for the fire-induced cable damage probabilities (listed in Table 2.5) are shown in 
Table 2.6. For each target and condition in terms of AD and AS, the first value shows the point estimate, 
while the second and third values with square brackets show the lower and upper bounds of the 90% CIs. 
These CIs are constructed by the replicated LHS method [78-81], where LHS is replicated three times using 
independent random seeds to generate the IID random samples of the probability quantity of interest, and 




Table 2.6 90% Confidence Intervals (CIs) for the fire-induced cable damage probabilities.  
Target Name AD = S, AS = F AD = F, AS = F 
Cable Tray A 0.807; [0.800, 0.813] 0.893; [0.887, 0.900] 
Cable Tray B 0.040; [0.027, 0.053] 0.180; [0.167, 0.193] 
Cable Tray C N.A. N.A. 
Electrical Cabinet 0.013; [0.007, 0.020] 0.047; [0.040, 0.053] 
2.4.7 Scenario-Based Damage Model 
In this case study, a single fire scenario is considered where cable tray B is assumed to be a part of 
the control circuits for component “c” in the Plant-Specific PRA Module. The dominant failure mode of 
component “c”, caused by fire-induced damage to cable tray B, is assumed to be a spurious operation, 
denoted by the event “SpA”. The output from this Scenario-Based Damage Model is the conditional 
probability of a component “c” failure due to the fire-induced spurious actuation caused by a hot short 
circuit, given fire occurrence, represented by Pr (SpA | FR). This conditional probability is used as an input 
to the MCS Probability Estimation Considering Dependent Failure. The Scenario-Based Damage Model 
for this small-scale case study is shown in Figure 2.10.  
 
• Top event AD represents the availability of the automatic detection system in the fire compartment 
being analyzed. The split fraction for this top event is set to a generic reliability of a smoke detector 
[29], i.e., Pr (AD) = 0.05. 
 
• Top event AS represents the availability of automatic suppression systems installed in the fire 
compartment being analyzed. This study assumes that the automatic suppression system is not 
credited; hence, the top event AS is always assumed to be failure (or the downward branch in Figure 
2.10). 
 
• Top event CBD shows if the cable target of interest (in this example, cable tray B) has been 
damaged by the fire. The split fraction for top event CBD is the fire-induced damage probability of 
cable tray B and provided by the Uncertainty Propagation submodule. From Table 2.5, the point 
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estimates of the conditional split fractions for top event CBD, given the success and failure of the 
top event AD, are Pr (CBD | AD: Success) = 0.040 and Pr (CBD | AD: Failure) = 0.180, respectively. 
 
• Top event SpA represents the spurious actuation of component c due to a hot short circuit caused 
by the fire-induced damage to cable tray B. The Post-Fire Damage Propagation Model provides 
the point estimate of the split fraction of this top event, Pr (SpA | CBD) = 0.48. 
 
Figure 2.10 Scenario-Based Damage Model for the small-scale case study.  
 
By quantifying the Scenario-Based Damage Model (shown in Figure 2.10) using these probability values, 
the conditional probability of spurious actuation of component “c”, given the occurrence of a fire, is 
calculated as  
 Pr(SpA | FR) = (0.95)(1)(0.040)(0.48) + (0.05)(1)(0.18)(0.48) = 0.0226. (2.31) 
The uncertainty bounds for the fire-induced damage probabilities, constructed by the Probabilistic 
Validation (Section 2.4.6, listed in Table 2.6), are then propagated in the Scenario-Based Damage Model 
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to construct the uncertainty bounds for the fire-induced MCS probability. This can be done by repeatedly 
computing the fire-induced MCS probability based on Equation (2.33) using the bootstrap resamples 
generated in construction of the 90% CIs for the fire-induced cable damage probabilities (Table 2.6). As a 
result, the uncertainty bounds (i.e., 90% CIs) for the probability of the second MCS, are computed as [3.23 
× 10−4, 5.79 × 10−4]. These uncertainty bounds are provided for the Plant-Specific PRA Module where 
further uncertainty propagation is conducted to construct the uncertainty bounds for the plant risk estimates.  
2.4.8 Minimal Cut Set Probability Estimation  
Based on the hypothetical PRA logic in the Plant-Specific PRA Module (shown in Figure 2.3), the 
MCSs for the core damage end state are obtained as {a, OP} and {c, OP}, where the basic events ‘a’ and 
‘c’ represent the hardware components, while the event ‘OP’ represents the operators’ actions. This case 
study assumes that only the hardware component ‘c’ is susceptible to the fire-induced failure, whereas the 
hardware component ‘a’ and the operator’s action ‘OP’ are not influenced by fire progression. As the first 
MCS does not include the fire-induced component failure, it is not within the scope of this section. 
Meanwhile, based on the procedure explained in Section 2.3.9, the conditional probability for the second 
MCS, {c, OP}, given the fire occurrence, can be formulated as: 
 Pr(c, OP|FR) = Pr(SpA|FR) Pr(OP), (2.32) 
where, to be consistent with Section 2.3.9, the non-fire human failure event ‘OP’ is independent from the 
fire-induced component failure event ‘SpA’ and from the fire occurrence. By plugging the point estimate 
of Pr (SpA | FR) obtained in Equation (2.31) and the point estimate of Pr (OP) = 0.02 that is assumed to be 
extracted from the existing plant PRA, the conditional probability of the second MCS, given the fire 
occurrence, is obtained as follows: 
 Pr(c, OP|FR) = (0.0226)(0.02) = 4.51 × 10−4. (2.33) 
2.4.9 Connecting the Interface Module to the Plant-Specific PRA Module 
In this small-scale case study, to demonstrate the feasibility of the Fire I-PRA framework proposed 
in this research, a hypothetical small-scale PRA model, illustrated in Figure 2.3, is used as the Plant-Specific 
PRA Module. In this system-level ET, two pivotal events are considered; the hardware system and 
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intervention by the operators, represented by HS and OP, respectively. The hardware system (HS) is 
composed of two components, ‘a’ and ‘c’, placed in a series configuration. Among those two components 
associated with HS, only component ‘c’ is susceptible to the failure caused by the fire scenario of interest, 
while component ‘a’ may fail due to a non-fire failure mode. The Interface Module is connected to the 
Plant-Specific PRA Module through the fire-induced MCS probability.  
The Boolean expression for the core damage end state is given as CD = IE∙a∙OP + IE∙c∙OP where 
IE denotes the initiating event or the fire ignition in the fire compartment being analyzed; hence, the core 
damage frequency due to this fire scenario is expressed by: 
 𝑓𝑓(CD) = 𝑓𝑓(FR) Pr(a, OP|FR) + 𝑓𝑓(FR) Pr(c, OP|FR) (2.34) 
where 𝑓𝑓(FR): fire ignition frequency in this fire compartment, while Pr(a, OP|FR) and Pr(c, OP|FR) are 
conditional probabilities of the two MCSs derived in Section 0. 𝑓𝑓(FR) is provided by the Fire Initiation 
Model (Section 2.4.1), and the point estimate of 𝑓𝑓(FR) = 0.03 fires per year is used in this case study. As 
shown in Section 2.4.8, the point estimate of Pr(c, OP|FR) is obtained as 4.51 × 10−4. Pr(a, OP|FR) is the 
probability of the non-fire MCS and computed based on the existing plant PRA for non-fire initiating events. 
Assume that (i) this MCS is independent from the fire, (ii) the hardware component ‘a’ is independent from 
the human failure event ‘OP’, and (iii) the point estimates of failure probabilities for ‘a’ and ‘OP’ are 
extracted from the existing plant PRA as Pr (a) = 0.05 and Pr (OP) = 0.02,  
 Pr(a, OP|FR) = Pr(a) Pr(OP) = (0.05)(0.02) = 1.00 × 10−3 (2.35) 
By plugging these probabilities into Equation (2.34), the point estimate of the core damage frequency due 
to this fire scenario is computed as 
 𝑓𝑓(CD) = (0.03)(1.00 × 10−3) + (0.03)(4.51 × 10−4) = 4.35 × 10−5 per year. (2.36) 
By propagating the uncertainty bounds for the fire-induced MCS probability obtained by the Probabilistic 
Validation (Section 2.4.6), the 90% CIs for the core damage frequency are computed as [3.97 × 10−5, 4.74 
× 10−4] per year. Because this case study is developed for a hypothetical and simplified PRA (not an actual 
NPP PRA), the results should not be interpreted in the context of an actual fire risk to NPPs.  
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2.5 Methodological and Practical Comparison of the Integrated PRA with Existing Fire PRA of 
Nuclear Power Plants  
To highlight the value of the Fire I-PRA framework developed in this research, this section provides 
a methodological and practical comparison with the current Fire PRA methodology in NUREG/CR-6850 
[29, 32] that has been widely applied for NFPA 805 transitions by the nuclear industry in the U.S. Section 
2.5.1 qualitatively analyzes the methodological advancements in the Fire I-PRA framework as compared 
with the current Fire PRA for NPPs. Further quantitative justification on the value of the Fire I-PRA is then 
provided in Section 2.5.2, where these methods are applied for a case study, using a selected realistic fire 
scenario at the representative NPP, and the estimated plant risk (i.e., core damage frequency) is then 
evaluated and compared. 
2.5.1 Methodological Comparison of Integrated PRA with Existing Fire PRA of Nuclear Power Plants  
The methodological advancements in the Fire I-PRA framework, as compared with the current Fire 
PRA methodology of NPPs, are listed in Table 2.7 and are described in this section. It should be noted that 
the Fire I-PRA framework neither attempts to develop a completely new Fire PRA methodology nor to 
completely replace the current Fire PRA procedures. Rather, the Fire I-PRA framework makes 
methodological advancements in some elements of the existing Fire PRA methodology so that the plant 
can gradually adopt the Fire I-PRA approach for risk-significant scenarios while avoiding major changes 




Table 2.7 Methodological advancements of Fire I-PRA in comparison with NUREG/CR-6850. 
Methodological Areas NUREG/CR-6850 (Ref. [29]) Fire I-PRA Framework 
Uncertainty propagation & 
computation of fire-induced 
cable damage probability  
Severity factor method  Monte Carlo method using 
Latin-Hypercube Sampling  
Fire detection and suppression 
analysis – Treatment of manual 
suppression 
“Implicit” treatment by 
competition between time-to-
damage and time-to-suppression 
“Explicit” interface between the 
FDS code and manual 
suppression by modifying the 
time profile of HRR  
Connection between plant PRA 
and the fire physics model 
“Passively” connected  Unified computational 
framework (i.e., Integrated 
PRA).  
Importance Measure analysis Classical IM (e.g., Fussell-
Vesely, Risk Achievement 
Worth) at the basic event level 
Extend an IM analysis to the 
inputs at the failure mechanism 
level by performing Global IM 
 
 
Uncertainty Propagation and Computation of Fire-Induced Cable Damage Probability: In the current Fire 
PRA methodology of NPPs, fire-induced cable damage probabilities are computed by the severity factor 
method (NUREG/CR-6850 [29], Steps 11.7 and 11.8). For a fire inside vertical cabinets with more than 
one bundle of qualified cables, Table E-3 of NUREG/CR-6850 [29] specifies 15 discretized bins with 
respect to the maximum HRR (lower, upper, and point values) and the corresponding Severity Factor (SFi). 
For the ith point value of HRR (i = 1, 2, …, 15), the fire model is run to predict the time to damage (tdam,i), 
defined as the time when either the maximum temperature inside the cable jacket (Tmax) or the maximum 
heat flux at the surface of the cable (q˝max) exceeds the damage threshold, e.g., Tmax = 400 ◦C or q˝max = 11 
kW/m2 for cable trays filled with cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) insulated cables [34]. In the fire model, 
the HRR curve for the full burn-out condition without any fixed or manual fire protection system is assumed. 
Using tdam,i predicted by the fire model, the time available for manual suppression is computed for the ith 
HRR bin as [33]: 
 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,𝑖𝑖 , (2.37) 
where tms,i and tdet,i represent the time available for manual suppression and the time to fire detection, 
respectively, for the ith HRR bin. The non-suppression probability for the ith HRR bin, denoted as PNS,i, is 
then computed using the non-suppression curve [31, 33] by calculating the probability that the time-to-
suppression tsupp exceeds the time available for manual suppression (tms,i): 
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 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 = Pr�𝑡𝑡supp > 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖� = exp�−𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖�, (2.38) 
where tms,i is given in minutes, while λ is a constant non-suppression rate [1/minutes] derived from the 
historical fire event database [31]. The fire-induced damage probability of a specific cable is computed by 
adding the product of SFi and PNS,i for all HRR bins: 




where nBin represents the number of HRR bins provided in NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix E.  
In contrast, as shown in Section 2.3.6, the Fire I-PRA framework propagates parameter uncertainty 
in the Uncertainty Propagation submodule by conducting the Monte Carlo simulation using the replicated 
LHS method [77, 78, 80, 81]. The input parameters in the FDS, such as the time profile of HRR and material 
properties of electrical cables and concrete walls, are treated as random variables. Compared with the Fire 
I-PRA methodology, the severity factor method in the current Fire PRA is regarded as a “simplified” 
uncertainty propagation for the parameter uncertainty, where (i) only the uncertainty of the maximum HRR 
value is considered, while the other input parameters are treated as fixed point values, and (ii) the input 
parameter space is discretized into a prescribed number of sampling bins, without performing the 
convergence study, to determine if the prescribed sampling strategy produces an accurate and stable 
estimation of the cable damage probability.  
Fire Detection and Suppression Analysis: The current Fire PRA methodology of NPPs uses the severity 
factor method (NUREG/CR-6850 [29, 32, 33], Steps 11.7 and 11.8) to estimate the fire-induced cable 
damage probabilities considering fire detection and suppression. This severity factor method is an “implicit” 
approach for addressing the interactions between fire progression and manual fire suppression, since the 
influences of manual fire suppression on the fire progression are not explicitly considered in the fire 
progression model. These influences are implicitly considered by comparing the time-to-damage (under the 
burnout conditions without fire detection and suppression) with the time-to-suppression derived from the 
industry-wide historical fire event data, as shown in Equation (2.38). Since the reduction of the HRR value 
due to manual suppression activity, is not credited, the current Fire PRA methodology, using the severity 
factor approach, generally results in “conservative approximations” [9].  
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In the Fire I-PRA framework, applied in Section 2.3.5, while the data-driven probability model is 
still used in the Manual Fire Suppression Module, an “explicit” interface between the FSM and the Manual 
Fire Suppression Module is created to address the interactions between fire progression and manual 
suppression. This explicit interface is developed by modifying the HRR curve for the burnout condition 
based on three timings associated with manual suppression predicted by the data-driven Manual Fire 
Suppression Module: tdet, tfb, and tfb→sup. At this stage, this study assumes the linear HRR reduction during 
manual suppression (i.e., between tdet + tfb and tdet + tsupp), as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Note that, as discussed 
in Section 2.3.5, this linear HRR reduction might be a conservative assumption compared to the exponential 
HRR reduction, but is more realistic than the implicit approach in the current Fire PRA methodology. In 
Chapter 5, the Manual Fire Suppression Module is advanced by developing an HRA-based method for 
analyzing the human performance in manual suppression activity.  
 
Connection between Plant PRA and the Fire Model: In the current Fire PRA methodology, the PRA model 
for the plant system is developed by modifying the existing internal event PRA model (NUREG/CR-6850 
[29], Task 5) and is quantified by substituting the fire-induced component failure probabilities, computed 
by the severity factor method (NUREG/CR-6850 [29], Steps 11.7 and 11.8), into the plant PRA model. 
This approach is referred to as a “passive” connection since only the probability outputs are communicated 
from the fire progression analysis to the plant PRA model. In contrast, the Fire I-PRA framework creates a 
“unified” connection between the FSM and the Plant-Specific PRA Module, where the communications of 
data and information among multiple levels of causal chains (i.e., cable-, component-, and system-levels) 
are generated in a single computational platform. This unified connection between the underlying failure 
mechanisms (i.e., the FSM in Figure 2.3) and the plant PRA model (i.e., the Plant-Specific PRA Module in 
Figure 2.3) allows for a comprehensive parametric study to explore the influences of changing the fire 
protection design parameters on the plant risk estimates. In addition, this unified connection allows for 
conducting a Global IM analysis (Chapter 3) to generate the risk-importance ranking of the fire protection 
design parameters based on the influence on the system-level risk, as briefly discussed below.  
 
Risk Importance Measure Analysis: In the current Fire PRA methodology of NPPs, classical IM methods, 
such as Fussell-Vesely and Risk Achievement Worth [117], are computed to generate a ranking of PRA 
components based on their contribution to plant risk estimates (NUREG/CR-6850 [29, 32, 33], Task 15). 
These classical IM methods, however, are insufficient for the I-PRA framework because ranking of the fire 
protection design parameters should be obtained at the level of failure mechanisms (corresponding to “Input 
78 
 
Module” in Figure 2.3). To overcome this challenge, the author selected and applied the cdf-based Global 
IM method, Si(CDF) [118], for the I-PRA framework. The theoretical background, methodology, and case 
studies of the Global IM analysis in the I-PRA methodological framework are shown in Chapter 3.  
2.5.2 Quantitative Comparison of Estimated Risk from Integrated PRA & Existing Fire PRAs for the 
Selected Nuclear Power Plant Fire Scenario 
In this section, the Core Damage Frequency (CDF), due to a selected fire-induced scenario in a 
representative NPP, is quantified by applying three Fire PRA methodologies: (i) the “full compartment 
burn” screening approach, (ii) the NUREG/CR-6850 approach (i.e., the current regulatory guidance by the 
U.S. NRC), and (iii) the Fire I-PRA framework. Table 2.8 compares these Fire PRA approaches, applied in 
this case study, with respect to key elements of Fire PRA.  
Table 2.8 Three Fire PRA approaches implemented in this case study. 
Key Elements 





Fire I-PRA  
(This Research) 
Plant PRA model Small Break LOCA PRA model 
Fire ignition 
frequency 1.33E-3 fires per year 
Fire progression 
model No fire model Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 




(p = 1 for all targets) Severity Factor method 
Uncertainty propagation 
by the Monte Carlo 
simulation 
Interactions of fire 
brigade with fire 
progression 




It should be noted that NUREG/CR-6850 suggests a phased approach with increasing degrees of 
accuracy and realism in accordance with the risk contribution of each fire scenario [15, 17, 29, 119], where 
the level of detail and the realism of the risk quantification are gradually refined along the step-by-step 
procedure based on the risk contribution of each scenario. The NUREG/CR-6850 methodology in this study 
is based on the full procedure in NUREG/CR-6850 [29], including the circuit failure analysis (Task 9 in 
NUREG/CR-6850), the circuit failure mode likelihood analysis (Task 10 in NUREG/CR-6850), and the 
detailed fire modeling (Task 11 in NUREG/CR-6850) using the most sophisticated fire model verified and 
validated in the regulatory guidelines by the U.S. NRC (i.e., a CFD-based fire model, FDS).  
2.5.2.1 Selected Fire-Induced Scenario at a Representative NPP 
For the case study, a fire-induced Small-Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) at a 
representative NPP is selected. A fire occurs in the Engineering Safety Features (ESF) Train A switchgear 
room and may cause the pressurizer Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) to spuriously open and remain 
open because of a sustained hot short circuit in the associated control cables. For this selected scenario, the 
fire-induced initiating event in the PRA model is a SBLOCA due to a fire-induced stuck-open pressurizer 
PORV.  
In this case study, the same fire compartment as the one used in the small-scope case study (Figure 
2.6), i.e., NUREG-1934 Scenario D [34] (a motor control center panel fire in a switchgear room), is used 
as a surrogate fire compartment for the ESF Train A switchgear room at a representative plant. Based on 
discussions with NPP personnel, the selected fire compartment has characteristics that are like those of the 
ESF Train A switchgear room at the representative NPP in terms of the room configuration, ignition source, 
and damage targets. Two electrical cabinets, one assumed to be a fire ignition source and the other a damage 
target, are included in the compartment. The initial fire source is modeled by a plate heat source placed on 
the top surface of the ignition source cabinet, as recommended by NUREG/CR-6850 [29, 33]. Three cable 
trays (A, B, and C in) are installed at different heights below the ceiling and are filled with XLPE insulated 
cables that have neoprene jackets. The automatic suppression system is not credited, while the failure 
probability of automatic fire detectors is assumed to be 0.05; if the automatic detectors work properly, they 
are assumed to be activated one minute after the fire ignition [29].  
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Identifying the Fire PRA components and the associated cable raceways is a critical task in Fire 
PRA. This case study assumes the following relationships between the Fire PRA components and the target 
cable trays: 
 
• The pressurizer PORV control cable is placed in cable tray B. The fire-induced damage to cable 
tray B may cause a sustained hot short circuit and spurious opening of the pressurizer PORV, which 
may lead to a SB-LOCA. Spurious actuation of the pressurizer PORV is assumed sustained long 
enough to cause an SB-LOCA condition. 
 
• The control and power cables associated with the Essential Cooling Water (ECW) system Train A 
are placed in cable tray B. It is assumed that, given fire-induced damage to cable tray B, the function 
of ECW Train A is lost with certainty, i.e., the conditional probability of ECW Train A failure, 
given the fire-induced damage to cable tray B, is assumed to be unity. 
 
• The control and power cables associated with the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system Train 
A are placed in cable tray A. It is assumed that, given the fire-induced damage to cable tray A, the 
function of CCW Train A is lost with certainty, i.e., the conditional probability of the CCW Train 
A failure, given the fire-induced damage to cable tray A, is assumed to be unity. 
2.5.2.2. Plant PRA Model 
The Plant-Specific PRA Module is developed for the selected scenario, i.e., SB-LOCA caused by 
the fire-induced stuck-open pressurizer PORV. The scenario consists of two ETs: (i) Plant Response ET, 
representing the PRA scenarios in terms of the frontline systems based on the Event Sequence Diagram of 
the representative NPP for the SBLOCA scenario; and (ii) Support System ET, representing the functional 
relationships between the frontline systems (also included in the Plant System ET) and the critical support 
systems, such as ECW and CCW systems. These two plant-specific ETs developed for this case study are 
explained in Appendix G. Frontline and support system functional dependencies are incorporated by 
conditional split fraction assignments. For instance, based on the plant design information, the Reactor 
Containment Fan Cooler (RCFC) system, included in the Plant Response ET as one of the front-line systems, 
requires heat removal by the CCW system. Its functional dependency is addressed by defining the 
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conditional split fractions for the RCFC top event so that the conditional probability of RCFC failure, given 
the CCW failure probability, is unity, while the conditional probability of RCFC failure, given the success 
of the CCW operation, is determined based on the random failure of the CCW system.  
The scope of the plant PRA model in this case study is based on the previous plant fire risk study 
conducted under the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program [120]. The Plant 
Response ET considers the dominant PRA scenarios identified as significant contributors to the plant risk 
in the previous fire risk study. Specifically, the plant PRA model assumes that (i) the reactor is successfully 
tripped following the fire-induced SB-LOCA, (ii) the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) inadvertently 
close, and (iii) no steam generator PORV or safety valve is available for providing secondary side heat 
removal. To model the plant system response to the fire-induced cable damages in the switchgear room, the 
Plant Response ET and the Support System ET are constructed and quantified using the RISKMAN® 
application developed by ABS Consulting [111] and are linked through a shared initiating event, i.e., the 
fire ignition by the electrical cabinets. In the Plant Response ET, three end states are considered: Success, 
Early Core Damage, and Late Core Damage. The “Success” end state is defined as the scenarios leading to 
successful reactor shutdown and long-term core cooling without core damage. The “Early Core Damage” 
end state is defined as the core damage scenarios with high Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure, caused 
by the failure of all High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) systems and the operators’ failure in depressurizing 
the RCS after the loss of the HHSI systems. The “Late Core Damage” end state is defined as the scenarios 
where the core damage occurs while the RCS pressure is low, i.e., either the HHSI system or the RCS 
depressurization by the operators is success; however, the long-term heat cooling is not established due to 
the failure of containment recirculation or heat removal. The details on these two ETs, such as the logic 
structure, a list of pivotal events, and the definition of end states, are shown in Appendix G. The conditional 
split fractions for the top events are provided as direct inputs to RISKMAN® using the point values 
provided in Ref. [121]. For the three Fire PRA approaches (listed in Table 2.8), the same plant PRA model, 




2.5.2.3 Fire Ignition Frequency and Fire Progression Model  
Even though updated data and methods are available for characterizing fire ignition frequency [31], 
this case study uses the fire ignition frequency from the fire risk study by the plant under the IPEEE program 
[120, 122, 123]. All three Fire PRA approaches use the same point estimate, 1.33E-3 fires per year, for the 
ESF Train A switchgear room. 
The “full compartment burn” screening approach does not require a fire progression model as it 
assumes all targets inside the fire compartment are damaged with certainty. For the NUREG/CR-6850 
approach and the Fire I-PRA framework, among the five fire models verified and validated by the U.S. 
NRC [112], the FDS [40] is selected as a fire progression model. The whole fire compartment, shown in 
Figure 2.8, is included in the computational domain of the FDS code. To take advantage of parallel 
computation, the fire compartment is divided into 39 meshes. Each mesh is assigned to one computation 
node and the entire FDS simulation is executed using the MPI. Based on the mesh resolution study [5], 
each mesh is discretized into 0.10 m cubic grid cells. This grid size generates, in total, 85 × 85 × 30 grids 
for the low-ceiling portion and 86 × 85 × 90 grids for the high-ceiling portion. Each cable is modeled as a 
cylinder with a 1.5 cm diameter and homogeneous physical properties in accordance with the THIEF 
method [114]. The heat of combustion and product yields of XLPE cables with neoprene jackets are chosen 
based on the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [124].  
2.5.2.4. Circuit Failure Model 
In all three Fire PRA approaches (listed in Table 2.8), the aleatory uncertainty of the hot short 
circuit failure for the pressurizer PORV, given the fire-induced damage to cable tray B, is treated by a 
conditional probability table provided in NUREG-7150 [51]. In this study, the pressurizer PORV is 
assumed to be a Solenoid-Operated Valve controlled by a double break control circuit for ungrounded 
alternating current. The mean value in Ref. [51] for this circuit category (0.48) is used as the conditional 
probability for spurious actuation of the pressurizer PORV, given fire-induced damage to cable tray B. 
Meanwhile, as stated, the conditional failure probabilities of the ECW and CCW systems, given the fire-
induced damage to the associated cable trays, is conservatively assumed to be unity. Note that the accuracy 
of these conditional probabilities of circuit failure for the ECW and CCW systems can be improved by 
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conducting a more detailed circuit failure analysis (Tasks 9 and 10 of NUREG/CR-6850 [29]) considering 
aleatory uncertainty associated with the occurrence and duration of the fire-induced circuit failure following 
the fire-induced cable damage.  
2.5.2.5. Fire-Induced Damage Probability Generation 
One of the key differences among the three Fire PRA approaches is how the probabilities of fire-
induced damage to cable trays and the electrical cabinet are generated. With the “full compartment burn” 
screening approach, the fire-induced damage probabilities are conservatively assumed to be unity; that is, 
after fire ignition, all targets within the fire compartment are damaged with certainty. In the NUREG/CR-
6850 approach, the fire-induced damage probabilities are computed by the severity factor method. In Fire 
I-PRA, the fire-induced damage probabilities are quantified by conducting uncertainty propagation using 
the MC simulation (as explained in Section 2.3.6). Some of the input parameters in the FDS are treated as 
random variables represented by the probability distributions listed in Table 2.3 (Section 2.4.3). Based on 
the convergence study shown in Section 2.4.3, three batches of replicated LHS with 50 random samples in 
each batch (150 random samples in total) are used to estimate the fire-induced cable damage probabilities. 
The point estimates of the cable damage probabilities are provided as inputs to the Scenario-Based Damage 
Model which is constructed and quantified in RISKMAN® software.  
2.5.2.6. Interactions of Fire Brigade with Fire Progression 
Another key difference among the three Fire PRA approaches is how the interactions between fire 
progression and manual suppression are modeled. The “full compartment burn” screening approach does 
not credit any fire detection and suppression since it assumes all targets are certainly damaged, thereby 
eliminating the need for addressing the interface between fire progression and manual fire suppression. 
With the NUREG/CR-6850 approach, the manual suppression is incorporated by an “implicit” interface, 
where the time-to-damage, computed by a physical fire model without fire detection and suppression, is 
compared to the time-to-suppression derived from the data-driven non-suppression curve provided in 
NUREG-2169 [31].  
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2.5.2.7. Results and Discussion 
Table 2.9 shows the point estimates of CDF due to the selected fire-induced scenario (shown in 
Figure 2.8) computed by the three Fire PRA methodologies. The NUREG/CR-6850 approach has reduced 
the total CDF by one order of magnitude compared with the “full compartment burn” screening approach, 
while Fire I-PRA has reduced the total CDF by approximately 50% compared with the NUREG/CR-6850 
approach. The sources of reduction in the risk estimate can be understood based on the key differences 
among the three approaches (Table 2.8). The risk estimate reduction by the NUREG/CR-6850 approach 
compared with the “full compartment burn” screening approach is achieved by an explicit modeling of fire 
progression using FDS and by crediting the manual suppression through an “implicit” method based on the 
competition between time-to-target-damage and time-to-suppression. On the other hand, the risk estimate 
reduction by the Fire I-PRA framework, compared with the NUREG/CR-6850 approach, is achieved by 
methodological advancements in (i) uncertainty propagation and fire-induced damage probability 
estimation and (ii) the explicit interface between fire progression and manual fire suppression. Although 
these results are specific to the selected scenario and cannot be generalized for other scenarios, this case 
study indicates that, in a typical NPP setting, the degree of realism in Fire PRA methodology could be 
significantly improved by the methodological advancements implemented in the Fire I-PRA framework. 
Table 2.9 Core Damage Frequency of the selected fire-induced scenario computed by three Fire PRA 
approaches. 
Methodology Early CDF  [per year] 
Late CDF  
[per year] 
Total CDF  
[per year] 
“Full compartment burn” 
screening approach 1.54E-10 2.84E-7 2.84E-7 
Current Fire PRA methodology 
(NUREG/CR-6850) 1.47E-11 2.70E-8 2.71E-8 
Integrated Fire PRA 
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CHAPTER 3: GLOBAL IMPORTANCE MEASURE METHODOLOGY FOR INTEGRATED 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter relates to Step 6 in the roadmap of the research presented in Figure 3.1, and develops 
the IM methodology for the I-PRA methodological framework. This chapter is based on the conference 
papers [1, 2] and the journal publication [3] by the author.  
 
Figure 3.1 Research roadmap. 
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In PRA, IM analysis is one of the key post analyses [4]. It provides a quantitative ranking of risk-
contributing factors (e.g., component failures, human failure events) based on the contribution of these 
factors to the system-level risk estimates, such as core damage frequency, for an NPP. The results of IM 
ranking offer valuable inputs to decision-making by identifying the dominant risk contributors and sources 
of uncertainty. This helps decision makers steer resource allocations in a direction that will effectively 
reduce system risk and the associated uncertainty. Classical IM methods, such as Fussell-Vesely IM (FV-
IM) and Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) that are commonly utilized in classical PRA [5-8], are found to 
have limited capabilities and that, when applied to the I-PRA methodological framework, could produce 
misleading rankings of risk-contributing factors. These classical IM methods are designed to generate a 
risk-importance ranking of components at the basic event level in classical PRA; however, they cannot rank 
input parameters at the failure mechanism level (i.e., the input parameters in the Input Module) in the I-
PRA methodological framework. The two reasons are: (i) input parameters in I-PRA can have multiple 
units and ranges, unlike classical PRA models where the basic event probabilities have no units and only 
range from 0 to 1, and (ii) the Simulation Module in I-PRA usually includes non-closed form equations 
(e.g., differential equations for underlying physical phenomena) and this generates non-linearity and 
interactions among input parameters, while a classical PRA model (i.e., ET, FT) can be expressed in a 
closed-form equation as a linear function of input parameters at the basic event level, i.e., basic event 
probabilities, initiating event frequency.  
To select a proper IM method for ranking the input parameters in I-PRA, this research conducts a 
comparative study, based on the relevant literature on IM and Sensitivity Analysis (SA) methods, to identify 
the key attributes that differentiate various types of importance ranking approaches and to utilize these 
attributes to justify the selection of an IM method for I-PRA. Section 3.2 provides qualitative justifications 
for the selected IM method (i.e. moment-independent Global IM) for I-PRA. Section 3.3 then justifies the 
applicability and usefulness of the Global IM method for I-PRA quantitatively using four case studies: 
Ishigami function (Section 3.3.1), two FT models (Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), and two reduced-order I-PRA 
frameworks developed for GSI-191 (Section 3.3.4) and for Fire PRA (Section 3.3.5). Gap Analysis and 
future work associated with GIM for I-PRA are included in Chapter 6.  
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3.2 Qualitative Justification to Support the Selection of the Global Importance Measure Methodology 
for I-PRA 
Appendix H provides a comprehensive literature review on the existing SA and IM methods in the 
PRA domain including (i) local and one-way methods and their extensions and (ii) global methods 
(correlation-based, variance-based, and moment-independent). These existing SA and IM methods differ 
in their capabilities to account for: (a) the level of analysis of the risk-contributing factors (i.e., component 
vs. failure-mechanism level), (b) uncertainty of input parameters, (c) uncertainty of the model outputs, and 
(d) non-linearity and interactions among input parameters inside the model. This section highlights these 
four points (i.e., a, b, c, and d) in the context of the I-PRA framework and compares different categories of 
SA and IM methods with respect to their capabilities to address these four aspects. Based on the 
comparisons, the conclusion is that the cdf-based moment-independent Global IM is the most appropriate 
IM methodology for the I-PRA framework to obtain the ranking of input parameters at the failure 
mechanism level. This conclusion is quantitatively supported by the case studies conducted in Section 3.3.  
(a) Level of analysis of the risk-contributing factors: The purpose of the IM analysis in this research 
is to generate the ranking of input parameters in I-PRA at the failure mechanism level. In other words, the 
IM methodology in this research should be able to rank the input parameters of the Simulation Module 
(module ‘b’ in Figure 2.3) with respect to their impact on the system risk metrics, i.e., the risk metrics 
computed by the “Plant-Specific PRA Module” (module ‘d’ in Figure 2.3). As stated in Appendix H, 
classical IMs (e.g., FV-IM, RAW) and their extensions [9-11], and the DIM method have only been applied 
for input parameters at the level of PRA basic events or at the level of the parameters of failure probability 
distributions associated with PRA basic events. In contrast, other SA and IM methods, including the one-
way SA (e.g., tornado diagram), Morris screening method, and Global SA/IM methods, have been applied 
for the input parameters at the failure mechanism level. In the remainder of this section, therefore, those 
SA and IM methods that have been applied at the failure mechanism level are compared based on their 
capabilities to address the other three aspects: uncertainty of input parameters, uncertainty of the model 
outputs, and non-linearity and interactions inside the model.  
(b) Uncertainty of input parameters: The input parameters of the I-PRA framework have 
uncertainties characterized by the associated probability distributions. Because the explicit consideration of 
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uncertainty (both aleatory and epistemic) is one of the most important elements of PRA [12], the IM 
methodology selected for I-PRA should be capable of capturing the uncertainty of input parameters. The 
one-way SA, e.g., the tornado diagram and sensitivity plot methods, addresses the range of input parameters 
(i.e., upper and lower bounds) [13], but does not, however, fully capture the probability distribution 
representing the uncertainty of input parameters. In addition, in the one-way SA, the choice of upper and 
lower bounds of the individual input parameter is not straightforward when the uncertainty is represented 
by a continuous probability distribution, since continuous probability distributions do not necessarily have 
finite upper and lower bounds. Global SA and IM methods can account for uncertainty associated with 
input parameters, including both range and shape of probability distribution, because the sensitivity is 
computed by randomly sampling input parameters from the probability distributions [14-19]. 
(c) Uncertainty of the model outputs: When the uncertainty of input parameters is propagated 
through the I-PRA framework, the resultant model output, i.e., the system risk estimates, also have 
uncertainty. The consideration of uncertainty associated with the model output is crucial in the IM analysis 
to (i) obtain an adequate understanding of the influence of uncertainty on the ranking and (ii) avoid too 
large a sensitivity to the outlier which could mislead the ranking. The one-way SA methods address the 
uncertainty of model output by computing the upper and lower bounds of the model response. Although 
these methods can capture the range of model output, the probability distribution representing the 
uncertainty of the model output is not explicitly considered. Meanwhile, the adequacy of the correlation-
based global methods in this regard depends on whether the variation of the model output is accurately 
captured by the selected regression method [20-22]. Also, when the coefficient of determination (RY2) is 
used as a measure of sensitivity, the correlation-based global methods can suffer from the same limitation 
as the variance-based global methods (as discussed below) since the RY2 value is defined as the ratio of the 
variance of the regression model output to that of the original data. On the other hand, although the variance-
based global methods capture uncertainty of the model output using its variance, these methods can produce 
misleading conclusions when (i) input parameters and the model output have asymmetric uncertainty 
distributions and long tails [23-25], or (ii) the model output has multiple modes [26, 27]. Several studies 
demonstrated that the input parameters, which have the largest influence on the variance of the model output, 
do not necessarily have the largest influence on the entire probability distribution of model output [22, 28-
31]; therefore, “the variance alone does not always measure the overall decision-maker uncertainty on the 
model output” [22]. In contrast, the moment-independent global methods capture uncertainty of the model 
output using the probability distribution (either pdf or cdf) as a measure of sensitivity. As stated in Appendix 
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H, there are two categories of moment-independent Global IMs: the pdf-based method δi [29] and cdf-based 
methods including Si (CDF) [31] and the PAWN index [27]. The pdf-based method has the limitation that (i) 
the construction of empirical pdf (e.g., histogram, kernel density estimation) is affected by the user-
specified tuning parameters [27] and (ii) when compared to the cdf-based method, a smaller amount of 
information on uncertainty of the model output (i.e., only the maximum distance between conditional and 
unconditional cdfs) can be addressed [31]. When comparing the two cdf-based methods, Si (CDF) [31] and 
the PAWN index [27], Si (CDF) has the capability to address the uncertainty of the model output since it 
considers the entire region of cdf, while the PAWN index [27] only quantifies the maximum deviation 
between cdfs. 
(d) Non-linearity and interactions inside the model: In the I-PRA framework, the Plant-Specific 
PRA Module is formulated by a linear function of basic event probabilities and initiating event frequencies, 
while the Simulation Module is composed of spatio-temporal models of underlying physical failure 
mechanisms, often formed by non-linear governing equations with many input parameters. The I-PRA 
framework, therefore, involves non-linearity and interaction among input parameters. Due to their local and 
OAT nature (i.e., only one input is varied at a time), classical IM and one-way SA methods are incapable 
of capturing non-linearity and interactions in the model [32]. Correlation-based global methods are 
inadequate for addressing this aspect because their performance could deteriorate either when the model is 
a non-monotonic function or when a higher degree of interaction is involved [33, 34]. Although the non-
parametric regression methods are less restrictive than the parametric regression methods in terms of the 
assumed input-output relationships, they have limitations: (i) their ranking is not fully “model-independent”, 
i.e., the results could be strongly influenced by the choice of regression model [9], (ii) they could overfit 
the data and may introduce artificial input-output relationships, and (iii) they could be computationally 
expensive as more input-output data are necessary than with the parametric regression methods [35]. In 
contrast, the variance-based and moment-independent global methods can more accurately capture non-
linearity and interactions of parameters by sampling all input parameters simultaneously and without using 
the first-derivative-based sensitivity measure. 
In this research, the Morris screening method [38] is not considered as an alternative for the IM 
methodology in I-PRA. Although the Morris screening method can accurately distinguish the influential 
from the non-influential input parameters in most cases, when compared to the Global SA and IM methods 
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[18, 33, 36], it may sometimes provide an inaccurate ranking among the influential input parameters. Indeed, 
one can conduct a two-phase IM analysis by first using the Morris screening method to facilitate the 
execution of another IM method [33, 36-39]: i.e., in the first phase, non-influential input parameters are 
screened out by the Morris screening method, and in the second phase, the final ranking of the influential 
input parameters is computed by a more accurate and complex IM method. The Morris screening method 
is thus considered as a complemental tool for the IM methodology in I-PRA, rather than as an individual 
alternative for the IM methodology.  
In conclusion, for ranking the input parameters in I-PRA, this research selects the cdf-based 
moment-independent Global IM, Si (CDF), considering that (i) Si (CDF) can explicitly address all four aspects 
of the I-PRA framework, i.e., (a) the ranking at the failure mechanism level, (b) uncertainty of input 
parameters, (c) uncertainty of the model output, and (d) non-linearity and interactions inside the model, and 
(ii) among the three moment-independent Global IM methods (identified in Appendix H), Si (CDF) captures 
more information on the uncertainty of the model output. The computational procedure for estimating Si 
(CDF) is explained in Appendix I.  
3.3 Quantitative Case Studies to Support the Selection of the Global Importance Measure 
Methodology for I-PRA 
This section demonstrates the application of the selected Global IM, Si(CDF), to four quantitative 
case studies: Ishigami function (Section 3.3.1), two FT models (Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), and two reduced-
order I-PRA frameworks developed for GSI-191 (Section 3.3.4) and for Fire PRA (Section 3.3.5). These 
case studies are designed based on the four key aspects (a, b, c, and d) identified in Section 3.2 to provide 
quantitative justifications for the selection of the Global IM method in I-PRA. It should be noted that this 
section does not aim to offer a comprehensive comparative and quantitative study for all existing IM and 
SA methods. Rather, these case studies aim to (i) compare the results of the selected Global IM method 
with a representative one-way SA method, i.e., the tornado diagram, using models with different structures 
and degrees of complexity, (ii) explore the influences of non-linearity and interactions inside the model on 
the results of the selected Global IM and one-way SA methods, and (iii) demonstrate the feasibility of the 
selected Global IM method for the I-PRA framework (Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5). The FT models (Sections 
3.3.2 and 3.3.3) are primarily used for studying the influences of non-linearity and interactions inside the 
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model on the ranking of input parameters. For the FT models, two commonly-used classical IMs, FV-IM 
and RAW, are also calculated to set the stage for future research on making a physical and practical 
relationship between the results of Global IM and those from classical IMs in risk-informed applications. 
3.3.1 Mathematical Model: Ishigami Function 
The Ishigami function is a nonlinear and non-monotonic mathematical function [40] and commonly 
used to check the performance of SA and IM methods [29, 31]:  
 𝑌𝑌 = sin𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑎𝑎sin 2𝑋𝑋2 + 𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋34 sin𝑋𝑋1, (3.1) 
where Xi (i = 1, 2, 3) are three independent input parameters, while the coefficients a and b are constants, a 
= 5 and b = 0.1. Each input parameter Xi (i = 1, 2, 3) is distributed in a uniform distribution [– π, π]. 
Figure 3.2 shows the results of the tornado diagram, selected as a representative one-way SA 
method. In Figure 3.2, the change in the model output Y, relative to the nominal output, is plotted when 
decreasing (black bar) and increasing (gray bar) each input parameter by the OAT method. X2 is identified 
as the most influential factor, followed by X1 and X3. Moreover, Figure 3.2 reveals that the Ishigami function 
is a non-monotonic function with respect to input parameter X2 as both the increased and decreased values 
of X2 increase the model output. Also, the sensitivity to X3 is calculated to be zero because the third term of 
Equation (3.1) becomes zero when input parameter X1 is set to its nominal value. This fact illustrates the 
key limitation of the one-way SA method when applied to a non-monotonic model. 
Table 3.1 reports the ranking of input parameters based on the cdf-based moment-independent 
Global IM method, Si(CDF). The expected value, S̅i (CDF), represents the influence of each input parameter on 
the model output and is used as a sensitivity indicator to rank the input parameters. By the convergence 
study (using the procedure in Appendix I), the sample sizes for the outer and inner loops are determined to 
be n1 = 1,500 and n2 = 100, respectively. Table 3.1 shows that the standard error of the estimated S̅i(CDF), 
denoted by s [Si (CDF)], is relatively small compared to S̅i(CDF), indicating that Monte Carlo simulation for 
computing Si (CDF) converged well. X1 is identified as the most influential factor, followed by X2 and X3. This 
ranking is different from the tornado diagram (Figure 3.2) which identified X2 as the most important factor. 
This indicates that the one-way SA could produce a misleading ranking of input parameters for a non-linear 




Figure 3.2 The tornado diagram for the Ishigami function. 




S̅i(CDF) s [Si (CDF)] 
X1 0.813 (1) 0.019 
X2 0.656 (2) 0.015 
X3 0.419 (3) 0.014 
3.3.2 Linear Fault Tree Model 
Si (CDF), tornado diagram, and classical IMs (FV-IM, RAW) are applied to a linear fault tree model 
[41], where the top event frequency Y is given by a function of initiating event frequencies (X1, X2) and 
basic event probabilities (X3 to X7): 
 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋3𝑋𝑋5 + 𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋3𝑋𝑋6 + 𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋4𝑋𝑋5 + 𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋4𝑋𝑋6 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋3𝑋𝑋4 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋3𝑋𝑋5 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋4𝑋𝑋5 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋5𝑋𝑋6
+ 𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋4𝑋𝑋7 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋6𝑋𝑋7, 
(3.2) 
where uncertainty of each input parameter is represented by a lognormal distribution. The mean value E[Xi] 
and error factor EF [Xi] of each input parameter are listed in the second to fourth columns of Table 3.2 [31, 
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41]. This model is considered to be a linear function of input parameters, as the maximum order of each 
input parameter in each term on the right-hand side of Equation (3.2) is the first order.  
Table 3.2 List of input parameters of the linear fault tree model (second to fourth columns) and the 
ranking of input parameters based on Si (CDF) (fifth and sixth columns) and classical IMs (last two 
columns). S̅i (CDF): expected value of Si (CDF) and s [Si (CDF)]: standard error of the estimate of Si (CDF). The 
parenthesized number indicates the ranking of input parameter. 
Input Distribution E [Xi] EF [Xi] 
Si (CDF) Classical IM 
S̅i (CDF) s [Si (CDF)] FV-IM RAW 
X 1 Lognormal 2 2 0.085 (6) 0.001 NA NA 
X 2 Lognormal 3 2 0.265 (1) 0.004 NA NA 
X 3 Lognormal 0.001 2 0.057 (7) 0.001 0.06 (5) 165   (2) 
X 4 Lognormal 0.002 2 0.132 (4) 0.001 0.13 (3) 192   (1) 
X 5 Lognormal 0.004 2 0.189 (3) 0.002 0.19 (2) 137   (3) 
X 6 Lognormal 0.005 2 0.214 (2) 0.004 0.21 (1) 124   (4) 
X 7 Lognormal 0.003 2 0.099 (5) 0.001 0.10 (4) 96.6  (5) 
 
Based on the tornado diagram (Figure 3.3), the relative importance of input parameters is identified 
as X2 > X6 > X5 > X4 > X7 > X1 > X3. Figure 3.3 indicates that this linear fault tree model is a monotonically 
increasing function with respect to every input parameter. Meanwhile, the results of Global IM are shown 
in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 3.2. Based on the convergence study (using the computational 
procedure in Appendix A), the sample sizes for the outer and inner loops are determined as n1 = 1,070 and 
n2 = 530, respectively. A relatively small standard deviation, compared to the expected value of Si(CDF), 
indicates the sufficient convergence of the Monte Carlo simulation. Based on the expected value of Si(CDF), 
X2 is identified as the most influential factor, followed by X6, X5, X4, X7, X1, and X3. This ranking of input 




Figure 3.3 Results of the tornado diagram for the linear fault tree model with the input parameters listed 
in Table 3.2. 
The last two columns of Table 3.2 show the ranking of basic events by classical IMs, FV-IM and 
RAW. These classical IMs are computed based on the median of each basic event probability. For initiating 
events, FV-IM and RAW are not computed as they are not applicable to the initiating event frequency. The 
ranking of basic event probabilities based on Si(CDF) and one-way SA agrees with the FV-IM, while it differs 
from the RAW.  
To investigate the influences of uncertainty associated with input parameters on the ranking results, 
this linear FT model is analyzed with different input parameters having various mean values and error 
factors. Here, the mean value E [Xi] and error factor EF [Xi] of lognormal distributions are randomly varied 
and the results of three IM methods (i.e., Si (CDF), tornado diagram, and classical IMs) are compared. For 
some combinations of mean values and error factors, the results of Si(CDF) are found to be different from the 
results of the tornado diagram. One example of such settings of input parameters is shown in Table 3.3.  
Figure 3.4 shows the tornado diagram calculated for the linear FT model with the input parameters 
in Table 3.3. The ranking of input parameters is determined as X2 > X3 > X5 > X7 > X1 > X4 > X6. On the 
other hand, the results of Si(CDF), shown in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 3.3, show that the input 
parameters are ranked as X2 > X5 > X3 > X7 > X4 > X1 > X6. Hence, the second and third most influential 
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factors are not the same for Si(CDF) and the tornado diagram. This indicates that, when the degree of 
uncertainties associated with input parameters becomes higher, one-way SA may misidentify the ranking 
of crucial input parameters. Meanwhile, for this set of input parameters, the results of both FV-IM and 
RAW (in the last two columns of Table 3.3) differ from the results of Si(CDF) and the tornado diagram. 
Table 3.3 List of input parameters of a linear fault tree model which resulted in a different ranking among 
three IM methods (second to fourth columns) and the ranking of input parameters based on Si (CDF) (fifth 
and sixth columns) and two classical IMs (last two columns). The parenthesized number indicates the 
ranking of input parameters. 
Input Distribution E [Xi] EF [Xi] 
Si (CDF) Classical IM 
S̅i (CDF) s [Si (CDF)] FV-IM RAW 
X 1 Lognormal 2 2.0 0.084 (6) 0.001 NA NA 
X 2 Lognormal 3 2.0 0.274 (1) 0.002 NA NA 
X 3 Lognormal 0.001 4.3 0.115 (3) 0.002 0.164 (5) 165   (2) 
X 4 Lognormal 0.002 1.6 0.086 (5) 0.000 0.384 (3) 192   (1) 
X 5 Lognormal 0.004 1.6 0.130 (2) 0.001 0.548 (2) 137   (3) 
X 6 Lognormal 0.005 1.2 0.049 (7) 0.000 0.616 (1) 124   (4) 
X 7 Lognormal 0.003 2.0 0.098 (4) 0.001 0.288 (4) 96.6  (5) 
 




3.3.3 Non-linear Fault Tree Model  
As the third quantitative case study, a FT model of a hypothetical system (Figure 3.5) involving 
CCF is considered. In this system, components D1, D2, and D3 are identical and subjected to CCF.  
 
Figure 3.5 Block diagram of the hypothetical fault tree model. 
The Boolean expression for the top event T is given by 
 T = A + B ∙ C + D1,I ∙ D2,I ∙ D3,I + D123,C, (3.3) 
where Dj,I (j = 1, 2, 3) represents the independent failures of redundant components D, while D123,C 
represents the CCF among D1, D2, and D3. Here, the CCF is modeled by the beta factor approach [42]. 
Using rare-event approximation, the probability of the top event (T) is, therefore, given by 
 Pr(T) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) Pr(C) + [(1 − 𝛽𝛽) Pr(DT)]3 + 𝛽𝛽 Pr(DT), (3.4) 
where Pr (DT) is the total failure probability of component D (i.e., the sum of independent failure and CCF 
probabilities), and β represents the beta factor defined as the ratio of CCF probability to the total failure 
probability and is assumed to be β = 0.1. The model output is the top event probability, Pr (T). This model 
aims to investigate the effects of non-linearity on the ranking of input parameters; namely, this model is a 
non-linear function in terms of the input parameter Pr (DT), as Pr (DT) is the third order in the third term on 
the right-hand side. The input parameters (i.e., basic event probabilities of A, B, C, and DT) are 
independently distributed in lognormal distributions, specified by the mean value E [Xi] and error factor EF 
[Xi]. Many combinations of E [Xi] and EF [Xi] are tested to compare the ranking of input parameters by 
Si(CDF), the tornado diagram, and two classical IM methods (FV-IM, RAW). 
In Table 3.4, the second to fourth columns show the set of E [Xi] and EF [Xi] which led to the same 
rankings by Si(CDF) (fifth and sixth columns of Table 3.4) and the tornado diagram (Figure 3.6), where 
component D is identified as the most important basic event, followed by components A, B and C. We 
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should note that, given this set of probability distributions, the fourth term in Equation (3.4), representing 
the contribution by CCF, makes a much higher contribution than the others. In this case, the difference 
between the rankings by Global IM and one-way SA does not appear, since the importance of the most 
influential factor (i.e., component D) is much higher than the others.  
Table 3.4 List of input parameters of a nonlinear fault tree model which resulted in the same ranking 
among three IM methods (second to fourth columns) and their ranking based on Si(CDF) (fifth and sixth 
columns) and classical IMs (last two columns). The parenthesized number indicates the ranking of the 
input parameters. 
Input Distribution E [Xi] EF [Xi] 
Si (CDF) Classical IM 
S̅i (CDF) s [Si (CDF)] FV-IM RAW 
A Lognormal 1.0 × 10−5 2 0.007 (2) 0.000 0.020 (2) 1960     (1) 
B Lognormal 1.0 × 10−3 2 0.001 (3) 0.000 0.002 (3) 2.96      (3) 
C Lognormal 1.0 × 10−3 2 0.001 (3) 0.000 0.002 (3) 2.96      (3) 
DT Lognormal 5.0 × 10−3 2 0.452 (1) 0.005 0.978 (1) 1620     (2) 
 
Figure 3.6 The tornado diagram for the non-linear fault tree model with the input parameters in Table 3.4.  
This observation indicates that the existence of non-linearity in the model does not always lead to 
a disagreement between Global IM and one-way SA. In other words, whether Global IM produces the same 
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ranking as one-way SA depends not only on the existence of non-linearity and interactions in the model, 
but also on the characteristics of the input parameters, e.g., the magnitude and the degree of uncertainty of 
the input parameters. Meanwhile, for this set of input parameters, the FV-IM generates the same ranking as 
Si(CDF) and the tornado diagram, while the RAW generates a different ranking.  
In contrast, Table 3.5 shows the set of E [Xi] and EF [Xi] which has led to the different ranking by 
Si(CDF) (fifth and sixth columns of Table 3.5) and the tornado diagram (Figure 3.7). The tornado diagram 
identified component D as the most important, while Si(CDF) identified component A. Meanwhile, for this 
set of input parameters, both FV-IM and RAW (the last two columns of Table 3.5) generate the same 
ranking (A > DT > B ~ C) as the Global IM. The observations on the classical IM methods in this section 
indicate that the relationship of classical IMs (FV-IM and RAW) with Global IM and one-way SA depends 
on the choice of input parameters; for the input parameters listed in Table 3.4, both Global IM and one-way 
SA agree only with FV-IM; in contrast, for the input parameters listed in Table 3.5, both FV-IM and RAW 
agree with Global IM, but not with the one-way SA. It is not possible to derive a simple relationship between 
classical IM, one-way SA, and Global IM methods based solely on these results for two fault tree case 
studies, and future research is necessary to understand the physical and systematic interpretations of Global 
IM when compared to the classical IMs in practical PRA applications.  
Table 3.5 List of input parameters of the nonlinear fault tree model which resulted in the same ranking 
among three IM methods (second to fourth columns) and their ranking based on Si(CDF) fifth and sixth 
columns) and classical IMs (last two columns). The parenthesized number indicates the ranking of the 
corresponding input parameter. 
Input Distribution E [Xi] EF [Xi] 
Si (CDF) Classical IM 
S̅i (CDF) s [Si (CDF)] FV-IM RAW 
A Lognormal 1.0 × 10−3 1.2 0.098 (1) 0.000 0.908 (1) 908    (1) 
B Lognormal 1.0 × 10−3 4.3 0.001 (3) 0.000 0.001 (3) 1.91   (3) 
C Lognormal 1.0 × 10−3 3.6 0.001 (3) 0.000 0.001 (3) 1.91   (3) 





Figure 3.7 The tornado diagram for the non-linear fault tree model with the input parameter distributions 
in Table 3.5, showing a different input parameter ranking by Global IM and one-way SA 
3.3.4 Reduced-Order I-PRA for Generic Safety Issue 191 
The selected Global IM, Si(CDF), is applied to the reduced-order I-PRA developed for the risk-
informed resolution of GSI-191 [2, 43-48]. This case study aims to provide quantitative justifications for 
the selected Global IM by showing its applicability for a realistic I-PRA framework and to demonstrate that 
the Global IM method can generate valuable outputs which cannot be obtained by one-way and local 
methods.  
GSI-191 is a safety issue for pressurized water reactors (PWR) [49], associated with the scenarios 
following an LOCA, where debris (e.g., insulation, failed coatings, and latent dust and dirt) can be generated 
in the primary containment vessel by the LOCA break jet. Such debris is transported into the containment 
sump by coolant jet flows ejected through a break of the primary coolant boundary. After a certain time 
following a LOCA, the water collected in the containment sump should be recirculated into the reactor core 
to remove decay heat. In the recirculation phase, the debris that is transported into the containment sump 
poses two potential hazards: (a) the transported debris plugs up the Emergency Core Cooling System 
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(ECCS) strainers, and (b) the debris penetrating the ECCS strainers blocks coolant channels in the reactor 
core. Since the identification of GSI-191, significant efforts by both the nuclear industry and the regulatory 
agency were made using deterministic approaches that relied on experimental data and deterministic 
engineering analyses [49]. Because of limited success using those traditional approaches, the U.S. NRC 
suggested a risk-informed approach [50]. In 2011, the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company 
initiated a pilot plant project for risk-informed resolution of GSI-191 [43, 51, 52], where an I-PRA 
framework was developed to deal with the dynamic and location-specific nature of the physical failure 
mechanisms identified in GSI-191 [43]. This I-PRA framework has two main modules: (i) a Plant-Specific 
PRA Module and (ii) Containment Accident Stochastic Analysis Grande (CASA Grande). The CASA 
Grande simulates underlying physical processes associated with GSI-191, such as a location-specific LOCA 
occurrence, jet formation, debris generation, debris transport, strainer head loss, chemical effects on head 
loss in debris beds, and thermal-hydraulics in the reactor coolant system. With spatio-temporal modeling 
of underlying physical processes, key performance measures associated with GSI-191 scenarios are 
computed by CASA Grande, including ECCS strainer head loss and debris accumulation in fuel assemblies. 
Uncertainty quantification is conducted on the CASA Grande to propagate the uncertainties associated with 
input parameters and to compute the failure probabilities of the interfaced basic events. The calculated 
failure probabilities of the interfacing basic events are then used as inputs to the Plant-Specific PRA Module 
that computes the system risk metrics using classical PRA models, i.e., ETs and FTs. More details on this 
I-PRA framework for a risk-informed resolution of GSI-191 are presented in Ref. [43, 53]. 
To demonstrate the applicability of the selected Global IM method for the I-PRA framework, a 
reduced-order I-PRA for GSI-191 is developed in this case study (Figure 3.8). This I-PRA is a “reduced-
order” model in that (i) the Plant-Specific PRA Module utilizes a hypothetical and simplified PRA and (ii) 
compared to the scope of the original CASA Grande, the scope of the simulation module (“Reduced-Order 




Figure 3.8 Reduced-Order Integrated PRA (I-PRA) framework for a hypothetical GSI-191 scenario 
3.3.4.1 Plant-Specific PRA Module 
As illustrated in Figure 3.8, the Plant-Specific PRA Module consists of an ET and FT, representing 
a hypothetical PRA scenario following a LOCA (‘IE’ in Figure 3.8). The ET indicates that the core damage 
state occurs when both the hardware system (HS) and the operator intervention (OP) fail. Using a rare-
event approximation, the core damage frequency is expressed by 
 𝑓𝑓(CD) = 𝑓𝑓(IE) Pr(a) Pr(b) Pr(OP) + 𝑓𝑓(IE) Pr(CB) Pr(OP). (3.5) 
To quantify f (CD), failure probabilities of all basic events and the initiating event frequency should 
be specified. The frequency of the initiating event, f (IE), is assumed to be 1 × 10–4 [1/year] based on a 
typical range of a LOCA frequency [54]. Among three basic events associated with the hardware system 
(‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘CB’), CB represents the reactor core blockage due to debris accumulation, one of the potential 
112 
 
failure modes induced by GSI-191. The failure probability of CB is computed by the Reduced-Order CASA, 
as described below. Basic events a and b are caused by non-GSI-191 failure modes (e.g., random failure of 
components) and their probabilities are Pr (a) = Pr (b) = 0.1. The failure probability of the top event OP is 
assumed to be Pr (OP) = 0.05. 
3.3.4.2. Reduced-Order CASA Grande 
In this research, the Reduced-Order CASA Grande is developed to simulate underlying physical 
processes leading to GSI-191. This Reduced-Order CASA is a limited-scope version of the original CASA 
Grande [43, 52] in that it explicitly addresses a portion of the underlying physical processes that were 
included in the original full-scope CASA Grande. After a LOCA occurs, piping and equipment insulation 
debris are generated by a jet flow from the break. The zone of influence and debris size distribution depend 
on several factors, such as the break size, weld location, and geometry of concrete structure in the 
containment building. The generated debris is then transported to the containment water pool by several 
modes of debris transport, e.g., blowdown, washdown, and recirculation transport. In the Reduced-Order 
CASA developed in this study, these physical processes associated with the debris generation and transport 
are treated in an implicit way through the stochasticity of the input parameters, rather than by an explicit 
modeling of the associated physical processes as done in the original full-scope CASA Grande [43, 52]. 
Meanwhile, in the Reduced-Order CASA, the differential equations described below address three 
underlying physical processes following a LOCA: (i) debris accumulation on ECCS strainers, (ii) debris 
penetration through ECCS strainers, and (iii) accumulation of debris in the reactor core. The strainers can 
capture some portion of the debris during the recirculation phase, while the debris penetrating the strainers 
can accumulate in the reactor core and cause a blockage of the coolant.  
With this problem, the system of interest consists of the containment recirculation pool, three sump 














𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑) = 0, (3.6) 
where Mp (t): debris amount in the containment water pool, MS(k) (t): debris accumulation mass on strainer 
k, 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶} which represents a strainer for each ECCS train, and MC (t): debris accumulation mass on 
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reactor core. This study assumes that the debris arriving in the containment pool forms a homogeneous 
mixing volume, and the initial amounts of debris and water volume in the containment pool, denoted by Mp 
(0) and Vp, are given as input parameters. The variability of Mp (0) and Vp, depending on the LOCA scenarios 
and the conditions in the reactor coolant system, is treated as parameter uncertainty, rather than by an 
explicit modeling of underlying physical processes.  
The rate of debris accumulation on the strainers is determined by the flow rates of ECCS and 
Containment Spray System (CSS) trains, the concentration of debris in the containment pool, and the 
fraction of debris penetrating the strainer. The debris penetration through the strainer occurs due to two 
mechanisms: (i) direct passage where a portion of the arriving debris passes through the strainer, while the 
remainder is captured by the existing debris bed on the strainers, and (ii) a shedding effect where a portion 
of the accumulated debris may be kicked up from the debris bed and pass through the strainer [43]. 
Considering these two mechanisms of debris penetration, the rate of debris accumulation on the strainer 








(𝑘𝑘) (𝑑𝑑), (3.7) 
where QS(k) (t): water flow rate on ECCS strainer k, Cp (t): debris concentration in the containment water 
pool, and Smdl(k) (t): amount of debris penetration due to the shedding effect on each module of strainer k. 
On the right-hand side of Equation (3.7), the first term addresses the debris accumulation due to the direct 
passage, while the second term addresses the debris penetration due to a shedding effect. QS(k) is a time-
dependent flow rate on each strainer and depends on the water demanded by the ECCS and CSS train k. In 
this study, QS(k) is treated as a discrete random variable to handle the aleatory uncertainty associated with 
the functional states of the ECCS and CSS pumps. In Equation (3.7), the fraction of debris captured by the 
strainer is addressed by a filtration function, fmdl(k) (•), which gives a fraction between 0 and 1 depending on 
the amount of debris accumulated on each strainer: 
 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑘𝑘) (𝑥𝑥) = �
𝑚𝑚 ∙ 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑏𝑏 ;  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑘𝑘) (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) + �1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑘𝑘) (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)� �1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛿𝛿(𝑥𝑥−𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)� ; 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
, (3.8) 
where m, b, δ, and MCP are empirical coefficients obtained by fitting experimental data from the prototype 
strainer module testing [55]. Meanwhile, the debris penetration due to the shedding effect on the strainer, 
denoted by Smdl(k), is proportional to the shedding mass on each module of the strainers mmdl(k): 
 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑘𝑘) (𝑑𝑑) = 𝜂𝜂𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑘𝑘) (𝑑𝑑), (3.9) 
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where η is the shedding coefficient derived from the experimental data [55], while mmdl(k) is the shedding 











(𝑘𝑘) (𝑑𝑑), (3.10) 
where ν represents an empirical parameter.  
The debris accumulation in the reactor core is governed by the core flow rate from ECCS and the 
average proportion of debris penetrating the strainers during recirculation. The potential for core blockage 
depends on several factors, such as the size and location of the break and the ECCS injection path. In this 
case study, it is conservatively assumed that (i) all debris contained in the Safety Injection (SI) flow 
accumulates in the reactor core, i.e., the filtration efficiency for the fuel assemblies is unity, and (ii) there 
is no shedding effect in the reactor core. The rate of debris accumulation in the reactor core is described by 




𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑) = 𝜆𝜆(𝑑𝑑)𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑)� ��1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑘𝑘) �𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠
(𝑘𝑘)(𝑑𝑑)�� �1 − 𝛾𝛾(𝑘𝑘)�𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
(𝑘𝑘)(𝑑𝑑)�
𝑘𝑘





where γ(k) and λ (t) represent two possible paths of diverting the debris penetrating the strainers from the 
reactor core. γ(k) is the fraction of QS(k) that recirculates directly back to the strainer through the CSS. 
Meanwhile, λ (t) is the fraction of SI flow going to the reactor core; {1 − λ (t)} × 100% of the penetrating 




∑ �(1 − 𝛾𝛾(𝑘𝑘))𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
(𝑘𝑘)(𝑑𝑑)�𝑘𝑘
 , (3.12) 
where QC (t) represents the time profile of decay heat boil-off and is provided by the thermal-hydraulics 
analysis as an input to the reduced-order CASA.  
As initial conditions, all debris is assumed to exist in the containment pool at t = 0; hence, there is 
no initial debris mass on the strainers and in the reactor core. 
 𝑀𝑀c(0) = 0 and 𝑀𝑀s
(𝑘𝑘)(0) = 0;  𝑘𝑘 ∈ {A, B, C}. (3.13) 
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In this set of equations, a non-linearity is introduced by the filtration function, given by Equation (3.8); 
hence, these equations are not analytically solvable. Numerical solutions of these equations are obtained 
using Matlab and its built-in function ode45. This numerical solution is verified using a special case of 
input parameters and a constant filtration function which can be solved analytically. In this research, the 
amount of debris accumulation in the reactor core per fuel assembly, MC (t) [gram/FA], is used as a key 
performance measure associated with the basic event ‘CB’ in Figure 3.8.  
3.3.4.3. Uncertainty Quantification 
To generate the failure probability of basic event CB, uncertainty quantification is performed on 
the Reduced-Order CASA. The aleatory uncertainty associated with the input parameters is represented by 
probability distributions (Table 3.6) obtained based on the GSI-191 project report [56] and engineering 
judgment.  
Table 3.6 List of input parameters, their units and uncertainty distributions to Reduced-Order CASA 
Grande module. 
# Input Parameters Unit Distribution 
1 VP: Initial water volume in containment pool [gallon] Uniform (338,126-518,123) 
2 MP (0): Initial debris mass in containment pool [gram]           Uniform (87,000-96,500) 
3 η: Shedding Rate [1/min] Uniform (0.008236, 0.0546) 
4 υ: Fraction of Sheddable Debris Unit less Uniform (0.00956, 0.0272) 
5 m: Efficiency per gram of debris accumulation [1/gram] Uniform (0.000339, 0.003723) 
6 b: Initial efficiency Unit less Uniform (0.656, 0.706) 
7 δ: Exponential rate constant of the fitted filtration function model. [1/gram] 
Truncated Triangular (0.0011254; 0.10, 
0.0013078;0.45, 0.0317870; 0.10) 
8 MCP: Fitting cut point [gram] Uniform (790, 880) 
9 QS(A): Total ECCS flow of Train A [gallon/min] Discrete random variable (See text) 
10 QS(B): Total ECCS flow of Train B [gallon/min] Discrete random variable (See text) 
11 QS(C): Total ECCS flow of Train C [gallon/min] Assumed being turned off (QS(C) = 0) 
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Among those input parameters, the exponential rate constant of the fitted filtration function model, 
δ, is assumed to be distributed in a truncated triangular distribution [57]. The lower and upper bounds of 
the truncated triangular distribution are set to 0.0011254 [1/gram] and 0.0317870 [1/gram], respectively, 
while the mode is 0.0013078 [1/gram]. The probability density associated with the lower and upper bounds 
is equal to 0.10 and the maximum probability density at the mode is 0.45. On the other hand, the total flow 
rate of each ECCS train (A, B, and C) is determined based on discrete probability distributions. Each ECCS 
train is composed of three pumps, HHSI, Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI), and CSS with the designed 
maximum flow rates of 2,800 gpm 1,600 gpm, and 2,300 gpm, respectively. This study assumes that two 
out of three ECCS trains, Trains A and B, are operating, while the remaining one (Train C) is turned off. 
The flow rate of each pump is assumed to have a discrete probability distribution with three equiprobable 
values: 0%, 50%, or 100% of the designed maximum flow rate. For each train, because there are three 
pumps with three possible states, the total number of possible combinations with respect to its flow rate 
would be 33 = 27. The combinations with the flow rates of both HHSI and LHSI pumps being zero are 
excluded as these conditions directly lead to core damage.  
The uncertainties associated with the input parameters (Table 3.6) are propagated in Reduced-Order 
CASA by the Monte Carlo simulation. Random samples of input parameters are generated using LHS [58]. 
The sample size of LHS, nS = 500, is selected based on the convergence study (explained in Appendix I). 
Based on the Monte Carlo outputs, an empirical cdf of MC is developed. The failure probability of basic 
event CB is then computed as the probability that MC exceeds a damage threshold value, Mcrt. 
Mathematically, Pr (CB) = Pr (MC > Mcrt) and, to estimate this probability based on the Monte Carlo outputs, 
it is useful to introduce an indicator function ICB (x), defined as: 
 𝐼𝐼CB(𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖) = �  1 , if 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶
(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  
  0 , otherwise
, (3.14) 
where ICB (xn) represents an indicator function, computed with the ith random sample of input parameters 
xi, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆}, by running the Reduced-Order CASA. The indicator function has a binary outcome, 0 
or 1, indicating the success and failure of the CB event, respectively. Using this notation, the point estimate 










The uncertainty associated with Mcrt is represented by a uniform distribution with upper and lower bounds 
of 50 [gram/FA] and 4 [gram/FA], respectively, and is propagated by another layer of the Monte Carlo 
simulation. The random samples of Mcrt of size 2,000 are generated by LHS and Equation (3.15) is computed 
with each sample to develop a probability distribution of Pr (CB). 
3.3.4.4. Comparing IM Analysis Results Using Tornado Diagram and Global IM 
The input parameters of Reduced-Order CASA (Table 3.6) are ranked based on their contribution 
to the core damage frequency, f (CD), using the tornado diagram and Si(CDF). For the tornado diagram, the 
upper and lower bounds of input parameters are set to the 99th and 1st percentiles of the probability 
distributions in Table 3.6, respectively. Si(CDF) is computed by the two-loop Monte Carlo method (Appendix 
I) where the random samples are generated by LHS. The sample size for the inner loop is set to nS2 = 500, 
as determined by the convergence criterion. Meanwhile, the sample size for the outer loop is set to nS1 = 
20. Although this number has been arbitrarily chosen, the results below indicate that there is no overlap 
among the CIs of the five most influential input parameters (except for QS(A) and QS(B) which are expected 
to have the same risk importance because of the symmetric system configuration); therefore, the two-loop 
Monte Carlo simulation has converged sufficiently to obtain a meaningful ranking of input parameters. 
Table 3.7 shows the results of Si(CDF), where the efficiency per gram of debris accumulation, m, is identified 
as the most important input parameter, followed by the total ECCS train flow rate of Trains A and B (QS(A) 
and QS(B)).  
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Table 3.7 Results of Global IM based on Si(CDF) with respect to influence on core damage frequency. 
Ranking Input Parameters S̅i (CDF) s [Si (CDF)] 95 % CIs 
#1 m: Efficiency per gram of debris accumulation 0.071 0.016 (0.062, 0.080) 
#2 QS(B): Total ECCS flow of Train B 0.045 0.002 (0.044, 0.046) 
#3 QS(A): Total ECCS flow of Train A 0.044 0.002 (0.043, 0.045) 
#4 υ: Fraction of Sheddable Debris 0.013 0.001 (0.012, 0.014) 
#5 b: Initial efficiency 0.011 0.001 (0.010, 0.012) 
#6 VP: Initial water volume in containment pool 0.002 0.000 (0.002, 0.002) 
#6 η: Shedding Rate 0.002 0.000 (0.002, 0.002) 
#8 MP (0): Initial debris mass in containment pool 0.001 0.000 (0.001, 0.001) 
#8 δ: Exponential rate constant of the fitted filtration function model. 0.001 0.000 (0.001, 0.001) 
#8 Mc: Fitting cut point 0.001 0.000 (0.001, 0.001) 
#11 QS(C): Total ECCS flow of Train C 0.000 0.000 (0.000, 0.000) 
In contrast, the tornado diagram results in zero sensitivity to all input parameters and is not capable 
of ranking input parameters with respect to the system risk contribution. This is because the change of input 
parameters in an OAT manner does not result in an amount of debris accumulation that would cause core 
blockage. This point is illuminated by the spider plot (Figure 3.9) developed for the five most influential 
input parameters identified by Si(CDF).  A spider plot depicts the response of the model output (i.e., the change 
in MC [grams/FA]) when each input parameter is varied from its lower bound to the upper bound by the 
OAT method. The x-axis represents the percentage change in input parameters relative to the nominal value 
of each input parameter, while the y-axis shows the change in Mc [grams/FA] relative to the nominal output 
computed with all input parameters being set to their nominal values. The variation of any individual input 
parameter using the OAT method does not lead to core blockage, as shown by the fact that the maximum 
deviance of MC (3.05 [grams/FA]) due to a perturbation in the most influential input parameter m does not 
exceed the lower bound (4.0 [grams/FA]) of the damage threshold. This indicates that, when the failure is 
relatively rare and is only caused by combinations of extreme values of more than one input parameter, the 
failure region cannot be captured by the classical one-way or local IMs. Therefore, one-way and local IMs 
are not capable of ranking the input parameters at the failure-mechanism level in terms of their influence 




Figure 3.9 Spider plot for the five most important input parameters identified by Global IM analysis in 
terms of the amount of debris accumulation in reactor core per fuel assembly, MC [gram/FA]. 
3.3.5 Reduced-Order I-PRA for Fire PRA 
In this section, the cdf-based moment-independent Global IM, Si(CDF), is applied for the reduced-
order Fire I-PRA framework developed in Section 2.4. This case study aims to demonstrate that the Global 
IM methodology for the I-PRA framework, introduced in this chapter, is also applicable for the I-PRA 
framework developed for NPP Fire PRA (Chapter 2). The I-PRA framework for Fire PRA uses the CFD-
based fire model, the FDS, as one of the sub-modules of the Simulation Module. By this case study, it is 
shown that (i) the Global IM methodology introduced in this chapter is flexibly applicable for a high-fidelity 
mechanistic physical model and (ii) an application of the Global IM methodology for the Fire I-PRA 
framework can generate valuable insights that are beneficial for an effective resource allocation in risk 
management. This case study uses the same simplistic I-PRA example as the one shown in Section 2.4. 
However, because of a high computational demand by the FDS code (especially when it is combined with 
GIM), the NUREG-1934 Scenario D is further simplified as follows: (i) partial geometry (i.e., only the area 
having a lower ceiling) is considered, (ii) grid cell size in y-direction (originally 0.10 m) is reduced to 0.19 
m, (iii) only three input parameters are considered as random variables to be ranked by the Global IM 
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analysis: maximum HRR of fire source (X1), thermal conductivity of the concrete material (X5), and jacket 
thickness (X9), (iv) no fire protection measure, including fixed and manual detection and suppression, are 
credited, and (v) in the two-loop Monte Carlo simulation (Appendix I), the sample size for the inner loop 
is set to nS2 = 50 based on the convergence study conducted in Section 2.4.5, while the outer loop is treated 
by the predefined equally-spaced percentiles, from the 5th to 95th percentile with the 10% interval, in each 
input parameter space.  
Table 3.8 shows the results of the Global IM analysis based on Si(CDF) [31] with respect to the plant 
risk (i.e., core damage frequency) computed by the simplistic plant PRA model shown in Figure 2.3. Among 
those three input parameters, the maximum HRR (Qmax) is identified as the most influential input parameter, 
while the other two input parameters (kconcrete and djacket) are shown to be less important. This result shows 
that the maximum HRR value is the most important input parameter in terms of its influence on the plant 
risk estimates. This indicates that, to improve the accuracy of Fire PRA for this scenario, it is crucial to 
reduce the uncertainty and improve the realism of Qmax through further data collection and analysis or more 
explicit modeling of underlying physical mechanisms. In addition, the results of the Global IM analysis 
indicate that the resources should be allocated for the design elements associated with the maximum HRR, 
rather than for cable jacket thickness and concrete wall materials, to achieve an effective reduction of the 
plant risk estimates due to this fire scenario. 
Table 3.8 Results of Global IM analysis based on Si(CDF) for the reduced-order I-PRA framework 
developed for NUREG-1934 Scenario D (Section 2.4.5). 
Input parameters Si(CDF) 95 % CIs 
Qmax 0.44 (0.23, 0.65) 
kconcrete 0.07 (0.00, 0.15) 






Observations from the case studies using the Ishigami function and two fault tree models show that: 
 
• The ranking of input parameters is influenced by the synergistic effects of multiple attributes of the 
model, including not only the model structure (e.g., non-linearity, interaction among inputs), but 
also the magnitude and uncertainty of input parameters. 
 
• When the model is linear, but there is uncertainty associated with input parameters, Global IM and 
one-way SA may produce dissimilar results. This indicates that an increased degree of uncertainty 
associated with input parameters could make one-way SA ineffective (Section 3.3.2).  
 
• For the FT models (Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), the results of Global IM and one-way SA have been 
compared with the classical IM methods, including FV and RAW. The observations indicate that, 
future research is necessary to understand the physical and systematic interpretation of Global IM 
and its relationship to the classical IMs commonly used in existing plant PRA. 
 
The last two case studies using the reduced-order I-PRAs developed for GSI-191 (Section 3.3.4) and Fire 
PRA (Section 3.3.5) demonstrate that Si(CDF) is applicable for the I-PRA framework to generate the ranking 
of input parameters in the Input Module at the failure mechanism level. The results for the GSI-191 I-PRA 
(Section 3.3.4) show that, when the system-level failure is relatively rare and is caused only by interactions 
among input parameters, one-way and local IM methods are not capable of producing the risk importance 
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CHAPTER 4: SPATIO-TEMPOPRAL PROBABILISTIC METHODOLOGY FOR COMMON 
CAUSE FAILURE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter relates to Step #7.a in the roadmap of the research presented in Figure 4.1. The content of this 
chapter is based on References [1, 2] developed by the author.  
 
Figure 4.1 Research Roadmap.  
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Under the fire conditions, multiple damage targets and components can have dependent failures 
due to the shared physical failure mechanisms (e.g., exposed to the same fire source); thus, a realistic 
estimation of joint probabilities (in the MCSs) in consideration of such fire-induced dependency has been 
a key challenge in the field of Fire PRA. The Fire I-PRA framework captures the sources of fire-induced 
dependency through the simulation of underlying physical fire phenomena in the FSM. Section 2.3.8 has 
developed a method for estimating joint probability of dependent fire-induced component failure events 
(e.g., fire-induced damage to more than one cable) in MCSs, taken directly from the results of the simulation 
as shown in Equation (2.19) and with the Scenario-Based Damage Model (Section 2.3.7), rather than (i) 
relying solely on empirical data for the joint occurrence of dependent failures or (ii) making overly 
conservative assumptions for conditional probabilities of two or more dependent failure events.  
The first approach (i.e., solely relying on empirical data for the joint occurrence of dependent 
failures) is the foundation of the existing CCF analysis in classical PRA. The second approach (i.e., making 
overly conservative assumptions for conditional probabilities of two or more dependent failure events) is 
the foundation of dependency treatment in existing Fire PRA of NPPs; therefore, the method of treating 
dependency in Chapter 2 is offered as a more realistic alternative for Fire I-PRA. In other applications of I-
PRA, however, where the dependent basic events in the MCS interfacing between the simulation module 
and the plant-specific PRA are currently being treated using empirical data and the parametric CCF 
approach in the PRA of NPPs, it is necessary to develop mathematical and computational relationships 
between the dependency treatment in I-PRA and the existing CCF of NPPs. The methodological 
developments in this chapter not only create a quantitative relationship between the results of simulation 
modules in I-PRA and the existing data-driven CCF methods of NPPs, but also advance the CCF modeling 
and quantification for the field of PRA.  
The background information on CCF in classical PRA is provided in Appendix J. CCF is defined 
as the component failure event that satisfies the following criteria: (i) more than one component within the 
system boundary fails or is degraded during a PRA mission time; (ii) the failure or degradation is caused 
by a shared failure cause in the presence of coupling mechanisms; and (iii) the sources of dependency are 
not explicitly modeled in classical PRA [3-5]. Classical PRA predominantly uses parametric CCF methods 
to account for CCF. As stated in Appendix J, there are two key limitations in the existing parametric CCF 
methods: (i) the accuracy and realism depend on the availability, quality, and relevancy of the available 
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CCF event data and (ii) a quantitative causal connection between the CCF probabilities and underlying 
failure mechanisms is lacking.  
To overcome these existing CCF method limitations, this chapter develops a Spatio-Temporal 
Probabilistic CCF methodology. The theoretical concept of this new methodology, which is the explicit 
incorporation of underlying physical failure mechanisms associated with dependent failures, was originally 
introduced by Mohaghegh et al. [6-8]. This research provides methodological advancements on the original 
concept [6-8] and generates a computational algorithm to operationalize this new CCF methodology in the 
Interface Module of I-PRA. Bayesian updating is used in this computational algorithm to take into account 
all available sources of data related to the results of simulations. The epistemic uncertainty associated with 
the estimated probabilities are also analyzed to execute a probabilistic validation.  
Section 4.2 explains the methodological and computational development for this new CCF method. 
In Section 4.3, the new CCF methodology is applied for the emergency service water pump at NPPs, and 
the results demonstrate that, by updating the existing plant-specific CCF parameters with the simulation-
based estimates, the degree of uncertainty associated with the resultant core damage frequency can be 
reduced significantly. Section 4 includes a discussion on the value of the new CCF method, comparing it 
with the existing CCF approaches of NPPs.  
4.2 Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic Common Cause Failure Analysis  
Section 2.2 in Chapter 2 covers the description of four main modules of the I-PRA framework 
(Figure 4.2): (a) Input Module, (b) Simulation Module, (c) Interface Module, and (d) Plant-Specific PRA 
Module. The following summarizes the methodological and theoretical relationships between the four 
modules of the I-PRA framework to facilitate the explanation of the computational algorithm of the Spatio-
Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology in Section 4.2.1, where the Common Cause Basic Events 
(CCBEs) in the Plant-Specific Module of I-PRA (module “d” in Figure 4.2) are updated with the results of 




Figure 4.2 Integrated Probabilistic Risk Assessment (I-PRA) Methodological Framework. 
In the I-PRA framework, the system- and component-level accident causations are modeled by the 
Plant-Specific PRA module (module ‘d’ in Figure 4.2). The ET model (‘#5’ in Figure 4.2) represents the 
system-level accident scenarios, i.e., the failure of both SYS1 and SYS2 leads to core damage. The pivotal 
events in the ET are typically decomposed into smaller pieces of components and functional failure modes 
using the FTs. For instance, in Figure 4.2, the FT shows that SYS1 comprises two components, pumps A 
and B, in a one-out-of-two configuration and, for each component, two functional failure modes are 
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considered: fail to run (A1 and B1) and fail to start (A2 and B2). There are four MCSs for the core damage 
end state: {A1, B1, SYS2}, {A1, B2, SYS2}, {A2, B1, SYS2}, and {A2, B2, SYS2}, where IE stands for the 
initiating event. Assume that (i) A and B pumps are independent from the IE and SYS2, (ii) IE and SYS2 
are independent from each other, and (iii) two functional failure modes are mutually exclusive. The core 
damage frequency can then be expressed by: 
 𝑓𝑓(CD) = 𝑓𝑓(IE) Pr(SYSB) {Pr(A1 ∙ B1) + Pr(A1 ∙ B2) + Pr(A2 ∙ B1) + Pr(A2 ∙ B2)}. (4.1) 
where f (∙) is the frequency of an event.  
If A and B pumps are exposed to CCFs, classical PRA quantifies their joint failure probabilities by 
decomposing each basic event into CCBEs (as shown in Figure 4.2) and uses the parametric CCF model to 
estimate the probabilities of individual CCBEs. For instance, basic events A1 and B1 are decomposed as 
follows: 
 A1 = A1,I + CA1,B1, (4.2) 
 B1 = B1,I + CA1,B1, (4.3) 
where A1,I and B1,I are the independent failure events, while CA1,B1 is the CCF event between basic events 
A1 and B1. Using these CCBEs, the Boolean expression for A1 • B1 is rewritten by: 
 A1 ∙ B1 = A1,I ∙ B1,I + CA1,B1. (4.4) 
Based on this Boolean expression, the probability of the joint failure event (A1 • B1) is represented by: 
 Pr(A1 ∙ B1) = Pr�A1,I�Pr�B1,I� + Pr�CA1,B1�. (4.5) 
If the Alpha Factor Model (AFM) [5], which is one of the existing parametric methods for CCF analysis in 
NPPs and explained in Appendix J, is used, under the non-staggered testing scheme, the probability of each 
CCBE is expressed by: 








where α1 and α2 are the AFM parameters, while pT is the total failure probability of the component [9]. To 
implement the CCF quantification, the CCF model parameters (α1 and α2) and the total failure probability 
(pT) need to be provided as the inputs for the Plant-Specific PRA Module. As stated in Section 4.2, in the 
existing NPP PRAs, these PRA inputs are estimated by the data-driven approach. In contrast, in the Spatio-
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Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology, these PRA inputs are estimated from the results of a Simulation 
Module (Module “b” in Figure 4.2) that explicitly models underlying failure mechanisms. 
To develop the Simulation Module, for each functional failure mode in the Plant-Specific PRA 
Module, the physical failure modes (i.e., the observable and measurable physical damage states for each 
component and its individual parts) are identified. For instance, in Figure 4.2, the dominant physical failure 
mode for each functional failure mode, utilizing the design information and historical failure records, has 
been identified as: a crack propagation in the shaft for the failure to run, while vibration for the failure to 
start. To define physical failure modes, the sub-components and individual parts of the component may 
need to be considered; e.g., a crack propagation in the “shaft” of the pump. Each physical failure mode is 
caused by a spatio-temporal progression of underlying physical failure mechanisms. The physical failure 
mechanism is defined as the cause-and-effect chain that explains how the underlying failure causes 
propagate in the system and result in the physical failure modes of each component. For instance, in Figure 
4.2, suppose that the dominant physical failure mechanisms are identified as: Stress Corrosion Cracking 
(SCC) for the crack propagation in the pump shaft, while corrosion and mechanical wear in the bearing for 
the vibration. For identification of the dominant physical failure modes and mechanisms, the plant-specific 
information collected and analyzed in the qualitative analysis of the NUREG/CR-5485 procedure can 
provide helpful insights.  
As stated in Section 4.1 and explained in Sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.8, the results of the Simulation 
Module in I-PRA help estimate the probabilities of joint events in the MCSs interfacing with plant-specific 
module; for example, the four joint events in Equation 4.1 including: “A1 • B1” , “A1 • B2”, “A2 • B1”, and 
“A2 • B2”. These joint events can have different natures with respect to the types of their underlying failure 
mechanisms and based on the relationships among the failure mechanisms. For instance, as Figure 4.2 
shows, (i) the joint failure event “A1 • B1” is due to a single shared failure mechanism (SCC), and refers to 
the failure of both pumps, A and B, to run due to crack propagation in a shaft caused by SCC; (ii)  the joint 
failure events  “A1 • B2 and A2 • B1” are due to unshared failure mechanisms, where one pump fails to run 
due to crack propagation in a shaft caused by SCC, while the other one fails to start due to vibration caused 
by corrosion and/or mechanical wear in the bearings; (ii)  the joint failure event A2 • B2 is due to more than 
one, but interrelated, failure mechanism, where pumps A and B fail to start due to vibration caused by 
corrosion and mechanical wear in the bearings. In the remainder of this paper, the first type of joint failure 
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event, i.e., A1 • B1 in Equation (4.1), is used to explain the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology. An 
extension of the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology to the second and third types of joint 
failure events is left to future research.  
For the joint failure event, A1 • B1 in Figure 4.2, a crack size, denoted by Y, is selected as the KPM, 
indicating the physical damage state of the pump shaft due to SCC. To predict the KPM, the Simulation 
Module (Module “b” in Figure 4.2) is developed by using the state-of-the-art models for the physical failure 
mechanisms. For instance, for A1 and B1 in Figure 4.2, a phenomenological SCC model, developed by Wu 
[10, 11] for Alloy 600 and by O’Shea et al. [12-16] for Alloy 690 and stainless steel and denoted by the 
function g (•) below, can be used to predict the crack propagation rate: 
 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑔𝑔�𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 ,𝜎𝜎ys;𝑙𝑙 ,𝜎𝜎app;𝑙𝑙 ,𝛈𝛈�;  𝑙𝑙 ∈ {A, B}, (4.8) 
 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙,0 ~ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙�𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙,0�, (4.9) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙: crack size in a shaft of pump l, 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙: operational temperature of pump l, 𝜎𝜎ys;𝑙𝑙: yield strength of the 
shaft material of pump l, 𝜎𝜎app;𝑙𝑙: applied stress in the shaft of pump l, 𝛈𝛈: empirical coefficients obtained by 
fitting to experimental data, and 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙: probability distribution for the initial crack size in the shaft of pump l, 
denoted by Yl,0. 
The progression of the physical failure mechanisms in the Simulation Module can be initiated and 
accelerated by underlying causal factors, such as operational conditions, installation, maintenance, and 
manufacturing. The influences of these underlying causal factors on the physical failure mechanisms are 
addressed by the stochastic variability of the input parameters (module ‘a’ in Figure 4.2). These input 
parameters define the initial and boundary conditions for the Simulation Module, e.g., material properties 
and environmental conditions. The stochastic variability associated with these input parameters is 
represented by probability distributions derived from empirical data. Stochasticity of these input parameters 
reflects the randomness induced by the underlying causalities, i.e., “implicit causal factors” in Figure 4.2. 
From the viewpoint of the accident causations, this Input Module forms the borderline between the 
underlying causalities “explicitly” incorporated by the Simulation Module and those “implicitly” embedded 
by the data-driven approach. Above this borderline, failure causes and coupling factors associated with the 
physical failure mechanisms are explicitly captured by the numerical solution of physical governing 
equations in the Simulation Module; hence, the sources of dependency are addressed by running the 
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Simulation Module. Below this borderline, failure causes and coupling factors are captured by the data-
driven stochasticity of input parameters. Since the sources of dependency induced by the implicit causal 
factors are not explicitly addressed by the Simulation Module, a special treatment is needed to handle the 
coupling factors at the level of input parameters, e.g., by accounting for the statistical correlation among 
input parameters. The location of this borderline should be determined by taking several aspects into 
account: (i) availability of empirical data for the input parameter estimation, (ii) the desired level of 
explicitness and resolution in causalities, (iii) resource constraints (e.g., budget, staff, computational 
facility), and (iv) the state of knowledge relating to the underlying failure mechanisms. 
To further explain the treatment of dependencies among input parameters, consider the SCC model 
in Equations (4.8) and (4.9), where the input parameters (Tl, σapp;l, σys;l and Yl,0) can be influenced by several 
underlying causal factors, e.g., operational and environmental conditions, selection of material, design, 
manufacturing, maintenance, and installation. There are two approaches for handling the variability of those 
input parameters induced by the underlying causal factors. The first approach is to “implicitly” address 
them by using the data-driven approach. For instance, a probability distribution of Tl, which represents its 
variability induced by the operational and environmental conditions, can be developed by a statistical 
analysis of observational data, e.g., plant design information and historical observation of the plant 
parameters. In this approach, Tl corresponds to the borderline between explicit and implicit treatments of 
causalities; hence, the underlying causalities influencing Tl are incorporated as “implicit causal factors” and 
stochastically handled by treating Tl as a random variable. In this case, in order to accurately estimate the 
joint failure probability of two pumps, the statistical correlation between the two random variables, TA and 
TB, should be considered. For instance, a shared working fluid may induce a strong coupling between two 
pumps, and TA and TB are likely to show a complete correlation; hence, the common input value is used for 
TA and TB. The second approach is to develop an explicit model for the underlying causal factors to predict 
the spatio-temporal progression of underlying causalities that influence those input parameters and to 
connect it to the SCC model in the Simulation Module. For instance, a thermal-hydraulics model can be 
linked with the Simulation Module to explicitly consider the underlying causalities that influence the input 
parameters Tl and σapp;l by solving for the spatial and temporal plant system behavior. The explicit approach 
for σys;l and Yl (0) is more challenging as the underlying causal factors, e.g., design, manufacturing, 
maintenance, and installation processes, are strongly interrelated with human and organizational factors. 
To develop an explicit approach for this category of input parameters, ongoing research by the UIUC 
SoTeRiA Laboratory [17-29] develops the Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA) framework to 
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incorporate the underlying human and organizational causalities, such as the process of maintenance and 
installation, into the Simulation Module of the I-PRA framework. In this stage of research, the physical 
failure mechanisms are explicitly treated by the Simulation Module, while the initiating and accelerating 
conditions due to the implicit causal factors are treated by the data-driven approach.  
To integrate the deterministic Simulation Module with the Plant-Specific PRA Module, a 
probabilistic interface is created by the Interface Module (module ‘c’ in Figure 4.2). The Uncertainty 
Propagation (#1 of module ‘c’ in Figure 4.2) performs the Monte Carlo simulation to propagate the 
uncertainty of the input parameters, representing the stochastic variability induced by the implicit causal 
factors, to make the Simulation Module probabilistic and ready to be connected to the Plant-Specific PRA 
module. Following uncertainty propagation, the Interface Module generates the point estimates of the joint 
events (including the dependent events) in the MCS probabilities (#3 of module ‘c’ in Figure 4.2). The 
Probabilistic Validation (#2 of module ‘c’ in Figure 4.2) characterizes and propagates all sources of 
epistemic uncertainty existing in the Input, Simulation, and Interface Modules to generate the uncertainty 
bounds (or interval estimates) for the PRA inputs, which indicate the degree of accuracy of the simulation-
based estimates of those PRA inputs. The Bayesian integration (#4 of module ‘c’ in Figure 4.2) updates the 
data-driven estimates of the PRA inputs available (including the CCBE probabilities) in the existing PRA 
with the simulation-based estimates to enhance the validity of the resultant plant risk quantification. The 
next section demonstrates a computational algorithm to be used in the interface module of the I-PRA 
framework to operationalize the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology.  
4.2.1 Computational Algorithm of the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic Methodology for Common Cause 
Failure Analysis  
This section provides a computational algorithm (Figure 4.3) that can be used (i) to operationalize the 
Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology for CCFs in the interface of the I-PRA framework and/or (ii) 
to advance the CCF analysis for the existing NPPs. The key assumptions used for the computational 





Figure 4.3 The computational algorithm for the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology 
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a) In the Plant-Specific PRA module (Module “d” in Figure 4.2), the MCS consisting of “two basic 
events,” {A1, B1}, has the potential for CCF. Note that this new CCF methodology and the 
computational algorithm explained in this section are also applicable for the Common Cause 
Component Group (CCCG) of more than two components; however, this section uses a two-
component CCCG for simplicity of illustration. The extension of this new methodology for the 
CCCG of more than two components is discussed in Section 4.2.2. The basic events A1 and B1 are 
caused by a single shared physical failure mode (i.e., crack propagation in the pump shaft) and 
physical failure mechanism (i.e., SCC).  
 
b) The basic events A1 and B1 are caused by a single shared physical failure mode (i.e., crack 
propagation in the pump shaft) and physical failure mechanism (i.e., SCC).  
 
c) The Simulation Module in the I-PRA is represented by a functional form: 
 〈𝑌𝑌A1,𝑌𝑌B1〉 = 𝑔𝑔�𝐗𝐗A1,𝐗𝐗B1�, (4.10) 
where YA1 and YB1 stand for the KPMs associated with basic events A1 and B1, respectively, g (•) is 
the function representing the Simulation Module, and 𝐗𝐗A1 and 𝐗𝐗B1 represent the input parameters 
for each component.  
 
The existing plant PRA typically uses the parametric model to account for CCFs and requires the CCF 
parameters and total component failure probability as inputs, e.g., 𝜋𝜋(𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝑝𝑝T) in Figure 4.3; hence, this 
computational algorithm is designed to generate the estimates of those PRA inputs. Each step of the 
computational algorithm is described below. 
Step 1 of the Computational Algorithm: Uncertainty Propagation for the Simulation Module 
This step propagates uncertainty of the input parameters for the Simulation Module, which 
represents the stochastic variability induced by the implicit causal factors, using the Monte Carlo method. 
This uncertainty is characterized by probability distributions derived from empirical data. Random samples 
of input parameters are then generated from the probability distributions using LHS [30-32]:  
 𝐗𝐗 = �〈𝐗𝐗A1
(𝑖𝑖) ,𝐗𝐗B1
(𝑖𝑖)〉 ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�, (4.11) 
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where nS represents the sample size in LHS and is determined by conducting the convergence study [33]. 
Subsequently, by running the Simulation Module in Equation (4.10) with each set of randomly-sampled 
input parameters, random samples of the KPM for each component are generated: 
 〈𝑌𝑌A1
(𝑖𝑖),𝑌𝑌B1
(𝑖𝑖)〉 = 𝑔𝑔 �𝐗𝐗A1
(𝑖𝑖) ,𝐗𝐗B1
(𝑖𝑖)�  ;  𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, (4.12) 
where YA1(i) and YB1(i) are the KPMs associated with basic events A1 and B1, respectively, computed with 
the ith set of randomly-sampled input parameters.  
Step 2 of the Computational Algorithm: MCS Probability Estimation 
Based on the KPM outputs generated in Step 1, the point estimate of the MCS probability is 
computed. Using the KPMs, the probability of MCS {A1, B1} can be expressed by 
 Pr(A1 ∙ B1) = Pr[(𝑌𝑌A1 > 𝑌𝑌crt) and (𝑌𝑌B1 > 𝑌𝑌crt)]. (4.13) 
To estimate the joint probability in Equation (4.13) using the Monte Carlo outputs obtained in Step 1, it is 
useful to introduce the indicator function Im (x) for each pump l, defined as: 
 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙 �𝐱𝐱𝑙𝑙
(𝑖𝑖)� = �  1 , if 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙
(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑌𝑌crt  
  0 , otherwise
;   𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ {A1, B1}, (4.14) 
Using this notation, a point estimate of the MCS probability in Equation (4.13) can be computed as follows: 









where 𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽∗ denotes the simulation-based point estimate of the MCS probability (equivalently, the joint failure 
probability of basic events A1 and B1), and the asterisk indicates that this quantity is a simulation-based 
estimation generated from the Monte Carlo outputs of KPMs generated in Step 1.  
As an input for the subsequent steps, the point estimate of the total failure probability of each 
component, i.e., the sum of independent failure and CCF probabilities, is also computed using the KPMs 








 ; 𝑙𝑙 ∈ {A1, B1}, (4.16) 
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In the existing NPP PRA, the symmetrical CCCG is assumed; hence, the total failure probability for each 
component in a CCCG is assumed to be identical to the others. Under this assumption, the simulation-based 










where the denominator on the right-hand side is the total number of trials where each component is exposed 
to the potential of failure due to a specific physical failure mechanism of interest in the Monte Carlo runs, 
while the numerator is the total number of failures observed in the Monte Carlo runs. 
Step 3 of the Computational Algorithm: Probabilistic Validation 
This step aims to quantitatively characterize the degree of accuracy of the simulation-based 
probability estimates obtained in Step 2. All known sources of epistemic uncertainty associated with the 
Input, Simulation, and Interface Modules are characterized and propagated to construct uncertainty bounds 
or probability distributions of the simulation-based estimates of pJ* and pT* obtained in Step 2. Section 2.3.7 
of this thesis has identified five categories of epistemic uncertainty sources that should be addressed in the 
probabilistic validation: (i) probability distributions for input parameters, (ii) failure mechanism models, 
(iii) sampling-based uncertainty propagation, (iv) the selection of KPMs and damage thresholds, and (v) 
statistical inference methods for probability estimation. The regulatory document, NUREG/CR-5485 [5], 
also identified three types of epistemic uncertainty for CCF analysis including (a) statistical uncertainty, 
which is relevant to categories (i), (iii), (iv), and (v) above; (b) model uncertainty, which is relevant to 
category (ii) above; and (c) data uncertainty, which is relevant to the categories (i) and (iv) above. This 
chapter covers the epistemic uncertainty induced by the sampling-based uncertainty propagation only. 
Ongoing research by the author is focusing on the inclusion of other sources of epistemic uncertainties in 
this algorithm.   
To address epistemic uncertainty Source iii (sampling-based uncertainty propagation), this research 
uses the replicated LHS method [32, 34-36] to generate the CIs of each probability estimate. For each 
probability estimated in Step 2, denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 , 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {T, J}, the Monte Carlo simulation using LHS is repeated 
for nR times using independent random seeds. As a result, the IID random samples of the point estimate 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘∗  
of size nR are generated. The point estimates and CIs are computed by the bootstrap method using the 
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computational approach suggested by Janssen [37]. The outputs from this procedure are the point estimate 
and the lower and upper bounds of CIs for the simulation-based MCS probabilities: 
 〈𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝐿𝐿(𝛾𝛾)
∗ ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑈𝑈(𝛾𝛾)
∗  〉;  𝑘𝑘∈{T, J}, (4.18) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ : point estimate of the probability pk, while 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝐿𝐿(𝛾𝛾)∗  and 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑈𝑈(𝛾𝛾)∗  represent the lower and upper 
bounds of the (1 – γ) % CIs for the estimate of pk. 
Step 4 of the Computational Algorithm: Simulation-Based Estimation of BPM Parameters 
Based on the definition of the Basic Parameter Model (BPM) parameters [5], the following relation 
is obtained: 
 𝑄𝑄1 = 𝑝𝑝T − 𝑄𝑄2, (4.19) 
where pT represents the total failure probability of each component, while Q1 and Q2 represent the BPM 
parameters for basic events A1 and B1, defined as Q1: the probability of an independent failure and Q2: the 
probability of the CCF. Meanwhile, from Equation (4.5), 
 𝑝𝑝J = (𝑄𝑄1)2 + 𝑄𝑄2. (4.20) 
Substituting Equation (4.20) into Equation (4.19), and rearranging it, the following expression can be 
written: 
 (𝑄𝑄2)2 + (1 − 2𝑝𝑝T)𝑄𝑄2 + (𝑝𝑝T)2 − 𝑝𝑝J = 0. (4.21) 








where the term inside the square root on the right-hand side is mathematically proven to be greater than or 
equal to zero, considering that pT and pJ are expressed as functions of Q1 and Q2 based on Equations (4.19) 
and (4.20). By plugging 𝑝𝑝T∗  and 𝑝𝑝J∗, obtained in Step 2, into Equation (4.21), 𝑄𝑄2∗ is computed. There are two 
roots, and an appropriate one is chosen so that the probability axioms are satisfied. By plugging Q2, 









where, out of the two roots, an appropriate one should be chosen based on the root selected in Equation 
(4.22). The outputs of this step are the simulation-based point estimates and the CIs for Q1 and Q2, which 
are obtained by computing Q1 and Q2 for each bootstrap resample generated in Step 3: 
 𝐸𝐸SM = �〈𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘,PE∗ ,𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘,𝐿𝐿(𝛾𝛾)
∗ ,𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘,𝑈𝑈(𝛾𝛾)
∗  〉;  𝑘𝑘 = 1, 2�, (4.24) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗  is the simulation-based estimate of Qk, while 𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘,𝐿𝐿(𝛾𝛾)∗  and 𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘,𝑈𝑈(𝛾𝛾)∗  are the lower and upper bounds 
of the (1 – γ) % CIs constructed for 𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘,PE∗ . 
Step 5 of the Computational Algorithm: Estimation of Data-Driven BPM Parameters 
In this step, the data-driven PRA inputs for the MCS being analyzed, i.e., probability distributions 
for α1, α2, and pT, are extracted from the existing plant PRA and processed to obtain the data-driven joint 
probability distribution of Q1 and Q2. This will be used as the prior distribution in the Bayesian integration 
in Step 6. This study assumes that, in the existing plant PRA, the AFM is used to quantify the CCBE 
probabilities, and that the joint probability distribution for α1 and α2 has been obtained based on the data-







 𝛉𝛉:  Unknown(s) of Interest (UOI); a vector of the AFM parameters 
EData: Evidence available for updating the prior knowledge on the UOI; in this equation, 
the subscript “Data” indicates that the evidence comes from the empirical CCF 
event data.  
 𝜋𝜋(𝛉𝛉|EData): Posterior distribution of the UOI 
 𝐿𝐿(EData|𝛉𝛉): Likelihood function for the evidence given a specific value of the UOI; 




To estimate the data-driven AFM parameters based on the empirical CCF event data, as a prior distribution, 
Reference [5] recommends a Dirichlet distribution whose probability density function is given as: 
 𝜋𝜋0(𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2 ⋯ ,𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚) =







where A0,k’s (k = 1, …, m) represent the parameters of the distribution. When a non-informative prior 
distribution is used, A0,k = 1 for k = 1, …, m. The evidence for the Bayesian updating is the event impact 
vector obtained by the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the generic and plant-specific CCF event data, 
represented by EData = {𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘; 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚} where 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 stands for the count of the CCF events involving k 
components. The likelihood function is then represented by a multinomial distribution: 
 𝐿𝐿(EData|𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2 ⋯ ,𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚) =







Note that, by definition, ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 1. As the Dirichlet prior distribution and the multinomial likelihood 
function are conjugate, the posterior distribution is also a Dirichlet distribution: 
 𝜋𝜋(𝛼𝛼1,⋯ ,𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚|EData) =







where 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘;  𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑚𝑚}, represent the updated parameters, Ak = A0,k + nk. Meanwhile, in the existing 
plant PRA, it is assumed that the probability distribution of the total failure probability derived from the 
generic and plant-specific component reliability data, denoted by 𝜋𝜋(𝑝𝑝T|EData), is also available.  
To estimate the data-driven probability distributions of Q1 and Q2 based on the data-driven 
probability distributions of α1, α2, and pT obtained above, analytical relationships between {𝑄𝑄1,𝑄𝑄2} and 
{𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝑝𝑝T} are derived. Under the non-staggered test scheme, Q1 and Q2 for a size two CCCG are related 
to the AFM parameters as shown in Equations (4.6) and (4.7). The uncertainty associated with {𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝑝𝑝T}, 
represented by the data-driven probability distributions obtained from the existing plant PRA, is propagated 
by the Monte Carlo method in Equations (4.6) and (4.7) to obtain the probability distribution of {𝑄𝑄1,𝑄𝑄2}. 
As Equations (4.6) and (4.7) have common inputs (α1, α2, and pT), Q1 and Q2 are not independent variables; 
hence, the joint probability distribution, π (Q1, Q2 | EData), is developed and used as a prior distribution in 
Step 6.  
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The uncertainty associated with the CCF probabilities estimated from the Spatio-Temporal 
Probabilistic methodology also depends on the quality of the data-driven estimates of α1, α2, and pT available 
in the existing plant PRA, which are used in this step to derive a prior distribution for the Bayesian 
integration. The CCF parameters in the existing plant PRA are estimated by pooling all CCF events that 
were observed during a specific period into one homogeneous dataset [38]; therefore, the data-driven 
estimates of CCF parameters are time-averaged without considering continuous updates of operation and 
maintenance and recent improvements in nuclear regulation. To estimate the CCF parameters accurately 
and realistically by the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology, additional data screening and 
analysis might be required to extract the CCF data that are truly relevant to the current as-designed, as-
operated system on a plant-specific basis. This point should be considered in future research for practical 
applications of the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology. 
Step 6 of the Computational Algorithm: Bayesian Integration of Data-Driven and Simulation-Based BPM 
Parameters 
This step combines the simulation-based BPM parameter estimates, obtained in Step 4, with the 
data-driven probability distribution π (Q1, Q2 | EData), obtained in Step 5, using the Bayesian approach 
formulated by Equation (4.25). The UOIs in this step are Q1 and Q2. This study adopts the Bayesian 
approach for the treatment of model uncertainty proposed in Refs. [39-41]. The data-driven probability 
distribution π (Q1, Q2 | EData), obtained from Step 5, is used as a prior distribution. The simulation-based 
estimates of Q1* and Q2* obtained in Steps 1 to 3, denoted by ESM as shown in Equation (4.24), are treated 
as the evidence. Under this setting, the likelihood function L (ESM | θ) characterizes the accuracy of the 
simulation-based estimates of Q1* and Q2* compared to the true (but unknown) values of Q1 and Q2. For L 
(ESM | θ), this study uses the additive error model [39-43] which assumes that the simulation-based estimates 
of Q1* and Q2* can be represented by the sum of the true (but unknown) value of the UOI and the error term 
𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘, 𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘. Considering that Q1* and Q2* are estimated from the common Monte Carlo scenarios, the 
error term for Q1* is correlated with that for Q2*. To capture this error term correlation, the bivariate normal 
distribution is used for the likelihood function [42]: 
 𝐿𝐿(ESM | 𝐐𝐐) =
exp �− 12 �𝐐𝐐





where Q*: a vector of simulation-based estimates 〈𝑄𝑄1∗,𝑄𝑄2∗〉; Q: a vector of the true (but unknown) values of 
the UOIs, 〈𝑄𝑄1,𝑄𝑄2〉; 𝚺𝚺: covariance matrix for Q1* and Q2*; and 𝐛𝐛: a vector of bias for Q1* and Q2*. The bias 
factor b can be assumed to be zero. This assumption is accurate if, in the Probabilistic Validation (Step 3), 
all known epistemic uncertainty sources in the Input, Simulation, and Interface Modules are characterized 
and propagated; hence, the influences of all known sources of prediction error are reflected in the point 
estimates and the CIs of Q1* and Q2* computed in Step 4. 𝚺𝚺 consists of the variances of Q1* and Q2* (denoted 
by σ12 and σ22) and the covariance between Q1* and Q2* (denoted by c12). σ12 and σ22 are estimated based on 
the CIs obtained in Step 4 by considering the 100(1 – γ/2)th and 100(γ/2)th percentiles of the marginal 






−1 ; 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1,2}, (4.30) 
where 𝛷𝛷1−𝛾𝛾 2⁄−1  represents the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution at 
the 100(1 – γ/2)th percentile. c12 is estimated by computing the sample covariance of Q1* and Q2* based on 
the 10,000 bootstrap resamples generated in Step 4. By computing the Bayes equation using the prior 
distribution (from Step 5) and the likelihood function in Equation (4.29), the posterior distribution of Q1 
and Q2, π (Q1, Q2 | EData, ESM), is obtained. 
Step 7 of the Computational Algorithm: Estimation of Posterior Distributions for PRA Inputs 
The updated distribution of α1, α2, and pT is estimated from the posterior distribution of Q1 and Q2 
obtained in Step 6. For this purpose, the analytical expressions of α1 and α2 as a function of Q1 and Q2 are 
derived. Under the non-staggered test scheme, the BPM parameters as a function of the AFM parameters 
are expressed by Equations (4.6) and (4.7). By substituting the relationship between pT and the BPM 
parameters, 𝑝𝑝T = 𝑄𝑄1 + 𝑄𝑄2 , into Equations (4.6) and (4.7) and solving it for α1 and α2, the following 








The uncertainty is propagated to develop the joint probability distribution of 〈𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝑝𝑝T〉 using the Monte 
Carlo method. As a result, the probability distribution of α1, α2, and pT updated by the outputs of the 
Simulation Module, denoted by 𝜋𝜋(𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝑝𝑝T|𝐸𝐸Data,𝐸𝐸SM), is obtained and provided as inputs to the Plant-
Specific PRA Module. 
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4.2.2 Extension of the Computational Algorithm to CCCGs of more than Two Components 
The computational methodology developed in Section 4.2.1 has assumed a CCCG of two 
components. To illustrate the feasibility of the extension of this methodology to a CCCG of more than two 
components, consider an MCS, {A1, A2, A3}, where three basic events Aj , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, represent failures 
of three hardware components in the CCCG due to an identical functional failure mode. As in Section 4.2.1, 
the discussion in this section makes the following assumptions: 
 
• In the Plant-Specific PRA module, the MCS {A1, A2, A3} has a potential of CCF and is analyzed 
by the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology. The existing plant PRA uses the 
parametric CCF method for analyzing this MCS.  
 
• Three basic events Aj, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3} , are caused by a single shared physical failure mode and 
mechanism. 
 
• A phenomenological model of the identified physical failure mechanism is developed in the 
Simulation Module, represented by a functional form: 
 〈𝑌𝑌1,𝑌𝑌2,𝑌𝑌3〉 = 𝑔𝑔�𝐗𝐗1,𝐗𝐗2,𝐗𝐗3�, (4.32) 
where Yj , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, represent the KPMs associated with the damage state of basic events Aj, 
𝑔𝑔: ℝ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 → ℝ3 is a real-valued function representing the physical failure mechanism model, nX is 
the total number of input parameters, and 𝐗𝐗𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are vectors of input parameters for the 
basic event Aj.  
 
The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology for the three-component MCS can use the same 
computational algorithm as in Section 4.2.1, with a few modifications in the following steps: (i) simulation-
based estimates of MCS probabilities (Step 2), (ii) simulation-based estimation of the BPM parameters 
(Step 4), and (iii) estimation of the posterior distributions for PRA inputs (Step 7).  
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Modification to Step 2: Simulation-based Estimates of MCS Probabilities 
Based on the KPMs predicted by running the Simulation Module with nS random samples of input 
parameters (Step 1), the total and joint failure probabilities of components Aj, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are estimated. 
For ease of mathematical formulation, the CCCG multiplicity function is defined as follows: 
 𝐼𝐼mult




 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, (4.33) 
where 𝛿𝛿[∙] is the Kronecker delta function, while the indicator function for each basic event is defined as 
 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 �𝐱𝐱𝑗𝑗
(𝑖𝑖)� = �  1 , if 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑌𝑌crt  
  0 , otherwise
;   𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (4.34) 
This equation represents how many components in the CCCG have failed in each Monte Carlo scenario. 
The point estimates of two types of joint probabilities are then obtained: 










where 𝑝𝑝2∗ and 𝑝𝑝3∗ represent the point estimates of the probabilities that two and three components in the 
CCCG fail in the same PRA mission time, respectively. In addition, using the same concept as Equation 











The CIs of each probability estimate can be constructed using a combination of the replicated LHS and the 
bootstrap method [35, 36].  
Modification to Step 4: Estimation of the Simulation-Based BPM Parameters 
To compute the BPM parameters (Q1, Q2, and Q3) based on the estimates of 𝑝𝑝T∗, 𝑝𝑝2∗, and 𝑝𝑝3∗ obtained 
in the modified Step 2 above, the analytical relationships like Equation (4.22) is developed. Using the 
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parametric CCF method, the total failure event for component A1 can be decomposed into CCBEs as 
follows: 
 A1,T = A1,I + C12 + C13 + C123, (4.38) 
where A1,T and A1,I represent the total and independent failure events of component A1, while Cℒ represents 
the CCF event among the components 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 , 𝑙𝑙 ∈ ℒ. Using the assumption that three basic events Aj , 𝑗𝑗 ∈
{1, 2, 3}, are symmetrical and the fact that four events on the right-hand side of Equation (4.38) are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive, it follows that 
 𝑝𝑝T = 𝑄𝑄1 + 2𝑄𝑄2 + 𝑄𝑄3, (4.39) 
where Qj , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, represent the probability that j components in the CCCG fail together because of a 
shared failure cause and are equivalent to the BPM parameters. The similar expression also holds for basic 
events A2 and A3. The joint probabilities obtained in the modified Step 2 above (𝑝𝑝2 and 𝑝𝑝3) can be expressed 
using Qj as follows: 
 𝑝𝑝2 = (𝑄𝑄1)2 + 𝑄𝑄2, (4.40) 
 𝑝𝑝3 = (𝑄𝑄1)3 + 3𝑄𝑄1𝑄𝑄2 + 𝑄𝑄3, (4.41) 
In Equations (4.39) through (4.41), three quantities on the left-hand side, 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇, 𝑝𝑝2, and 𝑝𝑝3,have been estimated 
in the modified Step 2 above. These three equations are solved for Qj , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to obtain the BPM 
parameter estimates based on the KPM predictions from the Simulation Module.  
Modification to Step 7: Estimation of the posterior distributions for PRA inputs 
In this step, analytical relationships between 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 and 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗  , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are derived. In the existing 
CCF methods, under the non-staggered test scheme, the BPM parameters for a CCCG of three components 








𝛼𝛼1 + 2𝛼𝛼2 + 3𝛼𝛼3








𝛼𝛼1 + 2𝛼𝛼2 + 3𝛼𝛼3








𝛼𝛼1 + 2𝛼𝛼2 + 3𝛼𝛼3
𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 , (4.44) 
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By substituting Equation (4.39) into Equations (4.42) through (4.44) and solving for 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗  , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the 
following relationships are derived: 
 𝛼𝛼1 =
3𝑄𝑄1
3𝑄𝑄1 + 3𝑄𝑄2 + 𝑄𝑄3
 ;   𝛼𝛼2 =
3𝑄𝑄2
3𝑄𝑄1 + 3𝑄𝑄2 + 𝑄𝑄3
;   𝛼𝛼3 =
𝑄𝑄3
3𝑄𝑄1 + 3𝑄𝑄2 + 𝑄𝑄3
, (4.45) 
By combining Equation (4.45) with the solutions of Equations (4.39) to (4.41), 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗  , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3} , are 
obtained from pT*, p2*, and p3*computed in Step 2.  
After these modifications to the three steps above, the remaining portion of the computational 
procedure for the three-component CCCG is the same as that for the two-component CCCG explained in 
Section 4.2.1. Essentially, the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology can be extended to CCCGs 
of any size (more than three components) in a similar manner.  
4.3 Case Study: Applying the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic Methodology of Common Cause 
Failures for the Emergency Service Water Pumps in a Nuclear Power Plant  
To demonstrate an implementation of the computational algorithm explained in Section 4.2.1, a 
case study for the emergency service water pumps in NPPs is conducted using the I-PRA framework (Figure 
4.2). Suppose that there is interest in quantifying the probability that both A and B pumps fail to run during 
a PRA mission time, Pr (A1 • B1), in Equation (4.1). Basic events A1 and B1 are assumed to be induced by 
a single physical failure mode, a crack propagation in the pump shaft coupling, caused by SCC. The shaft 
couplings of pumps A and B are assumed to be made of identical stainless-steel material [44]. 
For the SCC failure mechanism, the Simulation Module is developed by adopting the probabilistic 
physics-of-failure model, developed by O’Shea et al. [12-16]. This SCC model accounts for two sequential 
stages of physical damage progression: crack initiation and crack propagation. For crack initiation, the 
pitting mechanism is often a precursor to SCC. The pitting mechanism occurs while the material is exposed 
to a corrosive environment, and the resultant pits can become the initiating point of the SCC propagation. 
To capture the crack initiation due to the pitting mechanism, this study adopts the pit-to-crack transition 
criterion proposed by Kondo [45], suggesting that a pit will transition into a crack when the SCC 
propagation rate is greater than or equal to the pit growth rate. The pit growth rate is predicted by a pit 












  ;  𝑙𝑙 ∈ {A, B}, (4.46) 
where αp and βp are empirical model parameters. Based on the analyses by O’Shea et al. [12-16], αp is 
treated as a random variable represented by a uniform distribution, U (9.5917E-09, 2.8249E-07), while the 
βp parameter is fixed at a point estimate, βp = 0.5. After the pit-to-crack transition, the crack propagation 
rate is predicted by the SCC model: 















𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆[𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙 − 𝐾𝐾th]𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , (4.47) 
 𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙 = 𝜎𝜎app,𝑙𝑙�𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙 , (4.48) 
where Q: activation energy for stainless steel (84 kJ/mol [47]), R: universal gas constant (8.314E-3 kJ/mol-
K), Tl: operating temperature [K] for pump l, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ {A1, B1}, Tref: reference temperature (588 K), σys,l: yield 
strength [MPa] for the shaft coupling of pump l, Kl: stress intensity factor (SIF) for pump l, defined by 
Equation (4.48) where σapp,l: total effective stress [MPa] on the shaft coupling and Kth: threshold SIF (10 
MPa√m [47]). Based on private communications with an NPP expert, the applied stress on the shaft 
coupling, σapp,A and σapp,B, is set to 450 MPa. Ref. [44] showed that the fracture toughness of the shaft 
coupling material is KIC = 54.94 MPa√m; using this KIC and Equation (4.48), the damage threshold of 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙 is 
computed to be 0.00384 m. In Equation (4.47), CSS, mSS, and nSS are empirical model parameters and need 
to be estimated by fitting the SCC model to empirical data. This case study resamples the random samples 
of CSS, mSS, and nSS of size 200,000, generated by the Bayesian regression analysis in Ref. [12-16] (statistics 
are shown in Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Statistics of the SCC Propagation Empirical Model Parameters. 
Parameter Mean Std. Dev. 2.50% Median 97.5% 
CSS 9.5E-18 1.0E-10 1.1E-21 2.9E-19 5.5E-17 
mSS 2.547 0.4411 1.756 2.532 3.43 
nSS 1.052 0.4335 0.3383 0.9984 1.989 
 
To solve the SCC model in the Simulation Module, the simulation time of interest needs to be 
identified. This case study assumes that, since the A and B pumps were installed, they have been operating 
without failure for t1 = 200 hours (e.g., for testing the system) before being activated by the PRA initiating 
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event. The PRA mission time is assumed to be 72 hours; hence, the simulation time of interest is t2 = 272 
hours. The Simulation Module generates the time profile of the crack size for each pump, Yl (i) (t); 𝑙𝑙 ∈
{A1, B1}, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 0 < 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝑑𝑑2 . The KPMs for pumps A and B in each Monte Carlo scenario are 
obtained as the crack size at the end of the simulation time, Yl (i) (t = t2). 
One of the potential implicit causal factors influencing the SCC propagation is an installation error. 
For instance, Ref. [44] performed a finite element analysis for the shaft coupling of the emergency service 
water pump and showed that an improper installation could increase the SIF by up to 35%. To account for 
the influences of an improper installation, two factors need to be considered. The first is the probability of 
an improper installation, which is determined by the performance of the installation crew. The probability 
of an improper installation can be estimated by analyzing empirical data (e.g., historical records of 
installation performance) or by using the human reliability analysis technique for a pre-initiator human 
failure event [48, 49]. This study assumes that (i) the probability of an improper installation is 0.02 and (ii) 
two pumps are completely dependent in terms of an improper installation. The second factor is the influence 
the improper installation has on the SCC propagation. Ref. [44] suggested that the improper installation 
influences the SIF. A quantitative relationship between the SIF and the degree of the improper installation 
should be established either by the data-driven approach or by an explicit approach (e.g., a finite element 
analysis, as done in Ref. [44]). This case study assumes that, given that an improper installation has occurred, 
the SIF is expressed by 
 𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙,ImpIns = (1 + 𝑢𝑢1)𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙,PropIns ;  𝑙𝑙 ∈ {A1, B1}, (4.49) 
where 𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙,ImpIns : SIF under an improper installation, u1: a random number between [0, 1] representing 
variability in the degree of an improper installation and its influence on the SIF, and 𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙,PropIns: SIF under a 
proper installation computed by Equation (4.48). 
Step 1: Uncertainty Propagation for Simulation Module 
The uncertainty of the input parameters, associated with their stochastic variability induced by the 
implicit causal factors, is propagated using the computational method in Section 4.2.1. There are four 
categories of input parameters: (i) SCC model parameters (CSS, mSS, nSS), (ii) initial pit size (YA1,0, YB1,0), 
(iii) physical input parameters (σys,A1, σys,B1, TA1, TB1), and (iv) the SIF coefficients induced by an improper 
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installation. The uncertainty of these input parameters is characterized by probability distributions, as 
explained below.  
The uncertainty associated with the SCC model parameters (CSS, mSS, nSS) is represented by the 
probability distributions in Table 4.1. As stated above, random samples of CSS, mSS, and nSS of size 200,000, 
generated in the Bayesian regression analysis by O’Shea et al. [12-16], are resampled. These parameters 
represent the influences of the environmental conditions that are not explicitly included in the SCC model 
(i.e., those other than σys,A1, σys,B1, TA1, TB1). To capture the coupling between two pumps induced by similar 
environmental conditions, the common samples of CSS, mSS, and nSS are used for pumps A and B. In relation 
to the discussion in Section 4.2, this corresponds to the implicit treatment of dependency due to similar 
environmental conditions by using the statistical correlation (in this case, assuming the complete correlation 
between pumps A and B).  
The uncertainty associated with the initial pit size (YA1,0, YB1,0), yield strength (σys,A1, σys,B1), and 
operating temperature (TA1, TB1), is characterized by probability distributions derived from literature and 
engineering judgment (Table 4.2). YA1,0 and YB1,0 are represented by the Weibull distribution, which 
characterizes the uncertainty of the natural imperfection in the stainless steel and is fitted to the experimental 
data collected for pit depth distribution in deaerated pure water [46]. σys,A1 and σys,B1 are represented by the 
uniform distribution, whose upper and lower bounds are set to the maximum and minimum values provided 
in Ref. [47]. TA1 and TB1 are the shaft surface temperature during operation and have spatial distribution 
throughout the shaft length. In this case study, the spatial distribution of TA1 and TB1 is treated by a random 
variable, represented by a uniform distribution with upper and lower bounds being set to the minimum and 
maximum values found in Ref. [50]. This case study assumes that pumps A and B share the working fluid, 
which indicates that TA1 and TB1 are strongly correlated; hence, common samples are used for TA1 and TB1 
to account for the dependency between pumps A and B induced by the shared working fluid. In relation to 
the discussion in Section 4.2, this corresponds to the implicit treatment of dependency using the statistical 
correlation (in this case, a complete correlation).  
The uncertainty of the SIF induced by an installation error is characterized by two random variables, 
u0 and u1, uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. u0 represents the aleatory uncertainty of the occurrence of an 
improper installation; given that the probability of an improper installation is 0.02, u0 ≤ 0.02 indicates an 
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improper installation. u1 represents the influence of the improper installation on the SIF, as shown in 
Equation (4.49). The random samples of these input parameters are generated using LHS [30-32] with an 
arbitrarily large sample size, nS = 105. Although a structured convergence study (e.g., Sakurahara et al. 
[33]) is not performed, the CIs of the probability estimates are developed for the estimates of the MCS 
probabilities and the CCF parameters in the following steps. The Simulation Module is run with each 
sample of input parameters to generate random samples of the KPMs. 
Table 4.2 List of random input parameters, their units, and probability distributions. 
Input Parameters Unit Probability Distribution 
YA1,0: Initial pit size for pump A [m] Weibull (α = 99.7 × 10−6, β = 2.67) 
YB1,0: Initial pit size for pump B [m] Weibull (α = 99.7 × 10−6, β = 2.67) 
σys,A1: Yield strength for pump A shaft 
coupling [MPa] Uniform (250, 350) 
σys,B1: Yield strength for pump B shaft 
coupling [MPa] Uniform (250, 350) 
TA1, TB1: Temperature of the shaft couplings [K] Uniform (310.95, 534.15) 
 
Step 2: MCS Probability Estimation 
In this step, pT and pJ of pumps A and B are estimated based on the KPM outputs from Step 1. This 
case study assumes that pumps A and B are successfully operated for t1 hours before the PRA initiating 
event; hence, 𝑝𝑝T∗  and 𝑝𝑝J∗ estimated in this case study are conditional, given that both pumps have not failed 
between [0, t1]. To consider this conditionality, the Monte Carlo scenarios leading to any pump failure 
before t1 are discarded, and the remaining ones are regarded as a conditional set of Monte Carlo scenarios. 
Let 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛′ and 𝐘𝐘′ be the sample size of the conditional set of Monte Carlo scenarios and the corresponding 
set of KPMs, respectively. By applying Equation (4.14) for 𝐘𝐘′ and the damage threshold Ycrt, the vector of 
indicator function of size 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛′ for each pump is generated. By applying Equations (4.15) and (4.17), the 
point estimates are obtained as 𝑝𝑝T∗  = 7.20E-4 and 𝑝𝑝J∗ = 2.71E-5. 
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Step 3: Probabilistic Validation 
The Probabilistic Validation in this case study only addresses the statistical error due to the 
sampling-based probability estimation. This source of epistemic uncertainty is characterized by the 95% 
CIs of the point estimates, constructed by the replicated LHS method [32, 34-36], where 20 LHS 
replications are generated using independent random seeds and are then resampled using the bootstrap 
method [37]. The 95% CIs for 𝑝𝑝T∗  and 𝑝𝑝J∗  are computed as [6.88E-4, 7.51E-4] and [1.76E-5, 3.76E-5], 
respectively. 
Step 4: Estimation of Simulation-Based BPM Parameters 
Based on the point estimates and CIs of 𝑝𝑝J∗ and 𝑝𝑝T∗  obtained in Steps 2 and 3, the simulation-based 
point estimates and 95% CIs of Q1 and Q2 (Table 4.3) are generated. In addition, as an input to the Bayesian 
integration (Step 6), the covariance matrix for 𝑄𝑄1∗ and 𝑄𝑄2∗ is computed based on the bootstrap resamples 
generated in Step 3: Var (𝑄𝑄1∗) = 2.86E−10, Var (𝑄𝑄2∗) = 2.64E−11, and Cov (𝑄𝑄1∗,𝑄𝑄2∗) = − 2.71E−11. 
Table 4.3 Point estimates and 95% CIs of the BPM parameters, 𝑄𝑄1∗ and 𝑄𝑄2∗. 
BPM Parameters Point Estimate 95% CIs 
𝑄𝑄1∗ 6.93E-4  [6.60E−4, 7.26E−4] 
𝑄𝑄2∗ 2.66E-5 [1.70E−6, 3.72E−5] 
Step 5: Estimation of the Data-Driven BPM Parameters 
Suppose that, in the existing plant PRA, these A and B pumps comprise a symmetric CCCG and, 
using the approach in Ref. [4], the event impact vector for this CCCG has been obtained as n1 = 181.32 and 
n2 = 4.6837. Using the Bayesian approach with a non-informative Dirichlet prior distribution [5], the data-
driven probability distribution of α1 and α2 is obtained as a Dirichlet distribution with parameters A1 = 
78.072 and A2 = 2.0223. It is also assumed that, by analyzing the component reliability data, the total failure 
probability of pumps A and B is represented by a beta distribution with αT,Data = 72 and βT,Data = 100,000. 
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Based on these data-driven probability distributions of α1, α2, and pT, the data-driven probability distribution 
of Q1 and Q2 is estimated using the computational procedure explained in Section 4.2.1. 
Step 6: Bayesian Integration of Data-Driven and Simulation-Based BPM Parameters 
This step performs the Bayesian integration to update the data-driven estimate of Q1 and Q2 
obtained in Step 5 with the simulation-based estimates obtained in Step 4. The Bayesian integration is 
implemented in the OpenBUGS software package [51, 52]. Based on the statistical model specified by the 
Directed Acyclic Graph, the OpenBUGS constructs a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) scheme to 
generate random samples of each parameter from the full conditional probability distribution [51]. This 
case study uses an arbitrarily large size of random samples (106) and burn-in (104) with three chains. The 
adequacy of the selected sizes of burn-in and random samples is checked by using two criteria [52]: (i) 
whether the sample size of the burn-in is sufficient and (ii) whether the sample size following the burn-in 
is sufficient. In a qualitative way, the trace of each UOI in each chain is plotted against the number of 
replications and, if all chains are mixed well, a good convergence is indicated. For this case study, a visual 
check of the trace of Q1 and Q2, has shown that three chains mixed well after the burn-in. In a quantitative 
way, the size of burn-in is checked by the Brooks-Gelman-Rubin (BGR) diagnostic. The BGR plot 
illustrates the behavior of the within-chain variance, the between-chain variance, and their ratio (denoted 
by 𝐶𝐶�), and, if 𝐶𝐶� becomes smaller than 1.2, the MCMC sampling is considered to be converged [52]. In this 
case study, the 𝐶𝐶� value for each UOI, Q1 and Q2, is computed as 1.001. Whether the sample size after the 
burn-in is sufficient is checked by computing the ratio of the Monte Carlo standard error to the overall 
standard error. For this case study, for each UOI, the relative Monte Carlo error is smaller than 0.2%, which 
indicates that the MCMC process has converged well. 
Step 7: Estimation of Posterior Distributions for AFM Parameters 
The posterior distribution of α1, α2, and pT (Figure 4.4) is generated based on the posterior 
distribution of Q1 and Q2 obtained in Step 6. In this figure, the dotted line shows the data-driven marginal 
probability distribution of each UOI that is available in the existing plant PRA, while the solid line shows 
the updated marginal probability distribution generated in this step. The posterior distributions have a 
smaller uncertainty than the data-driven prior distributions as additional CCF information is provided by 
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the simulation-based estimates and incorporated through this step. As the data-driven probability 
distributions for α1, α2, and pT, available in the existing plant PRA and used as the prior distributions in the 
Bayesian integration, are relatively sparse, the posterior distributions are driven by the likelihood function, 
which represents the degree of accuracy in the simulation-based estimates. 
 
Figure 4.4 Posterior marginal distributions for the AFM parameters and the total failure probability of the 
component obtained for the case study. 
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These posterior distributions are provided as updated inputs to the Plant-Specific PRA Module 
(‘PRA Inputs’ in Figure 4.2) and used for the plant risk quantification. For instance, in Figure 4.2, assume 
that the initiating event frequency is 0.1 [per year], while the failure probability of SYS2 is 0.1. The 
estimates of core damage frequency due to the first MCS in Equation (4.1), {A1, B1, SYS2}, computed with 
the data-driven PRA inputs (“prior distributions” in Figure 4.4 obtained from the existing plant PRA) and 
with the updated PRA inputs (“posterior distributions” in Figure 4.4 obtained in this step) are plotted in 
Figure 4.5. After the Bayesian integration, the uncertainty of the MCS frequency becomes narrower as the 
simulation-based CCF data, generated in the previous steps, are combined with the data-driven PRA inputs 
through the Bayesian integration. 
 
Figure 4.5 Core damage frequency due to the MCS {A1, B1, SYS2} in Figure 4.2 estimated with the data-
driven PRA inputs (available in the existing plant PRA) and the updated PRA inputs (obtained in Step 7 
of the computational algorithm developed in this research). 
4.4 Comparative Discussion: The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF Method vs. Existing CCF 
Approaches  
This research has done a thorough literature review on the existing CCF methods and the summary 
of this review is included in Appendix K. Based on the literature review and qualitative analysis provided 
in Appendix K, This section discusses the similarities and differences of the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic 
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CCF methodology compared with the existing CCF methods, including (i) parametric models [5, 53-56], 
(ii) cause-specific parametric models [57-63], and (iii) other methods [64-70], as follows:  
 
• The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology can be treated as an additional module to the 
existing classical PRA because the CCF parameters, used in classical PRA, are updated with the 
simulation-based estimates, which can be readily used as inputs to the commercial PRA software. 
In this sense, the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology can be connected to classical PRA in 
the same manner as the traditional parametric models and the cause-specific parametric models. 
Using this new method, the realism of the CCF parameter estimates can be improved by accounting 
for the as-built, as-operated plant conditions, e.g., plant-specific improvements in operation and 
maintenance, through the initial and boundary conditions of the simulation of underlying failure 
mechanism. This new CCF methodology reduces the uncertainty of the CCF parameter estimates 
by generating the simulation-based CCF data that augment the existing empirical CCF event data. 
 
• The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology has features in common with the cause-specific 
parametric models [57-63], Bayesian network [65, 66], and influence diagram method [67, 68] in 
the sense that (i) it does not rely on any parametric model and (ii) the causal connections between 
the CCBEs and the failure causes and coupling mechanisms are explicitly addressed. Because of 
this feature, the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology can handle the asymmetrical CCCG. 
Nevertheless, the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology differs from the cause-specific 
parametric models, Bayesian network, and influence diagram method as to how the causal structure 
below the CCBE level is quantified. In these existing methods, the influences of failure causes and 
coupling mechanisms on the component failure events are quantified by a data-driven approach, 
e.g., by analyzing the CCF event data to derive the cause-specific CCF parameters and the 
conditional probability table in the Bayesian network. In the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF 
methodology, the influences of the underlying causalities on the CCBEs are quantified by solving 
the governing equations for the failure mechanisms in the Simulation Module. 
 
• This difference also affects the time and space explicitness and resolution in the CCF modeling. As 
discussed in Appendix K, the location- and time-dependent progression of failure mechanisms can 
only be treated implicitly in the cause-specific parametric models, Bayesian network, and influence 
diagram method. In contrast, as the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology solves the physical 
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governing equations in time and space, the predictions of KPMs can explicitly reflect the location-
specific and time-dependent progression of underlying failure mechanisms. Note that the degree of 
time and space explicitness and resolution depends on the choice of failure mechanism models used 
in the Simulation Module. For instance, the SCC model used in the case study (in Section 4.3) has 
an explicit time as the governing equations include a time dimension (i.e., the first derivative of the 
KPM with respect to time) and are solved at each time step. While implicit in space (i.e., the spatial 
dimension is not explicitly included in the governing equations), this SCC model can be computed 
with the location-specific inputs to externally add the spatial dimension. 
 
• Compared to the existing CCF methods, the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology requires 
observational data at different levels in the causalities. In this new methodology, the observational 
data are required at the level of the Input Module to construct probability distributions for input 
parameters. In contrast, the parametric models, Bayesian network, and influence diagram method 
require the data on the observed failure events (either cause-lumped or cause-specific), while the 
CLM requires the empirical data for the component load and resistance. The CCF data at the 
component level are limited because CCF events are not frequent; however, the input parameters 
to the I-PRA framework are not failure events and instead represent physical and operational 
conditions. If the design and maintenance policy of a plant change, neither component-level CCF 
data nor data-driven information associated with some of the input parameters are reliable. 
Therefore, there is need for the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology to be expanded to 
modeling underlying design and organizational factors to generate a new collection of CCF events.     
 
• Using the new methodology can generate the ranking of the CCF-contributing factors at the failure-
mechanism level (e.g., material properties, environmental conditions) by performing an advanced 
IM analysis (developed in Chapter 3). The existing PRA conducts classical IM methods at the level 
of CCBEs, but not at the level of failure mechanisms. The Global IM in I-PRA, performed at the 
failure mechanism level, contributes to more efficient prevention and mitigation of the CCFs by 
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CHAPTER 5: HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS-BASED METHOD FOR MANUAL FIRE 
SUPPRESSION MODULE OF INTEGRATED PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT   
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter relates to Step 7.b in the roadmap of the thesis presented in Figure 5.1. The content of 
this chapter is based on a conference paper [1] and a journal manuscript [2] by the author. 
 
Figure 5.1 Roadmap of this thesis.  
166 
 
NPPs typically have multiple layers of fire detection and suppression features, as illustrated in a 
detection and suppression event tree (Figure 5.2) [3]. This event tree considers two end states: success (OK) 
and failure (NS) of fire suppression before fire-induced equipment damage occurs; if both detection and 
suppression are successfully carried out, the fire is successfully suppressed (end state ‘OK’); otherwise, the 
fire cannot be suppressed before the fire-induced component damage (end state ‘NS’). 
 
Figure 5.2 Detection and suppression event tree (from NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix P [3]). NS – Failure 
of suppression; OK – Success of suppression. 
For detection, there are three success paths: prompt detection (PD), automatic detection (AD), and manual 
detection (MD). The prompt detection (PD) can be achieved if a continuous fire watch is present in the fire 
compartment (e.g., under the hot work), the room is continuously occupied by plant crew, or high sensitivity 
detectors, such as the VEWFD systems [4], are installed. The automatic detection (AD) is achieved by 
automatic fire detectors, such as heat detectors and smoke detectors installed in the fire compartment. The 
manual detection (MD) refers to a delayed detection by a roving fire watch or fire patrol present in the fire 
room, or a delayed detection by the Main Control Room (MCR) through abnormal indications caused by 
fire-induced equipment damage. For suppression, there are three success paths: prompt suppression (PS), 
automatic suppression (AS), and manual suppression (MF and FB). The prompt suppression (PS) refers to 
suppression by a fire watch or a fire patrol on the scene and can be only credited in the hot work scenario 
where the fire detection is achieved by the prompt detection (PD). The automatic suppression (AS) refers 
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to the fire suppression by fixed and automatic suppression systems (e.g., actuated by a fusible link which 
melts under high temperature), such as water-based, carbon-dioxide, and halon sprinklers. The manual 
suppression (MS) can be achieved in two ways: (i) manual activation of the fixed systems (MF) and (ii) 
manual suppression by the fire brigade (FB). As shown in Figure 5.2, the viable suppression features depend 
on how the fire has been detected. Following the successful prompt detection (sequences ‘A’ to ‘E’), all 
four features of suppression (PS, AS, MF, and FB) are possible. In contrast, if the fire is detected by the 
automatic detectors (sequences ‘F’ to ‘I’), the prompt suppression is not possible, and the fire should be 
controlled by either automatic suppression (AS) or manual suppression (MF and FB). When the fire is 
detected by the delayed manual detection (sequences ‘K’ to ‘M’), the only possible suppression mode is 
manual suppression, either by manual actuation of fixed suppression systems (MF) or by the fire brigade 
(FB).  
Among the top events shown in Figure 5.2, the prompt and manual fire protection features (PD, PS, 
MD, MF, and FB) involve human actions to achieve their desired function. There are two key gaps in the 
existing approach for the fire protection analysis in NPPs: (1) there is no explicit connection between the 
manual fire protection features and the fire progression model, and (2) the quantification of the top events 
associated with the detection and suppression in the event tree (Figure 5.2) is solely based on empirical data 
and expert opinion. The first gap would generate unrealistic fire risk estimations in NPPs because the 
interactions of the manual fire protection features with the fire source would change the behavior of the fire 
progression. To address this, in the Fire I-PRA framework (Figure 5.3) developed in Chapter 2, an explicit 
interface between the Fire Progression Model and the Manual Fire Suppression Module is generated by 
modifying the HRR curve. In Fire I-PRA, HRR (an input to the FDS code) is modified based on three key 
timings associated with manual suppression. In Fire I-PRA, the sequence of fire protection events follows 
the current practice in NPPs (event tree in Figure 5.2) that is reflected in the Scenario-Based Damage model 
(Module 5 in Figure 5.3). The approach offered in Chapter 2, however, still has the second gap (stated 
above) because the information used for modifying the HRR curve is based solely on empirical data, i.e., 
using the existing data-driven probability model (or “non-suppression curve”) available in the current Fire 
PRA methodology [5]. To further improve the realism and time resolution of the manual suppression 
analysis in Fire I-PRA, this chapter (Step 7.b of the roadmap) develops a Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA)-based model for the Manual Fire Suppression Module (Module “c” in Figure 2.3) to be used along 
with the explicit interface (i.e., modified HRR) developed in Chapter 2, and this integration would address 
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the two key gaps identified above. Section 5.2 explains the HRA-based fire protection model developed for 
the I-PRA. 
 
Figure 5.3 Integrated Probabilistic Risk Assessment (I-PRA) for Fire PRA in Nuclear Power Plants.  
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5.2 The HRA-Based Method for Manual Fire Suppression Module in I-PRA Framework  
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the author’s perspective regarding the layers of analysis in the data-driven 
methods and the HRA-based models for manual fire protection analysis. As this figure shows, there are 
three causal layers for the manual suppression process: (1) time-based performance measure for manual 
suppression (e.g., time to manual suppression), (2) task processes, including the sequences of tasks, Human 
Error Probabilities (HEPs), and timings, and (3) human behavior of the fire brigade crew. The data-driven 
methods are based on historical data associated with layer 1. HRA [6] is a technical discipline in PRA that 
has covered a collection of models and methods to quantify operator error probabilities in the risk scenarios. 
There are several recent studies that have developed HRA-based models for manual fire protection features, 
including prompt detection (PD) and suppression (PS) [4] and manual suppression by the fire brigade [7-
11]. The HRA-based methods explicitly address the task processes of manual suppression (Layer 2 in 
Figure 5.4) by developing the HRA scenarios using an HRA event tree, while the underlying human 
behavior (Layer 3 in Figure 5.4) is implicitly treated in the quantification of HEPs through the existing 
HRA quantification techniques based on Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs); as a result, the time-based 
performance measure for manual suppression, e.g., time to manual suppression (Layer 1 in Figure 5.4), is 
predicted.  
The available HRA-based models for manual fire protection analysis have not yet been put into 
practice in NPPs (they are mainly at the study/research level), and are based on the combination of first- 
and second-generation methods in the field of HRA. The difference between the first and second generation 
HRA methods is the resolution (types and number) of the PSFs that would lead to a specific degree of 
realism in the estimated HEPs. For example, Reference [17] uses first-generation HRA methods including 
the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [12] and the Cause-Based Decision Tree Method 
(CBDTM) [13], and References [7, 8, 10, 11] also use first-generation HRA methods including THERP 
[12] and the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP) [14] for fire protection analysis in NPPs. The 
recent nuclear regulatory document, NUREG-2180 [21], uses a combination of first- and second-generation 
HRA methods including THERP [12], CBDTM [13], and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human 
Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method [15]. Appendix C provides more detailed information on each of 
these HRA-based methods. The simulation-based methods [16, 17] for fire protection analysis focus on 
explicitly modeling Layer 3 in Figure 5.4 to more realistically model interactive paths (A), (B) and (C) in 
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Figure 5.4; therefore, they can add more realism in the prediction of time in Layer 1. The development of 
the simulation-based methods for fire protection analysis is the scope of ongoing research by the author [16, 
17] and can be considered to be one of the advancements in the third-generation HRA methods [18-24] that 
focus on modeling human cognitive processes.  
 
Figure 5.4 Pictorial representation of underlying causations associated with manual suppression and its 
interactions with fire progression in NPPs. 
This chapter develops an HRA-based model for analyzing fire brigade manual suppression (i.e., top event 
“ FB”, and sequences ‘H’ and ‘I’ in Figure 5.2) by tailoring and advancing the recent HRA-based method 
in NUREG-2180 [4], originally developed for modeling the prompt detection (the top event ‘PD’ in Figure 
5.2) in response to the Very Early Warning Fire Detection (VEWFD) systems in NPPs. In addition to its 
contribution to the advancement of the Manual Fire Suppression Module (Module “c” in Figure 5.3) in Fire 
I-PRA, the HRA-based model developed in this research can enhance the existing Fire PRA of NPPs by 




The methodological advancements that the HRA-based method offered in this chapter make to the 
HRA-based method in NUREG-2180 [4] include (i) using a CFD-based fire progression model to define 
the system time window (i.e., the time available for manual suppression before fire-induced equipment 
damage occurs); (ii) considering the dependency of the human performance on the fire severity in the HRA 
event tree logic; and (iii) explicitly addressing the influences of manual suppression by the fire brigade on 
fire progression using the correlation-based water suppression model [25]. This HRA-based model is also 
extended to estimate two pivotal timings associated with the fire brigade performance that are used to create 
an explicit interface between fire progression and manual suppression in the Fire I-PRA framework. In 
addition, a method for combining the existing data-driven non-suppression curve with the results of the 
HRA-based manual suppression model developed in this research through the scenario-specific adjustment 
factor is proposed.  
In this study, the task sequences by the onsite fire brigade are explicitly modeled using an HRA 
event tree, while the HEPs and timings of individual tasks are assessed by the existing HRA quantification 
techniques for NPPs (i.e., SPAR-H method [15]) and based on the empirical fire brigade performance data, 
respectively. The HRA-based method in this research is executed in two phases: 
 
Phase I:  
This phase uses the HRA procedure introduced in NUREG-2180 [4], including the following nine steps: 
 Step I-1: Define and interpret the issue 
 Step I-2: Define the scope of analysis 
 Step I-3: Identify and define the success criteria and human failure events (HFEs) 
 Step I-4: Perform qualitative analysis 
 Substep I-4.a: Develop an HRA event tree for manual suppression 
 Substep I-4.b: Timeline analysis 
 Substep I-4.c: Feasibility analysis  
 Step I-5: Perform quantitative analysis (HEP development) 
 Step I-6: Perform dependency analysis 
 Step I-7: Perform recovery analysis 
 Step I-8: Perform uncertainty analysis 




The output from this phase is the non-suppression probability for manual suppression by the fire brigade, 
i.e., the split fraction for the top event ‘FB’ in Figure 5.2. 
 
Phase II:  
In Phase II of this research, the HRA-based manual suppression model, developed in Phase I, is 
advanced so that it can be utilized as the Manual Fire Suppression Module in the Fire I-PRA.  
 
• As explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.5), to create an explicit interface between fire progression 
and manual suppression (Figure 5.5), the Manual Fire Suppression Module generates the 
estimations of (i) the fire brigade response time (tfb), (ii) the duration of manual suppression (tfb→sup), 
and (iii) the HRR curve during manual suppression; hence, a new computational algorithm for the 
HRA-based manual suppression model is developed in this phase so that these three outputs can be 
generated from the results of the HRA-based model as well as from data. The following steps are 
developed in this research to execute Phase II:  
 
 Step II-1: Generate random samples of uncertain input parameters for FDS (including the 
burnout HRR curve and other physical inputs) 
 Step II-2: Obtain the time to detection 
 Step II-3: Generate the manual suppression scenarios before the suppression: 
 Substep II-3.1: Consideration of HFEs for the MCR operators and the fire brigade 
 Substep II-3.2: Generating timing estimates for the MCR and fire brigade response 
 Step II-4: Run the FDS code up to the time when suppression begins 
 Step II-5: Develop the HRR during suppression and incorporate it into the FDS input file: 
 Substep II-5.1: Manual suppression using a portable extinguisher (MS1) 
 Substep II-5.2: Manual suppression using the water hose (MS2) 
 Step II-6: Restart the FDS code and until the fire is suppressed 
 Step II-7: Updating the existing data-driven non-suppression curve [5] with the HRA-based 
outputs. This method uses the scenario-specific adjustment factor, available in the current 
Fire PRA methodology [26]. From Step II-4, the random samples of tfb are obtained and 
used for developing the probability distribution for the scenario-specific adjustment factor. 
This allows the HRA-based manual suppression model to be used in the current Fire PRA 
methodology to generate the evidence for the plant-specific modification of the data-driven 
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non-suppression curve; hence, this can improve the realism of manual suppression analysis 
by increasing the plant specificity of the non-suppression curve in the current Fire PRA 
methodology. The following steps are used to execute this approach:  
 
Figure 5.5 Modeling the interactions between fire progression and manual suppression in I-PRA 
The methodological and computational details related to executing Phases I and II are explained in detail 
in the following sections while applying them to a case study for the selected NPP fire scenario described 
in Section 5.3. 
5.3 Computational and Methodological Execution of the HRA-Based Manual Suppression Modeling 
in A Nuclear Power Plant Fire Scenario  
A representative NPP fire scenario selected from NUREG-1934 Scenario D (a motor control center 
panel fire in a switchgear room) [27], which is the same fire scenario as the one used in the case study in 
Chapter 2, is used in this chapter to demonstrate the computational and methodological steps of the HRA-
based method for manual suppression analysis. The fire compartment is illustrated in Figure 2.6, and more 
details on the room configuration and damage targets are provided in Section 2.4. Among four damage 
targets (i.e., three cable trays and a target electrical cabinet), cable tray B is assumed to be associated with 
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the fire-induced initiating event in the plant PRA model (e.g., small-break Loss-of-Coolant Accident due 
to a stuck-open pressurizer valve) and is considered as the damage target of interest in this case study. Fire 
progression and its effect on the damage targets are simulated by a CFD-based fire model, the FDS [28].  
5.3.1 Phase I of the HRA-based Method for Manual Suppression Modeling in I-PRA 
This section executes the methodological steps listed under Phase I in Section 5.2 for the selected 
NPP fire scenario:  
 
 
5.3.1.1. Step I-1: Define and Interpret the Issue 
This study focuses on the human performance of the fire brigade in manual suppression (i.e., top 
event ‘FB’ in Figure 5.2) for a selected NPP fire scenario, i.e., an electrical cabinet fire in the switchgear 
room (as described in Section 5.3). 
 
 
5.3.1.2. Step I-2: Define the Scope of Analysis 
In Phase I of this study, the desired output is the conditional split fraction for the top event ‘FB’, 
given that the fire is detected by the automatic detectors and that the automatic suppression system is 
unavailable; mathematically, the conditional probability of interest is represented by Pr (FB = F | PD = F, 
AD = S, AS = F) where ‘FB’, ‘PD’, ‘AD’, and ‘AS’ refer to the top events in Figure 5.2, and their states 
are denoted by ‘S’: Success and ‘F’: Failure (or unavailable). Note that the conditional split fraction for the 
success of manual suppression by the fire brigade under the same conditions, i.e., Pr (FB = S | PD = F, AD 
= S, AS = F), can be obtained by 1 − Pr (FB = F | PD = F, AD = S, AS = F) since the two states, success 
and failure of FB, are binary events that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. It should also 
be noted that the inputs used in this study are generic and do not represent any specific NPP. The main 
objective of this study is to demonstrate the methodology, applicability, and the remaining methodological 
gaps of the proposed HRA-based method for the manual suppression analysis. To apply the proposed 
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methodology for a specific NPP, a plant-specific qualitative and quantitative analysis should be conducted 
to obtain the HRA inputs specific to the plant being analyzed.  
 
5.3.1.3. Step I-3: Identify and Define Success Criteria and Human Failure Events 
This step identifies and defines the success criteria and HFEs for the problem and scope identified 
in Steps 1 and 2. The success criteria define under what conditions the human action of interest for 
maintaining system safety is considered as success. The potential human errors that could impede the 
achievements of the success criteria are identified as the HFEs. To facilitate the definition of success criteria 
and the HFEs, the fire drill records for the switchgear room at a representative plant are qualitatively 
analyzed to identify the sequence of tasks required for achieving manual suppression of the switchgear 
room fire (Figure 5.6).  
Based on the drill record, three types of personnel involved in the manual suppression process are 
identified: (i) the MCR operators, (ii) the first responder of the fire brigade, and (iii) the fire brigade teams. 
The MCR operators are responsible for detecting the fire alarm in the MCR and communicating with the 
fire brigade members to dispatch them. The first responder, who is part of the fire brigade team, is 
responsible for checking the conditions of the fire room before the fire brigade teams arrive and begin their 
suppression activity. The fire brigade teams are responsible for performing the manual suppression activity. 
The vertical axis of Figure 5.6 shows the sequence of tasks, i.e., the chronological order of tasks that should 
be implemented by those three types of personnel to achieve a successful manual suppression. The timeline 
of this figure starts with the fire detection by the automatic fire detectors installed in the fire compartment 
that send the fire detection signals to the MCR and ends with the fire suppression by the fire brigade. The 
first column shows the tasks implemented by the MCR operators. Their actions are initiated in response to 
the fire detection alarm in the MCR and include two tasks:  
 
• Detect and diagnose the fire detection signal on the MCR computer (Task 1.A) 





Figure 5.6 Generic description of actions for manual fire suppression after fire detection by automatic 
detectors, based on the fire drill records from a representative plant. 
The second column (in Figure 5.6) shows the tasks implemented by the first responder (i.e., one 
member of the fire brigade) and include the following four tasks: 
 
• Following the notification from the MCR, arrive at the assembly area 
• Leave the assembly area and move to the fire room 
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• Arrive at the door of the fire room 
• Check the indications of the fire from the outside of the fire room and report the status to the fire 
brigade team 
The third column (in Figure 5.6) shows the tasks implemented by the fire brigade teams, including 
the following eleven tasks: 
 
• Following the alarm notification from the MCR, gather at the assembly area (Task 2.A) 
• Communicate with the MCR to get an appropriate fire preplan number (Task 2.B) 
• Put on and peer check the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (Task 2.C) 
• Leave the assembly area and move to the staging area using a vehicle (Task 2.D) 
• Arrive at the staging area (Task 2.E) 
• Prepare for entering the fire room, i.e., laying out the water hose from the hose cabinet to the 
entrance of the room (Task 2.F) 
• Put on the Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) (Task 2.G) 
• Enter the fire room (Task 2.H) 
• Search for and locate the fire source (Task 2.I) 
• Manually suppress the fire using a portable fire extinguisher (Task 2.J) 
o Open the electrical cabinet door (Task 2.J.i) 
o Discharge the portable fire extinguisher (Task 2.J.ii) 
• If the fire is not suppressed by the portable extinguisher, suppress the fire using a water hose (Task 
2.K) 
o Prepare the water hose (Task 2.K.i) 
o Open the electrical cabinet door if it has not been opened in Task 2.J.i (Task 2.K.ii) 
o Discharge the water hose on the fire source (Task 2.K.ii) 
• Fire suppressed or under control 
 
In this study, for simplicity, the human errors associated with the first responder are not considered; i.e., 
the first responder’s action is assumed to be performed successfully. The scope of HRA in this study 
includes the actions taken by the MCR operators (Tasks 1.a and 1.b) and those taken by the fire brigade 
teams (Tasks 2.a to 2.k). For the sake of reference in the following sections, each task by the MCR operators 
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and by the fire brigade teams is numbered as “Task [1 or 2].[alphabet]” where the number represents the 
type of personnel (1: MCR operators and 2: fire brigade), while the lower-case alphabet represents the task 
order.  
In summary, the HFEs in this study consider the MCR operator response to the fire detection signals 
and the manual suppression activity by the fire brigade teams. The success criteria for each human action 
are defined as follows: 
 
• Success criteria for MCR response: the MCR operators dispatch the fire brigade to the correct 
location in a timely manner upon recognizing the automatic detector’s fire detection alarm. In other 
words, both tasks 1.A and 1.B are performed successfully and in a timely manner. 
 
• Success criteria for fire brigade response: The fire brigade teams (i) arrive at the correct fire 
compartment as instructed by the MCR operators, (ii) search for and locate the fire source, and (iii) 
suppress or control the fire in a timely manner (i.e., before the fire-induced equipment damage 
occurs). In other words, all tasks from 2.A to 2.K are performed successfully and in a timely manner. 
The HFEs are defined as the failure by the MCR operators and the fire brigade crews to satisfy the 
success criteria identified above. To be more specific, for each type of personnel, the HFE is defined as 
follows: 
 
• HFE for MCR operators: Failure to dispatch the fire brigade to the correct location in a timely 
manner upon fire detection alarm from the automatic detectors. In other words, the MCR operator’s 
action is considered as failure when either Task 1.A or Task 1.B fails. 
 
• HFE for the fire brigade: Failure to either (i) arrive at the correct fire compartment where the fire 
was detected by the automatic detectors, (ii) search for and locate the fire source, (iii) suppress or 
control the fire in a timely manner (i.e., before the fire-induced equipment damage occurs). In other 
words, the fire brigade action is considered as failure when any of the Tasks 2.A through 2.I and 





5.3.1.4. Step I-4: Perform Qualitative Analysis 
This step conducts three qualitative analyses for manual suppression: (a) development of an HRA 
event tree; (b) timeline analysis; and (c) feasibility analysis. The qualitative analysis in this study is 
conducted based on (i) fire drill records and the fire brigade manual from the representative plant; (ii) 
discussions with the NPP fire protection experts from the representative plant; and (iii) industry-wide 
technical reports on fire protection analysis for NPPs. The following sub-sections, explains “a” to “c” 
qualitative analyses.  
(a) Development of an HRA Event Tree 
For sequences ‘H’ and ‘I’ in the detection and suppression event tree (Figure 5.2), the top event 
‘FB’ is further expanded by developing the HRA event tree, as shown in Figure 5.7, based on the task 
analysis described in Step I-3. The initiating event of this event tree (‘Seq. H & I’ in Figure 5.7) represents 
an entry into sequences ‘H’ and ‘I’ in the detection and suppression event tree (Figure 5.2); namely, 
following a fire ignition in the switchgear room, the fire is detected by automatic detectors, and no fixed 




Figure 5.7 HRA Event Tree for manual suppression after fire detection by automatic detectors. The end 
states NS: Failure of suppression activity and OK: Success of suppression activity. 
 
The first top event (‘HRR Bins’ in Figure 5.7) considers different intensities of the fire, represented 
by the maximum HRR value Qi and the associated probability weight θi. The consideration of maximum 
HRR is necessary to account for the fact that the time available for manual suppression strongly depends 
on the intensity of the fire. Based on the severity factor method recommended in NUREG/CR-6850 [3], the 
probability distribution representing the uncertainty associated with the maximum HRR is discretized into 
15 bins (Table 5.1). In this study, the fire ignition source is assumed to be a vertical cabinet with qualified 
cable containing more than one cable bundle; hence, the HRR bins listed in Table E-3 of NUREG/CR-6850 





Table 5.1 Discretized distribution for maximum HRR (Vertical cabinets with qualified cable, fire in more 
than one cable bundle) from NUREG/CR-6850 Volume 2, Table E-3 [3]. 
Bin 
Heat Release Rate [kW] Probability  
Weight θi Lower Upper Point Value Qi 
1 0 90 34 0.506 
2 90 179 130 0.202 
3 179 269 221 0.113 
4 269 359 310 0.067 
5 359 448 400 0.041 
6 448 538 490 0.026 
7 538 628 579 0.016 
8 628 717 669 0.010 
9 717 807 759 0.006 
10 807 897 848 0.004 
11 897 986 938 0.003 
12 986 1076 1028 0.002 
13 1076 1166 1118 0.001 
14 1166 1255 1208 0.001 
15 1255 Infinity 1462 0.001 
 
When the HRR value of the fire is too low to cause the fire-induced cable damage, the scenario 
results in the success end state (‘OK’), regardless of the success or failure of manual suppression by the fire 
brigade. To consider this situation, the second top event, ‘NPD’, is introduced in Figure 5.7. This top event 
has a “deterministic” branching condition based on the outputs from the fire progression model, rather than 
the stochastic branching condition which is typically considered in the event tree analysis. The state of this 
top event is determined based on the maximum temperature and heat flux at the cable tray B predicted by 
the FDS code; if both maximum temperature and heat flux are lower than the associated damage threshold 
values (as explained in the timeline analysis below), there is no potential for the fire-induced cable damage 
regardless of the outcome of manual suppression; thus, the top event ‘NPD’ has an upper branch (i.e., the 
TRUE logic) with the probability of one. On the other hand, if either the maximum temperature or the heat 
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flux exceeds the corresponding damage threshold values, the top event ‘NPD’ has a lower branch (i.e., the 
FALSE logic) with the probability of one.  
The third to sixth top events in Figure 5.7 represent the human actions performed either by the 
MCR operator or by the fire brigade. Note that, in the existing HRA techniques, there are two spectra on 
how to model human actions. The first direction is to break down the tasks into the lower-level task elements 
or subtasks and assign the HEP for each subtask by consulting look-up tables provided by the HRA 
quantification methods. The underlying presumption is that the subtask element is the most important 
attribute of human actions in predicting the HEP value [6]. This approach is introduced by THERP [12], 
which is the most common HRA quantification technique in the nuclear industry. In contrast, the second 
direction is to focus on the context in which the human error is produced, instead of focusing on the lower-
level subtasks. In this approach, the HEP value for generic task types at a higher level is determined by 
analyzing the context of the human action (e.g., procedure, training, experience, and communication). This 
approach is used by some of the first-generation HRA techniques, such as HEART [29] and NARA [30], 
and by most second-generation HRA techniques, such as SPAR-H [15] and ATHEANA [31]. In this study, 
as suggested by NUREG-2180 [4] in the context of the VEWFD application, the second approach is adapted, 
where each HFE is treated holistically, rather than breaking it down into various lower-level subtasks and 
totaling them up to obtain the HEP for the whole HFE. This is because the lower-level subtasks, defined in 
THERP [12] for the MCR context, are not necessarily applicable for the context of manual suppression. In 
the HRA event tree (Figure 5.7), therefore, the action by the MCR operators (i.e., combination of Tasks 1.a 
and 1.b) is treated as one HFE (top event ‘MCR Response’), whereas the action by the fire brigade team is 
divided into three HFEs, including (i) top event ‘FB Response (FR)’ including Tasks 2.a through 2.i before 
starting suppression, (ii) top event ‘1st Manual Supp. (MS1)’ where the fire brigade uses a portable fire 
extinguisher to control the fire, and (iii) top event ‘2nd Manual Supp. (MS2)’ where the fire brigade uses a 
water hose to control the fire. The separation between the fire brigade response (‘FR’) and manual 
suppression activity (‘MS1’ and ‘MS2’) is consistent with the approach proposed in NUREG-2180 [4] and 
can be justified by the fact that the interactions between manual suppression and fire progression cannot be 
captured by the existing HRA quantification techniques.  
As illustrated in Figure 5.7, the entire manual suppression process (top event ‘FB’ in Figure 5.2) is 
considered to be success when (i) the MCR response (‘MR’) and the fire brigade response (‘FR’) are both 
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success and (ii) either the first manual suppression attempt using a portable extinguisher (‘MS1’) or the 
second manual suppression attempt using the water hose (‘MS2’) is success, as indicated by the sequences 
‘Hi,1’ and ‘Hi,2’ in Figure 5.7 where i is an index for the HRR bins (i = 1, 2, …, 15). In contrast, the manual 
suppression process fails when either (i) the MCR response fails (‘MR’), (ii) the fire brigade response fails 
(‘FR’), or (iii) both first and second manual suppression attempts (‘MS1’ and ‘MS2’) fail, as indicated by 
the sequences ‘Ii,1’ to ‘Ii,3’ in Figure 5.7. 
Note that the possibility of recovery actions by the MCR operators and the fire brigade has been 
included in the HFEs and the associated HEPs. For instance, even when one MCR operator fails to 
recognize and diagnose the fire detection alarms, there is a high chance that another MCR operator can 
recover from the human error made by the first operator. The HRA quantification technique used in this 
study considers such recovery actions as part of PSFs, instead of explicitly modeling the additional human 
subtasks by the second operator. More discussion on this point can be found in Step I-7.  
(b) Timeline Analysis 
The timeline analysis is one of the key steps in the existing HRA methods to determine the times 
available and required for operators’ actions. This study conducts the timeline analysis using the approach 
in the EPRI HRA methodology [32], which was also applied in the HRA for the VEWFD systems [4]. 
Figure 5.8 shows the timeline diagram used in the EPRI HRA methodology, where the time between the 
initiating event (at time t0) and the time at which the human action will no longer succeed (at time tSW) is 




Figure 5.8 Timeline diagram for the EPRI HRA Methodology [32]. 
• t0 = Start time: t0 is defined as the start time of the progression of events. This study defines t0 as 
the time when the fire ignites in the electrical cabinet. 
 
• tsw = System time window: tsw is defined as the time from the start of the event (t0) until the time 
when human action is no longer beneficial in terms of preventing the progression of the event. 
From the HRA viewpoint, tsw represents the maximum amount of time available for the manual 
suppression action. In this study, tsw is the time when the damage target of interest (i.e., cable tray 
B) is damaged by the fire and is computed by the FDS for each maximum HRR value (Table 5.2). 
Among input parameters in the FDS code, Phase I of this research only accounts for the uncertainty 
associated with the maximum HRR of the electrical cabinet fire. The uncertainty of maximum HRR 
is treated by the severity factor method, recommended in the current Fire PRA methodology [3]. 
Meanwhile, the other input parameters, including timings of the HRR curve (i.e., time to growth, 
duration of maximum HRR, and time to decay under the burnout condition) and material properties 
of concrete wall and cable jacket, use point estimates which are consistent with the ones suggested 
in NUREG-1934 [27]. Two key performance measures, maximum temperature inside the cable 
jacket (Tmax) and maximum heat flux at the surface of cable jacket (q˝max), are computed for cable 
tray B. The damage threshold values, in terms of these two key performance measures, are given 
as Tmax = 400 ◦C or q˝max = 11 kW/m2 [27], respectively. tsw is defined as the time when either of 
these two key performance measures reaches the corresponding damage threshold value. As shown 
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in Table 5.2, for the first three HRR bins, no damage to cable tray B occurred until the end of the 
FDS run (i.e., until natural decay of the fire).  
Table 5.2 System time window tsw [sec] for cable tray B predicted by the FDS code. 
Bin Heat Release Rate  Qi [kW] 
System Time Window  
tsw [sec] 
1 34 No Damage 
2 130 No Damage 
3 221 No Damage 
4 310 1140 
5 400 945 
6 490 765 
7 579 735 
8 669 690 
9 759 660 
10 848 525 
11 938 585 
12 1028 570 
13 1118 495 
14 1208 525 
15 1462 480 
 
 
• tdelay = Delay time: tdelay represents the time from the start of the event (t0) until the time at which 
the “operators” receive the cue to initiate action. It should be noted that the “operator” in this 
context refers to every plant crew member who is involved in the manual suppression process, 
including the MCR operators and the fire brigade members. As shown in Figure 5.6, the manual 
suppression process is initiated by the fire detection signal received by the MCR operators; hence, 
the fire detection signal from the fire compartment, received by the MCR, is considered as the cue 
that initiates the manual suppression process. tdelay is defined as the time from the fire ignition until 
the time when the fire detection signal is received by the MCR. tdelay can be affected by various 
factors, including (i) fire growth rate, (ii) ventilation condition, (iii) design of automatic fire 
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detectors, and (iv) design of the plant instrument and control (I&C) systems. Although the 
influences by fire progression and the automatic detector design on tdelay can be explicitly modeled 
by the FDS code, this study assumes that tdelay is 1 minute [3].  
 
• treqd = Time required: treqd represents the time required for completing the human actions to 
achieve the success criteria and is defined as a summation of the cognition time tcog and execution 
time texe, treqd = tcog + texe. Here, tcog is defined as the nominal time required for the cognition process 
by the operators including detection, diagnosis, and decision making upon receiving the cue. texe is 
defined as the nominal time required for the execution of the actions after successful diagnosis and 
includes travel time to the local components, time to collect tools and put on PPE, and time to 
control the components. tcog and texe are estimated by the HRA analyst based on various sources of 
data and information, such as plant procedures, plant walk-thorough, plant personnel talk-through, 
the MCR simulator observations, and plant fire drill records. 
 
Note that this research treats treqd for manual suppression as a single time quantity, rather than dividing it 
into tcog and texe, because the existing empirical data concerning manual suppression do not separate tcog and 
texe. Based on Figure 5.6, treqd can be expressed by the summation of the time for all tasks by the MCR 
operators and the fire brigade. When the fire is suppressed by the first manual suppression attempt (‘MS1’ 
in Figure 5.7), 





where t1,l, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ {A, B}, represents the time required for the tasks (1.A and 1.B) performed by the MCR 
operators, while t2,m 𝑚𝑚 ∈ {A, B, … , J}, represents the time required for the tasks performed by the fire brigade. 
Similarly, when the fire is suppressed by the second manual suppression attempt (‘MS2’ in Figure 5.7),  





When time data for the manual suppression actions are collected, the uncertainty associated with the time 
to complete each task, in addition to the point estimate corresponding to a nominal plant crew under an 
average condition, needs to be addressed. This is particularly crucial when the required time has the same 
order of magnitude as the available time, and when a small change in the required and/or available time 
could affect the conclusion reached on the feasibility of human actions. For this reason, this study identifies 
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the upper and lower bounds, in addition to the point estimate, of the time required for each task based on 
the empirical data and develops a probability distribution representing the uncertainty associated with time 
to complete each task. 
For the fire scenario being analyzed here, the times required for the tasks by the MCR operators 
and fire brigade are estimated based on two different data sources: (i) the fire drill records for the switchgear 
room at the representative NPP and (ii) the generic data for a cable spreading room provided by the IAEA 
technical report [33] (Table 5.3).  
Table 5.3 Probability distribution for time to complete each task [seconds], derived from the fire drill 
records at the representative plant (Dataset #1) and an IAEA technical report (Dataset #2). 
Tasks Dataset #1 Dataset #2 
Task 1.A Truncated Normal (μ = 15.0, σ = 11.7) Truncated Normal (μ = 15.0, σ = 11.7) 
Task 1.B Truncated Normal (μ = 75.0, σ = 35.1) 
Truncated Normal (μ = 180, σ = 46.8) 
Task 2.A Truncated Normal (μ = 540, σ = 255) 
Task 2.B Truncated Normal (μ = 45.0, σ = 11.7) 
Task 2.C Truncated Normal (μ = 45.0, σ = 11.7) 
Task 2.D Truncated Normal (μ = 35.0, σ = 19.5) 
Task 2.E Truncated Normal (μ = 150, σ = 23.4) 
Task 2.F Truncated Normal (μ = 630, σ = 164) 
Truncated Normal (μ = 240, σ = 328) Task 2.G Truncated Normal (μ = 180, σ = 46.8) 
Task 2.H Point Estimate (10 sec) 
Task 2.I Truncated Normal (μ = 35.0, σ = 19.5) Truncated Normal (μ = 45, σ = 11.7) 
Task 2.J.i 
Task 2.J.ii 
Truncated Normal (μ = 20.0, σ = 7.80) 
Truncated Normal (μ = 20.0, σ = 7.80) 
Truncated Normal (μ = 20.0, σ = 7.80) 




Truncated Normal (μ = 180, σ = 46.8) 
Truncated Normal (μ = 20.0, σ = 7.80) 
Fire suppression analysis 
Truncated Normal (μ = 180, σ = 46.8) 
Truncated Normal (μ = 20.0, σ = 7.80) 
Fire suppression analysis 
 
Note that the two sets of probability distributions, derived from these two separate datasets, are 
developed only to demonstrate the proposed HRA-based method. In the practical application of this HRA-
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based method, it is recommended that a plant-specific data analysis be conducted to develop more realistic 
probability distributions which reflect the as-built, as-operated conditions of the specific plant being 
analyzed. The first set of the probability distributions, derived from the fire drill records at the representative 
plant (second column of Table 5.3), shows an illustrative case where the time required for manual 
suppression is relatively long. On the other hand, the second set of the probability distributions, derived 
from the IAEA technical report (third column of Table 5.3), shows an illustrative case where the time 
required for manual suppression is relatively short. For the second dataset, some of the tasks are grouped 
to make the task sequence consistent with the task description and dataset provided in the IAEA technical 
report [33].  
For the first manual suppression attempt, using a portable extinguisher (Task 2.J; ‘MS1’ in Figure 
5.7), this study considers two failure modes: (i) the fire brigade fails to open the electrical cabinet before 
using the portable extinguisher and (ii) the portable extinguisher cannot control the fire progression because 
the fire is too large or because of a human error by the fire brigade. These failure modes and the associated 
human error probabilities are addressed in Step I.5. Under the condition that neither of these failure modes 
occurs, the time to complete Task 2.J is fitted to the truncated normal distribution such that its 10%-ile is 
10 seconds and 90%-ile is 30 seconds, considering the information that: (a) the fire drill records at the 
representative plant show that the time necessary for discharging the portable fire extinguisher was shorter 
than 1 minute, and (ii) the typical discharge time of a portable extinguisher ranges from 10 to 20 seconds 
[34-36]. 
For the second manual suppression attempt using the water hose (Task 2.k; ‘MS2’ in Figure 5.7), 
the duration of manual suppression is determined by (i) the human performance of the fire brigade and (ii) 
the physical and chemical interactions between the fire and the suppressant. For addressing the second 
element, there are two possible approaches [37]: (a) use a pyrolysis model in the FDS code where the fuel 
pyrolysis rate and the HRR of the fire source are computed by numerically solving the physical and 
chemical governing equations and (b) use the empirical correlation model derived from the physical theory 
and experimental data to describe the time-profile of HRR under water suppression [28, 38]. In this study, 
to compute the duration of manual suppression using the water hose, an empirical water suppression model 
is used. In previous studies [25, 39-41], several empirical correlations have been proposed for this purpose. 
These empirical correlations had a commonality in that the HRR during water suppression exponentially 
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decreases with a downward convex function of time. Meanwhile, in literature, there are a few differences 
among these empirical correlation models: (i) the types of fuel used in the experiments, including plastic 
commodity [25, 40-42], wood furnishing [39], and liquid fuel fires [37]; and (ii) the functional form of the 
empirical correlation (e.g., whether a linear term, in addition to the exponential reduction, is considered). 
As experimental data to support the selection of a specific model for the NPP electrical cabinet fire are 
insufficient, this study uses the engineering correlation model proposed by Yu et al. [25] to describe the 
HRR profile during manual suppression using a water hose. The physical background of their empirical 
water suppression model is provided in Appendix D. This empirical model is selected because (i) the fuel 
used to derive this model (i.e., plastic commodity) has more similar characteristics to the ignition source in 
the selected NPP fire scenario (i.e., a cable bundle in the electrical cabinet) than those used for the other 
existing empirical models, and (ii) this empirical model [25] has been incorporated into the FDS code [28, 
38] as a sub-model to predict the pyrolysis rate under water suppression and has been widely applied to 
study the water-based suppression in the NPP context [43-46]. In this empirical model by Yu et al. [25], 
based on the global energy balance, the HRR curve during the water-based suppression is described by 
 ?̇?𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = ?̇?𝑄0 exp[−𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡0)], (5.3) 
where  
 ?̇?𝑄(𝑡𝑡):  HRR [kW] during water-based suppression as a function of time, t [sec], 
 ?̇?𝑄0:  HRR [kW] at the time of water application, t0 [sec], 
 k:  An empirical fuel-dependent model parameter. 
 
Yu et al. [25] conducted a regression analysis using the experimental data and found that the empirical 
model parameter k can be obtained as a linear function of the water application rate: 
 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑎𝑎1?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′ + 𝑎𝑎2, (5.4) 
where  
 ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′ : Water application rate on the fuel bed [kg/(sec∙m2)], 
 a1, a2: Empirical regression parameters. 
Since there is no experimental data that is specific for electrical cabinet fires in NPPs to estimate 
the two empirical parameters in Equation (5.4), as the first-order approximation, this study uses the values 
obtained by Yu et al. [25] for the plastic commodity. They provided the point estimates of two empirical 
coefficients in Equation (5.4) by fitting this model to experimental data: a1 = 0.716, and a2 = − 0.0131. In 
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this research, to consider uncertainty associated with these two empirical parameters, the experimental data 
provided by Yu et al. [25] are reanalyzed by performing a linear regression analysis to construct the 95% 
CIs for a1 and a2. For each parameter, as listed in Table 5.4, the uncertainty is characterized by a normal 
distribution whose mean value is set to the point estimate, while the 97.5th and 2.5th percentiles are set to 
the upper and lower bounds of the 95% CIs. This study assumes that a1 and a2 are independent from the 
fire progression characteristics (e.g., intensity, growth rate). 
Table 5.4 List of input parameters in the empirical correlation model of water-based suppression treated 
as random variables and the associated probability distribution. 
Input Parameters Probability Distribution 
a1: Empirical regression coefficient Normal (μ = 0.713, σ = 0.072) 
a2: Empirical regression coefficient Normal (μ = − 0.0132, σ = 0.0018) 
?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′ : Water application rate [kg/(sec∙m2)] Uniform (0.017, 0.170) 
The empirical water suppression model, shown in Equation (5.3), also requires ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  as an input that 
represents the water application rate that is sprayed on the fuel bed and is closely interrelated with the 
human performance of the fire brigade. There are two possible approaches for estimating ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′ : (i) perform 
a manual suppression test with the plant fire brigade to estimate the range of ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  based on the empirical 
observations under the simulated fire conditions; or (ii) develop an explicit model of the fire brigade 
performance and estimate ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  based on the model outputs. There is no literature, however, that studied ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  
for the NPP fire brigade crew; thus, the range of water application rate observed in the manual suppression 
test by Scheffey and Williams [47], where professional and well-trained firefighters tackled the wood crib 
fires, is used in this study. The uncertainty associated with ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  is represented by a uniform distribution 
(Table 5.4) which has the upper and lower bounds being set to the maximum and minimum values observed 
in Ref. [47]. Note that the range of ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  given in Table 5.4 exceeds the upper limit in the experimental data 
used by Yu et al. to fit the empirical water suppression model (0.012 ≤ ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  ≤ 0.041 kg/sec∙m2). In this 
research, it is assumed that their empirical water suppression model can be extrapolated beyond ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  = 0.041 
kg/sec∙m2. As stated in Section 6.2.4, future research needs to advance the water suppression model for 
manual suppression in the NPP context.  
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To propagate the uncertainty associated with a1, a2, and ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  (listed in Table 5.4), one million 
random samples of these parameters are generated by LHS. Then, Equation (5.4) is repeatedly evaluate 
with each set of a1, a2, and ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  to develop an empirical cdf for k. (Figure 5.9). In the uncertainty propagation 
conducted in the following steps, random samples for k are drawn from this truncated empirical cdf. Figure 
5.9 shows that approximately 1.5% random samples of k are negative values, which indicates that the water 
application rate is below the critical water flow rate (defined as the minimum water flow rate to achieve 
fire extinction); hence, manual water suppression is not efficient enough to extinguish the fire.  
 
Figure 5.9 Empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) for coefficient k in the empirical correlation 
model by Yu et al. [25] 
Given that k is a non-negative value, the exponential reduction curve in Equation (5.3) 
asymptotically approaches zero, but never reaches the zero value; thus, it is necessary to predefine a 
threshold HRR value below which the fire is considered as being suppressed or fully controlled. This 
research defines the fire suppression as the situation where the HRR value declines to below 10 kW so that 
there is no potential for fire-induced equipment damage. This selection of the extinguishment criterion is 
justified for two reasons: (i) the selected HRR criterion is smaller by an order of magnitude than the 
minimum HRR that is necessary for causing the fire-induced cable damage (i.e., Q = 310 kW for the fourth 
HRR bin in Table 5.2) and (ii) sensitivity analyses are conducted with two alternatives in the extinguishment 
criteria, 5 kW and 20 kW, and shows that the resultant change in the total failure probability of manual 
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suppression (computed in Step I-5) is less than 4% of the point estimate. Based on Equation (5.3), the 
duration of manual suppression, denoted as t2,K, is obtained by solving the following equation for t2,K:  
 10 kW = ?̇?𝑄0 exp�−𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡2,𝐾𝐾 − 𝑡𝑡0��, (5.5) 
where ?̇?𝑄0 is the HRR at t0 when the second attempt of manual suppression using the water hose begins, i.e., 
using the time distributions given in Table 5.3, 





Note that ?̇?𝑄0  in Equation (5.5) depends on (i) the maximum HRR bin and (ii) the random variables 
associated with time to complete each task (Table 5.3); thus, t2,K is also a random variable and is dependent 
on the maximum HRR bin and other random variables listed in Table 5.3. The empirical cdfs of t2,K, 
computed with two datasets (in Table 5.3), are shown in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11. In contrast, if the 
parameter k is a negative value, it is assumed that the time to complete MS2 is infinity. In Figure 5.10 and 
Figure 5.11, this situation is reflected in the difference between the maximum cdf value and unity. 
 
Figure 5.10 Empirical cumulative distribution function of t2.K (duration of the second manual suppression 
attempt using the water hose), given that NPD = No, MR = S, FR = S, and MS1 = F, for three HRR bins 




Figure 5.11 Empirical cumulative distribution function of t2.K (duration of the second manual suppression 
attempt using the water hose), given that NPD = No, MR = S, FR = S, and MS1 = F, for three HRR bins 
#2, #7, and #12 computed with Dataset #2. 
The empirical cdf of the total time required for MS1, 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖, given MR = S, FR = S, and MS1 
= S, are shown in Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 for Datasets #1 and #2, respectively. These empirical cdfs 
have been developed by Monte Carlo simulation, where the time to implement each task is randomly 
sampled from the corresponding probability distributions in Table 5.3, and the total required time for MS1 
is then computed by Equation (5.1). A batch of the LHS, sample size 1,000, is used to generate the random 
samples of input parameters. This sample size is selected so that the width of the 95% CIs for the total 
failure probability of manual suppression becomes less than 1% of the point estimate for both datasets given 
in Table 5.3. In the current scope, this research does not explicitly account for the influences of fire 
progression on the time to complete individual tasks by the fire brigade except for MS2; hence, 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 




Figure 5.12 Empirical cumulative distribution function of the time to complete MS1 given MR = S, FR = 
S, and MS1 = S, computed with Dataset #1. 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Empirical cumulative distribution function of the time to complete MS1 given MR = S, FR = 




The empirical cdf of the total required time for MS2, 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS2; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖, given MR = S, FR = S, and 
MS1 = F, is also developed using Monte Carlo simulation for Equation (5.2), as shown in Figure 5.14 and 
Figure 5.15, where the empirical cdf plots are generated for the HRR bins #2, #7, and #12 (only for 
illustration), even though the similar empirical cdfs can be constructed for all 15 HRR bins.  
 
Figure 5.14 Empirical cumulative distribution function of the cumulative time to complete MS2 given 
MR = S, FR = S, and MS1 = F, computed with Dataset #1 for the HRR bins #2, #7, and #12.  
 
Figure 5.15 Empirical cumulative distribution function of the cumulative time to complete MS2 given 
MR = S, FR = S, and MS1 = F, computed with Dataset #2 for the HRR bins #2, #7, and #12.  
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(c) Feasibility Analysis 
The purpose of the feasibility analysis is to evaluate, before conducting the quantitative HRA, whether it is 
plausible for operators to carry out the designated tasks under the given contexts and conditions. If an 
operator action is not feasible, the failure probability of 1.0 is assigned to the corresponding HFE [32]. In 
the context of Fire HRA, NUREG-1921 [32] identifies six criteria for the feasibility analysis: (1) Sufficient 
time, (2) Sufficient manpower, (3) Primary cues available/sufficient, (4) Proceduralized and trained actions, 
(5) Accessible location, and (6) Equipment and tools available and accessible. The following explains how 
these criteria are satisfied in the selected case study.  
Sufficient time: This criterion questions whether the designated task or set of tasks for the HFE being 
analyzed could be completed within the available time, considering both cognitive and execution tasks [48]. 
The important contributors to this criterion include equipment accessibility, environmental conditions, and 
variability among individual crews. The uncertainty associated with the required time, due to the variability 
of those contributing factors, should be addressed by assigning the probability distribution [32]. In this 
research, this criterion is explicitly considered in Step 5 (Quantitative Analysis – HEP Development) by 
computing the HEP for each manual suppression HFE, i.e., ‘MS1’ and ‘MS2’, considering the comparison 
between the total required time and the system time window, i.e., the time following the fire ignition until 
the fire-induced equipment damage occurs. If the total required time for each human action (or a sequence 
of tasks) is longer than the system time window, the corresponding human action is considered to be 
infeasible and is assumed to be a failure.  
Sufficient manpower: This criterion questions whether a sufficient number of trained personnel, such as the 
MCR operators and fire brigade crews, is available for completing the required tasks [48]. The potential 
parallel tasks, which could reduce their availability, should also be considered. Based on the review of the 
plant fire protection manual and an interview with the fire protection experts from the representative NPP, 
it was found that (i) the MCR operators are guided to place the top priority on the fire detection signal and 
(ii) the minimum number of fire brigade crews (e.g., two five-member fire brigade teams) is always 
available; therefore, this study assumes that sufficient manpower is always available to deal with the fire 
detection signals in the MCR and for manual suppression activity by the fire brigade.   
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Primary cues available/sufficient: This criterion questions whether the cues, sufficient for initiating and 
implementing the designated human actions, are available in a timely manner [48]. In the context of manual 
suppression, the first cue for the MCR operators to initiate their tasks (i.e., Tasks 1.a and 1.b) is the fire 
detection signal generated by the automatic fire detectors in the switchgear room. Since the sequences ‘H’ 
and ‘I’ in Figure 5.7 assume a successful fire detection by the automatic detectors, this first cue for the 
MCR operators is assumed to be clearly available and sufficient. The initial cues for the fire brigade tasks, 
including the top events ‘FR’, ‘MS1’, and ‘MS2’ in Figure 5.7, are the notifications provided by the MCR 
operators. The failure of the MCR to issue notifications is explicitly addressed by the HRA event tree logic 
where the entire manual suppression process is assumed to fail when the MCR response fails, as represented 
by the downward branch of the HFE ‘MR’ in Figure 5.7. In the case where the MCR successfully provides 
the notifications for the fire brigade (represented by the rightward branch of the HFE ‘MR’ in Figure 5.7), 
it is assumed that sufficient initial cues are available for the fire brigade to initiate their tasks represented 
by the HFEs ‘FR’, ‘MS1’, and ‘MS2.’ The physical cues of the fire source, such as smoke, heat, temperature, 
and visible flame, are also critical cues for manual suppression by the fire brigade, especially for the fire 
search task (Task 2.I). This study assumes that the fires which can cause the fire-induced equipment damage 
will generate a sufficient level of physical cues for fire search by the fire brigade. Note that the fire brigade 
at the representative NPP is equipped with the thermal imaging camera to detect the fire location based on 
the thermal abnormality. This improves the capability of the fire brigade to detect the physical cues of the 
fire source.  
Proceduralized and trained actions: This criterion questions whether (i) the quality of the plant procedure 
is sufficiently high to provide an effective guidance for the MCR operators and the fire brigade during the 
fire event and (ii) the amount and quality of the training are adequate to provide the MCR operators and the 
fire brigade with the opportunity to practice their responses [48]. Based on the information from the 
representative plant, this study assumes that well-structured and well-written operational procedures are 
provided for the MCR operator when the fire detection alarms are received. Meanwhile, the representative 
plant has a well-structured and clear fire preplan for each fire compartment, which details the room 
geometry, location of the firefighting equipment, and the recommended firefighting strategy for each 
potential fire source in each fire compartment. The fire drills for the MCR operators and the fire brigade 
are periodically conducted, at least once per quarter for each shift, with critical feedback from the internal 
and peer reviewers. The procedure and training, therefore, have no negative impact on the feasibility of the 
manual suppression tasks by the MCR operators and the fire brigade.  
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Accessible location: This criterion questions whether the location where the required tasks are implemented 
is accessible by the plant personnel. The accessibility of the task location could be influenced by the travel 
path, environmental effects (e.g., smoke, toxic gas, heat stress, radiation), and other external factors such 
as the physical obstructions (e.g., locked doors) [32, 48]. For the MCR response to the fire detection signals, 
the tasks by the operators are performed inside the MCR; hence, there is no need for travel to another 
location. Since the fire location is outside of the MCR, the environmental conditions in the MCR do not 
deteriorate. There is, therefore, no concern about the accessibility of the location for the MCR operator 
response. On the other hand, for the fire brigade response and manual suppression, the accessibility of the 
location may be hampered by the fire-induced environmental conditions, especially inside the room where 
the fire has occurred. Those fire-induced physical conditions can strongly affect the accessibility of the 
locations for Tasks 2.H (entering the fire room) through 2.K (manual suppression using the water hose). 
Indeed, in the Fire HRA for the MCR operators, NUREG-1921 [32] recommends that, when the operators 
perform any of the critical tasks in the fire location, the MCR operator action should be considered to be 
infeasible and should not be credited in HRA. For manual suppression by the fire brigade, however, this 
study assumes that the required tasks by the fire brigade, including Tasks 2.A through 2.K, are feasible, 
even though their tasks are partially performed in the fire location, considering the facts that (i) the fire 
brigade crews at the representative plant are periodically trained under the real fire conditions and (ii) the 
fire brigade crews wear SCBA and PPE which are designed such that the location accessibility of the fire 
brigade is not compromised by the fire scenarios encompassed in the NPP Fire PRA. There are a few 
additional considerations for this assumption: (a) for manual suppression using the portable extinguisher 
(MS1), an upper limit of HRR value that can be controlled by the portable extinguisher is considered; and 
(b) the effects of fire-induced adverse conditions on the fire brigade response are addressed by the PSFs in 
the HEP quantification. Note that the limited accessibility due to fire-induced environmental conditions is 
correlated with the availability of sufficient time in a sense that the fires, which are so large that the room 
accessibility is compromised, result in quite a short time to equipment damage; thus, manual suppression 
with such large fires is already judged to be infeasible based on the time sufficiency criterion.  
Equipment and tools available and accessible: This criterion questions whether the portable and special 
equipment necessary for implementing the local tasks, such as the keys to open locked areas, portable radios, 
SCBAs and PPEs, portable extinguishers, and water hoses, is available and accessible by the plant personnel 
[32, 48]. In the context of manual suppression, this criterion is especially important for the fire brigade as 
their tasks should be implemented in several locations around and inside the fire room. Based on the fire 
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preplan at the representative plant, the equipment necessary for the fire brigade action is stored in the 
designated locations, clearly indicated in the fire preplan, and is periodically tested to check its availability. 
This study assumes that all equipment and tools needed for manual suppression tasks by the fire brigade 
are available and accessible; therefore, the equipment and tools would not have a negative influence on the 
feasibility of manual suppression. 
Based on the qualitative observations above, all feasibility criteria, with the exception of the 
sufficient time criterion, are satisfied for the MCR operators and the fire brigade crews. The timeline 
analysis has shown that, depending on the maximum HRR value of the fire, the system time window could 
be shorter than the total required time for manual suppression. This means that, in some cases, manual 
suppression could be infeasible due to the lack of sufficient time. The feasibility associated with the 
sufficient time is explicitly considered in the HEP calculation below (Step I-5). 
 
 
5.3.1.5. Step I-5: Perform Quantitative Analysis (HEP Development) 
The purpose of this step is to quantify the HEPs for the top events in the HRA event tree (Figure 
5.7) using the existing HRA techniques and the information collected in the previous steps. It should be 
noted that the HRA in this case study has several differences when compared with the traditional HRA 
developed for the operator response under the internal events: 
 
• The human actions associated with manual suppression may be taken before or without a reactor 
trip and after the fire detection signal is received by the MCR. In contrast, the existing HRA 
methods are mainly developed for the post-initiator operator response to the non-fire internal events.  
 
• The human actions associated with manual suppression involve various plant personnel (i.e., the 
MCR operators and the fire brigade members) in multiple locations. It should be noted that the 
existing HRA methods only consider a limited scope of the local actions by the MCR operators.  
 
• The HRA for manual suppression should consider direct interactions between the fire-induced 
physical environment (e.g., smoke, high temperature) and the performance of the fire brigade crews. 
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In contrast, the existing HRA methods, developed for the MCR operators, do not typically consider 
direct interactions between operators and their surrounding physical environment explicitly. 
 
This study uses the SPAR-H method [15] to estimate the HEPs of top events (other than ‘MS1’ and ‘MS2’) 
in the HRA event tree. The SPAR-H, one of the most common second-generation HRA techniques [49], 
was developed by the Idaho National Laboratory as an HRA method for the risk-informed regulatory 
applications, such as the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) and Significance Determination Process 
(SDP) programs [50, 51] for the U.S. NRC. The SPAR-H method is selected in this study, after considering 
its several advantages over the other HRA quantification techniques: (i) both execution and cognitive 
actions can be addressed in a consistent framework, (ii) the treatment of PSFs has more resolution and 
flexibility than the other existing HRA methods, such as THERP [12], HCR/ORE, and CBDTM [32], to 
aid in accounting for the fire effects on human performance, and (iii) the detailed methodology and 
procedure are available in the public NUREG document [15]. For the sake of readability, only the numerical 
results of the SPAR-H method obtained for the HFEs ‘MR’ and ‘FR’ are shown in the following subsections. 
The quantitative details of the SPAR-H analysis can be found in Appendix M.  
Note that the SPAR-H is a relatively simple method, aimed at obtaining the first-order 
approximation of the HEPs in PRA. In addition, even though the SPAR-H method has been applied for the 
external event PRA in limited studies, e.g., for internal fire [52] and seismic [53] initiating events, 
NUREG/CR-6883 [15] has reservations about the applicability of SPAR-H for external events, especially 
concerning the base HEP values and the PSF multipliers. In this study, the SPAR-H method is applied in 
the context of internal fires and the fire brigade actions to obtain the first-order approximation of the HEP 
estimate. Currently, a new HRA quantification method applicable for the external events, the Integrated 
Decision-Tree Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) [54, 55], is under development by the U.S. NRC 
and EPRI. Considering the approximate nature of the SPAR-H method and its applicability for the specific 
context of interest, it is recommended that, if the HEP estimated for the fire brigade response is identified 
as the significant risk contributor based on the risk importance measure analysis, a more detailed and 
complex HRA technique, such as ATHEANA [31] and IDHEAS [54, 55], be applied to obtain more 
accurate and realistic HEP estimates. Meanwhile, the SPAR-H method is not applicable for the HFEs 
associated with manual suppression itself, i.e., the HFEs ‘MS1’ and ‘MS2’ in Figure 5.7, because the 
contexts for which the base HEPs and the PSFs of the SPAR-H have been developed (i.e., the MCR and 
ex-MCR actions by the MCR operators) are significantly different from the conditions and work processes 
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during the manual suppression by the fire brigade. As detailed below, this study, therefore, estimates the 
HEPs for MS1 and MS2 based on (i) the timeline analysis in consideration of uncertainties and (ii) the 
empirical data from literature.  
 
MCR Operator Response (MR): The HFE ‘MR’ in the HRA event tree (Figure 5.7) has two tasks: (1.A) 
detection of the signal received from the automatic fire detectors and (1.B) radio communication with the 
fire brigade members to dispatch them to the fire compartment. By the SPAR-H (Appendix M), the HEP 
for the HFE ‘MR’ is estimated as Pr (MR) = 0.0055. 
 
Fire Brigade Response (FR): The HFE ‘FR’ in the HRA event tree (Figure 5.7) consists of nine tasks: (2.A) 
following the alarm notification from the MCR, gather at the assembly area; (2.B) communicate with the 
MCR to get an appropriate fire preplan number; (2.C) put on and peer check the PPE; (2.D) leave the 
assembly area and travel to the staging area using a vehicle; (2.E) arrive at the staging area; (2.F) prepare 
for entering the fire room, i.e., laying out the water hose from the hose cabinet to the room entrance; (2.G) 
put on the SCBA; (2.H) enter the fire room; and (2.I) search for and locate the fire source. By the SPAR-H 
(Appendix M), the HEP for the HFE ‘FR’ is estimated as Pr (FR) = 0.055. 
 
Manual Suppression Actions (MS1 & MS2): For the manual suppression tasks by the portable extinguisher 
(MS1) and discharging the water hose (MS2), the existing HRA techniques are hardly applicable since the 
required human action and its interactions with fire progression are significantly different from the context 
of post-initiator operator response inside and outside the MCR; therefore, this study quantifies the HEPs 
for MS1 and MS2 using empirical data and the correlation-based water suppression model, instead of 
relying on the existing HRA quantification methods.  
Mathematically, the HEP for the first manual suppression attempt (MS1) can be expressed by 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = Pr�MS1 | 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�Pr�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�




(𝑖𝑖) :  Failure probability of the first manual suppression attempt using a portable extinguisher 
(the HFE ‘MS1’) given the maximum HRR bin Qi (i = 1, 2, …, 15); 
MS1: Failure in the first manual suppression attempt (MS1); 
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𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖:  Cumulative required time for the first manual suppression attempt using a portable 
extinguisher (the HFE ‘MS1’) given the maximum HRR bin Qi; 
𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖:  System time window (i.e., time to fire-induced damage for cable tray B) for the 
maximum HRR bin Qi. 
 
In Equation (5.7), the probabilities associated with the required and available times, Pr�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 <
𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� and Pr�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�, can be estimated using the empirical cdf of the cumulative required 
time 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 developed in the timeline analysis: 
 Pr�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� = 𝐹𝐹�MS1�𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�, (5.8) 
 Pr�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� = 1 − 𝐹𝐹�MS1�𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� (5.9) 
where 𝐹𝐹�MS1 represents the empirical cdf of 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖. As stated, since the current scope of this study 
does not explicitly account for the influences of fire progression on the manual suppression activity, 
𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 is independent of the maximum HRR value; hence, the same empirical cdf 𝐹𝐹�MS1 is used for 
all HRR bins.  
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (5.7) represents the case where the time required 
for completing MS1 is shorter than the system time window. For this situation, based on the fire drill records 
at the representative plant and other literature, two failure modes are considered for the HFE ‘MS1’: 
 
• Failure mode #1 (MS1FM1): One of the fire drill records from the representative plant showed the 
situation where the first manual suppression attempt failed since the fire brigade failed to open the 
electrical cabinet before starting discharging the portable extinguisher. The HEP for this failure 
mode by the fire brigade is estimated using the SPAR-H, as shown in Appendix M:  
 Pr�MS1FM1 | 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� = 0.00125. (5.10) 
 
• Failure mode #2 (MS1FM2): Even when the electrical cabinet is adequately opened before using the 
portable extinguisher, there is a possibility that the portable extinguisher cannot control the fire 
progression due to human error or because the fire is too large. Houlding and Rew [56] stated that 
1,000 kW is the upper limit HRR for the portable extinguisher to be able to control the fire; 
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therefore, this study assumes that, if the HRR at the time when the first manual suppression attempt 
begins is higher than 1,000 kW, MS1 is assumed to be failure, i.e.,  
 Pr�MS1FM2 | 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 , ?̇?𝑄�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� ≥ 1000, MS1FM1����������� = 1, (5.11) 
where  ?̇?𝑄�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� represents the HRR at time 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖.  
 
Guymer and Parry [57] suggested that, if the fire does not grow to an unmanageable size, in the 
NPP context, the probability of the fire being suppressed by the portable extinguisher is 40%. In 
other words, given that the HRR is below 1,000 kW, the probability that the fire is not suppressed 
by the portable extinguisher is 60%, i.e.,  
 Pr�MS1FM2 | 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 , ?̇?𝑄�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� < 1000, MS1FM1����������� = 0.6. (5.12) 
 
Considering that these two failure modes are mutually exclusive (i.e., there is no possibility that the HFE 
‘MS1’ occurs due to a combination of these two failure modes), the split fraction for the top event ‘MS1’ 
in Figure 5.7 is computed by: 
 Pr�MS1 | 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� = �
  1              ;   if ?̇?𝑄�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� ≥ 1000
  0.60125 ;   if ?̇?𝑄�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� < 1000
 . (5.13) 
The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (5.7) represents the situation where the time 
required for completing MS1 is longer than the system time window. In this case, the conditional HEP for 
MS1 is assumed to be unity since manual suppression before the fire-induced equipment damage is not 
feasible; namely, 
 Pr�MS1 | 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS1; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖� = 1. (5.14) 
Note that, even when the fire brigade fails to fully suppress the fire in MS1, the use of a portable 
extinguisher most probably will still provide some benefit in terms of the fire control, such as a partial 
reduction of the HRR and delay in the fire growth; however, this study conservatively assumes that, given 
that MS1 (using a portable extinguisher) fails, there is no influence on the HRR curve induced by MS1. 
On the other hand, this study assumes that, if the total required time for MS2 is longer than or equal 
to the system time window, i.e., treqd; MS2 ≥ tsw, the MS2 fails, and vice versa; hence, the HEP for the HFE 
‘MS2’ is estimated based on the comparison between the system time window, tsw, and the total required 
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time for MS2, treqd; MS2. Given that (i) the fire has been detected by the automatic detectors (‘AD’ = Success), 
(ii) the automatic suppression system is not credited (‘AS’ = Failure), (iii) both HRA top events ‘MR’ and 
‘FR’ are successes in Figure 5.7, and (iv) the first manual suppression attempt using the portable 
extinguisher (MS1) has failed, the HEP for the second manual suppression attempt using the water hose is 
computed by: 
 Pr(MS2 | 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖) = Pr�𝑡𝑡reqd; MS2; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�, (5.15) 
where 𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, … , 15}, have been predicted by the FDS for each HRR bin and listed in Table 5.2, 
while an empirical cdf of 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS2; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖  has been constructed for each HRR bin Qi by the Monte Carlo 
simulation in the timeline analysis, as illustrated in Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15. Let 𝐹𝐹�MS2; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 be the Monte-
Carlo estimate of the empirical cdf for 𝑡𝑡reqd; MS2; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 obtained in Section 0; then, Equation (5.15) can be 
estimated by: 
 Pr�(MS2 | 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖) = 1 − 𝐹𝐹�MS2;𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�𝑡𝑡sw; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖�;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, … , 15}. (5.16) 
 
Results of HRA Quantification: Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show the results of HRA quantification using two 
different sets of time inputs (listed in Table 5.3). In these tables, from the third to eighth column, the 
probability of each end state in the HRA event tree is shown for each HRR bin. The last column in each 
table shows the total failure probability of manual suppression for each HRR bin, which can be computed 
by: 
 Pr�I𝑖𝑖,total� = Pr�I𝑖𝑖,3 ∪ I𝑖𝑖,4 ∪ I𝑖𝑖,5� = Pr�I𝑖𝑖,3� + Pr�I𝑖𝑖,4� + Pr�I𝑖𝑖,5�, (5.17) 
where Pr (Ii,total) represents the total failure probability for the HRR bin i. Note that, since three failure end 
states Ii,3, Ii,4, and Ii,5 are mutually exclusive, this equation is an exact expression without any approximation. 
The total failure probability of manual suppression, which is equivalent to the probability of non-
suppression (the sequence ‘I’ in Figure 5.2), is then computed by 
 Pr(I) = Pr�� I𝑖𝑖,total
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Table 5.5 Probability of each sequence in the HRA event tree computed with Dataset #1. 
Bin Weight θi Hi,NPD Hi,1 Hi,2 Ii,1 Ii,2 I1i,3 Pr (Fail) 
1 0.506 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.202 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.113 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.938 0.055 0.005 0.999 
5 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.939 0.055 0.005 1.000 
6 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
7 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
8 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
9 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
10 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
11 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
12 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
13 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
14 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
15 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.055 0.005 1.000 
  Weighted Total 0.178 
Table 5.6 Probability of each sequence in the HRA Event Tree computed with Dataset #2. 
Bin Weight θi Hi,NPD Hi,1 Hi,2 Ii,1 Ii,2 I1i,3 Pr (Fail) 
1 0.506 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.202 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.113 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 0.067 0.000 0.349 0.411 0.180 0.055 0.005 0.240 
5 0.041 0.000 0.277 0.260 0.402 0.055 0.005 0.462 
6 0.026 0.000 0.154 0.126 0.659 0.055 0.005 0.720 
7 0.016 0.000 0.139 0.103 0.697 0.055 0.005 0.758 
8 0.010 0.000 0.103 0.071 0.765 0.055 0.005 0.826 
9 0.006 0.000 0.085 0.051 0.803 0.055 0.005 0.864 
10 0.004 0.000 0.027 0.006 0.907 0.055 0.005 0.967 
11 0.003 0.000 0.051 0.019 0.870 0.055 0.005 0.931 
12 0.002 0.000 0.045 0.015 0.880 0.055 0.005 0.941 
13 0.001 0.000 0.017 0.002 0.920 0.055 0.005 0.980 
14 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.005 0.907 0.055 0.005 0.968 
15 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.923 0.055 0.005 0.984 
  Weighted Total 0.091 
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Table 5.5 shows that the failure probability of manual suppression for the first three HRR bins is zero. In 
those three HRR bins, Pr (Hi,NPD) = 1.000, which indicates that the fire brigade actions have no influence 
on the outcome of fire-induced equipment damage (i.e., damage does not occur regardless of the 
performance of the fire brigade). Table 5.5 also shows that Pr (Hi,1) and Pr (Hi,2) are zeros for the HRR bins 
#5 to #15 and are almost zero for the HRR bin #4. This indicates that, under this setting, the fire brigade 
contributes very little because, depending on the size of fire, either (i) the fire does not have the potential 
to cause equipment damage or (ii) the fire progression is much quicker than the manual suppression by the 
fire brigade. By taking the weighted average over all HRR bins using Equation (5.18), the total failure 
probability of manual suppression is computed as Pr (I) = 0.178. In contrast, Table 5.6 shows a different 
pattern of outputs. Like Table 5.5, the fire has no potential to cause the fire-induced cable damage for the 
first three HRR bins. Meanwhile, in Table 5.6, Pr (Hi,1) and Pr (Hi,2) for the other bins are not zero, which 
means that there is a possibility that manual suppression by the fire brigade can be completed before the 
fire-induced equipment damage occurs. By taking the weighted average over all HRR bins based on 
Equation (5.18), the total failure probability of manual suppression is computed as Pr (I) = 0.094.  
 
5.3.1.6. Step I-6: Perform Dependency Analysis 
Dependency among the HFEs is explicitly addressed in the HRA event tree logic (Figure 5.7) and 
the SPAR-H method (Appendix M). Meanwhile, the dependency among the times required for the MCR 
and fire brigade tasks (Table 5.3) is not addressed in this study as those times are assumed to be independent 
random variables in the uncertainty propagation conducted in Step 5. Qualitatively, the potential strength 
of dependency among the required times for the MCR and fire brigade tasks can be understood based on 
the dependency matrix in the SPAR-H method, using four criteria: (i) crew (same or different), (ii) time 
(close or not close in time), (iii) location (same or different), and (iv) cues (additional or no additional). For 
the MCR operators, as Tasks 1.A and 1.B are performed by the same crew, closely in time, and in the same 
location, a “high” or “complete” level of dependency is expected. On the other hand, the fire brigade tasks 
are performed by the same crew and closely in time; therefore, a “high” degree of dependency is expected. 
A quantitative treatment of dependency among the times to complete individual tasks is left to future 






5.3.1.7. Step I-7: Perform Recovery Analysis 
In HRA, the recovery action is defined as the human action needed/required to repair or restore a 
system or component so that a desired function or plant state can be achieved. There are two categories of 
recovery actions commonly considered in the NPP HRA. The first category is the recovery action for the 
safety systems and components which failed during the accident scenario. For instance, following the fire-
induced initiating event (e.g., a fire-induced small-break LOCA), there is the possibility that the safety 
functions, such as a high-head and low-head safety injection, could fail due to random failure or fire-induced 
damage. In this case, the operator action to restore the failed safety function could be credited depending 
on the feasibility of the recovery action. This category of recovery action needs to be addressed in the plant 
PRA model and is not considered in the HRA for manual suppression. The second category is the human 
error recovery where the failed human action could be corrected by the subsequent tasks or through double-
checking by another crew. The SPAR-H method [15] suggests that the human error recovery be addressed 
through adjustment to the PSFs. For instance, if the additional personnel are present to double-check the 
precedent task, a positive level can be assigned to the work-practice PSF. This PSF-based approach is 
followed for the recovery analysis in this study.  
 
5.3.1.8. Step I-8: Perform Uncertainty Analysis 
In this step, the uncertainty analysis is conducted to identify, characterize, and propagate all sources 
of uncertainty existing in the HRA. The potential sources of uncertainty in the HRA-based Manual Fire 
Suppression Module developed in this research are as follows: 
 
Aleatory uncertainty: (A.1) Variability in the times to complete individual tasks by the MCR operators 
and the fire brigade; (A.2) Randomness associated with the outcome (i.e., success or failure) of each 
task performed by the MCR operators and the fire brigade teams; and (A.3) Natural variability of fire 
characteristics, such as the time-profile of the HRR curve, room temperature, and smoke density. 
 
Epistemic uncertainty: (E.1) Uncertainty associated with the choice of probability model and the 
estimation of parameters for probability distributions of the required times for the MCR and fire brigade 
tasks (Table 5.3);  (E.2) Parameter uncertainty associated with the physical input parameters of the FDS 
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code (e.g., material properties, cable jacket thickness);  (E.3) Parameter uncertainty associated with the 
SPAR-H method, such as the basic HEP values and evaluation of PSFs; (E.4) Model uncertainty 
associated with the FDS code, the HRA event tree, and the empirical water suppression model. This 
includes the uncertainty induced by the assumptions made in the HRA modeling, e.g., the assumption 
that the HRR curve during the manual suppression using the portable extinguisher is unchanged from 
the “burnout” HRR curve; and (E.5) Completeness uncertainty associated with the manual suppression 
scenarios considered in the HRA event tree (Figure 5.7). 
In this study, the sources of aleatory uncertainty have been mostly addressed in the HRA 
quantification. The aleatory uncertainty due to (A.1) is represented by the probability distributions listed in 
Table 5.3 and is explicitly treated in the uncertainty propagation conducted in Step 5. The aleatory 
uncertainty due to (A.2) is explicitly treated by the HRA event tree logic. In this stage of research, he 
aleatory uncertainty due to (A.3) is partially treated by the HRR bins in terms of maximum HRR values 
(Table 5.1), while the natural variability of the timings associated with the HRR curve (e.g., time to growth, 
time to decay) has not been explicitly addressed. In contrast, the epistemic uncertainty has not been 
explicitly or quantitatively addressed in the HRA quantification. Indeed, a quantitative treatment of 
epistemic uncertainty in HRA is an evolving research area [32, 58, 59], and future research should 
investigate the influences of the sources of epistemic uncertainty on the outputs from the manual 
suppression HRA framework developed in this study. All sources of epistemic uncertainty associated with 
the HRA-based method developed in this chapter should be addressed in the Probabilistic Validation, 
introduced as one of the submodules of the I-PRA methodological framework in Section 2.3.7. 
 
 
5.3.1.9. Step I-9: Complete Documentation 
This step has been fulfilled by creating this chapter which documents the HRA procedure and 
results in the format of a structured scientific report.  
209 
 
5.3.2 Phase II of HRA-based Method for Manual Suppression Modeling in I-PRA 
This section executes the methodological steps listed under Phase II in Section 5.2 for the selected 
NPP fire scenario:  
 
 
5.3.2.1. Step II-1: Generate random samples of uncertain input parameters for FDS 
As shown in Chapter 2, in the I-PRA methodological framework, several physical input parameters 
in the FDS code, such as material properties, maximum HRR value, and time profile of HRR, are treated 
as random variables in uncertainty propagation for the FSM. Let the FDS code be represented by a function, 
𝑔𝑔�𝐗𝐗�, which maps between input parameters 𝐗𝐗 and the physical key performance measure associated with 
fire-induced equipment damage 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑔𝑔�𝐗𝐗� = 𝑔𝑔�?̇?𝑄max, 𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2, 𝑡𝑡3, 𝐱𝐱other�, (5.19) 
where 
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗:  Key performance measure associated with damage target j 
𝑔𝑔: A function representing the input-output relationship in the FDS code.  
𝐗𝐗:  A vector of all random input parameters, of which uncertainty is represented by the joint 
distribution function 𝐹𝐹𝐗𝐗�𝐗𝐗� where 𝐗𝐗 = �?̇?𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2, 𝑡𝑡3, 𝐱𝐱other�; 
 ?̇?𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚:  Maximum HRR value 
 𝑡𝑡1:  Time to the maximum HRR under the burnout condition 
 𝑡𝑡2:  Duration of the maximum HRR under the burnout condition 
 𝑡𝑡3:  Time to decay under the burnout condition 
𝐱𝐱other:  A vector of other random input parameters (e.g., material properties, geometry).  
 
In this step, the random samples for the random input parameters of size nS are generated using a selected 
sampling strategy, such as the simple random sampling or the LHS. The generated random samples of input 








































where the superscript 𝑖𝑖;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, represents the index of the Monte Carlo scenarios.  
 
 
5.3.2.2. Step II-2: Obtain the time to detection 
In this step, the time to detection by automatic detectors, tdet, is estimated. tdet for the automatic 
detectors depends on fire progression because the automatic detectors are activated by the fire-induced 
conditions, such as smoke and heat, that are the consequences of fire progression; hence, in the estimation 
of tdet, its dependence on the input parameters sampled in Step 1 should be addressed. The existing methods 
for estimating tdet can be divided into two approaches: (i) data-driven and (ii) model-based. The data-driven 
approach uses the point estimate of tdet derived from empirical data, such as fire test data or the generic 
engineering handbook. For instance, NUREG/CR-6850 [3] suggests tdet = 1 minute as a generic point 
estimate, and this point value is used in this study. Note that, in this data-driven approach, the influences of 
random input parameters are averaged over various conditions; therefore, a constant point estimate is used 
for all Monte Carlo scenarios. The model-based approach estimates tdet using the fire model, such as 
correlation-based model [60] or the FDS code [28]. The model-based approach can explicitly account for 
the influences of the random input parameters generated in Step 1 and can provide more realistic and 
context-specific estimates. If tdet is estimated by the FDS code, its restart capability can be used to stop the 
simulation upon the activation of automatic detectors so that the outputs of tdet are extracted, while the 
“restart files” necessary for restarting the FDS run in the subsequent steps are automatically generated. As 


















5.3.2.3. Step II-3: Generate the manual suppression scenarios before the suppression  
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This step generates the Monte Carlo scenarios for manual suppression. Two factors are considered 
using the HRA-based method developed in Section 5.3.1: (i) the HFEs for the MCR response and the fire 
brigade response and (ii) the time required before starting manual suppression (up to Task 2.I). In this case 
study, the dataset #2 (Table 5.3) is used for the time distribution of each task by the MCR operators and the 
fire brigade teams. For each Monte Carlo scenario 𝑖𝑖;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, two substeps are implemented:  
 
Substep II-3.1: Consideration of HFEs ‘MR’ and ‘FR’ 
 
For each Monte Carlo scenario, two independent uniformly-distributed random numbers between 
0 and 1, denoted by uMR(i) and uFR(i), are generated to consider aleatory uncertainty associated with 
the outcomes of the HFEs ‘MR’ and ‘FR’: 
 
 If uMR(i) < 0.0055, i.e., Pr (MR) computed by the SPAR-H method (Appendix M), the MCR 
operator response is failure; hence, the entire manual suppression process fails, and the 
original burnout HRR curve should be used in the FDS runs until the end of the natural 
decay of the fire. Go to Step II-6.  
 
 If uMR(i) ≥ 0.0055 and uFR(i) < 0.055, i.e., Pr (FR) computed by the SPAR-H method 
(Appendix M), the MCR operator response is considered to be success, but the fire brigade 
response is considered to be failure; hence, the entire manual suppression process fails, and 
the original burnout HRR curve should be used in the FDS runs until the end of the natural 
decay of the fire. Go to Step II-6. 
 
 If uMR(i) ≥ 0.0055 and uFR(i) ≥ 0.055, both the MCR operator response (MR) and the fire 
brigade response (FR) are considered to be success. Go to Step II-3.2.  
 
Substep II-3.2: Generating timing estimates for the MCR and fire brigade response 
 
The random samples of the time required for each task, from tasks 1.A to 2.I, are generated from 
the probability distributions listed in Table 5.3. Then, the fire brigade response time for the Monte 













(𝑖𝑖): Time to complete Task 1.l (l = A, B) for the Monte Carlo scenario i 
 𝑡𝑡2,𝑚𝑚
(𝑖𝑖) : Time to complete Task 2.m (m = A, B, …, I) for the Monte Carlo scenario i 
 
Then, go to Step II-4. 
 
 
5.3.2.4. Step II-4: Run the FDS code up to the time when suppression begins 
This step runs the FDS code for each Monte Carlo scenario 𝑖𝑖;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, until the time tfb(i) 
using the burnout HRR curve, i.e., using the original HRR curve from Ref. [3] without any modifications, 
and using the random samples of input parameters 𝐗𝐗(𝑖𝑖)generated in Step II-1. When the simulation time 
reaches tfb(i), the FDS run is stopped by taking advantage of the restart capability of the FDS code. This 
method assumes that the fire brigade actions before starting to discharge the suppressant on the fire source 
have no influence on fire progression; thus, the FDS outputs with the burnout HRR curve can be used until 
the simulation time tfb(i). Go to Step II-5.  
 
 
5.3.2.5. Step II-5: Develop the HRR during suppression and incorporate it into the FDS input file 
For each Monte Carlo scenario, the HRR curve during the manual suppression is developed by 
applying the HRA method in Section 5.3.1. Note that, as illustrated in the HRA event tree (Figure 5.7), this 
study accounts for two modes of manual suppression by the fire brigade: (i) the first suppression attempt 
using a portable extinguisher (MS1) and (ii) the second suppression attempt using a water hose (MS2). 
Each of these two suppression modes is considered in the following substeps: 
 




For each Monte Carlo scenario 𝑖𝑖;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛},  a uniformly-distributed random number 
between 0 and 1, denoted by u1(i), is generated.  
 
If u1(i) ≤ 0.00125 (i.e., the HEP estimated by the SPAR-H method in Appendix M), MS1 fails due 
to the first failure mode (i.e., the fire brigade fails to open the cabinet before discharging the 
portable extinguisher). In this case, generate a random sample of the times required for discharging 
the portable extinguisher (t2.J.ii), for preparing the water hose (t2.K.i), and for opening the cabinet 
before starting MS2 (t2.K.ii) from the corresponding probability distributions listed in Table 5.3 and 






(𝑖𝑖) , (5.23) 
where 
𝑡𝑡2.𝐾𝐾.i
(𝑖𝑖) : A random sample of t2.K.i for the Monte Carlo scenario i  
𝑡𝑡2.𝐾𝐾.ii
(𝑖𝑖) : A random sample of t2.K.ii for the Monte Carlo scenario i  
 
Restart and run the FDS code until tdet(i) + tfb(i) using the burnout HRR curve. Then, go to Substep 
II-5.2.  
 
If u1(i) > 0.00125, the first failure mode of MS1 does not occur. Generate a random sample of the 
time required for opening the electrical cabinet (t2.J.i) from the corresponding probability 
distribution in Table 5.3. Then, restart and run the FDS code until tdet(i) + tfb(i) + t2.J.i(i) using the 
burnout HRR curve. Check if the second failure mode of MS1 occurs due to an excessively high 
intensity of the fire source by the following procedure: 
 
• If the HRR value at time tdet(i) + tfb(i) + t2.J.i(i) predicted by the FDS code is larger than 1,000 
[kW], as stated in Section 0, the fire cannot be suppressed by the portable extinguisher and 
MS1 fails. In this case, generate a random sample of the times required for discharging the 
portable extinguisher (t2.J.ii) and for preparing the water hose (t2.K.i) from the corresponding 






(𝑖𝑖) . (5.24) 





• If the HRR value at time tdet(i) + tfb(i) + t2.J.i(i) is smaller than or equal to 1,000 [kW], the 
probability that the fire can be suppressed by the portable extinguisher is 40% (see Section 0). 
To account for this aleatory uncertainty associated with MS1, for each Monte Carlo scenario 
𝑖𝑖;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, a uniformly-distributed random number between 0 and 1, denoted by u2(i), 
is generated.  
 
If u2(i) ≤ 0.40, this indicates that the fire is successfully suppressed by MS1 and there is no need 
for MS2. The duration of manual suppression, tfb→sup, corresponds to the time required for 
discharging the portable extinguisher (t2.J.ii). A random sample of t2.J.ii is generated from the 
corresponding probability distribution in Table 5.3 and is used as tfb→sup. This study assumes 
that, in this situation, the HRR curve during the manual suppression has the same time profile 
as the burnout condition, and at time tdet(i) + tfb(i) + tfb→sup(i), the HRR becomes zero in a step-
wise function. This is a conservative assumption since the influence of the portable extinguisher 
is ignored during the manual suppression; however, this is also considered as a good 
approximation since the duration of discharging the portable extinguisher (whose mean value 
is 20 seconds) is much shorter than the total time to manual suppression for MS1 (in the range 
of 400 to 1500 seconds, as illustrated in Figure 5.13). Go to Step II-6.  
 
If u2(i) > 0.40, this indicates that the fire is not suppressed by MS1. In this case, generate a 
random sample of the times required for discharging the portable extinguisher (t2.J.ii) and for 
preparing the water hose (t2.K.i) from the corresponding probability distributions in Table 5.3, 






(𝑖𝑖) . (5.25) 
Restart and run the FDS code until tdet(i) + tfb(i), using the burnout HRR curve. Then, go to 
Substep II-5.2 below. 
 
Substep II-5.2: MS2 (Manual suppression using the water hose) 
 
If MS1 has failed, the fire brigade performs the second attempt for manual suppression using the 




k(i) are generated from the empirical cdf generated in Step I-5 (Figure 5.9), and the HRR value at tdet(i) 
+ tfb(i) is retrieved from the FDS outputs and used as ?̇?𝑄0 in Equation (5.3). Then, the HRR during MS2 
is developed by using the empirical water suppression model suggested by Yu et al. [25] in Equation 
(5.3).  
 
In the current scope, the FDS code is not coupled with the HRA algorithm and, instead, the time-
profile of the HRR without manual suppression is based on the original “burnout” HRR time profile 
prescribed in NUREG/CR-6850 [3]. Note that, when the HRR curve is externally prescribed by an 
analyst in the FDS input file, as recommended by the U.S. NRC [3, 27], the HRR curve predicted by 
the FDS is approximately the same as the one prescribed in the input file. For instance, for the HRR 
bin #10 (Table 5.1), the mean value and standard deviation of the HRR, due to physical variability 
during the fully developed phase, are 844 kW and 5.5 kW, respectively. These statistics indicate that 
the HRR curve predicted by the FDS code can be approximated by the burnout HRR curve prescribed 
in the input file.  
 
Figure 5.16 compares two HRR curves, the burnout HRR curve prescribed in the FDS input file and 
the modified HRR curve generated in this step. For illustration, 10 independent random samples are 
generated for the FDS input parameters and the required times for the MCR and fire brigade tasks, 
and the same random samples are used to generate two comparative plots in Figure 5.16. In the 
modified HRR curves, the solid lines show the Monte Carlo scenarios where the fire is suppressed 
by MS2, while the dot-dash lines show those where the fire is suppressed by MS1 (manual 
suppression using a portable extinguisher). The HRR curve generated in this step will be used in the 





Figure 5.16 Comparison of the HRR curves: the original burnout HRR curve (left) and the modified HRR 
curve considering manual suppression (right) generated in Phase II. 
 
5.3.2.6. Step II-6: Restart the FDS code and run it until the fire is suppressed 
In this step, for each Monte Carlo scenario 𝑖𝑖;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, the FDS code is run with the updated 
HRR curve during manual suppression obtained in Step II-5. Under MS2, the empirical water suppression 
model, shown in Equation (5.3), asymptotically approaches zero but never reaches the zero HRR value. In 
this study, the fire is regarded as being fully controlled when the HRR value falls below 10 kW; thus, the 
FDS simulation for each Monte Carlo scenario is run until the HRR falls below 10 kW. This way, the HRR 
curve in consideration of manual suppression is provided for each Monte Carlo scenario and is used in the 
Fire Progression Model of the I-PRA framework to predict the key performance measures associated with 
the fire-induced equipment damage.  
 
 
5.3.2.7. Step II-7: Generate random samples of uncertain input parameters 
This step develops a method for adjusting the existing data-driven non-suppression curve with the 
plant-specific estimation of tfb generated by the HRA-based method using the scenario-specific adjustment 
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factor [26]. By this method, the outputs from the HRA-based manual suppression model in this study can 
also be incorporated into the current Fire PRA methodology to partially improve the realism of the manual 
suppression analysis.  
In NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1 [26], the adjustment factor is considered to address the 
scenario-specific adjustment to the data-driven non-suppression curve. The current methodology 
recommends that the adjustment factor be applied when the fire scenario being analyzed has factors that 
have significant influence on the industry-average fire brigade response time (e.g., more than a five-minute 
difference from the generic fire brigade response time). To estimate the adjustment factor, the plant- and 
scenario-specific factors affecting the fire brigade response time tfb, such as (i) the location, accessibility, 
and type of fire, (ii) the location and conditions of suppression equipment, and (iii) other special features 
of fire (e.g., proximity to sensitive equipment), are identified. Considering these plant- and scenario-specific 
factors, the mean typical and scenario-specific fire brigade response times, denoted by 〈𝑡𝑡fb,t〉 and 〈𝑡𝑡fb,s〉 
respectively, are estimated. Based on these timing estimates, the scenario-specific adjustment factor is 
obtained by 




In this equation, 〈𝑡𝑡fb,s〉 can be estimated by the HRA-based algorithm in Section 5.3.2, while 〈𝑡𝑡fb,t〉 should 
be obtained by analyzing the industry-average fire brigade performance data. Note that Equation (5.26) has 
not been derived from the first-principle analysis, but from the empirical basis to achieve the desired 
characteristics as discussed in Ref. [26]. Then, the data-driven non-suppression curve, available in NUREG-
2169 [5], is updated using the scenario-specific adjustment factor computed by the HRA-based outputs in 
this research: 
 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀 = 𝜆𝜆0𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 , (5.27) 
where λS [1/minutes] represents the updated suppression rate, while λ0 [1/minutes] represents the generic 
suppression rate provided in NUREG-2169 [5]. Equation (5.27) shows how the existing data-driven 
suppression rate λ0 can be updated with the HRA-based scenario-specific adjustment factor CS.  
From Steps II-5 and II-6 in Section 5.3.2, the estimates of the fire brigade response time tfb(i) can be 
extracted for each Monte Carlo scenario 𝑖𝑖;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}. By computing the scenario-specific adjustment 
factor in Equation (5.26) with each random sample of tfb(i) and plugging it in Equation (5.27), the random 
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samples of the scenario-specific suppression rate 𝜆𝜆S
(𝑖𝑖);  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, are generated, based on which the 
empirical cdf for the scenario-specific suppression rate can be generated. This empirical cdf for 𝜆𝜆S can be 
used as an input to the current Fire PRA to improve the realism of manual suppression analysis by increasing 
the plant specificity. 
To demonstrate its feasibility, this method is applied to the same NPP fire scenario as that 
introduced in Section 5.3. 〈𝑇𝑇fb,t〉 = 7 minutes is assumed based on the point estimate in NUREG/CR-6850 
[3], while the generic suppression rate provided in NUREG-2169 [5] is assumed to be λ0 = 0.098 [min-1]. 
The HRA-based fire brigade model is operationalized by using Dataset #2 given in Table 5.3. Figure 5.17 
shows the empirical cdf for 𝜆𝜆S, obtained based on the outputs from the HRA-based fire brigade model (in 
Phase II). This plot shows that, compared with the industry-wide suppression rate λ0 = 0.098 [min-1], this 
specific plant tends to have a lower value of 𝜆𝜆S; in other words, the fire brigade response time for the 
scenario being analyzed at this plant estimated by the HRA-based fire brigade model (Section 5.3.2) tends 
to be longer than the industry-average value (〈𝑡𝑡fb,t〉 = 7 minutes). In the current Fire PRA methodology, 𝜆𝜆S 
in Figure 5.17 can be used as an input for the data-driven non-suppression curve.  
 
Figure 5.17 Empirical cumulative distribution function for the scenario-specific suppression rate based on 
the outputs from the HRA-based fire brigade model.  
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5.4 Discussion of the Remaining Methodological Gaps 
Based on the development and implementation of the HRA-based method for manual suppression 
analysis in this chapter, the following areas have been identified as the remaining methodological gaps 
when the existing HRA techniques are adapted for manual suppression. Based on the results of the HRA-
based method in this chapter and based on the following identified gaps, in collaboration with other 
members of the SoTeRiA Laboratory, the author has started a simulation-based human modeling research 
for fire brigade analysis [16, 17] that is an advancement of the HRA-based method developed in this thesis.    
5.4.1 Remaining Gap (1): Interface between Fire Progression and Manual Suppression 
In the interface between fire progression and manual suppression, two directions of interactions 
should be addressed: (a) the influences of manual suppression actions (e.g., discharging suppressant, 
opening the cabinet door) on fire progression and (b) the influences of fire progression (e.g., spatial 
evolution of fire-induced environmental conditions) on the human performance in manual suppression.  
 
Influences of manual suppression activity on fire progression: This research has considered the influence 
of manual suppression by a water hose (‘MS2’ in Figure 5.7) on the HRR curve using the empirical water 
suppression model [25]. There are key limitations and challenges associated with the empirical water 
suppression model: 
 
• There are insufficient data in the context of NPP fires to support the exponential reduction of the 
HRR curve during the water suppression and estimation of the exponential reduction rate. 
  
• The HRR curve, during manual suppression, is determined by only two physical parameters: the 
initial HRR value when water suppression begins and the water application rate. The influence of 
the fire characteristics, such as the fuel type and boundary conditions, is implicitly captured by the 
empirical regression coefficients, a1 and a2.  
 
• There is no explicit connection between the water application rate ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  and manual suppression 
performance. This study treats the variability of ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  as aleatory uncertainty using a random variable 
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derived from experimental data, and the dependence of ?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  on the human performance in manual 
suppression has not been explicitly addressed.  
 
To deal with these challenges, one possible direction for future research is to collect empirical data by 
conducting experiments for the NPP contexts, where the water suppression is performed on those specific 
types of fires that are likely to occur at NPPs and where the relationship between the HRR reduction and 
the performance of manual suppression is observed. For instance, the experimental settings in the 
intermediate-scale cable burning test in the CAROLFIRE program [61] could be used for the experiments 
to derive the empirical water suppression model. As those experiments for water suppression would need 
relatively large-scale experimental apparatus, sufficient experimental data to derive the relationships among 
all key physical parameters cannot be collected by relying exclusively on the experiments. Another possible 
direction of future research is to develop an explicit model of physical and chemical interactions between 
the burning fuel and water droplets to predict the HRR curve during manual suppression. For this purpose, 
the capability of FDS to explicitly solve the chemical kinetics might be useful. On the other hand, in future 
research, how to relate the human performance in manual suppression with the water application rate will 
also require methodological advancements. The water application rate depends on several factors associated 
with the fire brigade strategy, such as the direction of the water hose nozzle, flow rate, droplet size 
distribution, and water discharge pressure [47, 62-64]. As an interface of the water suppression model with 
the human performance model, it is perhaps more straightforward to use those fire-brigade factors than 
using the water application rate. Future research should investigate the potential for generating parametric 
relationships between the water application rate and those fire-brigade factors.  
 
Influences of fire progression on the human performance in manual suppression: This study addresses the 
influences of fire-induced environmental conditions on the human performance in manual suppression 
through the PSFs in the HEP quantification using the SPAR-H (Appendix M). The treatment by the PSFs 
is “semi-quantitative” because, while the state of PSFs is quantitatively reflected in the HEP estimates, only 
the qualitative PSF scale is considered (e.g., stress / stressor PSF has three discrete states, including extreme, 
high, and nominal). Meanwhile, the influences of fire progression on the times required for the manual 
suppression tasks have not been explicitly considered, except for MS2 for which the empirical water 
suppression model addresses the dependence of time to manual suppression on the HRR value at the time 
the manual suppression begins. Future research should advance the methodology for incorporating the 
influences of fire progression on manual suppression activity, both for the HEPs and task timings. To 
221 
 
increase the granularity of the interface between fire progression and manual suppression, we should 
consider applying advanced task-oriented HRA techniques, such as the Crew Module developed by Kloos 
et al. [7, 8, 10, 11] and the HUNTER developed by INL [65]. Kloos et al. [7, 8, 10, 11] accounted for the 
influence of smoke density on the timing of fire brigade actions by introducing an empirical multiplier for 
the time to locate the fire source as a function of smoke density. On the other hand, regarding the impacts 
on the HEPs, the INL group has recently developed the “dynamicized” HRA technique for dynamic PRA 
frameworks [65] (note that the INL method was not developed for manual suppression, but is mentioned 
here as an example of the interface between the task-oriented HRA and physical simulation). Their approach 
created a quantitative and closed-form relationship between the PSF rates (e.g., the levels of stress / stressor) 
and physical plant parameters (e.g., reactor coolant temperature) predicted by the thermal-hydraulics reactor 
system model based on the simulator data and expert judgment. As stated, the context-based HRA 
techniques, such as the SPAR-H method used in this chapter, have the advantage that the scenario-specific 
contexts can be addressed through various PSFs. To further improve the resolution of the interface between 
fire progression and manual suppression, however, it would be more convenient to break down the manual 
suppression tasks into smaller subtasks so that (i) the location-specific and dynamic nature of the manual 
suppression task sequence can be captured and (ii) the interactions of the manual suppression subtasks with 
the spatio-temporal fire-induced environment can be addressed. These methodological advancements 
should be considered as the first step in future research to increase the accuracy and realism of the manual 
suppression analysis in Fire PRA.  
Another promising direction of research is in the development of a more explicit model of 
underlying task processes and human behavior, like that used in the simulation-based (or dynamic) HRA 
techniques [18-24]. The simulation-based HRA methods use the human performance simulation, where the 
performance of humans in the scenarios and environments being analyzed are mimicked by creating virtual 
scenarios and virtual human entities inside the simulation environment [66]. For the manual detection and 
suppression context, the ongoing research by the SoTeRiA Laboratory [67] is developing a simulation-
based human performance method for manual suppression, focusing on the fire search phase in the fire 
room, using the Agent-Based Model (ABM), connected with a zone model for fire progression (CFAST) 
through the Geographic Information System (GIS). By conducting uncertainty propagation in the 
simulation-based HRA model, the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties can be explicitly addressed to 
estimate the HEPs under a specific fire scenario; this output can be used to update the generic HEPs, 
available in the existing HRA quantification methods, to generate more plant- and scenario-specific base 
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HEP values. In addition, it is possible to condition the simulation-based HRA model for any specific context 
of interest, such as a specific fire intensity and boundary conditions (e.g., open or closed room door); this 
feature helps develop more quantitative justifications for PSFs and their relationships to the base HEPs. 
This way, the outputs from the simulation-based HRA can be used as additional information to help improve 
the realism and plant-specificity of the manual suppression analysis in Fire PRA.   
5.4.2 Remaining Gap (2): Treatment of Human Action Dependency 
As stated in Section 5.3.1, dependency among the HFEs has been explicitly addressed in the HRA 
event tree logic (Figure 5.7) and the HEP quantification using the SPAR-H method (Appendix M). The 
dependency among the time required for each task by the MCR operators and the fire brigade, however, 
has not been addressed in this study as the uncertainties associated with those timings are characterized by 
independent random variables (Table 5.3). Section 5.3.1 has shown that, based on a qualitative dependency 
analysis using the SPAR-H dependency matrix, Tasks 1.A and 1.B, performed by the MCR operators, could 
have a “moderate” degree of dependency, while the fire brigade tasks could have a “high” degree of 
dependency. To deal with the dependency among the times to complete individual tasks by the MCR 
operators and the fire brigade, there are three possible approaches. 
 
Data-Driven Statistical Analysis for a Grouped Task: In this approach, multiple tasks and the associated 
timing parameters with the high degree of dependency are grouped into a single meta-task, and empirical 
data, such as historical fire event database and fire drill records, are analyzed to estimate the time required 
for that meta-task. This would be the simplest solution, especially when a relatively large amount of 
empirical data is available and is the approach that has been adopted for the current Fire PRA methodology. 
The dependency is completely masked by statistical data analysis; hence, there is no way to know the degree 
of dependency or to identify the dominant sources of dependency. Also, the accuracy and feasibility of this 
approach is strongly affected by the availability, quality, and plant- and scenario-specificity of the empirical 
data. It should be noted that, because of these limitations, this study has advanced the manual suppression 
model in Fire PRA by developing the HRA-based method; therefore, this data-driven approach is not 




Correlated Random Variables: This approach deals with the dependency among multiple timing parameters 
by treating them as correlated random variables, instead of assuming independent random variables. The 
degree of dependency among multiple input parameters can be represented by the correlation coefficients, 
an indication of how much the change in one input parameter can affect the other input parameters. If 
sufficient empirical data is available, the correlation coefficients can be statistically estimated by data 
analysis; otherwise, the correlation coefficients can be estimated by eliciting expert judgment [68-71]. After 
the correlation coefficients among input parameters are obtained, the uncertainty propagation in 
consideration of dependency can be conducted using the correlated random sampling methods [72-75]. 
Even though this approach can quantify the influence of dependency on the model output, it is not possible 
to identify the main sources of dependency because the underlying causations leading to the dependency 
among input parameters are not explicitly addressed.  
 
An Explicit Model of Underlying Physical & Social Mechanisms:  As a remedy for the limitation identified 
for the correlated random variables, this approach explicitly models the underlying physical and social 
mechanisms leading to dependency among multiple HFEs. For instance, the dependency among the timing 
parameters associated with the fire brigade tasks could be induced by the shared internal (e.g., mental stress) 
and external factors (e.g., fire-induced environmental conditions). By explicitly modeling the causations of 
these internal and external factors underlying the timing parameters for multiple fire brigade tasks, the 
sources of dependency can be captured through the explicit causal model, rather than by masking them 
through the statistical analysis of empirical data. In this direction, the ongoing research by the UIUC 
SoTeRiA Laboratory [17, 67] is developing an explicit model of the fire brigade movement during the fire 
search (corresponding to Task 2.I in this research) using the ABM coupled with the CFAST. The ABM 
simulates the behavior of the fire brigade crews during the fire search phase based on the “movement rules” 
provided by the analyst considering the plant fire protection procedures and expert opinion. The ABM is 
interfaced with the CFAST to address the interactions between fire progression and human performance. 
By applying the concept of simulation-based treatment of dependent failures, as introduced in Chapter 2 
and further generalized in Chapter 4, the dependency among multiple fire brigade tasks can be explicitly 
captured in the simulation environment.  
As a direction for future research, the author recommends developing an explicit model of 
underlying physical and social mechanisms in Fire PRA because, as discussed above, an introduction of 
explicit models of underlying manual suppression processes can overcome both the first and second gaps 
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stated above. Note that we are not proposing the development of a sophisticated model-based approach for 
all tasks to be undertaken by the MCR and the fire brigade; the accuracy, the level of detail, and the spatial 
and temporal resolutions of the human performance model need to be gradually increased based on the risk 
importance and the degree of dependency of each task. The manual suppression analysis should begin with 
a simpler and less expensive approach, such as the data-driven statistical analysis for a group of tasks and 
the use of correlated random variables. Then, for the significant risk contributors, a more detailed approach 
with higher accuracy and resolution should be developed.   
5.4.3 Remaining Gap (3): Uncertainty Analysis 
As stated in Section 0, while most aleatory uncertainties have been addressed in this research, 
epistemic uncertainties associated with the models, assumptions, and input parameters in the HRA-based 
method developed in this research have not been characterized or propagated. Based on the qualitative 
analysis, the main sources of epistemic uncertainties in the HRA-based method include: 
 
(E.1) Uncertainty associated with the choice of the probability model and the estimation of parameters 
for the probability distributions of the required times for the MCR and fire brigade tasks (Table 
5.3).  
(E.2) Parameter uncertainty associated with the physical input parameters of the FDS code (e.g., 
material properties, cable jacket thickness).  
(E.3) Parameter uncertainty associated with the SPAR-H method, such as the basic HEP value and 
the evaluation of PSFs.  
(E.4) Model uncertainty associated with the FDS code and the empirical water suppression model. 
This includes the uncertainty induced by the assumptions made in the HRA modeling, e.g., the 
assumption that the HRR curve is unchanged from the “burnout” HRR curve during the manual 
suppression using the portable extinguisher.  
(E.5) Completeness uncertainty associated with the manual suppression scenarios considered in the 
HRA event tree (Figure 5.7). 
 
Uncertainty source E.2 (parameter uncertainty associated with the FDS input parameters) is explicitly 
addressed in the HRA algorithm by performing the Monte Carlo simulation with the FDS code. Future 
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research needs to develop the methodology and computational procedure to characterize and propagate the 
other sources of epistemic uncertainties.  
For uncertainty source E.1, when the supporting data such as the fire brigade drill records are 
available, the degree of epistemic uncertainty can be quantitatively assessed by performing the goodness-
of-fit test to validate the selection of the probability model and by developing confidence intervals for the 
estimated parameters of the probability model. When no sufficient data are available, the Bayesian approach 
for a formal expert elicitation and aggregation [76-78] needs to be used to estimate the uncertainty 
associated with the timing inputs for the MCR and fire brigade actions.  
Regarding uncertainty source E.3, Section 2.7 of NUREG/CR-6883 [15] discusses the suggested 
method of uncertainty analysis for the SPAR-H method and provides the recommendations for a future 
research area, such as the treatment of uncertainty associated with the threshold values of PSFs and 
consideration of the correlations between PSFs. Future research should incorporate the state-of-the-art of 
the uncertainty analysis method into the HRA-based method developed in this research to characterize and 
propagate this source of uncertainty.  
For uncertainty source E.4, the model uncertainty associated with the FDS code has been 
characterized in the verification and validation (V&V) study conducted by the U.S. NRC [79, 80], where 
the model error of the FDS code is characterized by the probability distribution fitted to the comparison 
between the FDS predictions and experimental data. The model uncertainty associated with the empirical 
water suppression model could be characterized by an approach that is similar to the FDS V&V study [79, 
80]; however, more experimental data on the water suppression (in the similar format to Ref. [25]) is 
necessary in the context of NPP fires.  
Regarding the uncertainty source E.5, NUREG-1855 [58] suggested a structured methodology to 
deal with the completeness uncertainty in PRA. In general, the impact of the completeness uncertainty in 
PRA can be assessed by the bounding and screening analysis using the conservative assumptions. If the 
completeness uncertainty is identified as having a significant influence on the risk outputs, more detailed 
PRA needs to be constructed to address the missing items in the PRA model. This approach can be 
applicable for fire detection and suppression analysis; for instance, when the modeling of manual activation 
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of fixed suppression systems (‘MF’ in Figure 5.2) is challenging due to the lack of empirical data, the 
impact of ‘MF’ on the plant risk estimates can be assessed by bounding analysis, where the risk outputs, 
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CHAPTER 6: FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1 Introduction  
While PRA has been widely utilized by both the nuclear industry and the U.S. NRC to enhance 
NPP safety, in resolving emergent regulatory requirements (e.g., those created in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima accident), the existing classical PRAs of NPPs were found to have limitations in generating the 
required realism for plant risk estimations. Appendix A of this thesis provides background on the classical 
PRA technique, including its high-level elements, its application in the Risk-Informed Regulation by the 
U.S. NRC, and the gap analysis (Step 1 in Figure 6.1).  
To overcome the limitations of classical PRA and to help resolve the emergent regulatory 
requirements, this research develops an I-PRA methodological framework for NPPs that explicitly 
incorporates the underlying science of accident causation into plant risk scenarios and provides a feasible 
solution for adding realism to the plant risk estimations. In I-PRA, the underlying failure mechanisms 
associated with the specific safety concern in NPPs are simulated using separate modules and are integrated 
with classical PRA through a probabilistic interface methodology equipped with uncertainty quantification, 
Bayesian updating, and dependency modeling. Although I-PRA is applicable for various NPP safety 
challenges of concern, this research focuses on the risk assessment for internal fires in NPPs, which has 
been a longstanding challenge for both the nuclear industry and the regulatory agency. Appendix B provides 
a background on fire protection in NPPs (Step 2 in Figure 6.1) and identifies the key challenges in the 
current Fire PRA methodology which require methodological advancements to improve the realism in Fire 
PRA (Step 3 in Figure 6.1). The methodological and practical contributions of this research are categorized 
into four areas (Step 4 to 7 in Figure 6.1), and summarized in Sections 1.1 to 1.4 of Chapter 1. This chapter 
relates to Step 8 in Figure 6.1 in the roadmap of this thesis. The following sub-sections include a summary 






Figure 6.1 Roadmap of the Research 
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6.2 Future Research  
6.2.1 Future Research Related to the Fire I-PRA Framework  
Future research will be conducted in the following areas:  
(a) Advancing Probabilistic Validation  
 
• A causal model covering all the factors, identified in Section 2.3.7, affecting the degree of epistemic 
uncertainty in the probabilistic simulation will be developed to help more accurately quantify the 
validity of the probabilities estimated from the Simulation Module in the I-PRA methodological 
framework.  
 
(b) Advancing Fire Initiation and Post-Fire Damage Propagation Models 
 
• The existing data-driven approaches are used for these two submodules in the Fire I-PRA 
framework (Chapter 2). For the Fire I-PRA framework developed for the realistic case study (in 
Section 2.5), the Global IM analysis will be conducted to determine if these two submodules make 
significant contributions to the plant risk estimates. Then, if the fire initiation process is identified 
as a significant risk-contributing factor and/or a main source of uncertainty, future research will 
focus on advancing the fire initiation modeling beyond the current statistical and empirical method 
by considering the underlying physical and human failure mechanisms. If the post-fire damage 
propagation process is identified as a significant risk-contributing factor and/or a main source of 
uncertainty, future research will develop a physics-based model for electrical circuit failures due to 
the fire-induced cable damage. When an explicit model of underlying failure mechanisms is 
developed and incorporated into the FSM, the existing data-driven estimates will be updated with 
the model-based estimates through Bayesian integration.  
 




• The Fire I-PRA framework in this research does not aim to replace the entire process of the current 
Fire PRA methodology in NUREG/CR-6850; rather, it advances a few of the key elements in the 
existing Fire PRA and can be incorporated as additional steps into the current Fire PRA procedure. 
The author suggests, therefore, that the Fire I-PRA framework be utilized within a “phased 
approach” in the current Fire PRA procedure, where the level of detail and realism in the fire 
modeling and the plant PRA logic is gradually increased depending on the risk contribution of each 
fire-induced scenario. In other words, when a specific fire scenario does not satisfy the risk 
acceptance criteria (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.174 [1]) within the scope of the NUREG/CR-6850 
approach, the Fire I-PRA framework can be deployed to further improve the realism in the Fire 
PRA. 
 
• Developing a reduced-order model of the Fire Simulation Module for practical applications. This 
aims to make the Fire Simulation Module more efficient and computationally practical for the 
nuclear industry and for regulatory purposes. A reduced-order model will be developed and 
validated based on the FDS simulations performed using the high-performance parallel computing 
facility at the university and will then be provided for the nuclear industry and the regulatory agency. 
6.2.2 Future Research Related to Global Importance Measure Method in the I-PRA Framework  
Future research will be conducted in the following areas:  
 
(a) Mathematical Advancement to Reduce the Computational Demand of Global IM       
 
• Future research will focus on reducing the computational demand for executing the cdf-based 
moment-independent Global IM analysis in I-PRA, such as an application of the Bayesian approach 
for the statistical estimation of the sensitivity measures [6] and an advancement in the statistical 
computational procedure so that the Global IM can be estimated by a single-loop Monte Carlo 
simulation (instead of using the two-loop Monte Carlo) backed by a solid asymptotic theory, e.g., 
by tailoring the advanced computational procedure suggested in Ref. [7].  
 




• Developing systematic and physical relationships between the results of Global IM methodology 
and those from classical IMs to explore the possibility of building an integrated, multi-attribute 
importance ranking methodology. This line of research could contribute to a more stable SSC 
categorization (e.g., 10 CFR 50.69 [4, 5]) in NPPs.  
 
• Developing a phased-approach for promoting industry applications of Global IM, where (i) the 
screening of input parameters (e.g., using the Morris screening method [9]) is conducted to identify 
potentially influential input parameters, (ii) Global IM analysis is conducted using the methodology 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 to obtain the ranking among those influential input parameters, and (iii) 
a metamodel for the Simulation Module in I-PRA, based on those input parameters identified as 
important contributors by the Global IM, is developed and provided for industry applications.  
6.2.3 Future Research Related to the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF Methodology  
Future research will be conducted in the following areas:  
 
(a) Extending the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology to Underlying Human/Organizational 
Root Causes of CCF events 
  
• Future research will focus on connecting the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology to 
the human and organization performance models, e.g., the HRA models and the SoTeRiA 
framework [10-22]. In most cases, CCFs in NPPs are caused by the combination of physical, human, 
and organizational failure mechanisms, e.g., deficiencies in the training and procedure may induce 
an installation error, which may then induce the progression of physical failure mechanisms. For 
instance, in the case study shown in Section 4.3, two factors related to an improper installation 
should be addressed: (i) the probability of an installation error and (i) how the improper installation 
influences the SCC propagation. To improve the realism and resolution of these two factors, an 
explicit methodology for assessing the human and organization performance and its interactions 




(b) Developing a Methodology for Treating Interactions of Physical Failure Mechanisms in the Simulation 
Module of I-PRA  
        
• The methodological development and the case study in Chapter 4 have focused on the MCS where 
two components fail due to a single shared physical failure mechanism. As stated, however, there 
are two other possible MCS types: (i) multiple components fail because of unshared failure 
mechanisms which may share underlying implicit causal factors and (ii) multiple components fail 
because of more than one shared failure mechanism. An extension of the Spatio-Temporal 
Probabilistic CCF methodology to these two types of joint failure events is challenging because 
two or more physical failure mechanisms may be interacting with each other [23-25]. In this context, 
the interaction is defined as the situation where the physical degradation process for one component 
initiates, accelerates, or suppresses the physical failure mechanisms for others. To deal with this 
situation, two or more physical failure mechanism models should be connected to each other and 
solved simultaneously to account for the time- and location-dependent feedback. This requires 
methodological advancements in both physical models and uncertainty analysis and is left to future 
research.  
6.2.4 Future Research Related to the HRA-Based Manual Suppression Module  
Future research will be conducted in the following areas:  
 
(a) Advancing the Modeling of the Influences of Manual Suppression Activity on Fire Progression         
• The empirical water suppression model used in Chapter 5 has the following limitations: (i) there 
are insufficient data in the context of NPP fires to support the estimation of the exponential 
reduction rate; (ii) the influence of the fire characteristics, such as the fuel type and boundary 
conditions, on the water-based suppression is only implicitly captured by the empirical regression 
coefficients, a1 and a2; and (iii) there is no explicit connection between the water application rate 
?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′  and the human performance in manual suppression activity. To deal with these challenges, the 




• Conduct experiments to collect the water-based suppression data for the NPP contexts, where the 
water-based suppression is performed on those specific types of fires that are likely to occur at 
NPPs and where the relationship between the HRR reduction and the performance of manual 
suppression is observed.  
 
• As the experiments for water suppression would need relatively large-scale experimental apparatus, 
relying exclusively on the experiments may not provide sufficient experimental data to derive the 
relationships among all key physical parameters. Another direction of future research would be to 
develop an explicit model of physical and chemical interactions between the burning fuel and water 
droplets to predict the HRR curve during manual suppression. For this purpose, the capability of 
FDS to explicitly solve the chemical kinetics would be useful. 
 
• Develop a method to relate the human performance in manual suppression to the water application 
rate. The water application rate depends on several factors associated with the fire brigade strategy, 
e.g., the direction of the water hose nozzle, flow rate, droplet size distribution, and water discharge 
pressure [35, 50-52]. Future research should investigate the potential for generating parametric 
relationships between the water application rate and those fire-brigade factors. 
 
(b) Advancing the Modeling of the Influences of Fire Progression on Human Performance in Manual 
Suppression        
• The HRA-based method developed in Chapter 5 addresses these influences in terms of HEPs 
through the PSFs in the HRA quantification, while these influences in terms of the times to 
complete individual tasks have not been addressed (except for the water-based manual suppression 
for which the empirical water suppression model addresses the dependence of time to manual 
suppression on the HRR value). Future research needs to develop a method to address the 
influences of fire progression on the HEPs and timings of individual tasks for manual suppression. 
In this direction, ongoing  research by the UIUC SoTeRiA Laboratory1 [62] develops a simulation-
based human performance method for manual suppression, focusing on the fire search phase in the 
                                                     
1 Socio-Technical Risk Analysis Laboratory (http://soteria.npre.illinois.edu/), in the Department of Nuclear, 
Plasma and Radiological Engineering (NPRE) at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. 
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fire room, using the Agent-Based Model (ABM), connected with a zone model for fire progression 
(CFAST) through the Geographic Information System (GIS). 
 
(c) Advancing the Treatment of Human Action Dependency for HFEs and Timings of Individual Tasks        
• The HRA-based method developed in Chapter 5 addresses the dependency among the HFEs using 
the HRA event tree logic and the HEP dependency model in the SPAR-H method. The dependency 
among the time required for each task by the MCR operators and the fire brigade, however, has not 
been addressed in Chapter 5 as the uncertainty of those timings are characterized by independent 
random variables. The simulation-based human performance model, e.g., the one developed in the 
ongoing research by the SoTeRiA Laboratory [62], can also be beneficial for more accurate 
treatment of human action dependency as it can capture the sources of dependency explicitly in the 
simulation of underlying human behavior interacting with the fire-induced physical conditions.  
 
(d) Expanding the Probabilistic Validation Methodology (introduced in Chapter 2) to the HRA-Based Fire 
Brigade Model 
• The five categories of sources of epistemic uncertainty, identified in Section 2.3.7, are also 
applicable for the HRA-based manual suppression model. How to characterize and propagate these 
sources of epistemic uncertainty in a multi-model environment (i.e., the HRA-based manual 
suppression model interfaced with fire progression model) needs further research.  
It should be noted that the advancements of the HRA-based manual suppression model, listed above (“a” 
to “d”), are not recommended for all tasks to be undertaken by the MCR and the fire brigade; the accuracy, 
the level of detail, and the spatial and temporal resolutions of the human performance model should be 
gradually increased based on the risk importance and the degree of dependency of individual tasks. The 
manual suppression analysis should begin with a simpler and less expensive approach, such as the data-
driven model. Then, and only for the risk significant tasks and contextual factors, a more detailed approach 
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APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND ON CLASSICAL PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGY 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a structured and quantitative technique to assess the 
possibilities of low-frequency, high-consequence accidents in large-scale and complex socio-technical 
systems and to inform the decision makers of the current state of knowledge on the system characteristics 
and behavior in terms of safety and risk [1]. The PRA technique was originally developed by Professor 
Norman C. Rasmussen at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was published as the Reactor 
Safety Study (WASH-1400) [2] in 1975. The lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 
confirmed that PRA was a promising technique for assessment and management of the NPP risk due to its 
capability of (i) accounting for all possible accident scenarios, instead of relying on a set of preselected 
design-basis accidents, (ii) addressing the interaction between hardware systems and human actions, and 
(iii) identifying the plant-specific vulnerability based on realistic accident progression modeling [3]. After 
20 years of research and industry applications, the U.S. NRC issued the PRA Policy Statement [4] in 1995 
to open the door for use of PRA in the nuclear regulation process. It emphasized that the application of 
PRA should be increased within the bounds of the state of knowledge and used in a manner that augments 
the traditional deterministic approach, such as Defense-in-Depth (DiD) and safety margin. In 1998, the U.S. 
NRC published Regulatory Guide 1.174 [5] to establish the landmark “risk-informed” decision-making 
framework which uses the outputs and insights from PRA as key inputs to regulatory decisions. Since then, 
PRA has been widely used at Nuclear Power Plants the world over to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of risk management by the nuclear industry and regulatory agency. In addition, it has now been 
extended to other high-consequence industries that include healthcare [6], aviation [7], space [8], chemical 
processes [9], defense [10], oil and gas [11], digital I&C [12, 13], and cyber security [14]. 
In the 1970s, before PRA was introduced, the safety design of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and 
other complex technical systems was achieved using a deterministic approach. Using this approach, a set 
of design-basis accidents (DBAs), posing the greatest challenges to the system within a credible likelihood, 
are selected and the deterministic safety analysis is performed to demonstrate that the system endures the 
DBAs with an adequate safety margin. For NPPs, the single failure criterion is assumed in the deterministic 
safety analysis to ensure that DiD is adequately maintained.  
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In contrast, PRA is a structured and quantitative technique to assess the ‘risk triplets’ [15] on a 
system-specific basis: (i) what can go wrong? (Scenario), (ii) how likely is it? (Likelihood), and (iii) what 
are the consequences? (Consequence). The output from PRA is a set of ‘risk triplets’ for all scenarios 
considered in the PRA model [15]: 
 𝑅𝑅 = {〈𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖〉}; 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁}, (A.1) 
where si: the ith scenario in PRA, pi: the probability/frequency of scenario si, xi: the consequence or the 
measure of damage for scenario si, and N: total number of scenarios considered in PRA. One of the most 
crucial elements of PRA is the consideration of uncertainties associated with the estimates of the ‘risk 
triplets’ induced by both natural randomness of the system behavior and lack of knowledge. Consideration 
of uncertainties is especially important when the existence of uncertainties can alter the interpretations and 
conclusions of PRA, e.g., whether the risk-acceptance criteria are satisfied or which source of hazards is 
the most risk significant. In PRA, therefore, uncertainty analysis is performed to identify, characterize, and 
propagate all sources of uncertainty, and the ‘risk triplets’ estimated by PRA typically involve uncertainties 
represented by probability distributions: 
 𝑅𝑅 = �〈𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖),𝑝𝑝𝜑𝜑,𝑖𝑖(𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖),𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥,𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)〉�;  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁}, (A.2) 
where the marginal probability distributions for the ‘risk triplets’ in each scenario are represented by ps,i, 
pφ,i, and px,i, respectively. In a more general way, the probability distribution for the ‘risk triplets’ is given 
as a joint distribution, rather than a marginal distribution for each element, and Equation (A.2) becomes 
 𝑅𝑅 = {〈𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)〉};  𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁}. (A.3) 
A PRA model is developed for a whole spectrum of accident scenarios; whereby, ‘risk triplets’ are 
addressed by PRA logic, such as event tree and fault tree, combined with statistical data analysis for risk 
quantification. Compared to the traditional deterministic approach, PRA has the following advantages: (i) 
a broad spectrum of accident scenarios can be addressed, (ii) ‘risk triplets’ are realistically assessed instead 
of relying on conservative and prescriptive assumptions (e.g., single failure criterion), (iii) a logical and 
quantitative way of prioritizing the risk-contributing factors and allocating resources is provided, and (iv) 
uncertainties associated with ‘risk triplets’ can be explicitly and quantitatively addressed [16].  
In the following, the high-level structure and elements of classical PRA, widely applied over the 
past four decades for NPPs by the nuclear industry and the U.S. NRC, are explained. The subsequent 
subsection then provides a brief overview of the Risk-informed Regulation framework that is currently used 
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by the U.S. NRC and the role of classical PRA therein. The last subsection of this section describes the 
limitations of classical PRA to establish the motivation for this research.  
The high-level process of classical PRA is shown in Figure A.1 [17], including eleven elements: 
(a) definition of objectives, (b) system familiarization, (c) initiating event identification, (d) structuring 
scenarios, (e) logic modeling, (f) data collection and analysis, (g) quantification and integration, (h) 
uncertainty analysis, (i) interpretation of the results, (j) importance ranking, and (k) sensitivity analysis. It 
should be noted that the classical PRA procedure (Figure A.1) is, by nature, an iterative process; hence, 
those elements are not necessarily implemented only once or in the order as indicated in Figure A.1.  
 




A.1.1 Risk-Informed Regulation by U.S. NRC 
The goal of PRA is to inform the decision making on the design and operation of complex technical 
systems concerning the prevention and mitigation of the catastrophic accidents. For instance, PRA provides 
quantitative information to answer (or, at least, give some insights on) such questions, under the resource 
constraint, as: (i) for which equipment should the resources be allocated by the utility company to improve 
the NPP safety and (ii) on which safety issues the regulatory activity and the scientific research should 
focus on. As an example of the use of the PRA outputs in the practical decision-making process, this 
subsection provides an overview of the Risk-Informed Regulation framework by the U.S. NRC.  
Historically, the Risk-Informed Regulation framework originated in the U.S. NRC’s PRA policy 
statement, issued in 1995 [4], where the U.S. NRC expressed its intent to increase the use of PRA in the 
regulatory activity to promote regulatory stability and efficiency. The U.S. NRC emphasized that this 
regulatory framework is “risk-informed”, rather than “risk-based”, because the risk information generated 
by PRA is used in a way that complements and enhances the traditional deterministic approach, rather than 
completely replacing it. In 1998, the U.S. NRC issued the Regulatory Guide 1.174 [5] to provide guidance 
on how to use the PRA outputs and insights to support the risk-informed decision making concerning the 
licensee’s request for modifications to the plant licensing basis. The Regulatory Guide 1.174 [5] suggests 
that the principles, processes, and approaches introduced in this regulatory document “also provide useful 
guidance for the application of risk information to a set of activities that are broader than plant-specific 
changes to a plant’s LB [licensing basis].” Figure A.2 illustrates the principles of risk-informed integrated 




Figure A.2 Principles of risk-informed integrated decision making (based on Ref. [5]) 
In this decision-making approach, both traditional engineering considerations and risk insights generated 
by PRA should be addressed in an integrative manner. Specifically, as indicated in Figure A.2, five 
dimensions are considered: 
 
1) The proposed change to the licensing basis, submitted by the licensee, must satisfy the current 
regulations unless it is explicitly related to a requested exemption. 
 
2) The proposed change to the licensing basis, submitted by the licensee, must be consistent with the 
defense-in-depth philosophy.  
 
3) The proposed change to the licensing basis, submitted by the licensee, must maintain a sufficient 
level of safety margin.  
 
4) If the proposed change to the licensing basis, submitted by the licensee, increases the core damage 
frequency (CDF) and/or the large early release frequency (LERF), the increases in the plant risk 
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metric must be small enough to be consistent with the intent of the U.S. NRC’s Safety Goal Policy 
Statement. 
 
5) The impact of the proposed change to the licensing basis, submitted by the licensee, on the plant 
performance should be monitored using the predefined set of measurable performance measures to 
ensure that the implemented change to the licensing basis does not result in an unacceptable level 
of plant risk. 
 
In this integrated decision-making framework, the defense-in-depth philosophy (Principle #2 in Figure A.2) 
and safety margin (Principle #3 in Figure A.2), which are the fundamental principles in the traditional 
deterministic approach, continue to be the key principles of nuclear safety to deal with unknown and 
unforeseen failure mechanisms and phenomena that cannot be captured by PRA. The results and findings 
of PRA (Principle #4 in Figure A.2) are another element considered in this integrated decision-making 
process in a way that complements the other elements associated with the traditional deterministic approach, 
rather than completely substituting for them. For supporting the proposed licensing basis change, the 
licensee must evaluate the impact on plant risk by using the plant-specific PRA. The increase in the plant 
risk metrics, i.e., CDF and LERF, induced by the proposed licensing basis change and the cumulative level 
of the plant risk metrics after the proposed licensing basis change should be small enough to comply with 
the U.S. NRC’s Safety Goal Policy Statement [18]. Regulatory Guide 1.174 [5] provides the risk acceptance 
guidelines in terms of CDF and LERF, as shown in Figure A.3. The acceptance guidelines based on the 
CDF, shown in Figure A.3 (a), are implemented as follows: 
 
• If the proposed change decreases the plant CDF, the change is considered to satisfy Principle #4 
(in Figure A.2) with respect to CDF. Note that this situation is not illustrated in Figure A.3. 
• If the calculated increase in CDF due to the proposed change is less than 10−6 per year, the proposed 
change is accepted regardless of the total CDF estimate (Region III). Note that, if the total CDF is 
significantly greater than 10−4 per year, it is suggested that the corresponding plant should find a 
way to decrease the CDF, rather than to increase it by the licensing basis change.   
• If the calculated increase in CDF due to the proposed change is between 10−6 and 10−5 per year, the 




• If the calculated increase in CDF is greater than 10−5 per year, the request will not normally be 
considered, regardless of the total CDF estimate (Region I).  
 
The risk acceptance guidelines in terms of LERF are also provided, as shown in Figure A.3 (b), and are 
implemented in a way that is like the CDF acceptance guidelines described above.  
 
Figure A.3 Risk acceptance guidelines for Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release 
Frequency (LERF) in Regulatory Guide 1.174 [5]. 
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A.1.2 Gap Analysis of Classical PRA Methodology  
PRA has two fundamental dimensions: (i) development of event sequences (i.e., accident scenarios) 
with respect to functional states of systems and components and human failure events and (ii) estimation 
of failure probabilities associated with those events in the accident scenarios. As explained above, Classical 
PRA utilizes static event trees and fault trees to develop the accident scenarios (elements ‘b’ to ‘e’ in Figure 
A.1), while it relies on the statistical analysis of empirical data and engineering judgment for failure 
probability quantification (element ‘f’ in Figure A.1) [19]. Due to these features, classical PRA has the 
following limitations: 
 
• In the development of PRA scenarios, the exact timing of events is not considered. In the static 
event tree model, the “order” of the pivotal events is qualitatively considered; however, the order 
of the pivotal events should be predefined based on the analyst’s judgment and interpretation, is 
assumed to be unchanged for all event sequences within an event tree, and does not consider 
quantitative information on the timings of the events. The static fault tree is a binary-logic model 
and cannot account for the timing or order of the events. The only quantitative temporal information 
considered in classical PRAs for NPPs is the PRA mission time. For instance, for the basic event 
that represents the failure to run of a hardware component, the failure probability is obtained by 
computing the cumulative probability that the component fails during the predefined PRA mission 
time. In this sense, the results of classical PRA are “averaged” over the predefined PRA mission 
time.  
 
• In the estimation of failure probabilities associated with the events in accident scenarios, classical 
PRA has no explicit connection between those PRA events and the underlying accident causalities. 
The probabilities of failure events are mostly estimated by statistical analyses for empirical data. 
In this data-driven estimation process, different failure causes leading to the same event are lumped 
into a single set of data-driven parameters that characterize the occurrence of the corresponding 
event in PRA. In addition, classical PRA does not explicitly account for time and space in the 
estimation of the failure probabilities [20, 21]. Although there are statistical analysis methods to 
capture the time-dependent failure rate by using the parametric time-to-failure distributions which 
do not assume a constant failure rate, e.g., a Weibull distribution, the failure probabilities used in 
classical PRA do not carry the information on time-dependent failure occurrence because, as stated 
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above, the probability inputs in classical PRA are “time-averaged” value computed by integrating 
the failure rate over the PRA mission time. Meanwhile, the failure probabilities of the events in 
classical PRA are usually estimated based on the combination of plant-specific and industry-wide 
data. This is because, as the NPP systems are highly reliable by design, the plant-specific failure 
data are often quite sparse; hence, it is not possible to derive a meaningful statistical estimation of 
the failure probability only based on the plant-specific data. As the observational data from multiple 
sources for a specific period are pooled into one database, the resultant data-driven estimation of 
the failure probability is an average over time and location; thus, an explicit consideration of space 





[1] G. Apostolakis, "Beware of the Assumptions: Decision Making and Statistics," ed. Plenary Talk in 
the 12th Probabilistic Safety Assessment & Management Conference (PSAM12), 2014. 
[2] C. Acosta and N. O. Siu, "Dynamic event tree analysis method (DETAM) for accident sequence 
analysis," Cambridge, Mass.: Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1991, 1991. 
[3] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, "Three Mile Island 
Accident of 1979: Knowledge Management Digest (NUREG/KM-0001, Revision 1)," 2016. 
[4] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear 
Regulatory Activities; Final Policy Statement," 1995. 
[5] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Regulatory Guide 1.174 (Revision 2): An Approach for 
Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the 
Licensing Basis," 2011. 
[6] J. Li, R. Kang, A. Mosleh, and X. Pan, "Simulation-based automatic generation of risk scenarios," 
Systems Engineering and Electronics, Journal of, vol. 22, pp. 437-444, 2011. 
[7] H. Nejad and A. Mosleh, "SimPRA: A Simulation-Based Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Framework for Dynamic Systems," PSAM-9, Hong Kong, 2008. 
[8] A. Hakobyan, T. Aldemir, R. Denning, S. Dunagan, D. Kunsman, B. Rutt, and U. Catalyurek, 
"Dynamic generation of accident progression event trees," Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 
238, pp. 3457-3467, 2008. 
[9] J. Izquierdo, J. Hortal, M. Sánchez, E. Melendez, R. Herrero, J. Gil, L. Gamo, I. Fernandez, J. 
Esperón, and P. Gonzalez, "SCAIS (simulation code system for integrated safety assessment): 
current status and applications," ESREL 2008, Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis–Martorell et 
al.(eds), pp. 121-128, 2009. 
[10] C. Rabiti, A. Alfonsi, D. Mandelli, J. Cogliati, R. Martinueau, and C. Smith, "Deployment and 
overview of RAVEN capabilities for a probabilistic risk assessment demo for a PWR station 
blackout," Idaho National Laboratory report: INL/EXT-13-29510, 2013. 
[11] A. Alfonsi, C. Rabiti, D. Mandelli, J. Cogliati, R. Kinoshita, and A. Naviglio, "Dynamic event tree 
analysis through Raven," in Proceedings of ANS PSA 2013 International Topical Meeting on 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, 2013. 
[12] J. Devooght and C. Smidts, "Probabilistic reactor dynamics—I: the theory of continuous event 
trees," Nuclear science and engineering, vol. 111, pp. 229-240, 1992. 
[13] B. Tombuyses and T. Aldemir, "Dynamic PSA of process control systems via continuous cell-to-
cell mapping," Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM3, pp. 1541-1546, 1996. 
255 
 
[14] C. Smidts and J. Devooght, "Probabilistic reactor dynamics—II: a Monte Carlo study of a fast 
reactor transient," Nuclear science and engineering, vol. 111, pp. 241-256, 1992. 
[15] S. Kaplan and B. J. Garrick, "On The Quantitative Definition of Risk," Risk Analysis, vol. 1, pp. 
11-27, 1981. 
[16] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Staff Requirements (SECY-98-144) White Paper on Risk-
Informed and Performance-Based Regulation," 1999. 
[17] M. Stamatelatos, G. Apostolakis, H. Dezfuli, C. Everline, S. Guarro, P. Moieni, A. Mosleh, T. 
Paulos, and R. Youngblood, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA 
Managers and Practitioners (Version 1.1)," Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA, 
Washington, DC, 2002. 
[18] Office of the Federal Register. "51 FR 30028: Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power 
Plants; Policy Statement," 1986. 
[19] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "PRA Procedures Guide: A Guide to the Performance of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG/CR-2300)," 1983. 
[20] T. A. Wheeler, W. Thomas, and E. Thornsbury, "Spatially Informed Plant PRA Models for Security 
Assessment," in 14th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, 2006, pp. 319-325. 
[21] H. Bui, T. Sakurahara, J. Pence, Z. Mohaghegh, and E. Kee, "Integrating Spatio-Temporal 
Simulations with Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants to Resolve Emergent 
Regulatory Standards," Manuscript Submitted to Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 
256 
 
APPENDIX B: BACKGROUND ON FIRE PROTECTION IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
Before the major fire at the Browns Ferry NPP in 1975, the acceptance criteria of fire protection 
programs (FPP) at NPPs were based on the performance objectives given by General Design Criteria (GDC) 
3 in Appendix A of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50). This standard provided the general 
requirements for the design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance of structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) that are crucial for maintaining reactor safety. Due to insufficient guidance on the 
implementation of this GDC, the acceptance criteria of the FPP at NPPs were initially based on local fire 
codes; hence, the fire protection features at NPPs were like those in industrial facilities dealing with fossil 
fuels.  
The accident at the Browns Ferry NPP led to dramatic changes in fire protection and regulation at 
NPPs in the U.S. Since 1980, the FPP at NPPs has been implemented and regulated using the deterministic 
and prescriptive requirements in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R [1]. Deterministic and prescriptive fire 
protection was developed on the basis of three procedural elements of the Defense-in-Depth (DiD) 
philosophy; namely (i) prevent fires from starting, (ii) if a fire starts, rapidly detect and suppress it, and (iii) 
in case the rapid detection and suppression fail, provide protection for the structures, systems, and 
components essential for safe shutdown [1]. In general, the deterministic approach is effective in the initial 
stages of technological development when knowledge of and experience with the system is quite limited. 
As experience in design and operation of NPPs has increased, and as several major nuclear accidents have 
occurred in the past 60 years, the scope of nuclear regulation has expanded; therefore, both the licensees 
and the regulatory agency have recognized that the deterministic and prescriptive approaches have 
limitations, such as a complicated process of granting exemptions and deviation applications and inefficient 
resource allocations due to inflexible prescriptive requirements [2]. These limitations in the deterministic 
approach have motivated the transition to the risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) approach. 
In parallel with the deterministic and prescriptive FPP, research on probabilistic fire risk assessment, 
initiated in 1977 by the U.S. NRC, aimed to develop a systematic and structured methodology for estimating 
the fire-induced plant risk. The research was led by PRA researchers at the University of California at Los 
Angeles, developing a methodology to compute the probability of fire-induced equipment damage and use 
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it as an input to the plant PRA for calculating plant risk induced by internal fires [3-7]. This Fire PRA 
methodology was implemented in utility-sponsored PRA projects in the early 1980s [8, 9]. Subsequently, 
from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s, Fire PRAs were conducted in multiple industry-sponsored and 
regulatory PRA studies, such as NUREG-1150 [10] and the Individual Plant Examinations of External 
Events (IPEEE) [11]. In 2004, existing NPPs were allowed to voluntarily transition to the RIPB fire 
protection approach under the NFPA-805 [12]. In the transition to NFPA-805, Fire PRA is used as a basis 
for the Fire Risk Evaluation (FRE). Guidance on the Fire PRA methodology, based on state-of-the-art 
techniques, tools, and data, is provided in NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI TR-1011989, published in 2005 [13, 
14]. For brevity, this document is referred to as “NUREG/CR-6850”, and the methodology, therein, is 
referred to as the “current/existing Fire PRA methodology”. In the U.S., recent industry-wide 
implementation of plant-specific Fire PRAs is primarily based on this current Fire PRA methodology [15]. 
One of the main advantages of the RIPB approach is that the uncertainties associated with fire 
characteristics, fire detection and suppression system performance, and plant response can be explicitly 
addressed. The explicit treatment of uncertainties means the unnecessary safety factors in the deterministic 
approach [16] can be reduced. Furthermore, the RIPB approach provides an expanded scope of possible 
fire hazards and fire-induced event sequences, rather than focusing on predetermined representative fire 
hazards and fire-induced scenarios applied in the deterministic and prescriptive approach. This feature 
provides decision makers with valuable information and insights, on a plant-specific basis, about the fire 
protection features, major risk-contributing factors (e.g., fire locations, design parameters), and the 
predicted system responses to possible fires [2, 17]. In addition, licensing conditions and requirements are 
less complicated and time consuming than those prescribed in the traditional FPP regulation based on 
Appendix R, where many requests for exemption and deviation were submitted by licensees and all had to 
be individually reviewed by the U.S. NRC.  
During the U.S. nuclear industry’s transition to NFPA 805, concerns about excessive conservatism 
in the current Fire PRA applications have been widely expressed [17-27]. The belief is that the degree of 
conservatism in the current Fire PRA is much larger than that of the internal event PRA [27] and that the 
fire-induced plant risk calculated by the current Fire PRA is conservative when compared with reality by a 
factor of 5 to 10 or more [21]. Essentially, the conservatism is introduced in the areas where, rather than 
characterizing and propagating all sources of uncertainty, the bounding assumptions are introduced to deal 
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with (or mask) the uncertainty [21, 28]. In addition, the nuclear industry has claimed that fire tests 
performed by the U.S. NRC were biased toward unrealistically large fires, skewing the outcomes and 
producing unrealistic and possibly detrimental results with respect to the realism in PRA [18, 22, 27].  
Excessive conservatism in Fire PRA could cause practical problems and prevent the effective and 
efficient RIPB fire protection by the nuclear industry and the regulatory agency. First, if the degree of 
conservative bias is different among risk-contributing factors, the true importance ranking may be masked 
[18, 29, 30]. This problem may also influence the risk-informed SSC categorization, e.g., 10 CFR 50.69 
process [31]. Similarly, a different degree of risk bias among multiple types of hazards (e.g., internal events, 
fire, seismic, etc.) may cause a problem in risk aggregation since a relatively large bias for a specific type 
of hazard may skew the total plant risk profile by overemphasizing the risk contribution from that specific 
hazard [32]. Second, if the degree of risk overestimation in FPRA is large, the risk-informed fire protection 
design alternatives available to the utility company may be narrowed in a way that reduces the flexibility 
and efficiency of risk-informed applications [22]. For instance, based on Regulatory Guide 1.205 [33], the 
utility company can make design changes to the fire protection features without a prior approval by the U.S. 
NRC under the condition that (i) the proposed change results in a decrease in plant risk or (ii) the individual 
change results in a risk increase less than 10−7 per year for CDF and less than 10−8 per year for LERF. In 
the second situation, the utility company must demonstrate that the proposed change meets the risk-
informed criteria using the plant-specific Fire PRA. The excessive conservatism in Fire PRA methodology, 
which tends to overestimate the increase in CDF and LERF, may narrow down the design alternatives that 
can satisfy the risk acceptance criteria.  
To reduce the excessive conservatism and increase the realism in the current Fire PRA 
methodology, this research develops a new I-PRA methodological framework for NPP Fire PRA (Chapter 
2 of this thesis). A review of literature reveals five potential areas for improving realism in Fire PRA: (1) 
fire ignition frequency [18, 21, 27], (2) fire progression and damage modeling [18, 19, 21, 27], (3) modeling 
of interactions between fire progression and manual fire suppression [18, 34], (4) circuit failure analysis 
[13, 18, 27], and (5) post-fire Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) [13, 18, 27]. Among these five areas, the 
I-PRA methodological framework, developed in this research, aims to improve the realism in areas #2 (fire 




• Area #2: Fire progression and damage modeling: The literature review revealed that the modeling 
approaches for heat release rate, cable flame spread rate, and fire propagation among cable trays in 
the current Fire PRA methodology were unrealistic [18, 19, 21, 27]. In recent Fire PRAs conducted 
in the NFPA-805 transition [12], fire progression and fire-induced physical conditions are mainly 
modeled by zone of influence (ZOI) models and correlation-based models derived from 
experimental data and expert judgment, or by zone models such as the CFAST [18]. Those fire 
progression models rely on the empirical correlations that were derived from non-realistic and 
conservative experiments which were designed to ensure fire ignition and rapid propagation to 
produce an upper bound of the fire intensity [18, 27]. Also, the heat release rate (HRR) curve, 
recommended in the current Fire PRA methodology, was primarily derived from expert judgment 
and conservative experimental data. This research improves the realism associated with this area 
by (i) integrating a CFD-based fire model, the FDS, with classical PRA to improve the space and 
time resolution of the depiction of underlying physical phenomena and to reduce the extent of 
reliance on the empirical correlations derived from the fire tests; and (ii) conducting the quantitative 
and structured UQ to avoid relying on conservative input parameters and assumptions.  
 
• Area #3: Interaction between fire progression and manual suppression: Historically, Fire PRA 
addresses the interactions between physical fire progression and manual suppression using an 
“implicit” approach, i.e., based on the competition between two separately-computed time 
quantities for “time to target damage” and “time to manual fire suppression” [14]. In this implicit 
approach, since the reduction of the HRR value due to manual suppression activity is not credited, 
the current Fire PRA methodology, using the severity factor approach, generally results in 
“conservative approximations” [18]. This research improves the realism associated with this area 
in two ways: (i) by creating an explicit interface between fire progression and manual suppression 
through modifications to the HRR curve in the I-PRA methodological framework (Chapter 2); and 
(ii) by developing the HRA-based method for human performance analysis in manual suppression 
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APPENDIX C: BACKGROUND ON MANUAL SUPPRESSION ANALYSIS IN FIRE 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
C.1 Literature Review on Existing Method for Manual Suppression Analysis 
To assess the performance of manual suppression, two key elements should be addressed [1]: (a) 
the human performance in manual suppression activity and (b) interactions between fire progression and 
manual suppression. The first element can be further decomposed into two subfactors, including (a.1) task 
sequencing, which represents the order of tasks that should be implemented to achieve successful control 
and suppression of the fire and (a.2) Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) and timings associated with the 
manual suppression tasks. The second element, i.e., interactions between fire progression and manual 
suppression, have two dimensions: (b.1) the influences of fire-induced conditions (e.g., smoke, temperature, 
toxic species) on the human performance and (b.2) the influences of the manual suppression (e.g., 
discharging suppressant on the fire source, activating smoke purge) on the fire progression.  
In the following, a literature review on manual suppression analysis methods in the context of 
enclosure fires for both nuclear and non-nuclear domains is provided. In this literature review, the existing 
methods are categorized based on their features in terms of two key elements of manual suppression stated 
above:  
 
• Categorization for element ‘a’ (human performance in manual suppression): 
o Data-driven approach 
o Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)-based approach 
o Simulation-based approach 
 
• Categorization for element ‘b’ (interactions between fire progression and manual suppression): 
o Explicit interface 
o Implicit interface 
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C.1.1 Definition of Categorization for Manual Suppression Model 
To define the categorizations of the existing manual suppression analysis, consider the underlying 
causalities that lead to the observable performance of manual suppression in the context of the NPP fires 
(Figure C.1). The fire source and its progression in the fire compartment (‘Fire Progression’) is the driver 
of the underlying physical mechanisms leading to the fire-induced nuclear power plant (NPP) scenarios. 
The safety-related systems of an NPP can fail due to the fire-induced damage to the critical equipment in 
the room, such as cable trays and electrical cabinet (‘Cable Tray/ Cabinet Damage’ in Figure C.1). The 
impacts of fire progression and fire-induced physical environment, such as high temperature and heat flux, 
on the critical equipment are explicitly addressed by the Fire Progression Model (corresponding to the 
arrow ‘D’ in Figure C.1).  
 
Figure C.1 Pictorial representation of the underlying causations associated with NPP fire scenarios. 
To prevent and limit the fire-induced damage to the critical equipment, the manual suppression is 
performed by the fire brigade (‘Fire Brigade’ in Figure C.1). The manual suppression involves various tasks, 
consisting of both cognitive and execution steps, and is typically performed by multiple crews coordinating 
with each other. The performance of manual suppression can also be affected by the fire-induced conditions, 
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such as visibility and thermal stress (the arrow ‘C’ in Figure C.1). Through time-dependent and location-
specific human behavior of the fire brigade members, the pivotal manual suppression tasks necessary for 
suppressing and controlling the fires, such as traveling to the fire location, searching for the fire source, and 
manual suppression using the portable extinguisher, are performed (represented by the flowchart, consisting 
of ‘Task 1’, ‘Task 2’, etc. in Figure C.1). Each manual suppression task could influence the fire progression, 
e.g., the fire size and intensity can be influenced when the fire brigade opens the cabinet door, or when the 
fire brigade starts discharging the suppressant (the arrow ‘B’ in Figure C.1). In this aspect, the interactions 
between fire progression and manual suppression forms a time-dependent feedback loop, consisting of 
arrows ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ in Figure C.1.  
In relation to two key elements stated above, the key element ‘a’ (human performance in manual 
suppression) corresponds to the ‘Manual Fire Suppression Module’ in Figure C.1, where the performance 
of the fire brigade and the timings and human errors of the pivotal tasks are considered. The key element 
‘b’ (interactions between fire progression and manual suppression) corresponds to two arrows ‘B’ and ‘C’ 
in Figure C.1. To facilitate the definition of categorizations, three levels of causalities underlying the 
Manual Fire Suppression Module are defined: ‘Level #1’ refers to the time-based performance measure for 
manual suppression (e.g., time to complete the manual suppression), ‘Level #2’ refers to the sequence of 
manual suppression tasks including the timings and outcomes of individual tasks, and ‘Level #3; refers to 
the underlying behavior of the human beings (e.g., fire brigade members), including the physical 
movements and cognitive processes, during the manual suppression activity.  
Based on the causal understanding illustrated in Figure C.1, the existing methods for modeling the 
key element ‘a’ (human performance in manual suppression) are divided into three categories: 
 
• Data-driven Method: Based on the statistical analysis using empirical data (e.g., historical fire event 
database, fire drill records), the probability model representing the uncertainty associated with the 
time to manual suppression (‘tsupp’ in Figure C.1) is derived. For instance, the probability density 
function for tsupp can be fitted to the available data: 
 𝑡𝑡supp ~ 𝑓𝑓�𝑡𝑡supp;  𝛉𝛉�, (C.1) 
where 𝛉𝛉 represents the parameters of the probability distribution, e.g., a constant rate λ [1/time] 
when the exponential distribution is selected as the probability model. In this approach, the 
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underlying causations associated with the ‘Layers #2’ and ‘#3’ in Figure C.1 are lumped into the 
data-driven empirical parameters 𝛉𝛉. 
 
• HRA-based Method: In this approach, in addition to ‘Layer #1’, ‘Layer #2’ (task sequence of 
manual suppression activity) is explicitly modeled by using the HRA techniques. For this purpose, 
the HRA event tree is commonly used. The uncertainties associated with the outcomes (i.e., success 
or failure) and the timings of individual tasks are explicitly addressed in the HRA quantification. 
On the other hand, the causations at ‘Layer #3’ (underlying human behavior) are implicitly captured 
through the Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) which are used to adjust the HEPs based on the 
conditions influencing the human performance. For instance, the influences of the fire-induced 
adverse environment on the manual suppression performance can be captured by adjusting the 
stress and stressor PSFs.  
 
• Simulation-based Method: This approach extends the scope of an explicit modeling of the 
underlying causations to ‘Layer #3’, i.e., underlying mechanisms of the human errors, by 
simulating the behavior of “virtual” personnel in the simulation environment. The definition of 
“simulation-based” method in this category is consistent with the definition of “simulation-based” 
or “dynamic” HRA techniques in literature [2]. 
 
It should be noted that, even for the simulation-based method, empirical data and expert opinion are still 
necessary to estimate the input parameters of the human behavior model and to define the initial and 
boundary conditions of the simulation environment. In this sense, these three methodological categories 
should be considered as a continuous spectrum, rather than three discrete categories. In other words, 
although all methodological categories use both data-driven and model-based approaches, the degree of 
model-based approach increases from the data-driven method, the HRA-based method, to the simulation-
based method.  
For the key element ‘b’ (interactions between fire progression and manual suppression), the 
existing methods are divided into two categories: 
 
• Explicit interface: This approach addresses the interactions between fire progression and manual 
suppression (the arrows ‘B’ and ‘C’ in Figure C.1) by explicitly incorporating the influencing 
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factors associated with these interactions into the fire progression model and/or the Manual Fire 
Suppression Module. The “explicit” incorporation means that (i) the influences of the manual 
suppression activity on fire progression (e.g., increase/ decrease of fire size and intensity) are 
considered as the input parameters and boundary conditions of the fire progression model and/or 
(ii) the influences of fire progression on the manual suppression activity are considered in the input 
parameters and boundary conditions of the human performance model for manual suppression. 
 
• Implicit interface: In contrast, this approach does not have an explicit incorporation of these 
interactions into the fire progression model and/or the manual suppression performance model. 
There are two possible subcategories under the implicit interface: (i) the interactions between fire 
progression and manual suppression (arrows ‘B’ and ‘C’ in Figure C.1) are masked by data analysis, 
e.g., when empirical data is analyzed to derive the probability model for tsupp, all information on 
such interactions are abstracted in the estimated parameters 𝛉𝛉 of the probability model; and (ii) 
these interactions are treated by comparing the surrogate performance measure that is shared by 
fire progression and manual suppression models, e.g., two time quantities, the time to cable damage 
tdmg and tsupp, are computed by the fire progression model and the Manual Fire Suppression Module 
without the communication between each other (i.e., by ignoring the arrows ‘B’ and ‘C’ in Figure 
C.1) and are compared to determine if the fire can be suppressed before any fire-induced damage 
occurs. 
C.1.2 Literature Review 
a) Human Performance in Manual Suppression 
In both nuclear and non-nuclear domains, the most common approach is to estimate the time to 
manual suppression using a data-driven method [1, 3-15]. In this approach, the time duration between fire 
ignition and manual suppression is divided into several events with mutually-exclusive time intervals. For 
instance, in the current Fire PRA methodology for NPPs, the time between the fire ignition and manual 
suppression is divided into three time intervals, namely, time to fire detection, time to fire brigade response, 
and time duration of manual suppression [10, 12, 15, 16]. The probability distributions, representing the 
uncertainty of timings associated with manual suppression actions, are then derived from the empirical data, 
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such as historical fire event report and the fire drill records. This approach implicitly treats the two sub-
factors related to the human performance in manual suppression, i.e., (a.1) task sequencing and (a.2) HEPs 
and timings associated with individual tasks, through the data-driven probability distribution developed by 
the statistical data analysis. 
Another approach is to conduct HRA to address the task processes of manual suppression and to 
quantify the HEPs and timings of each task. A review of literature reveals that the use of HRA-based 
approaches for manual suppression analysis has been quite limited. Garvey et al. [17] performed an HRA 
for manual suppression by developing a static HRA Event Tree and quantifying HEPs using the Technique 
for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [18] and the Cause-Based Decision Tree Method (CBDTM) 
[19]. Recently, a study by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) [20] has explored the use of 
the existing HRA techniques, such as THERP [18], CBDTM [19], and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk 
Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method [21], for modeling the human response to Very Early 
Warning Fire Detection (VEWFD) in NPPs. In these studies, the task sequences are modeled by a static 
HRA event tree, while the associated HEPs are quantified by applying existing HRA quantification 
techniques. The timings of individual tasks are considered in an implicit manner as the temporal factor is 
only considered in the feasibility assessment and the PSFs without quantifying the exact timings of 
individual tasks.  
As an extension of the HRA-based approach, Kloos et al. [22-25] developed the Crew Module to 
account for the time-dependent sequences of human actions associated with manual detection and 
suppression. Their Crew Module is connected to a Dynamic Event Tree (DET) where the timings of pivotal 
events related to manual suppression, e.g., the time to fire brigade arrival and the time to setting up the fire-
fighting equipment, are assessed considering the interactions with the CFD-based fire progression model. 
Their Crew Module used the existing HRA quantification techniques for estimating HEPs, such as the 
THERP [18] and the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP) [26]. The Crew Module computed 
the timing of each human action, necessary for developing the task sequencing in the DET, by a data-driven 
approach, where the probability distribution of the time to complete each task was derived from the 
empirical data and expert judgment. Even though the approach by Kloos et al. [22, 24, 25] adds an explicit 
time consideration to the manual suppression analysis, there are still remaining limitations: (i) the timing 
of each human action is derived from empirical data without explicit modeling of human behavior, and (ii) 
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the influences of fire-induced conditions and other factors (e.g., mental processes, team interactions, and 
cognitive behaviors) are incorporated through the semi-quantitative PSFs relying on expert judgment. 
The most sophisticated approach, which could overcome the limitations in the data-driven and 
HRA-based approaches stated above, is to use a simulation-based HRA method to develop an explicit 
modeling of underlying human behavior. In this direction, for the (non-fire) NPP Main Control Room 
context, several simulation-based HRA methods have been developed in literature, such as the Information, 
Decision, Action in Crew context (IDAC) model [27-31], the Man–machine Integration Design and 
Analysis System (MIDAS) [32], and the Simulator for Human Error Probability Analysis (SHERPA) [33]. 
These simulation-based HRA methods use the human performance simulation, in which the performance 
of plant crews under the scenarios and environments being analyzed are mimicked by creating virtual 
scenarios and human inside the computational simulation environment [2]. For the manual suppression 
context, the ongoing parallel research in the UIUC SoTeRiA Laboratory by Bui et al. [34] develops a 
simulation-based approach for modeling the manual suppression processes using the Agent-Based Model 
(ABM), connected with a zone fire model (CFAST) through the Geographic Information System (GIS).  
b) Interactions between Fire Progression and Manual Suppression 
Several authors have developed correlation-based methods that implicitly account for this element 
by incorporating input variables associated with manual suppression into the engineering correlations to 
calculate fire spread area and damage [1, 4, 14]. For instance, De Sanctis et al. [14] computed the fire spread 
area using an engineering correlation as a function of the time to firefighter intervention, the time to prevent 
further damage, and other physical variables. In this approach, the interactions between fire progression 
and manual suppression are implicitly treated through the structure of analytical correlation and empirical 
coefficients fitted to the empirical data. There are, however, limitations in this approach due to the implicit 
nature in its consideration of underlying physical phenomena: (i) it is difficult to address plant- and 
scenario-specific contextual factors, and (ii) its capability of in-depth root-cause and sensitivity analyses, 
at the level of controllable design parameters, is limited. In this approach, both the sub-factors b.1 
(influences of fire-induced conditions on the human performance) and b.2 (influences of the manual 
suppression actions on the fire progression) are lumped into a single engineering correlation and implicitly 
captured through the fitting to the empirical data.  
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Another approach, currently in use in NPP Fire PRAs, is to utilize the concept of competition 
between two temporal quantities, one associated with fire progression and the other associated with manual 
suppression [10, 12, 35-39]. These timing parameters are computed by two independent models without an 
explicit treatment of their interactions. The time-to-damage of a specific damage target (e.g., cable tray) is 
computed by a fire model, assuming the full burnout condition without fire detection and suppression, while 
the time-to-manual-suppression is treated by a data-driven probability model derived from the historical 
fire event database [10, 12, 15] or by the HRA-based method [39]. For each damage target, the probability 
of fire-induced damage is then computed as the probability that the time-to-damage is less than the time-
to-manual-suppression. As the interactions between fire progression and manual suppression are not 
explicitly considered in the fire model, the results are “conservative approximations” [40]. In this approach, 
the sub-factor ‘b.2’ (influences of the manual suppression on fire progression) is addressed by using two 
temporal quantities as surrogate performance measures. On the other hand, if the data-driven probability 
model is used for the time-to-manual-suppression [10, 12, 35-38], the sub-factor ‘b.1’ (influences of fire-
induced conditions on the human performance) is implicitly lumped into the statistical parameter(s) of the 
probability model derived from historical fire event database. Meanwhile, in the HRA-based approach by 
Hostikka et al. [39], the sub-factor ‘b.1’ is only addressed in the feasibility assessment of manual 
suppression by considering the threshold values in terms of the visibility, temperature, and radiative heat 
flux, while its influences on the timings and HEPs of the fire brigade actions were not explicitly addressed.  
Recently, more explicit treatment of this factor has been introduced in non-nuclear domain through 
a modification of the design fire load based on the time to firefighter response [6, 7, 13]. Bénichou et al. 
[6] updated the HRR curve during the water suppression in the correlation-based fire model based on the 
available water supply rate, an empirical efficiency of water application, and the data-driven time to 
intervention by the fire fighters. De Sanctis et al. [13] proposed a modification of the heat release rate 
(HRR) curve in the correlation-based fire model, such that the decay phase begins earlier than the burnout 
condition because of an intervention by the firefighters. In their approach, the timings of the pivotal 
suppression tasks were treated by the data-driven probability model derived from empirical data. These two 
existing methods [6, 13] explicitly address the sub-factor ‘b.2’  (influences of the manual suppression on 
fire progression) through the modification of the HRR curve, while the sub-factor ‘b.1’ (influences of the 
fire-induced conditions on the human performance) is implicitly addressed through the empirical data 
analysis for the timings of manual suppression actions.  
271 
 
When the HRA-based method is used for modeling the human performance in manual suppression, 
the sub-factor ‘b.1’ (influences of the fire-induced conditions on the human performance) can be addressed 
by modifying the PSFs in the existing HRA quantification techniques. For instance, Garvey et al. [17] 
evaluated the level of PSFs for the THERP [18] and CBDTM [19] techniques by considering the fire-
induced influencing factors, such as high stress, adverse environment, and the complexity of the suppression 
task process.  
Kloos et al. [22-25] further advanced the approach for this element by developing an interface 
between the time-based Crew Module and the CFD-based fire model through a dynamic event tree. Their 
approach can explicitly address ‘two-way’ interactions between fire progression and manual suppression, 
i.e., addressing both sub-factors ‘b.1’ (influences of the fire-induced conditions on the human performance) 
and ‘b.2’ (influences of the manual detection and suppression actions on the fire progression). Specifically, 
to address the sub-factor ‘b.1’, the time-dependent and location-specific prediction of smoke density is 
extracted from the CFD-based fire model, and its effects on the performance of manual suppression are 
considered by adding the ‘delay time’ to the time-to-suppression based on the predicted smoke density. 
Meanwhile, the sub-factor ‘b.2’ was treated by conditioning the FDS runs on the completed manual actions 
(e.g., opening the room door) and by changing the HRR curve when the manual suppression is started. The 
details on how to change the HRR curve after manual suppression begins were not clarified in their papers 
[24, 25]. 
C.2 Comparison of the HRA-based Method in This Research with the Previous Studies 
 
In this appendix, the HRA-based fire brigade performance model for NPPs, developed in Chapter 5 og this 
thesis, is compared to the previous studies that developed the HRA-based method for manual suppression: 
 
• Garvey et al. [17] performed an HRA for manual suppression by developing a static HRA event 
tree and quantifying HEPs using the THERP [18] and the CBDTM [19]. Unlike the Garvey et al. 
method [17], this research advances the HRA-based suppression model by (i) using a CFD-based 
fire progression model, the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) [41], to define the success criteria in 
the HRA event tree; (ii) propagating the uncertainty associated with the times to complete 
individual tasks using the Monte Carlo simulation and quantifying the three timings associated with 
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manual suppression (in addition to the non-suppression probability); and (iii) explicitly addressing 
the HRR reduction during the manual suppression phase using the empirical water suppression 
model.  
 
• The recent study by the U.S. NRC [20] has explored the use of the existing HRA techniques, such 
as THERP [18], CBDTM [19], and SPAR-H [21], for modeling the human response to VEWFD 
systems in NPPs. While this research adapts the HRA procedure developed for the VEWFD context 
by the U.S. NRC [20], methodological advancements are made by: (i) using a CFD-based fire 
progression model, the FDS [41], to define the success criteria in the HRA event tree; (ii) explicitly 
quantifying the times to complete individual tasks and the three timings associated with manual 
suppression activity (vs. the timings of individual tasks are only considered in the feasibility 
analysis by the U.S. NRC method [20]); and (iii) addressing the HRR curve during manual 
suppression by using the empirical water suppression model (vs. the U.S. NRC method, where only 
the time duration of manual suppression is considered by using a data-driven non-suppression curve 
[20]). 
 
• Kloos et al. [22-25] developed the Crew Module to account for the time-dependent sequences of 
human actions associated with manual detection and suppression. Their Crew Module is connected 
to a dynamic event tree where the timings of pivotal events related to manual suppression, e.g., the 
time to fire brigade arrival and the time to setting up the fire-fighting equipment, are assessed 
considering the interactions with the fire progression modeled by a CFD-based fire model. In 
comparison with the Kloos et al. method [22-25], this research develops the static HRA event tree, 
instead of using a dynamic event tree technique, to develop the task sequence of the manual 
suppression activity without excessive modifications to the current HRA practice in the industry 
and regulatory PRA applications. Meanwhile, Kloos et al. [22-25] gave no clarification as to how 
to address the influence of manual suppression on fire progression in the CFD-based fire model. In 
contrast, the HRA-based method developed in this chapter aims to provide inputs to the explicit 
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APPENDIX D: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON THE EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR 
WATER-BASED MANUAL SUPPRESSION 
This appendix summarizes the empirical water suppression model proposed by Yu et al. [1] This 
empirical model was developed by a combination of theoretical analysis and a regression analysis for 
experimental data. Yu et al. [1] conducted the theoretical analysis using the global energy balance model 
to identify the physical parameters to correlate the water suppression experimental data. The developed 
model was then fitted to the experimental data to estimate some of the physical parameters in the model 
that were difficult to obtain in a first-principle manner. The functional form of the water suppression model, 
i.e., an exponentially-decreasing HRR curve, was derived from a theory-based physical model, as explained 
below.  
 
The global energy balance for the fuel bed is described by: 
 �
The rate of change 
















If the heat stored in the char and the fresh fuel behind the pyrolysis layer is negligible, the governing 
equation for the global energy balance is formulated as follows: 
 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
�𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 − 𝑇𝑇∞�� = 𝛽𝛽?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 − ?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − ?̇?𝑚𝑒𝑒′′𝑄𝑄𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴, (D.2) 
where 
 𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓: Volume of fuel at temperature 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 
 𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓: Fuel density 
 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓: Specific heat of fuel 
 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝: Average temperature of the layer of fuel undergoing pyrolysis 
 𝑇𝑇∞: Initial temperature of fuel 
 𝛽𝛽: Fraction of total heat release rate transferred to the fuel surface 
 ?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′: Average burning rate per unit burning surface area 
 ∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐: Heat of combustion of the fuel material 
 ?̇?𝑚𝑒𝑒′′: Average water evaporation rate per unit burning surface area 
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 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝: Heat of pyrolysis 
 𝑄𝑄𝑤𝑤: Heat of evaporation of water 
 𝐴𝐴: Total burning surface area of the fuel 
 
In this equation, 𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓 can be expressed as the product of average depth of fuel layer undergoing pyrolysis 
after the water application, denoted by δ, and 𝐴𝐴. Let 𝛼𝛼 be the ratio of the total burning fuel surface area to 
the total volume of fuel under pyrolysis; then, 𝛼𝛼~ 1 𝛿𝛿⁄ . If the thermal properties of the fuel material, 





𝛼𝛼�?̇?𝑚𝑒𝑒′′𝑄𝑄𝑤𝑤 − 𝛽𝛽?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 + ?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝�
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 − 𝑇𝑇∞�
𝐴𝐴 = 0. (D.3) 
If ?̇?𝑚𝑒𝑒′′, ?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′, 𝛼𝛼, and 𝛽𝛽 are regarded as the time-averaged value for the fire duration, Equation (D.3) can be 
analytically integrated with respect to time from the time when the water application begins, denoted by t0, 
to an arbitrary time point t: 
 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴0 exp[−𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡0)], (D.4) 
where 
 𝑘𝑘 =
𝛼𝛼�?̇?𝑚𝑒𝑒′′𝑄𝑄𝑤𝑤 − 𝛽𝛽?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 + ?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝�
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 − 𝑇𝑇∞�
, (D.5) 
and 𝐴𝐴0 denotes the area of fuel surface under pyrolysis at the time when water application begins. As the 
total HRR is the product of the heat of combustion and the total burning rate of the fuel,  
 ?̇?𝑄𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 , (D.6) 
the total HRR during the water suppression is obtained as 
 ?̇?𝑄𝑎𝑎 = ?̇?𝑄𝑎𝑎,0 exp[−𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡0)], (D.7) 
where ?̇?𝑄𝑎𝑎,0 represents the total HRR at the time when the water application begins. Under the assumption 
that the water evaporation rate per unit burning surface area (?̇?𝑚𝑒𝑒′′) is the same as the water application rate 
per unit area (?̇?𝑚𝑤𝑤′′), Equation (D.5) becomes: 












Yu et al. [1] estimated a1 and a2 for two types of fuel materials: (i) the FMRC Standard Class II Commodity, 
consisting of metal-lined cartons on a wood pallet and (ii) the FMRC Standard Plastic Commodity, 
consisting of polystyrene cups in compartmented paper cartons and a wood pallet. Among those physical 
variables that determine a1 and a2, the fuel and water material properties, including 𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓, 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓, 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝, ∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐, and 𝑄𝑄𝑤𝑤, 
can be obtained from the physical tables, such as the ones provided in the SFPE handbook [2]. Meanwhile, 
the other physical parameters that characterize the geometry, pyrolysis, and radiative heat flux of the fuel 
material (𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓, 𝛼𝛼, ?̇?𝑚𝑓𝑓′′, 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝, and 𝛽𝛽) were not directly measured in the water suppression experiment; hence, Yu 
et al. [1] estimated the material-specific coefficients a1 and a2 in Equation (D.8) by a statistical regression 
analysis where this empirical correlation was fitted to the experimental data: for the FMRC Standard Class 
II Commodity, a1 = 0.536 and a2 = 0.00416; for the FMRC Standard Plastic Commodity, a1 = 0.716 and a2 
= 0.01317.  
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APPENDIX E: I-PRA ALGORITHM FOR MODIFYING HEAT RELEASE RATE CURVE TO 
CREATE AN EXPLICIT INTERFACE BETWEEN FIRE PROGRESSION AND MANUAL 
SUPPRESSION 
In the I-PRA framework (Section 2.3.5), an interface between fire progression and manual fire 
suppression is created through modifications of the HRR curve based on three timings associated with 
detection and manual suppression: (i) time to detection, (ii) time to fire brigade response, and (iii) time 
duration of manual suppression. This appendix shows the detailed algorithm for modifying the HRR curve 
based on the performance of manual suppression.  
The baseline HRR curve under the burnout condition, recommended in regulatory document for 
Fire PRA [1-3], has three stages: fire growth, fully-developed fire, and natural decay (Figure E.1).  
 
Figure E.1 Baseline HRR curve under the burnout condition from NUREG/CR-6850 [1-3]. 
The growth stage, from fire ignition (defined as t = 0) to t1 (maximum HRR), is modeled by a t-
square curve, i.e., the HRR is proportional to the square of elapsed time since the fire ignition. In the fully-
developed stage, the HRR is assumed to be constant at the maximum HRR value. Then, the fire enters the 
natural decay stage in which the HRR is assumed to be linearly decrease from the maximum HRR to zero. 
To develop the burnout HRR curve, the timings associated with those three stages of the fire (t1, t2, and t3) 
and the maximum HRR value should be provided as inputs. In the I-PRA framework, these four input 
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parameters are treated as random variables, represented by probability distributions, to address the 
associated aleatory uncertainty. 
The influences of manual suppression on fire progression are explicitly incorporated into FDS by 
modifying the baseline HRR curve based on three key timings associated with the manual suppression, i.e., 
time to fire detection, time to fire brigade response, and time duration of fire suppression. The basic concept 
of this HRR curve modification is illustrated in Figure E.2. This method assumes that, as soon as the fire 
brigade begins applying suppressant on the fire source, the HRR starts decreasing, and the HRR curve 
during the manual suppression period can be modeled by a linear reduction.  
 
Figure E.2 Basic concept of modifying the baseline HRR curve based on three key timings associated 
with manual suppression activity. 
In Figure E.2, the three timings associated with manual suppression are defined as follows. 
 
• Time to fire detection (tdet): Duration between fire ignition and fire detection either by automatic 
fire detectors installed in the fire compartment or by manual fire detection (e.g., fire watch, or an 




• Time to fire brigade response (tfb): Duration between the fire detection and the time when the fire 
brigade begins applying suppressant on the fire.  
 
• Time duration of manual suppression (tfb→sup): Duration of the manual suppression, i.e., from the 
time when the fire brigade begins spraying the water hose on the fire to the time when the fire is 
suppressed.  
When modifying the baseline HRR curve (Figure E.2), three cases listed in Table E.1 should be 
considered in terms of the relationship among the timings of manual suppression actions and the burnout 
fire growth behavior to avoid physically infeasible HRR curves.  
Table E.1 Three cases of modifying the HRR curve in terms of relative timings of the fire brigade and 
physical fire growth. 
Cases tdet + tfb tdet + tfb + tfb→sup 
#1 [0, 𝑡𝑡3) [0, 𝑡𝑡3) 
#2 [0, 𝑡𝑡3) [𝑡𝑡3, +∞) 
#3 [𝑡𝑡3, +∞) [𝑡𝑡3, +∞) 
In Case #1, where both tdet + tfb and tdet + tfb + tfb→sup are less than the time to self-extinguishment 
under the burnout condition (denoted by t3 in Figure E.1), the HRR curve is modified exactly as shown in 
Figure E.2. In Case #3, where the timing when the manual suppression begins exceeds the time to natural 
decay, the burnout HRR curve (Figure E.1) is directly used without modification because the manual 
suppression does not start before the fire naturally burns out. In Case #2, as shown in Figure E.3, the 
modification to the baseline HRR curve is made in a way similar to Figure E.2; however, when the HRR 
under manual suppression exceeds the baseline HRR curve, the baseline HRR curve is used because it does 
not make a physical sense that manual suppression increases the HRR value compared to the original 




Figure E.3 HRR modification in Case #2: 𝑡𝑡det + 𝑡𝑡fb ∈ [0, 𝑡𝑡3) and 𝑡𝑡det + 𝑡𝑡fb + 𝑡𝑡fb→sup ∈ [𝑡𝑡3, +∞). 
Note that the empirical water suppression models in literatures [4-7], derived from a combination 
of a theoretical analysis and a statistical fitting to experimental data, suggested a downward-convex 
exponential reduction of HRR during water suppression (i.e., between tdet + tfb and tdet + tfb + tfb→sup). 
Compared to this exponential HRR reduction, the linear HRR reduction, assumed in the I-PRA 
methodological framework, is a conservative assumption. This point can be demonstrated by computing 
the total heat release during the manual suppression phase. For the linear HRR reduction assumption, the 
time-profile of HRR is represented by 
 ?̇?𝑄linear(𝑡𝑡) = �
  ?̇?𝑄max �1 −
𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡det − 𝑡𝑡fb
𝑡𝑡fb→sup
�  ;  𝑡𝑡det + 𝑡𝑡fb < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑡det + 𝑡𝑡supp
  0 ; 𝑡𝑡 > 𝑡𝑡det + 𝑡𝑡supp
, (E.1) 
Thus, the total heat release between tdet + tfb and tdet + tsupp is computed as 







In contrast, when the exponential HRR reduction model is used, the time-profile of HRR is represented by 
 ?̇?𝑄exp(𝑡𝑡) = ?̇?𝑄max exp[−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡det − 𝑡𝑡fb)] ; 𝑡𝑡 > 𝑡𝑡det + 𝑡𝑡fb, (E.3) 
where ρ [1/seconds] represents the constant HRR reduction rate under manual suppression and is typically 
estimated based on experimental data [4-9]. Here, to consider the same fire suppression duration as the 
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linear reduction model, ρ is computed by assuming that the fire is regarded as being suppressed when the 
HRR value decreases to lower than 1% of ?̇?𝑄max, which is a sufficiently small value to ensure that there is 
no further fire-induced equipment damage. Then, ρ is calculated as 
 𝜌𝜌 = − ln(0.01) 𝑡𝑡fb→sup⁄ . (E.4) 
For the exponential reduction model, therefore, the total heat release during the manual suppression phase 
is computed by 






� ?̇?𝑄max𝑡𝑡fb→sup ≅ 0.22?̇?𝑄max𝑡𝑡fb→sup. (E.5) 
Comparing Equations (E.2) and (E.5), the total heat release during the manual suppression phase based on 
the exponential reduction HRR curve is smaller than that based on the linear reduction assumption; hence, 
given the same manual suppression duration, the linear HRR reduction model is more conservative than the 
exponential HRR reduction model. Despite its potential conservatism due to the linear HRR reduction 
assumption, note that the explicit interface developed in the I-PRA framework is more realistic than the 
NUREG/CR-6850 methodology as it explicitly considers the interactions between fire progression and 
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APPENDIX F: TREATMENT OF ZERO-FAILURE DATA IN THE INTEGRATED PRA 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
F.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 2, in the I-PRA methodological framework, the equipment failure 
probability is estimated by performing the sampling-based uncertainty propagation, using the Monte Carlo 
method, for the Simulation Module. The case studies in this research have demonstrated that the Monte 
Carlo-based estimation of the failure probability may have a challenge in dealing with a relatively small 
probability, especially when the Simulation Module is computationally demanding; hence, the feasible 
number of samples in the Monte Carlo method is constrained by the available computational resources. For 
instance, in the FDS simulation for the NUREG-1934 Scenario D (Section 2.4.5), all three replications of 
the Monte Carlo simulation using LHS (of total sample size 150) have produced no fire-induced damage to 
cable tray C for both success and failure of automatic detectors. Based on these Monte Carlo outputs, the 
point estimate of the fire-induced damage probability for this cable tray is obtained as 
 Pr�(CBDC|FR, AD, AS����) = Pr�(CBDC|FR, AD����, AS����) =
0
150
= 0 (F.1) 
This point estimator is, however, questionable because the sample size could have been too small and some 
failure could have been observed if the sample size was larger; therefore, it is impossible to exclude the 
probability of the fire-induced damage to cable tray C only based on this point estimate.  
The most straightforward solution is to increase the sample size and/or the number of replications 
in the Monte Carlo simulation so that at least one failure is observed. Nevertheless, this solution is not 
always practical when the Simulation Module is computationally demanding, as is the case in the I-PRA 
framework for Fire PRA developed in Chapter 2. This appendix demonstrates a preliminary research on 
how to overcome this limitation within the constraint of the available computation resource. Two 
approaches are suggested, as explained in the following sections: (i) advancement in the statistical inference 
method for probability estimation (Section F.2) and (ii) advancement in the uncertainty propagation method 
(Section F.3). The first approach does not require additional runs of the Simulation Module, while the 
second approach requires those using an advanced sampling strategy (but much less efforts than the case 
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where the sample size is simply increased). In Section F.4, a preliminary recommendation on how to handle 
the zero-failure data in the I-PRA framework is provided.  
F.2 Advancement in Statistical Inference Method for Probability Estimation 
Provided that no additional run of the Simulation Module is performed, a practical solution is to 
utilize the statistical approach for computing a more realistic estimator of the failure probability based on 
the data with zero failure. In reliability engineering, one of the common problems is to estimate the failure 
probability of a component on demand, denoted by p, given an empirical data showing that x failures are 
observed in n independent trials. The underlying process of such a failure data is modeled by a Binomial 
distribution: 
 Pr(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) = �
𝑛𝑛
𝑥𝑥
� 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑙𝑙−𝑥𝑥 , (F.2) 
Based on the empirical data, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of p is given by 
 ?̂?𝑝MLE = 𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛⁄ . (F.3) 
From a statistical point of view, the procedure of estimating the equipment failure probability based on the 
indicator function, shown in Section 2.3.6, is equivalent to the MLE of p in Equation (F.3). In reliability 
engineering, when the component being analyzed is highly reliable and it is too expensive to repeat tests 
for many times, the failure probability, p, may need to be estimated based on the empirical data with no 
failure, i.e., x = 0 in Equation (F.3). In such a case, Equation (F.3) gives the MLE of p equal to zero; however, 
this estimator is unrealistic as zero failure probability is essentially unacceptable due to the existence of 
uncertainty; therefore, a more realistic method to estimate the probability of failure based on the zero-failure 
data has been widely studied. To avoid the issue of computing zero failure probability, various point and 
interval estimators were introduced, including (i) bounding analysis using the upper bound of the 
maximum-likelihood interval estimates, (ii) the “best guesses” with certain assumptions, and (iii) Bayesian 
inference. 
F.2.1 Bounding Methods Using Maximum-Likelihood Interval Estimates 
As mentioned above, the point estimator based on MLE yields a result of zero failure probability; 
however, the interval estimation based on MLE can still produce the bounding estimate of the probability 
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value. In literature, there are three types of the bounding methods for estimating the failure probability using 
the maximum likelihood interval estimates (Table F.1): Chi-square confidence limit [1], Z function 
hypothesis test [1, 2], and F function confidence limit [3]. In Table F.1, for the chi-square confidence limit 
method, 𝜒𝜒𝛼𝛼;22  stands for the value of chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom at the confidence 
level α. For the Z function hypothesis test method, 𝑧𝑧𝛼𝛼 represents the standard normal deviate at the level of 
confidence (1 – α). For the F function confidence limit method, FU represents the F distribution with the 
degrees of freedom ν1 = 2(𝑥𝑥 + 1) and ν2 = 2(𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥). In the last column of Table F.1, each method is 
applied for the estimation of fire-induced damage probability to cable tray C in the NUREG-1934 Scenario 
D (Chapter 2) where zero failure has been observed in 150 Monte Carlo scenarios (n = 150, x = 0). Note 
that the distributional assumptions used in these methods require the IID samples; hence, theoretically, 
these methods are not applicable for the random samples generated by LHS. Nevertheless, when these 
methods are applied for the LHS-based samples, they still generate a bounding estimate (i.e., a conservative 
upper bound) of the failure probability because, as theoretically proved by Stein [4], standard error for the 
probability estimate by LHS is always smaller than or equal to that by the IID simple random samples; 
hence, the upper bound of probability estimator computed by assuming the IID simple random samples 
(using the methods in Table F.1) always bounds the true upper bound of the CIs for the LHS-based 
probability estimator.  
Table F.1 Bounding Method for Zero-Failure Data Using Maximum Likelihood Interval Estimate. 
Method Equation Unknown of Interest Ref. ?̂?𝑝CBDC 
Chi-Square 
Confidence Limit 
𝜆𝜆 = 𝜒𝜒𝛼𝛼;22 /(2𝑛𝑛) Failure Frequency [1] 0.020 
Z Function 
Hypothesis Test 
𝜆𝜆 = 𝑧𝑧𝛼𝛼2/(𝑛𝑛 + 𝑧𝑧𝛼𝛼2) Failure Probability and 
Failure Frequency 
[1, 2] 0.018 
F Function 
Confidence Limit 𝜆𝜆upper =
1
1 + � 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈
�




F.2.2 “Best Guess” Methods 
This category of methods consists of the point estimators based on “best guesses” (Table F.2) rather 
than deriving with a statistical analysis approach [1, 2]. These “guesses” are derived from a subjective (but 
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theoretically reasonable to some extent) assumption such as “a failure would have occurred if one more test 
was performed,” or “no failure was observed, but it is safe to assume one failure happened.” Although these 
estimators are not completely justifiable from the statistical perspective, they are logical in the sense that 
the estimated probability becomes significantly closer to zero as the number of test, 𝑛𝑛, increases and the 
calculated value falls between 𝑝𝑝 = 0 (i.e., point estimator by MLE) and 𝑝𝑝 = 1/𝑛𝑛 (i.e., assumption of single 
failure). The author, however, does not recommend these “best guess” methods because (i) these estimates 
are based on heuristics or “rule of thumb” and do not have a solid theoretical foundation and (ii) they cannot 
be applied to the data including any failure event; hence, the data analysis method is inconsistent before 
and after a failure event is observed.  
Table F.2 “Best Guess” Methods for Zero-Failure Data. 
Method Equation Unknown of Interest Ref. ?̂?𝑝CBDC 
Assumption of 
Single Failure 𝜆𝜆 = 1/𝑛𝑛 
Failure Probability and 
Failure Frequency [1, 5] 0.007 
“Correction for 
Continuity” 𝜆𝜆 = 1/2𝑛𝑛 Failure Frequency [1] 0.003 
One-Third 
Estimator 𝜆𝜆 = 1/3𝑛𝑛 
Failure Probability and 
Failure Frequency [1] 0.002 
One-Fourth 
Estimator 𝜆𝜆 = 1/4𝑛𝑛 Failure Frequency [1] 0.002 
Binomial Failure 
Limit 𝜆𝜆 = 1 − (0.9)
1
𝑙𝑙 Failure Frequency [1] 0.001 
Bailey’s Estimator 𝜆𝜆 = 1 − (0.5)
1
𝑙𝑙 
Failure Probability and 
Failure Frequency [1, 2] 0.005 
Virtual Observation 𝜆𝜆 =
1
𝑛𝑛 + 1
 Failure Probability [5] 0.007 
 
F.2.3 Bayesian Inference 
Another common approach is the Bayesian approach [1, 2, 5, 6]. The Bayes’ theorem to update a 







where π0(p) represents the prior distribution for the failure probability p, while π (p | E) represents the 
posterior distribution of p obtained by updating the prior knowledge with evidence E. L(E | p) represents 
the likelihood function for evidence E, which is the same concept as the likelihood function in the classical 
statistics. In the Bayesian analysis, the binomial likelihood function requires that the random samples used 
for probability estimation are exchangeable, i.e., the joint probability of the permutated sequence is equal 
to that of the original sequence. Note that the IID property is not a necessary condition; hence, the Bayesian 
approach using the binomial likelihood function is also applicable for the random samples generated by 
LHS. For estimating the failure probability p, with zero-failure data, it is suggested that a Beta distribution 




𝑝𝑝𝛼𝛼−1(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝛽𝛽−1, (F.5) 
where 𝐵𝐵(𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽) represents a Beta function with two parameters α and β. Beta prior is a convenient choice 
because (i) Beta distribution is only defined between 0 and 1, which is consistent with the theoretical range 
of a probability, and (ii) it is conjugate with the binomial likelihood function; hence, the Bayes’ equation 
in Equation (F.4) can be analytically computed. For the application for the zero-failure data, it is suggested 
that a non-informative prior distribution, i.e., a Beta distribution with α = 1 and β = 1, be used as a prior 
distribution [2, 5, 6]. The evidence for the zero-failure data is given as “no failure is observed in n 
independent trials” and represented by binomial likelihood function, i.e., Equation (F.2) with x = 0. Using 
the conjugate relation, 𝜋𝜋(𝑝𝑝|E) is also a Beta distribution with updated parameters 𝛼𝛼′ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑥𝑥 and 𝛽𝛽′ =
𝛽𝛽 + 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥. The expected value of the posterior distribution is recommended as the Bayesian point estimate 




 . (F.6) 
Using Equation (F.6), the Bayesian point estimate of the equipment failure probability, given the evidence 
that no failure has been observed in 150 runs of the Simulation Module, is calculated as 1/(150+2) = 0.007. 
The Bayesian analysis, described above, is the best approach under the condition that no additional FDS 
simulation is performed and the failure probability needs to be estimated based on the current set of 
simulation outputs because (i) it can generate a full probability distribution representing the uncertainty of 
the probability estimate (rather than only generating the intervals) that can be directly used as an input for 
uncertainty propagation in classical PRA and (ii) the updating mechanism in Equation (F.4) provides a 
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coherent framework to account for a newly-available evidence and to incorporate other sources of evidence 
(e.g., expert opinion).  
F.3 Advancement in Uncertainty Propagation: An Exploratory Study on the Non-Uniform Latin-
Hypercube Sampling Method 
As the second approach for dealing with zero-failure data in the I-PRA methodological framework, 
this section explores the application of an advanced sampling strategy in the uncertainty propagation. This 
approach aims to improve the sampling efficiency so that the failure region in the input parameter space 
can be more efficiently covered by the random samples.  
LHS generates uniformly distributed samples in the quantile space and is not efficient enough when 
the probability of failure is relatively small (< 0.01) [7]. The low efficiency of the sampling design is caused 
by uniform sampling in the quantile space, regardless of the importance of each sampling point in terms of 
its contribution to the failure event. The efficiency of the sampling strategy can be enhanced by intentionally 
biasing the sampling procedure toward important regions in the sample space, i.e., around the failure region, 
as done by Variance Reduction Techniques (VRTs). There are several advanced sampling strategies that 
can be applicable for the I-PRA methodological framework: e.g., stratified sampling [8], non-uniform LHS 
[9], importance sampling [10], and subset simulation [11].  
To reduce the total computational cost in uncertainty propagation, the use of surrogate model (or 
metamodel) is another approach that has been widely studied [12]. In this approach, a surrogate model, 
such as a Gaussian Process model [13, 14], is constructed by the experimental design using the original 
model and is then utilized as an approximation of the original model in the subsequent uncertainty 
propagation. Since the surrogate model has a much simpler structure than the original model, the sampling-
based uncertainty propagation can be performed with much lower computational cost. However, 
development of a surrogate model for the I-PRA methodological framework is not straightforward as 
multiple KPMs should be extracted from a single model to consider the dependency among multiple failure 
events. In general, when there are multiple model outputs, a surrogate model should be developed for each 
output; hence, the total computational efficiency may be relatively low [15]. In this research, therefore, the 
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advanced sampling design is mainly considered as a strategy to increase the efficiency of uncertainty 
propagation using the original model, rather than developing a surrogate model. 
As one of the promising advanced sampling methods, this study explores the applicability of the 
non-uniform LHS (NU-LHS) method. The NU-LHS is selected because it has been considered for the I-
PRA methodological framework developed for Generic Safety Issue 191 [16] and has shown its high 
efficiency in the estimation of a small failure probability. Section F.3.1 explains the computational 
procedure for NU-LHS. To demonstrate the potential benefits of the NU-LHS method in terms of the 
estimation of a small failure probability, the probability estimation using NU-LHS is implemented for two 
case studies: (i) toy example using a bivariate model (Section F.3.2) and (ii) the Fire Dynamics Simulator 
(FDS) model developed for NUREG-1934 Scenario D (Section F.3.3). 
F.3.1 Computational Procedure for Non-Uniform LHS 
For demonstration of the computational procedure, consider the following situation: 
 
• The I-PRA framework has been developed for a specific area of safety concern, and in the Plant-
Specific PRA Module, the failure probability of equipment A needs to be estimated based on the 
key performance measure (KPM) outputs from the Simulation Module. 
• One dominant physical failure mode and the associated physical failure mechanism have been 
identified for the failure of equipment A.  
• For the identified physical failure mechanism, the Simulation Module is developed and represented 
by a functional form: 
 𝑌𝑌A = 𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,⋯ ,𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛), (F.7) 
where 𝑔𝑔(∙): the Simulation Module developed for equipment A, YA: the KPM for equipment A 
failure, and nX: the number of input parameters. The input parameters 𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,⋯ ,𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 are treated as 
random variables to account for the influences of underlying “implicit causal factors” through their 
aleatory uncertainty. The aleatory uncertainty of input parameters is characterized by a probability 
distribution, of which cumulative distribution function is given as: 
 𝐗𝐗 ≜ 〈𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,⋯ ,𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛〉 ~ 𝐹𝐹𝐗𝐗(𝐗𝐗). (F.8) 
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In this section, it is assumed that input parameters are independent; hence, the joint probability 
distribution on the right-hand side of Equation (F.8) can be expressed by the product of marginal 
probability distributions for individual input parameters:  
 𝐹𝐹𝐗𝐗(𝐗𝐗) = 𝐹𝐹1(𝑋𝑋1)𝐹𝐹2(𝑋𝑋2)⋯𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛), (F.9) 
where Fj represents the marginal cumulative distribution function for input parameter Xj. If the 
input parameters are not independent, an adequate technique should be used in the process of 
generating random samples to capture their correlation, e.g., Ref. [17, 18].  
 
• Equipment A fails if and only if the predicted KPM exceeds the predefined threshold value 𝑌𝑌crt. In 
other words, the failure probability of equipment A is equivalent to the probability that the predicted 
KPM exceeds the predefined damage threshold:  
 Pr(A) = Pr(𝑌𝑌A > 𝑌𝑌crt). (F.10) 
In this problem setting, the failure probability estimation can be computed using the NU-LHS method by 
the following computational algorithm: 
 
Step 1: Create non-uniform intervals in the quantile space 
 
The probability weight of each interval (or partition) in the quantile space is determined by the geometric 





� × 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1;    𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛;  𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋, (F.11) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 represents the constant ratio of the geometric series for input parameter 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗. The first term on the 
right-hand side is a normalization constant so that the sum of probability weights for each input parameter 
becomes unity. The direction of sample bias for each input parameter is controlled by 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 such that (i) 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 < 1 
biases the samples toward the higher quantile, (ii) 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 > 1  biases the samples toward the lower quantile, and 
(iii) 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 = 1  generates uniform samples in the quantile space (equivalent to the uniform LHS method). Based 
on the weights in Equation (F.11), the quantile space of each input parameter is divided into non-
overlapping intervals of size nS such that the ith interval for input parameter Xj spans �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝐿𝐿
(𝑖𝑖),𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑈𝑈
(𝑖𝑖) � where the 





  0            for 𝑖𝑖 = 1
  𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑈𝑈




(𝑖𝑖); 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋}. (F.13) 
 
Step 2: Draw one random sample from each interval 
 
In next step, for each input parameter, one random sample is drawn from each interval in the quantile space. 
For the ith interval of input parameter Xj, a random sample, denoted by 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,rnd
(𝑖𝑖) , is generated from a uniform 
distribution �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝐿𝐿
(𝑖𝑖),𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑈𝑈
(𝑖𝑖) �. By generating a random sample from every interval for all input parameters, an 






















The matrix of probability weight associated with the random samples of quantiles in Equation (F.14) is also 
developed where 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗
(𝑖𝑖); 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋} represent the probability weight of each quantile 
partition from which the random sample 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,rnd






















For the ease of description, let 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗
(𝑖𝑖) be a positive integer from 1 to nS which indicates the partition from 
which the random sample 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,rnd
(𝑖𝑖)  is drawn. For instance, for the sample of input parameter Xj drawn from 
the first quantile interval (i.e., the lowest interval), 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗
(1) = 1. In this step, because the quantile sample array 
in Equation (F.14) has not been randomly permutated yet, the location indicator is given as 
 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗,rnd
(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑖𝑖;    𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛;  𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋. (F.16) 
 




As of now, the columns of the quantile sample array in Equation (F.14) has perfect correlations in terms of 
the location of partitions in the quantile space from which each sample is drawn. For instance, the first row 
of Equation (F.14) represents the combination of input parameters selected from the first partition (i.e., 
lowest partition) in the quantile space for each input parameters. Like the uniform LHS, each column of the 
quantile sample array in Equation (F.14) is randomly and independently permutated without replacement 
(random matching) so that random pairs of input parameters are generated. By an independent random 
permutation of each column, the NU-LHS in the quantile space is generated and represented by an array: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,NULHS
�𝜎𝜎(𝑖𝑖)� = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,rnd
(𝑖𝑖) , (F.17) 
where the superscript 𝜎𝜎(𝑖𝑖)  represents the random permutation of the indices for the original random 
samples in Equation (F.14). For simplicity of notation, in the following, 𝑖𝑖′ ≜ 𝜎𝜎(𝑖𝑖) is used. The array of the 
probability weight of each quantile sample in Equation (F.15) is ordered linked to the NU-LHS quantile 
array in Equation (F.17). The order of the probability weight is not random and should be consistent with 
the random permutation of the quantile sample array: 
 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,rnd
(𝑖𝑖) . (F.18) 
The location indicator array in Equation (F.16) is also ordered consistently with the random permutation of 
the quantile sample array shown in Equation (F.17): 
 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� = 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗,rnd
(𝑖𝑖) . (F.19) 
 
Step 4: Transform the quantile samples to the sample space 
 
In this step, the random samples in the quantile space generated by NU-LHS, given in Equation (F.17), are 
transformed to the sample space based on the probability distributions for input parameters. Assume that 
input parameters are independent, and the joint cumulative distribution function is given by Equation (F.9). 
Each element in Equation (F.17) is transformed to the sample space using the inverse transform method: 
 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� = 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗−1 �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� � ;    𝑖𝑖′ ∈ {1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛};  𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋}. (F.20) 
 




The coordinate of the 𝑖𝑖′th set of randomly sampled input parameters, denoted by 𝛤𝛤�𝑖𝑖′�, can be represented 
as an intersection of the intervals in all dimensions: 
 𝛤𝛤�𝑖𝑖′� = 𝐼𝐼1 �𝑘𝑘1,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� � ∙ 𝐼𝐼2 �𝑘𝑘2,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� � ∙ ⋯ ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 �𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� �, (F.21) 
where Ij (k) represents the interval in the quantile space for input parameter Xj corresponding to the location 
k. As the input parameters are assumed to be independent, the probability weight associated with each 
vector of randomly-sampled input parameters is computed by 
 𝑤𝑤𝐗𝐗
�𝑖𝑖′� ≜ Pr�𝛤𝛤�𝑖𝑖′�� = � 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′�𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
; 𝑖𝑖′ ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}. (F.22) 
 
Step 6: Run the Simulation Module to Generate Random Samples of KPM  
 
Using the random samples of input parameters generated in Equation (F.20), the Simulation Module, 
represented by a functional form in Equation (F.7), is repeatedly run to generate random samples of the 
KPM: 
 𝑌𝑌A
�𝑖𝑖′� = 𝑔𝑔 �𝑥𝑥1,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� , 𝑥𝑥2,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� ,⋯ , 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� � ; 𝑖𝑖′ ∈ {1, 2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}. (F.23) 
 
Step 7: Estimation of Failure Probability  
 
Based on the random samples of the KPM generated in Equation (F.23), the point estimate of the failure 
probability for equipment A is computed as: 





 , (F.24) 
where the indicator function based on the random samples by NU-LHS is defined as: 
 𝐼𝐼A,NULHS
�𝑖𝑖′� = � 1, if 𝑌𝑌A
�𝑖𝑖′� > 𝑌𝑌crt
 0, otherwise
, 𝑖𝑖′ ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}. (F.25) 
The CIs for this point estimator can be constructed by the replicated Monte Carlo method [8, 19-21]. 
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F.3.2 Test Application for Toy Example: A Bivariate Model 
In this section, a case study using a bivariate toy model is shown to (i) investigate the behavior of 
the failure probability estimates by the NU-LHS method in comparison with that by the other common 
sampling methods and (ii) demonstrate the potential benefits of the NU-LHS method over the other 
sampling methods when the failure probability to be estimates is relatively small. This case study utilizes a 
hypothetical bivariate model, generating a key performance measure Y as a function of two input parameters 
X1 and X2: 
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋2, (F.26) 
where the uncertainty associated with X1 and X2 are represented by lognormal distributions with different 
parameters: 
 𝑋𝑋1~Lognormal(𝑥𝑥50 = 1,𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹 = 10), (F.27) 
 𝑋𝑋2~Lognormal(𝑥𝑥50 = 2,𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹 = 10), (F.28) 
where x50 and EF are median and error factor of the lognormal distribution, respectively.  
Characteristics of the Bivariate Model 
The characteristics of the bivariate mathematical model in Equation (F.26) is checked by Monte 
Carlo simulation using the uniform LHS method. In this section, to ensure that the statistical estimations 
by Monte Carlo method is reliable, the sample size is set to an arbitrarily large number, nS = 1,000,000. 
Figure F.1 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the model output Y. As expected, 
as the lognormal distributions for the input parameters range multiple orders of magnitude, the model output 
Y is also distributed in several orders of magnitude.  
Table F.3 shows the failure probabilities estimated by the Monte Carlo method using the uniform 
LHS of size 1,000,000. In this study, five different levels of damage threshold values (Ydmg = 4, 16, 64, 256, 
and 1024) are considered to investigate the effects of the magnitude of the failure probability on the 
convergence of the failure probability estimator based on different sampling methods. In the following 




Figure F.1 Empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the model output Y based on the uniform 
LHS of size 1,000,000. 
Table F.3 Probability of failure for multiple levels of damage thresholds, computed by Monte Carlo 
method using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) with 1,000,000 random samples. 







This case study compares the failure probability estimated by four sampling methods: SRS, uniform 
LHS, NU-LHS, and quasi-random samples (QRS). The NU-LHS is implemented using the computational 
procedure explained in Section F.3.1. The probability weight of each interval, shown in Equation (F.15), is 








which is selected to bias the random samples toward the higher quantiles of each input parameter. This 
direction of biasing random samples is selected considering that the function for the KPM inn Equation 
(F.26) is a monotonically increasing function of both input parameters.  
QRS is generated by the scrambled Sobol' sequence [22]. This study utilizes the built-in function 
of Matlab, called “sobolset”, to generate the Sobol' sequence, while uses the built-in function “scramble” 
to perform randomization of the Sobol' sequence using a random linear scramble.  
Measure of Convergence 
To quantify the convergence (or statistical error) of the probability estimation generated by a 
sampling-based uncertainty propagation, this case study computes the standard error of mean (SEM) by the 
replicated Monte Carlo method [20, 21]. By replicating each sampling method for nR = 20 times, the IID 








; 𝑟𝑟 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅}, (F.30) 
where nS represents the sample size in each replication of Monte Carlo simulation and is varied to explore 
the convergence behavior of each sampling method. Based on these random samples in Equation (F.30), 































To compare these four sampling methods in terms of the convergence rate, two graphs are generated based 
on the replicated Monte Carlo outputs: (i) the sample size vs. the point estimate in Equation (F.31) and (ii) 
the sample size vs. the standard error in Equation (F.33). The first plot illustrates the stability of the 
estimated failure probability against the increasing sample size, while the second plot illustrates the degree 
of statistical uncertainty associated with the point estimate of the failure probability. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure F.2 through Figure F.6 show the plot of the point estimate and the standard error for the 
failure probability obtained by the replicated Monte Carlo simulation using four sampling methods. Each 
figure shows the plots for different level of damage threshold and the order of magnitude of the failure 
probability to be estimated. The reference solution for the failure probability, indicated in each graph, is 
obtained from Table F.3.  
 
Figure F.2 Comparison of four sampling methods in terms of stability and convergence of the failure 




Figure F.3 Comparison of four sampling methods in terms of stability and convergence of the failure 
probability estimate as a function of sample size (Ydmg = 16, p = 0.1469). 
 
Figure F.4 Comparison of four sampling methods in terms of stability and convergence of the failure 





Figure F.5 Comparison of four sampling methods in terms of stability and convergence of the failure 
probability estimate as a function of sample size (Ydmg = 256, p = 7.13E-3). 
 
Figure F.6 Comparison of four sampling methods in terms of stability and convergence of the failure 
probability estimate as a function of sample size (Ydmg = 1,024, p = 7.99E-4). 
For a relatively large failure probability (i.e., Ydmg = 4 and 16, corresponding to p = 0.3634 and 
0.1469), the point estimate computed by the NU-LHS method shows a larger fluctuation for a smaller 
sample size than the other sampling methods. Several test calculations by the author have indicated that the 
performance of the NU-LHS method in terms of the stability of the point estimate can be strongly influenced 
by how the sample space is partitioned into non-equiprobable intervals. In other words, with the NU-LHS 
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method, the analyst should be very careful about the generation of the intervals to avoid introducing a 
systematic bias in the probability estimation. The plots of the standard error in Figure F.2 and Figure F.3 
indicate that, when the failure probability to be estimated is relatively large, the uniform LHS and QRS 
outperforms SRS in terms of standard error of the probability estimator.  
As the failure probability to be estimated is smaller, the advantage of the NU-LHS method becomes 
clearer. For instance, in Figure F.5 and Figure F.6 (i.e., Ydmg = 256 and 1024, corresponding to p = 7.13E-
3 and 7.99E-4), the NU-LHS outperforms the other three sampling methods in terms of both the stability 
of the point estimate and standard error of the probability estimator. Another important observation from 
these pplots is that, when the probability to be estimated is relatively small, the benefit of the uniform LHS 
and QRS, as compared to SRS, may disappear. This observation provides an additional confirmation that 
future research needs to develop theoretical and methodological foundation of the advanced sampling 
method for the I-PRA methodological framework to handle an estimation of a relatively small failure 
probability.  
F.3.3 Test Application for the Fire Dynamics Simulator 
In this section, the NU-LHS method is applied for the FDS model developed for the reduced-order 
NUREG-1934 Scenario D [23]. The original FDS input file for the NUREG-1934 Scenario D has been 
modified as follows: (i) partial geometry (i.e., only the area having a lower ceiling) is considered and (ii) 
grid cell size in y-direction (originally 0.10 m) is reduced to 0.19 m. In this study, the FDS simulations are 
running for the scenario where the automatic detectors successfully detect the fire within one minute after 
the fire ignition. The direction of biasing for each input parameter (listed in the last column of Table F.4) 
is determined so that the fire-induced damage to the cable trays and the electrical cabinet inside the fire 
compartment becomes more likely based on (i) the analyst’s physical understanding and (ii) the results of 




Table F.4 List of random input parameters and direction of biasing in NU-LHS. 
 Input parameters Probability Distribution Biasing Direction 
Heat Release Rate (HRR) of the fire source 
X1 Maximum HRR [kW] Gamma (α = 0.7, β = 216)  High quantile 
X2 Time to maximum HRR [mins]  Uniform (4, 18) Low quantile 
X3 Time duration of max HRR [mins] Triangular (0, 0, 20) High quantile 
X4 Time to decay [mins] Uniform (10, 30) High quantile 
Concrete material properties 
X5 Thermal conductivity [W/(m K)] Uniform (1.33, 1.95)  Low quantile 
X6 Specific heat [kJ/(kg K)] Uniform (0.50, 1.13)  High quantile 
X7 Density [kg/m3] Uniform (2000, 2400)  Low quantile 
Cable material properties 
X8 Thermal conductivity [W/(m K)] Uniform (0.01, 0.60)  High quantile 
X9 Jacket thickness [m] Uniform (0.0010, 0.0025)  Low quantile 
Manual fire suppression 
X10 Time to manual fire suppression [mins] Exponential (λ = 0.098) High quantile 
Input parameters associated with the HRR curve: Based on the physical understanding, the 
conservative direction is to maximize the total heat release by the fire (i.e., integral of HRR with respect to 
time); hence, all input parameters associated with the HRR curve (i.e., X1: maximum HRR, X2: time to 
maximum HRR, X3: time duration of maximum HRR, and X4: time to decay) should be biased towards the 
higher quantile. Meanwhile, one observation from the Morris SA results is that the time to maximum HRR 
(X2) has a strong negative correlation with the key performance measures (i.e., maximum temperature and 
heat flux at the damage targets). This can be explained by the effects of manual fire suppression; the longer 
the time to maximum HRR is, the more likely the manual fire suppression begins before the fire reaches its 
maximum HRR. Considering this observation, the time to maximum HRR is biased in the direction of the 
lower quantile.  
Input parameters associated with concrete material properties: The direction of sample bias for 
the concrete material properties is determined mainly based on the results of Morris SA. In terms of the 
maximum temperature at damage targets, the concrete specific heat (X6) does not show a clear correlation, 
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while the concrete thermal conductivity (X5) and density (X7) indicate weak negative correlations. On the 
other hand, in terms of the maximum heat flux at damage targets, thermal conductivity (X5) and specific 
heat (X6) show non-linear relationships with the model output, while the concrete density (X7) shows a 
negative correlation with the heat flux at Cable Trays A and B. The negative correlation between the 
concrete density and the target temperature and heat flux could possibly be explained as follows. By 
increasing the concrete density, thermal inertia of the concrete wall increases, meaning that a change of 
temperature in the wall would take generally longer times; hence, the radiation contribution of the wall to 
the cable tray A decreases due to generally lower temperatures. Based on these physical insights, thermal 
conductivity (X5) and density (X7) are biased towards the lower quantile, while specific heat (X6) is biased 
towards the higher quantile. 
Input parameters associated with electrical cable material: Based on the physical understanding, 
because the energy is transferred in the cable tray by heat conduction, higher thermal conductivity and 
smaller jacket thickness will generate higher temperature inside the cable jacket. This point is also 
supported by the Morris SA results. In contrast, in terms of the maximum heat flux at damage targets, the 
Morris SA results show that the cable thermal conductivity (X8) has a strong negative correlation for cable 
tray A, but it does not show a clear tendency for the other targets. The cable jacket thickness (X9) shows no 
tendency for the maximum heat flux. Considering these insights, the cable jacket thickness (X9) is biased 
towards the lower quantile. Meanwhile, the Morris SA does not provide clearly a direction of conservative 
bias for the cable thermal conductivity (X8), since it shows an opposite tendency for maximum temperature 
and heat flux at damage targets. In this study, the cable thermal conductivity (X8) is biased towards the 
higher quantile. 
Input parameter associated with manual fire suppression: The earlier the manual fire suppression 
starts, the faster the fire becomes under control and the less adverse effects the fire imposes on the damage 
targets. This physical understanding is also confirmed by the results of Morris SA, which indicate that time 
to manual fire suppression (X10) has positive correlations with target temperature, while it does not show a 
clear correlation with target heat flux. Therefore, the time to manual suppression (X10) is biased towards 
the higher quantile.  
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Figure F.7 and Figure F.8 show the histograms of the random samples in the quantile space and in 
the input parameter space, respectively, generated by NU-LHS. In Figure F.8, the marginal probability 
density function for each input parameter (listed in Table F.4) is also plotted by an orange line for 
comparison. These two plots confirm that the random samples are adequately generated by considering the 
direction of the sample bias specified in Table F.4. 
 




Figure F.8 Histograms of random samples in the input parameter space generated by NU-LHS. 
Table F.5 compares the point estimate and 90% CIs of the fire-induced damage probability for each 
target computed with uniform LHS and NU-LHS. These statistics are estimated by the replicated Monte 
Carlo method [8, 19-21] with three replications (nR = 3). These results show that the NU-LHS produces 
non-zero failure probability estimates for all targets. This indicates that NU-LHS may benefit the estimation 
of a relatively small failure probability in the I-PRA methodological framework by producing a non-zero 
failure data. Nevertheless, NU-LHS produces less accurate results than those of uniform LHS method for 
the targets that have relatively high failure probabilities (i.e., cable trays A and B). As stated in Section 
F.3.2, the stability and accuracy of the NU-LHS method can be strongly affected by how the non-uniform 
intervals are created in the quantile space. Future research needs to develop a comprehensive methodology 
for implementing the advanced sampling method in the I-PRA methodological framework, including the 
criteria for choosing an adequate sampling method and the method for generating the sampling rules (e.g., 




Table F.5 Point estimate and 90% CIs of the fire-induced damage probability for each target based on 
Uniform and Non-Uniform LHS methods. 
Damage Target Uniform LHS Non-Uniform LHS 
Cable tray A 9.1E-01; (8.9E-01, 9.2E-01) 9.4E-01; (8.5E-01, 1.0E+00) 
Cable tray B 2.0E-02; (6.7E-03, 3.3E-02) 5.5E-02; (1.5E-02, 7.5E-02) 
Electrical cabinet No Damage 2.1E-04; (0.0E+00, 6.2E-04) 
 
F.4 Recommended Strategy for Handling Zero-Failure Data in I-PRA 
Based on a preliminary research summarized in this appendix, when no failure is observed in the 
uncertainty propagation using the uniform LHS in the I-PRA framework, the recommended strategy is as 
follows: 
 
• First, estimate the failure probability of the corresponding equipment by the Bayesian approach in 
Section F.2.3. Use this Bayesian-based estimate of the failure probability for risk quantification in 
the Plant-Specific PRA Module. After risk quantification, perform the classical importance 
measure analysis at the basic-event level to identify whether the corresponding component is risk 
significant. If that component is identified as non-significant, the Bayesian-based estimate can be 
used as an approximate value of its failure probability. If that component is identified as risk 
significant, an advancement in the uncertainty propagation is considered below. 
 
• For those components that have been identified as risk significant above, consider either increasing 
the sample size in the uniform LHS or applying the VRTs, such as stratified sampling [8], non-
uniform LHS [9], importance sampling [10], and subset simulation [11]. Future research needs to 
select an adequate sampling method and develop a comprehensive computational procedure for 
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APPENDIX G: A PLANT-SPECIFIC PRA MODEL FOR THE SMALL-BREAK LOSS-OF-
COOLANT ACCIDENT 
This appendix explains the Plant-Specific PRA model developed for the realistic Fire I-PRA case 
study in Section 2.5.2. In this case study, one of the most critical fire-induced scenarios at the representative 
NPP, a Small-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) scenario induced by a switchgear room fire, is 
considered. To model the plant system response to the fire-induced equipment damage, two event trees are 
constructed: (i) plant response event tree and (ii) support system event tree. In the following subsections, 
the structure of each event tree, a list of pivotal events considered in these event trees, and definition of end 
states are shown in detail. 
G.1 Plant Response Event Tree 
The Plant Response Event Tree developed for the fire-induced SBLOCA scenario in this case study 
is illustrated in Figure G.1. The pivotal events considered in this event tree are listed below. The definition 
of end states is explained in Section G.3.  
 





• SBLOCA: Fire-induced SBLOCA due to a fire in Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) Train A 
switchgear room 
• HA: High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) system, Train A 
• HB: HHSI system, Train B 
• HC: HHSI system, Train C 
• OB: Operator action to start feed and bleed 
• LA: Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) system, Train A 
• LB: LHSI system, Train B 
• LC: LHSI system, Train C 
• RA: Containment sump recirculation, Train A 
• RB: Containment sump recirculation, Train B 
• RC: Containment sump recirculation, Train C 
• HXA: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system heat exchanger, Train A 
• HXB: RHR system heat exchanger, Train B 
• HXC: RHR system heat exchanger, Train C 
• RCFC: Reactor Containment Fan Cooler (assuming RCFC Trains B and C are running, RCFC 
Train A is not available) 
G.2 Support System Event Tree 
The Support System Event Tree (Figure G.2) is developed to represent the functional relationships 
among the support systems that are needed for the operation of the frontline systems modeled in the Plant 
Response Event Tree (Section G.1). The end states of this event tree represent the combinations of the failed 
support systems and the associated conditional probabilities given the fire initiation in the fire compartment 
being analyzed (i.e., a motor control center panel fire in a switchgear room in this case study). The list of 
top events is provided below: 
 
• ECHA: Essential Chill water (ECH) system, Train A 
• ECHB: ECH system, Train B 
• ECHC: ECH system, Train C 
• HVACA: EAB Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system, Train A 
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• HVACB: EAB HVAC system, Train B 
• HVACC: EAB HVAC system, Train C 
• OS03: Operator failure to start smoke purge 
• ECWA: Essential Cooling Water (ECW) system, Train A 
• ECWB: ECW system, Train B 
• ECWC: ECW system, Train C 
• CCWA: Component Cooling Water (CCW) system, Train A 
• CCWB: CCW system, Train B 
• CCWC: CCW system, Train C 
 
Figure G.2 Support System Event Tree 
G.3 Bin Assignment Rules for the Plant System Event Tree 
In the RISKMAN® software, the bin assignment rules are created to define the end states in the 
Plant System Event Tree (Section G.1), as listed in Table G.1. Three bins defined in Table G.1 correspond 
to three end states in the Plant-System Event Tree: Early Core Damage (‘CDEARLY’), Late Core Damage 
(‘CDLATE’), and Success (‘SUCCESS’). To facilitate the definition of bin assignment rules, the macro 





Table G.1 Bin Assignment Rules for the Plant System Event Tree. 

















Table G.2 Macro Rules for Bin Assignment Rules for the Plant System Event Tree 
NOHHSI HA=F*HB=F*HC=F No HHSI available  
LPHRAOK LA=S*RA=S*(HXA=S+RCFC=S) Success in heat removal (low pressure) through 
LA, RA, and HXA 
LPHRBOK LB=S*RB=S*(HXB=S+RCFC=S) Success in heat removal (low pressure) through 
LB, RB, and HXB 
LPHRCOK LC=S*RC=S*(HXC=S+RCFC=S) Success in heat removal (low pressure) through 










The “Early Core Damage (CDEARLY)” end state is defined as the core damage scenarios with high Reactor 
Coolant System (RCS) pressure, caused by the failure of all High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) systems 
and the operators’ failure in depressurizing the RCS after the loss of the HHSI systems. Corresponding to 
this definition, the bin assignment rule for the ‘CDEARLY’ end state is represented by the following 
Boolean logic: 
 CDEARLY = (SBLOCA = F) ∩ NOHHSI ∩ (OB = F), (G.1) 
where 
SBLOCA=F:  Occurrence of the fire-induced SBLOCA due to the stuck-open pressurizer PORV; 
NOHHSI: No HHSI systems are available, which is defined in Table G.2 as 
HA=F*HB=F*HC=F where all three trains of HHSI systems (HA, HB, and HC), 
modeled in the Support System Event Tree are unavailable; 
OB=F: The RCS depressurization by the operators (top event ‘OB’ in the Plant Response 
Event Tree) is failure. 
Meanwhile, the “Late Core Damage (CDLATE)” end state is defined as the scenarios where either 
the HHSI system or the RCS depressurization by the operators is success; however, the long-term heat 
cooling is not established due to the failure of containment recirculation or heat removal. Based on this 
definition, in Section G.2, the ‘CDLATE’ end state is represented by the following Boolean logic: 
 
CDLATE = [(SBLOCA = F) ∩ NOHHSI����������� ∩ (LPHRANYRUN + HPHRRUN������������������������������������)]
∪ [(SBLOCA = F) ∩ NOHHSI ∩ (OB = S) ∩ LPHRANYRUN�������������������], 
(G.2) 
where two macro rules are defined as follows: 
Macro Rule for LPHRANYRUN 
At least one low-pressure heat removal function is running. This macro rule is further defined by another 
sub-macro rule: LPHRANYRUN = LPHRAOK+LPHRBOK+LPHRCOK where ‘+’ sign represents the 
OR logic, and LPHRAOK, LPHRBOK, and LPHRCOK represent the success of the low-pressure heat 
removal function for each ECCS train (A, B, and C). At the representative plant, to establish the low-
pressure heat removal function for each ECCS train, the LHSI system, the containment sump recirculation 
system, and either the RHR system heat exchanger or the RCFC system should work. Based on this plant 
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system configuration, the macro rule for LPHRAOK, LPHRBOK, and LPHRCOK is defined (Table G.2). 
For instance, for train A, 
 LPHRAOK = (LA = S) ∩ (RA = S) ∩ (HXA = S ∪ RCFC = S), (G.3) 
where the acronyms of the frontline and support systems are consistent with those in Appendices A and B, 
while ‘S’ represents the success of the corresponding system. 
Macro Rule for HPHRRUN 
This represents the success of heat removal function using the high-pressure recirculation mode. 
This operational mode is necessary when the low-pressure heat removal function has failed and can be 
successfully operated if (i) at least one containment sump recirculation system is available and (ii) the 
RCFC system is available. Based on this plant system configuration, the macro rule for HPHRRUN is 
defined as: 
 HPHRRUN = LPHRANYRUN������������������� ∩ (RA = S ∪ RB = S ∪ RC = S) ∩ RCFC = S, (G.4) 
where the acronyms of the systems are consistent with those in Sections G.1 and G.2. 
The “Success (SUCCESS)” end state is defined as the scenarios leading to successful reactor 
shutdown and long-term core cooling without core damage. In other words, this end state is the complement 
of the union of “CDEARLY” and “CDLATE” end states, i.e., using the Boolean logic, 
 SUCCESS = CDEARLY ∪ CDLATE���������������������������, (G.5) 
In Table G.1, the bin rule assigned for the “SUCCESS” end state, ‘1’, indicates that any scenarios that do 
not lead to the other end states previously defined, “CDEARLY” or “CDLATE”, are assigned to the success 
end state, which is consistent with the notation in Equation (G.5). 
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APPENDIX H: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE EXISTING SENSITIVITY AND 
IMPORTANCE MEASURE ANALYSIS METHODS IN PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
This appendix offers a literature review on the existing SA and IM methods, focusing on the 
selected methods that can have applications in PRA frameworks. Earlier reviews on SA and IM methods 
in other domains have been provided in Ref. [1-6]. Although the terms “Sensitivity” and “Importance 
Measure” analysis have been used interchangeably in literature, they are clearly differentiated in this 
research. IM analysis ranks the input parameters based on their contributions to the system risk metrics, 
while SA ranks the input parameters based on their influence on the intermediate performance measures 
(e.g., physical outputs, such as maximum fuel cladding temperature). In the development and application 
of simulation models, SA is useful for identifying the critical parameters based on their influence on the 
model outputs and for analyzing how uncertainty and variability of the input parameters impact the 
uncertainty and variability of the model outputs [7, 8]. When SA methods are applied to a risk model whose 
output is the system-level risk metric (i.e., probability of the undesirable consequences induced by a 
complex system), the importance of input parameters, with respect to the system-level risk, is determined. 
In other words, an IM analysis is regarded as a specific usage of SA methods on the risk models whose 
outputs are the system risk metrics. To provide inputs for a Risk-Informed Decision Making (RI-DM) [9], 
risk-contributing factors should be ranked in terms of their impact on the system-level risk, rather than on 
intermediate performance measures. This is because the system-level risk is an outcome of complex 
interactions among many systems, components, and underlying physical and social failure mechanisms; 
therefore, the ranking of input parameters with respect to the intermediate performance measures may not 
be the same as the ranking with respect to the system-level risk, and vice versa. 
H.1 Local & One-Way Methods and Their Extensions 
Two of the most common IM methods in classical PRA are FV-IM and RAW, which are defined 
for basic event i as: 
 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = (𝑅𝑅0 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖−) 𝑅𝑅0⁄ , (H.1) 
 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖+ 𝑅𝑅0⁄ , (H.2) 
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where R0 is the nominal risk, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖− is the risk metric when the probability of basic event i is assumed to be 
zero (i.e., component i is perfectly reliable), and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖+ is the risk metric when the probability of basic event i 
is assumed to be unity (i.e., component i is assumed to fail) [10, 11]. There are three key characteristics of 
the classical IM methods: 
 
i. They are considered to be ‘local’ methods because they are typically calculated based on the 
point estimates of basic event probabilities [11, 12]. As an extension to this feature, the Monte 
Carlo approach has been studied to deal with uncertainty of component failure probabilities in the 
classical IM calculation [10, 13-15].  
 
ii. They are typically computed by the One-At-a-Time (OAT) method, where only one input 
parameter is perturbed from its nominal value, while the other input parameters remain fixed at 
their nominal values. There have been limited studies on the applications of classical IMs for a 
group of multiple basic events [10, 16, 17].  
 
iii. They are mainly designed for ranking basic events at the component level. Borgonovo and 
Apostolakis [18] introduced the Differential Importance Measure (DIM) to extend the level of 
analysis and to rank parameters (e.g., failure rates) associated with the PRA basic events. The 
DIM method [18] uses the first derivative of model output with respect to input parameters, 
dR/dxi, as a measure of sensitivity and is computed approximately by changing input parameter xi 
by a specific amount around its nominal value, while the other input parameters are fixed at their 
nominal values. As another extension, Jankovsky et al. [19] and Mandelli et al. [20] extended the 
definition of FV-IM and RAW to generate the ranking of components in the dynamic PRA 
frameworks. Their IMs were derived from the same concepts as were the classical IM methods - 
the components are ranked based on the change in risk metrics when a specific state for each 
component is conditioned. In their case studies, the input parameters associated with the 
component status, such as the time to component failure and the binary component state, are 
ranked based on the outputs from the dynamic PRA frameworks [19, 20].   
The IM methods, covered so far, focus on the ranking of input parameters either at the level of 
basic events or at the level of the parameters of probability distributions associated with the PRA basic 
events (e.g., failure rate λ for an exponentially-distributed time-to-failure of a hardware component). To 
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extend the risk ranking to the input parameters at the failure mechanism level (e.g., physical design 
parameters and material properties in fatigue, stress corrosion, or other failure mechanisms), Morton et al. 
[21] performed one-way SA methods (i.e., the tornado diagram and sensitivity plot methods) for the I-PRA 
framework developed for the risk-informed resolution of GSI-191, to generate the ranking of physical input 
parameters with respect to the plant risk estimates [22, 23]. These one-way SA methods are local and have 
the OAT nature, following this procedure: First, the model output is calculated by an OAT approach where 
one of the input parameters is swept from its lower to upper bounds, while the other input parameters are 
fixed at their nominal values. In the sensitivity plot, the model output is plotted against each input parameter 
to visualize the response of the model to an individual input parameter. Meanwhile, in the tornado diagram, 
the minimum and maximum values of those model outputs are plotted in a horizontal bar chart where the 
nominal output (i.e., the output computed with all input parameters being fixed at nominal values) is set as 
the zero point of the x-axis. The sensitivity of the model output of interest to each input parameter is 
measured by the total length of the corresponding bar graph; namely, the range (from lower to upper 
bounds) of the model output.  
As an extension of one-way (i.e., local and OAT) methods, the Morris method [24] is commonly 
applied to identify the influential from the non-influential factors in the model. Although the Morris method 
uses the first derivative of the model output as a measure of sensitivity, it advances the treatment of the 
uncertainty of input parameters, non-linearity, and interactions among input parameters inside the model. 
In the Morris screening method [24], the “elementary effect”, which is an approximate first derivative of 
the model output with respect to each input parameter, is computed by the individually randomized OAT 
design at different points in the input parameter space. The mean absolute value of the elementary effects 
indicates the main effects (i.e., influence of each input parameter on the model output), while the standard 
deviation of the elementary effects suggests the degree of non-linearity and interactions among input 
parameters. If the standard deviation of di (x) is small, the relationship between the input parameter and 
model output is thought to be relatively linear; otherwise, the level of non-linearity and/or interactions in 
the model would be high.  
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H.2 Global Methods  
In literature, global methods have been used (i) to conduct “SA” for the input parameters at the 
level of failure mechanisms with respect to the physical performance outputs [12, 25-45] or (ii) to conduct 
“IM analysis” for the basic events (i.e., at the level of components) in PRA with respect to the system-level 
risk estimates [34, 46-51]. In this section, those global SA and IM methods are reviewed and divided into 
three major categories: correlation-based, variance-based, and moment-independent methods [6, 38, 47, 52, 
53].  
Correlation-Based Global Sensitivity Analysis Methods 
The correlation-based global methods use the input-output correlation as a measure of sensitivity 
of the model output to input parameters. The most commonly-used methods include the standardized 
regression coefficients (SRCs) and partial correlation coefficients (PCCs) [25, 29, 44, 47, 54-57]. The SCRs 
indicate the total strength of the linear relationship between the model output and each input parameter, 
while the PCCs indicate the strength of the linear relationship between the model output and each input 
parameter after the linear effects of all other input parameters are removed. These two methods can also be 
conducted for the rank-transformed data, in which case they are referred to as the standardized rank 
regression coefficients (SRRCs) and partial rank correlation coefficients (PRCCs). The rank transformation 
improves the accuracy of ranking when the model is a non-linear but monotonic function [29]. For instance, 
the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) [37, 39, 45] applied these correlation-
based methods to rank the physical input parameters in the NPP accident progression model. The 
performance of the correlation-based methods is measured by the model coefficient of determination (RY2), 
which is defined as the ratio of the total sum of squares to the regression sum of squares and shows how 
much of the variation in the model output is explained by the regression [47, 54, 55]. The lower RY2 value 
indicates a poor performance by the correlation-based methods and, typically, this occurs when the model 
is highly non-linear and non-monotonic and involves a relatively high degree of interactions among input 
parameters [1, 26, 44, 57]. To improve the performance of the correlation-based SA in this situation, the 
non-parametric regression methods, such as locally-weighted regression, the generalized additive model, 
projection pursuit regression, and recursive partition regression methods, have also been applied for SA [5, 
58, 59].  
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Variance-Based Global Sensitivity Analysis Methods 
The variance-based methods use variance as a measure of sensitivity. Iman and Hora [60, 61] 
proposed a variance-based Global SA method which quantifies the relative importance of input parameters 
by the reduction of variance of the model output when each input parameter is conditioned on a specific 
fixed value: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 = �𝑉𝑉(𝑌𝑌) − 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 �𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛−𝑗𝑗�𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗�� , (H.3) 
where V (Y) represents the unconditional variance of Y, while EXj (VX–j (Y |Xj)) is the expected value of the 
remaining variance when Xj is fixed at a specific value. Another variance-based Global SA, the first-order 
sensitivity index Si, is defined by  
 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛−𝑖𝑖(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)� 𝑉𝑉(𝑌𝑌)⁄  , (H.4) 
where VXi (EX–i (Y |Xi)) represents the variance of the conditional expected value of model output given that 
input parameter Xi is known [28, 62-64]. Si can be estimated by the Fourier amplitude sensitivity test (FAST) 
method [65] or the Sobol' method [62, 63, 66, 67]. The concept of Si has been extended to the higher-order 
interactions among input parameters. For instance, the Sobol' sensitivity index for the interacting effect by 
input parameters X1, X2, … , Xs is defined by 
 𝑛𝑛1,2,⋯𝑠𝑠 = 𝑉𝑉1,2,⋯𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑉(𝑌𝑌)⁄  , (H.5) 
where V1,2, …,s represents the reduction of variance attributed to the synergistic effects of input parameters 
X1, X2, … , Xs  [62, 63, 66, 67]. The total number of S1, 2,… ,s increases exponentially as the dimension of the 
model increases and is given by 2m – 1 where m is the number of input parameters in a model. Hence, the 
calculation of high-order indices for all possible interactions could be impractical due to a high 
computational demand. To alleviate this challenge, the total sensitivity index STi, defined as the sum of all 
partial sensitivity indices S1,2,… ,s containing input parameter Xi, has been proposed in order to quantify the 
total variance reduction for each input parameter, including both the first-order and high-order effects [28, 
64, 68].  
Moment-Independent Global Sensitivity Analysis and Importance Measure Methods 
Borgonovo [48] proposed a moment-independent sensitivity indicator, δi, which assesses the 
influence of input parameters on the model output by considering the entire probability distribution of input 
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parameters and model output, without relying on correlation coefficients and any moments of the model 
output. This method uses the difference between the unconditional and conditional probability density 
functions (pdfs) as a measure of sensitivity: 
 𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = ��𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌|𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦) − 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦)�𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦, (H.6) 
where fY (y) is the unconditional pdf of the model output Y, while fY|Xi (y) is the conditional pdf of the model 
output Y given that the input parameters Xi is fixed at xi*. By repeating the computation of s (Xi) with 
different choices xi*, the expected value of s (Xi) is computed by 
 𝑠𝑠(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = ��𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌|𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦) − 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦)�𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦, (H.7) 
where fXi (xi) is the marginal pdf for input parameter Xi. The moment-independent sensitivity indicator δi is 





As another category of moment-independent methods, the cumulative distribution function (cdf)-
based Global IM has been proposed [41, 50]. Liu and Homma [50] proposed a cdf-based sensitivity 
indicator, Si (CDF), which quantifies the influence of input parameters based on the expected change in the 
cdf of the model output. Si (CDF) is defined based on the difference between unconditional cdf FY (y) and 
conditional cdf given Xi = xi*, FY|Xi (y), which is quantified by the area enclosed by these cdfs: 
 𝐴𝐴(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) = � �𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌|𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗(𝑦𝑦) − 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦)�𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦
𝑦𝑦∀
. (H.9) 
Based on the outputs from the replicated calculation of A (Xi), the expected value of A (Xi) is estimated by 
 𝐸𝐸[𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)] = � 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∀
. (H.10) 
The cdf-based sensitivity indicator Si (CDF) is defined as 
 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐴𝐴(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)] |𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌)|⁄  , (H.11) 
where E (Y) is the expected value of the unconditional output Y [50].  
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Pianosi et al. [41] proposed another cdf-based Global IM, the PAWN sensitivity index. PAWN 
quantifies the distance between unconditional and conditional cdfs based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
statistic, defined by 
 𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) = max 𝑦𝑦 �𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦) − 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌|𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
∗(𝑦𝑦)�. (H.12) 
The KS statistic depends on the selection of xi* at which point the input parameter Xi is fixed. The PAWN 
index, denoted by Ti, is defined by considering a statistic of the KS value (e.g., median, maximum) over all 
the possible values of xi*. It should be noted that the PAWN indicator has characteristics in common with 
the pdf-based Global IM, δi, in terms of how the uncertainty of the model output is addressed. As indicated 
by Equation (H.12), the PAWN indicator accounts for the information on the uncertainty of the model 
output by considering the maximum difference between unconditional and conditional cdfs of the model 
output. This provides similar information to the pdf-based indicator δi, which can be interpreted as the 
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APPENDIX I: COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE OF THE GLOBAL IMPORTANCE 
MEASURE ANALYSIS FOR THE INTEGRATED PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
In order to execute the cdf-based Global IM, Si (CDF) [1] for I-PRA, first, the unconditional cdf of 
the model output Y, FY (y), is quantified by the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation where all input parameters 
are randomly sampled. Then, the conditional model outputs are calculated using the substituted column 
method [1-3]. This method begins by developing two matrices consisting of random samples whose size is 
nS1 × nX and nS2 × nX, where nS1 and nS2 represent the sample sizes for the outer and inner loops of the 








































= (𝒃𝒃1 𝒃𝒃2 ⋯ 𝒃𝒃𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛) (I.2) 
Si (CDF) is computed by using a new nS2 by nX matrix C constructed by ‘substituting’ one of the columns of 
matrix B for the corresponding column in matrix A: 
 𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖 = (𝒃𝒃1  ⋯  𝒃𝒃𝑖𝑖−1 𝒂𝒂𝑖𝑖  𝒃𝒃𝑖𝑖+1  ⋯  𝒃𝒃𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛) , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋} (I.3) 
By repeating this substitution for all columns of matrix B, the full design matrix is obtained as nS1 × nS2 × 
nX matrix. Therefore, this approach requires a total of N = nS × (nX × nS + 1) model runs to compute Si 
(CDF). Based on the conditional outputs, the conditional cdfs of the model output, given that the input 
parameter Xi is fixed at a certain value xi*, denoted by FY|Xi (y), are constructed. Next, the difference between 
FY (y) and FY|Xi (y) is measured by the area closed by the FY (y) and FY|Xi (y) curves.  





These steps are repeated with the MC method using Latin-Hypercube Sampling (LHS) for the outer loop, 
that is, random sampling of xi*. Based on outputs from the replicated calculation of A (Xi), the expected 
value of A (Xi) is calculated by 
 𝐸𝐸[𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)] = � 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∀
 (I.5) 
where fxi (xi) is the marginal pdf of input parameter Xi. Lastly, Si(CDF) for input parameter Xi is computed by 
 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐴𝐴(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)] |𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌)|⁄  (I.6) 
where E (Y) is the expected value of the unconditional output Y [1].  
To demonstrate the robustness of the statistical estimation, the standard deviation of the estimated 
Si(CDF) was computed by the replicated MC simulations [4-8]. Two-loop MC simulations for calculating 
Si(CDF) are repeated with 20 independent batches of random samples. Thereby, the expected value and the 
standard deviation of Si(CDF), S̅i(CDF) and s [Si(CDF)], are reported. The ranking of input parameters is 
determined based on the magnitude of S̅i(CDF), while s [Si(CDF)] indicates the statistical convergence of the 




















where nR denotes the number of replicated MC simulations, while Si (CDF), j represents the result of Si (CDF) 
computed in the jth replication (j = 1, 2, …, nR) [9]. 
As the accuracy of the MC simulation largely depends on the sample size, a consistent criterion 
should be established to determine the sample size for outer and inner loops. In addition, considering the 
application of Si (CDF) to complex simulations, the optimal sample size should be investigated to obtain a 
statistically reliable ranking of input variables, while keeping the computational cost to a minimum. The 
sample size for the inner loop, n2, is determined by the relative error in the estimation of the unconditional 
expected value of the model output. Law et al. [10] suggested that, when the simulation is terminating (i.e., 
an event for specifying the length of each simulation run is defined), the half-width of the (1 – α) % 
confidence intervals (CIs) of the expected value is approximated by 
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 𝛿𝛿(𝑛𝑛,𝛼𝛼) = 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙−1,1−𝛼𝛼 2⁄ �𝑛𝑛2(𝑛𝑛) 𝑛𝑛⁄  (I.9) 
where tn-1, 1-α/2 represents the t-distribution value with significance level α and n – 1 degree of freedom, 
while S2(n) denotes the sample variance based on n model outputs. This study performs the sequential 
procedure to estimate n2 so that the expected value of the unconditional model output converges within a 
desired level of relative error [10], based on the following steps:  
 
i. Choose initial sample size n2(0) and set n2 = n2(0). This study uses n2(0) = 20. 
ii. Perform MC simulation with n2 random samples to compute unconditional model outputs. Then, 
compute the estimation of the expected value, denoted by Y̅ (n2), and the half-width of the (1 – α) % 
CI of the unconditional expected value δ (n2, α) using Equation (I.9). 
iii. If δ (n2, α)/|Y̅ (n2)| ≤ γ/(γ + 1) where γ is the desired relative error of the expected value and is set to 
γ = 5 %, n2 is selected as the optimal sample size for the inner loop. Otherwise, replace n2 with n2 
+ 1 and repeat the previous step.  
iv. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until the convergence criterion in Step 3 is satisfied.  
The sample size for the outer loop, n1, is then determined based on the relative error in the expected value 
of A (Xi). Like n2, the sequential procedure is conducted to select the optimal n1 so that the estimated 
expected value of A (Xi) converges within the desired level of relative error γ by the following steps: 
 
v. Choose the initial sample size n1(0) and set n1 = n1(0). This study uses n1(0) = 20. Meanwhile, the 
sample size for the inner loop, n2, is set to the optimal value determined in Steps 1 to 4. 
vi. Run a two-loop MC simulation to compute unconditional and conditional model outputs with n1 
random samples for the outer loop. Then, based on the unconditional and conditional cdfs, the 
estimated mean value of A (Xi) for input parameter Xi, A̅i (n1), and the half-width of the (1 – α) % 
CI for A̅i (n1), δi (n1, α), are computed. 
vii. If δi (n1, α)/|A̅i (n1)| ≤ γ/(γ + 1) for all input parameters where γ represents the desired relative error 
in the expected value and is set to γ = 5% in this study, current n1 is selected as the optimal sample 
size. Otherwise, replace n1 with n1 + 1 and repeat the previous step. 
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APPENDIX J: BACKGROUND ON COMMON CAUSE FAILURE ANALYSIS IN CLASSICAL 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
The critical safety functions in complex technical systems are designed with redundant components 
in a parallel configuration to enhance the reliability of the entire system; hence, dependent failures can be 
dominant risk contributors as they may simultaneously defeat more than one redundant component and 
compromise the reliability of the entire system. Mathematically, dependent failure (or dependency among 
more than one component) is defined as follows. Consider a safety system S consisting of m redundant 
components with the 1-out-of-m configuration. The entire system fails when all m components si ; i ∈ {1, 
2, …, m} fail, namely, in Boolean logic, 
 S = � s𝑗𝑗
𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗=1
= s1 ∩ ⋯∩ s𝑚𝑚, (J.1) 
where the events S and si represent the failures of the entire system and component i, respectively. If 
components si ; i ∈ {1, 2, …, m}, are independent, the failure probability of the entire system S is calculated 
by the multiplication of the failure probability of each individual component: 




Nevertheless, the failures of multiple components are typically dependent; hence, the failure probability of 
the entire system should be computed by the multiplication of the marginal and conditional probabilities, 
instead of the product of marginal probabilities in Equation (J.2). Assume that the joint of events si ; i ∈ {1, 
2, …, m} is not a null set, the system failure probability can be formulated by using the multiplication rule: 







As indicated by comparing Equations (J.2) and (J.3), dependent failure is defined as the situation where the 
conditional probability of the failure of a specific component is affected by the states of other components. 
In other words, component sj is dependent on the other components if the following inequality holds: 
 Pr�𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗� ≠ Pr�𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗|� 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗′
𝑗𝑗−1
𝑗𝑗′=1
� ;  𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, … ,𝑚𝑚. (J.4) 
In reliability and risk analysis, the conditional probability of a specific failure event, given the other failure 
events, is often (but not always) greater than the marginal probability of an individual failure event; i.e., in 
Equation (J.4), the right-hand side is typically greater than the left-hand side. This indicates that, if 
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dependencies exist among multiple components, the failure probability of the entire system, computed by 
Equation (J.3), can be much higher than that expected under the assumption of independence computed by 
Equation (J.2). To avoid an underestimation of the system risk and to obtain accurate risk insights, an 
adequate treatment of dependencies in PRA is imperative. To account for dependent failures in PRA, three 
perspectives need to be addressed: (i) identification of the dominant sources of dependencies, (ii) dependent 
failure modeling, and (iii) quantification of the likelihood of the dependent failures. 
To facilitate the identification of the dominant sources of dependencies, dependent failures are 
categorized based on their characteristics. One common classification considers two categories: intrinsic 
and extrinsic [1-3]. The intrinsic dependency is induced by designed functional relationships among 
systems and components and refers to situations where the functional status of one component is influenced 
by the functional status of the others [2, 3]. For instance, the dependent failure among more than one 
component induced by the failure of shared equipment, e.g., a power source, is a typical example of the 
intrinsic dependency. The extrinsic dependency refers to situations where the sources of dependency are 
not inherent in the system design, such as unintended and external physical mechanisms (e.g., a high room 
temperature) and man-machine interactions (e.g., maintenance error) [2, 3]. Another practical 
categorization is based on whether dependencies can be explicitly treated by the logic-based classical PRA 
models, namely, event tree and fault tree models [1-3]. In classical PRA, most of the known intrinsic 
dependencies are modeled in event trees and fault trees and are referred to as functional dependencies. In 
contrast, most of the extrinsic and intrinsic dependencies that cannot be explicitly addressed by classical 
PRA (e.g., unknown sources of dependency) are treated by parametric models and are referred to as CCF 
[1-3]. In terms of modeling and quantification in PRA, CCF is more complex and challenging than a 
functional dependency as additional sub-models and empirical data are required. Consistent with Refs. [1-
3], this article defines CCF as the failure state of more than one component, satisfying the following criteria: 
(i) more than one component within the established component boundary, i.e., a Common Cause 
Component Group (CCCG), fails or is degraded; (ii) the failure or degradation of multiple components 
occurs within a PRA mission time; (iii) the failure or degradation is due to the shared root causes in the 
presence of coupling mechanisms; and (iv) the sources of dependency cannot be explicitly modeled in the 
existing classical PRA.   
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 For modeling and quantification of CCFs in PRA, various methods have been proposed and 
applied. A literature review of the existing CCF methods is provided in Refs. [4-7]. Among these existing 
CCF methods, the parametric methods are commonly applied for NPP PRAs. NUREG/CR-5485 [3] 
provides structured guidance on assessing the CCFs in classical PRA using the parametric models. First, 
all groups of components susceptible to CCF, referred to as Common Cause Component Groups (CCCGs), 
are identified and a screening analysis is conducted to screen out the CCCGs that have insignificant risk 
contribution. Second, the detailed qualitative analysis is conducted to collect and analyze the plant-specific 
information and update the list of CCCGs by addressing the applicability of the failure causes and coupling 
factors identified in the CCF event data and the effectiveness of CCF defenses. Third, the detailed 
quantitative analysis is used to assess the likelihood of CCF events. For each CCCG, the system FT is 
expanded by including Common Cause Basic Events (CCBEs), representing the possible combinations of 
components in the CCCG that could fail due to CCFs. The probabilities of the CCBEs are then represented 
by using the parametric CCF model, such as the Basic Parameter Model (BPM), Beta-Factor Model (BFM), 
Alpha-Factor Model (AFM), or Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) model [1-3, 8]. As inputs to the parametric 
CCF model, the CCF parameters and the total failure probability of the component need to be provided. In 
the NPP PRAs, the total failure probability is typically estimated using the component reliability databases, 
while the CCF parameters are estimated by analyzing the historical CCF event data [2]. The generic CCF 
event data are collected from the industry-wide CCF databases (e.g., Refs. [9-11]) and are analyzed using 
the event impact vector method [2].  
The commonly-used parametric CCF models have limitations. First, the accuracy and realism of 
CCF modeling and quantification depend on the availability, quality, and relevancy of the CCF event data. 
Due to the rarity of CCF events, CCF event data are typically sparse. In addition, the CCF event reports 
often involve ambiguity in the event description, so assumptions and interpretations by the analyst are 
required. The estimation of the CCF parameters, hence, could involve a high degree of subjectivity and 
uncertainty, and derivation of the plant-specific CCF parameters, reflecting the current design and operation 
conditions of the plant, is challenging because the CCF event data for a specific plant, relevant to the current 
plant conditions, are even sparser. Second, there is no “explicit” or quantitative causal connection among 
failure causes, coupling mechanisms, or the CCBEs in PRA. In the parametric models, the spatio-temporal 
progression of underlying failure mechanisms is masked by the data-driven CCF parameters. Identification 
of the critical risk-contributing factors at the failure-mechanism level, e.g., physical parameters and 
operational conditions, therefore, is not possible. Another consequence of this limitation is an assumption 
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of a symmetric CCCG. Dependency among asymmetric components with unique design features and 
environmental conditions is difficult to address using the existing parametric models.  
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APPENDIX K: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING COMMON 
CAUSE FAILURE METHODS IN PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
To support the comparison of the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic CCF methodology developed in 
this research with other CCF methods (in Section 4.4), this appendix provides the literature review and 
qualitative analysis on the existing CCF methods in the PRA domain, including (i) parametric models [1-
5], (ii) cause-specific parametric models [6-12], and (iii) other methods [13-19]. As stated in the main 
chapter, the borderline between explicit and implicit treatments of causalities (introduced in Section 4.2.1) 
is considered as a criterion for comparison. In addition, three subcriteria are considered: (a) the choice of 
modeling techniques for the explicit causal structure, which determines the time and space resolutions in 
the treatment of causalities; (b) how the explicit causal model is quantified, and (c) the scope of the implicit 
data-driven treatment of causalities, which determines the type and quantity of the required empirical data. 
K.1 Parametric Models 
In classical PRA, ETs and FTs are developed to model the causalities at the system- and 
component-levels, and the probabilities of the CCBEs are quantified using the parametric CCF models. 
There are two subcategories under the parametric models: non-shock ratio models (e.g., AFM, BFM, BPM, 
and the MGL model) [1] and shock models (e.g.,  binomial failure rate model [2, 4], multinomial failure 
rate model [3, 5]). The non-shock ratio models use the ratio-based parameters to relate the CCF probabilities 
to the total failure probability of the components. The CCF parameters are estimated based on the CCF 
event data and the analyst’s interpretations; therefore, the explicit-implicit borderline is located at the level 
of CCBEs. The causalities above this borderline are explicitly modeled by ETs and FTs, while the 
causalities below this borderline, including the physical failure modes and mechanisms, are captured by the 
statistical analysis of the CCF event data along with the analyst’s interpretations. The causalities below the 
CCBE level are lumped into the CCF parameters; hence, the connections between the underlying failure 
mechanisms and the CCBEs are not explicitly provided, and the resultant estimates of the CCF parameters 
are not cause specific. As the CCF event data collected over the last few decades from the entire industry 
are pooled, this method is not capable of accounting for a temporal dependence of the CCF events. 
Meanwhile, the spatial dependence is implicitly addressed through the types of components and the 
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qualitative analyses of the plant-specific information. With the non-shock ratio models, however, an 
adjustment of the CCF model parameters based on the location-specific conditions in a quantitative and 
first-principle manner is not possible. To estimate the parameters of the non-shock ratio models, the failure 
event data is required, i.e., the counts of observed CCF events with different multiplicities and the 
qualitative description on component degradation states, potential of shared failure causes, and timings of 
failures. 
The shock models take one step toward the modeling of causal factors that underlie the CCBEs by 
addressing the occurrence of “shocks” which represent a collection of failure cause conditions that can lead 
to CCF and its influence on the component failure. The Binomial Failure Rate (BFR) model [4] considers 
independent random failures and CCFs as two separate processes. The BFR model uses two parameters to 
represent the CCF process: the common cause shock occurrence rate and the fragility parameter. The 
occurrence of the common cause shocks is modeled by a Poisson process, while the fragility of the 
components in the CCCG is modeled by a binomial distribution where the component failures are assumed 
to be conditionally independent. Later, the BFR model is modified to relax its assumptions, such as a 
consideration of the lethal shock concept [2] and the development of the Multinomial Failure Rate model 
[5]. The explicit-implicit borderline is located at the level of “shocks”. Above this level, the causalities are 
explicitly addressed by ET, FT, and the shock models. The common cause shocks considered in the shock 
models, however, are not cause specific as all failure causes and coupling factors are lumped; thus, the 
shock models do not provide explicit connections between the CCBEs and the underlying failure 
mechanisms. The causalities below the explicit-implicit borderline are treated by the data-driven approach 
based on the CCF event data and the analyst’s interpretations. The shock models, therefore, have the same 
level of spatial and temporal consideration as the non-shock ratio models. To estimate the shock model 
parameters, the categorization of failure event data based on the shock types (i.e., independent, non-lethal 
common cause, and lethal common cause) should be known. Also, in addition to the failure event data, the 
number of demands (or, the total time of observation) is required. 
Note that the parametric CCF models are also applicable for the other techniques of system and 
component modeling, including the Bayesian Network [20, 21], Markov chain model [22-24], Petri Net 
[25], and availability block diagram [26]. The probabilistic input parameters associated with the CCF events, 
such as the conditional probabilities of CCF events in the Bayesian network [20, 21] and the CCF transition 
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rates in the Markov chain model [22-24], can be obtained by the parametric CCF models. In these methods, 
the modeling of the system- and component-level causalities has been advanced; e.g., the Bayesian network 
can treat non-binary states of components and is a powerful technique for incorporation of social factors 
into PRA, while the Markov chain model, Petri Net, and availability block diagram are capable of 
accounting for time-dependent system and component state transition in consideration of repair. 
Nevertheless, these system- and component-level models do not explicitly account for the causal 
relationships between the underlying failure mechanisms and the failure states of systems and components. 
The explicit-implicit borderline is, thus, still located at the level of CCBEs for the non-shock ratio models 
and at the level of common cause shocks for the shock models. 
To improve the treatment of uncertainties in the CCF parameter estimation when the CCF event 
data is incomplete or absent, Le Duy and Vasseur [27, 28] proposed the extended impact vector method. 
Their approach uses a sampling-based method to generate resamples of three factors characterizing the 
uncertainty associated with the observed failure events (the degree of component degradation, existence of 
shared failure cause, and the timing of multiple component failures) and to generate “fictitious” impact 
vectors so that uncertainties associated with these three factors are fully propagated to the CCF parameter 
estimates, rather than averaging them as done by an approximate approach suggested in NUREG/CR-5485 
[1]. It should be noted that, even though they called their approach a “simulation method”, their approach 
is different from the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology developed in this article. In their approach, 
“simulation” refers to the sampling-based method for improving the CCF parameter estimation based on 
the existing CCF event data. In contrast, in the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology developed in 
this article, “simulation” is used to run the phenomenological or mechanistic model of underlying failure 
mechanisms to generate the predictions of KPMs, which are then used to estimate the CCF parameters.  
K.2 Cause-Specific Parametric Models 
The parametric methods do not provide an explicit connection between failure causes and CCBEs. 
To overcome this limitation, a natural direction of research is to extend the parametric models by developing 
the cause-specific CCF parameters. In the traditional parametric models, CCF parameters are 
conditionalized by component type, functional failure mode, and multiplicity of failure. Meanwhile, the 
cause-specific parametric models further conditionalize the CCF parameters by failure causes and coupling 
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factors. This extension has been studied for various parametric models, including the Partial Beta Factor 
Model (PBFM) [6], Multi-Class Binomial Failure Rate (MCBFR) model [7], Partial Alpha Factor Model 
(PAFM) [8-10], and the alpha decomposition method [11, 12]. This differs from traditional parametric 
methods in that the relationships between component failure and its causes and coupling factors are 
considered in the estimation of the CCF parameters. The structure of causalities below the CCBE level, i.e., 
the causal paths from the failure causes and coupling factors to the CCBEs, is captured by a predefined 
checklist of system defenses [6], by a probability equation relating the cause-specific CCF parameters and 
the CCBE probabilities [7, 9, 29], by an FT model [10], or by a Bayesian network [11, 12]. The explicit-
implicit borderline is located at the level of failure causes and coupling mechanisms that are considered as 
explanatory factors. Although the structure of causalities above this borderline is explicitly addressed, the 
influences of failure causes and coupling mechanisms on the CCBE probabilities are quantified either by 
statistical analysis of the CCF event data [7-12] or by relying on expert judgment [6]. In the statistical 
analysis approach [7-12], the CCF event database is categorized based on a combination of the component 
type and failure causes and coupling factors, and each categorized dataset is used to estimate the cause-
specific CCF parameters. The PBFM [6] relies on expert judgment to quantify the causal structure above 
the borderline, where the system-specific dependencies and defenses are qualitatively assessed by the 
analyst’s judgment using the predefined checklist. These cause-specific parametric methods capture the 
causalities below this borderline, i.e., the causal chains leading to the occurrence of failure causes and 
coupling mechanisms that are considered as explanatory factors in the causal structure, by an implicit 
approach based on a statistical analysis and/or the analyst’ interpretations of the CCF event data. 
The cause-specific parametric models have a higher capability of space and time consideration than 
the traditional parametric models because, even though spatial and temporal progression of causalities is 
not explicitly addressed in the causal model, the location-specific and time-dependent causal factors can be 
implicitly addressed by adjusting the failure causes and coupling mechanisms based on the location- and 
time-specific conditions. To estimate the CCF parameters in the cause-specific parametric models, the 
cause-specific CCF event data is required. In other words, the same failure event data as the one for the 
traditional parametric models can be used, but should be categorized based on the failure causes and 
coupling factors that are considered as explanatory factors in the causal model. 
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K.3 Other Existing CCF Methods 
A Bayesian network or an influence diagram can be used to construct the causal structure associated 
with failure causes and coupling mechanisms and be connected to classical PRA (ETs and FTs). Since BN 
can be solved using a binary decision diagram, which is a common computational method with ET and FT 
models, it helps explicitly incorporate the underlying causal factors into classical PRA. O’Connor et al. [14, 
15] developed the General Dependency Model (GDM) to estimate the CCBE probabilities in an explicit 
consideration of failure causes, coupling mechanisms, and component fragility using the Bayesian network. 
Zitrou et al. [16, 17] proposed an extension of the Unified Partial Method, a CCF modeling and 
quantification procedure commonly applied for NPP PRA in the UK that uses the PBFM [6] for component-
level CCFs, by using the influence diagram model to provide a more flexible causal structure with a higher 
resolution in the failure causes and coupling mechanisms. While the fundamental idea of creating the causal 
structure connecting the underlying failure causes and coupling mechanisms with CCF events in PRA is in 
common with the GDM [14, 15], the influence diagram model [16, 17] explicitly incorporated the defense 
mechanisms in the causal structure using the decision nodes to allow for a quantitative comparison between 
defense alternatives. Based on the three subcriteria stated above, both methods have similar features to the 
cause-specific parametric models except that no parametric model is assumed; thus, the symmetrical CCCG 
assumption is relaxed. 
The Stochastic Hybrid System (SHS) method [19] uses a combination of stochastic discrete and 
continuous state models to compute the time-dependent system reliability under the presence of physical 
degradation and CCFs. The physical degradation processes are modeled by the continuous stochastic 
differential equations, while the CCFs are modeled by considering the occurrence of both lethal and non-
lethal random shocks with a Poisson process. In this SHS method, CCFs are essentially modeled in a way 
that is like the shock models, except that the influences of the non-lethal shocks on the component state are 
addressed by introducing a stochastic degradation increment, rather than using the component fragility. The 
occurrence rates of the lethal and non-lethal shocks are estimated based on the failure event data or 
engineering judgment; therefore, while the SHS method advances the reliability calculation for dynamic 
systems exposed to physical degradation processes, it has characteristics that are like those of the shock 
models in terms of CCF modeling and quantification. 
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The Common Load Model (CLM) [13, 18] (also referred to as the interference model) uses the 
analogy to stress-resistance analysis in order to assess the impact of the common load on multiple 
components. Upon the system demand, all components in the system are exposed to a common stress S, 
and when S exceeds the resistance or strength of each component Ri, i ∈ {1, 2, …, m}, the corresponding 
component fails due to the stress S. The CLM considers two sources of dependencies, the one induced by 
the shared stress S, and the other induced by the correlation of the component resistance. The physical 
quantity used for S and Ri can be regarded as a KPM associated with a specific physical failure mode. Both 
S and Ri are treated as stochastic variables, represented by probability distributions derived from empirical 
data, such as historical observational data and experimental data. In the CLM, the borderline between the 
explicit and implicit treatments of causalities is located at the level of probability distributions of common 
load and component resistance. Theoretically, the location- and time-dependent CCFs could be implicitly 
addressed by using the location- and time-specific load and resistance distributions; however, such an 
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APPENDIX L: BACKGROUND ON FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS  
L.1 Fire Protection Features in NPPs 
NPPs typically have multiple layers of fire detection and suppression features, as illustrated in a detection 
and suppression event tree (Figure L.1) [1]. This event tree considers two end states: success (OK) and 
failure (NS) of fire suppression before fire-induced equipment damage occurs: if both detection and 
suppression are successfully carried out, the fire is successfully suppressed (i.e., end state ‘OK’); otherwise, 
the fire cannot be suppressed before the fire-induced component damage (end state ‘NS’). 
 
Figure L.1 Detection and suppression event tree (from NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix P [1]). NS – Failure of 
suppression; OK – Success of suppression. 
For detection, there are three possible success paths: prompt detection (PD), automatic detection (AD), and 
manual detection (MD). The prompt detection (PD) can be achieved if a continuous fire watch is present in 
the fire compartment (e.g., under the hot work), the room is continuously occupied by plant crew, or high 
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sensitivity detectors, such as the VEWFD systems [2], are installed. The automatic detection (AD) is 
achieved by automatic fire detectors, such as heat detectors and smoke detectors installed in the fire 
compartment. The manual detection (MD) refers to a delayed detection by a roving fire watch or fire patrol 
present in the fire room, or a delayed detection by the Main Control Room (MCR) through abnormal 
indications caused by fire-induced equipment damage. The order of the pivotal events in the event tree 
(Figure L.1) indicates the typical chronological order of these three fire detection features. The fire can be 
promptly detected, (PD) either before the fire flame is generated (i.e., at the smoldering stage) or right after 
the fire ignition. If this prompt detection feature is available and successfully achieved (sequences ‘A’ 
through ‘E’ in Figure L.1), two other fire detection features (AD and MD) are not necessary. Note that, per 
NUREG/CR-6850 [1, 3], the prompt detection can be credited only if (i) a continuous fire watch is present 
in the room or (ii) a high-sensitivity smoke detection system is installed. If the prompt detection fails, the 
automatic detection systems can serve as backups for the fire detection function. If, following the failure of 
the prompt detection feature (sequences ‘F’ to ‘I’ in Figure L.1), the automatic detection system works 
successfully, the manual fire detection is not necessary. Meanwhile, if both the automatic detection system 
and prompt detection features fail, there are still two possible success paths in terms of fire detection: (i) 
the automatic suppression system is available and controls the fire successfully (sequence ‘J’ in Figure L.1). 
In this case, because fire-induced damage is prevented by activation of the automatic suppression systems 
despite the failure of fire detection, there is no need for delayed manual detection; and (ii) although the 
automatic suppression system is not installed or is unavailable in the fire compartment, delayed manual 
detection is successfully carried out (sequences ‘K’ to ‘M’ in Figure L.1). When neither of these success 
paths are achieved (sequence ‘N’ in Figure L.1), there is no chance to control the fire as the fire cannot be 
detected before the fire-induced equipment damage occurs.  
For suppression, there are three success paths: prompt suppression (PS), automatic suppression (AS), and 
manual suppression (MF and FB). The prompt suppression (PS) refers to suppression by a fire watch or a 
fire patrol on the scene and can be only credited in the hot work scenario where the fire detection is achieved 
by the prompt detection (PD). The automatic suppression (AS) refers to the fire suppression by fixed and 
automatic suppression systems (e.g., actuated by a fusible link which melts under high temperature), such 
as water-based, carbon-dioxide, and halon sprinklers. The manual suppression (MS) can be achieved in two 
ways: (i) manual activation of the fixed systems (MF) and (ii) manual suppression by the fire brigade (FB). 
As shown in Figure L.1, the viable suppression features depend on how the fire has been detected. 
Following the successful prompt detection (sequences ‘A’ to ‘E’), all four features of suppression (PS, AS, 
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MF, and FB) are possible. In contrast, if the fire is detected by the automatic detectors (sequences ‘F’ to 
‘I’), the prompt suppression is not possible, and the fire should be controlled by either automatic 
suppression (AS) or manual suppression (MF and FB). When the fire is detected by the delayed manual 
detection (sequences ‘K’ to ‘M’), the only possible suppression mode is manual suppression, either by 
manual actuation of fixed suppression systems (MF) or by the fire brigade (FB).  
Note that Ref. [3] (an update to NUREG/CR-6850) recommended that two pivotal events, MF and FB, 
should be combined into one top event which represents manual suppression, ‘MS’. This change was made 
to deal with the ambiguity of historical fire event records in terms of the separation of these two modes of 
manual suppression and to address the manual detection and suppression as a continuous process by 
multiple parallel efforts. In contrast, in this research, these two top events are treated separately to support 
the development of the HRA-based method. The continuous and parallel efforts in fire detection and 
suppression can be explicitly captured in the HRA-based task process model; hence, the challenges 
associated with the separation of these two top events, encountered in the current Fire PRA methodology 
that relies on the data-driven approach, would not arise in the HRA-based method developed in this chapter.  
L.2 Research Scope in Chapter 5  
In relation to Figure L.1, Chapter 5 of this thesis focuses on development of the HRA-based method to 
account for the human performance in manual fire protection features at NPPs, including top events ‘MD’, 
‘MF’, and ‘FB’. The Fire I-PRA framework, developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, creates an explicit 
interface between fire progression and manual suppression through modifications to the HRR curve. To 
implement this explicit interface, the Manual Fire Suppression Module should provide three timings 
associated with the performance of manual suppression, (i) time to fire detection (tdet), (ii) fire brigade 
response time (tfb), and (iii) time duration of manual suppression (tfb→sup) [1, 4]. The goal of Chapter 5 is to 
develop the HRA-based Manual Fire Suppression Module to estimate these three timings (and their 
associated uncertainty distribution). 
Table L.1 shows the list of sequences in Figure L.1 that involve manual detection and suppression features. 
By nature, fire detection and suppression are implemented in a continuous and parallel manner. For instance, 
the fire brigade is activated as soon as the fire is detected, rather than waiting until the failure of the 
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automatic suppression by the sprinklers or the manual actuation of fixed suppression system is confirmed 
by the MCR. The HRA-based Manual Fire Suppression Module, developed in this study, therefore, should 
have a capability to address all sequences in Table L.1 in a unified manner. At this stage of research, the 
methodological development in this chapter focuses on the sequences ‘H’ and ‘I’ where the fire is detected 
by the automatic detectors and controlled by manual suppression performed by the fire brigade.  
Table L.1 List of sequences in the detection and suppression event tree involving manual detection (MD) 
and suppression (MF and FB). 
Sequence Detection Suppression End State 
C 
Prompt detection (PD) 
Manual actuation of fixed 
suppression (MF)  OK 
D Manual suppression by the fire brigade (FB) OK 
E No suppression NS 
G 
Automatic detection (AD) 
Manual actuation of fixed 
suppression (MF) OK 
H Manual suppression by the fire brigade (FB) OK 
I No suppression NS 
K 
Manual detection (MD) 
Manual actuation of fixed 
suppression (MF) OK 
L Manual suppression by the fire brigade (FB) OK 
M No suppression NS 






[1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Electric Power Research Institute. "EPRI/NRC-RES 
Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities Volume 2: Detailed Methodology (EPRI 
1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850)," 2005. 
[2] G. Taylor, S. Cooper, A. D’Agostino, N. Melly, and T. Cleary. "Determining the Effectiveness, 
Limitations, and Operator Response for Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems in Nuclear 
Facilities (DELORES-VEWFIRE), Final Report (NUREG-2180)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2016. 
[3] K. Canavan and J. S. Hyslop. "Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods Enhancements 
(NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1019259, Supplement 1)," 2010. 
[4] N. Melly and A. Lindeman. "Nuclear Power Plant Fire Ignition Frequency and Non-Suppression 
Probability Estimation Using the Updated Fire Events Database-United States Fire Event 




APPENDIX M: SPAR-H ANALYSIS FOR MANUAL SUPPRESSION ACTIVITY 
M.1 Main Control Room Operator Response  
This section applies the “SPAR Human Error Worksheet” for the at-power operation mode 
provided in NUREG/CR-6883 [1] to estimate the total Human Error Probability (HEP) for the Main Control 
Room (MCR) response to the automatic fire detection signals, represented by the top event ‘MR’ in the 
HRA event tree (shown in Section 5.3.1). The “total” HEP is computed as the summation of the diagnosis 
HEP (i.e., HEP associated with the cognitive portion of the task) and the action HEP (i.e., HEP associated 
with the execution portion of the task). For the MCR response, both diagnosis and action human errors are 
considered.  
 
• Initiating event: An electrical cabinet fire in the switchgear room at an NPP. 
• Basic event: The MCR response to the fire detection signal (the top event ‘MCR’ in the HRA event 
tree shown in Section 5.3.1). 
• Basic event context: An NPP at full-power operation mode. No shutdown at this stage.  
• Basic event description: The MCR operators detect and diagnosis the fire detection signal 
indication in the MCR. Then, the MCR operators communicate with the fire brigade members using 
the radio to dispatch them to the fire location.  
• Does this task contain a significant amount of diagnosis activity? YES. Because the MCR 
operators should detect the indications of fire detection, diagnosis the situation (e.g., in which room, 
and how many of the automatic detectors are activated) and decide what actions they should take 
including the remote communication with the fire brigade members using the radio.  
Part I. Evaluate Each PSF for Diagnosis 




Table M.1 Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) for the diagnosis portion of the task by the Main Control 
Room (MCR) operators 
PSFs PSF Levels Multiplier  Please note specific reasons for PSF level selection in this column. 
Available Time Nominal time 
1 
This human error probability is assessed 
given that the available time is longer 
than the required time. Note that timeline 
analysis is addressed in Section 5.3.1.  
Stress / Stressor Nominal 
1 
No external stress as the MCR 
environment is normal. Low internal 
stress because of a low workload.  
Complexity Nominal 
1 
Little ambiguity involved as the fire 
detection indication is clearly shown in 
the MCR and the actions to be performed 
is clearly defined. No parallel tasks due 
to the “priority number one” procedure 
for the fire detection signals.  
Experience / Training High 
0.5 
Fire drills are periodically conducted 
(e.g., at least once per quarter for each 
shift). A drill critique is held after every 
fire drill to provide the timely feedback 
to the participants.  
Procedures Nominal 
1 
The plant fire response procedures and 
the compartment-specific fire preplans 
are provided. The instructions are 
formatted and worded consistently.  
Ergonomics / HMI Nominal 
1 
Assume that the fire detection alarm is 
audible, per the MCR alarm standards, 
and the radio equipment is easy and 
intuitive to use.  
Fitness for Duty Nominal 
1 
Assume that the MCR operators are in a 
food fitness for this task and have no 
negative influencing factors (e.g., 
fatigue, distraction by a personal issues). 
Work Processes Nominal 
1 
A three-way communication is always 
available to facilitate the remote 
communication between the MCR and 
the fire brigade members. Assume no 
negatively influencing factors, such as 
inter-group conflict and uncoordinated 




B. Calculate the Diagnosis Failure Probability 
 
The diagnosis failure probability is computed by a product of the basic diagnosis HEP (0.01) and the 
multipliers of all PSFs: 
Diagnosis HEP = (0.01)(1)(1)(1)(0.5)(1)(1)(1)(1) = 0.005 
C. Calculate the Adjustment Factor IF Negative Multiple (≥ 3) PSFs are Present 
 
When 3 or more negative PSF influences are present, in lieu of the equation above, a composite PSF score 
must be computed using the adjustment factor. Negative PSFs are present when a multiplier greater than 1 
is selected. For this diagnosis activity by the MCR operators, because only one PSF has the negative 
influence, there is no need for considering the adjustment factor.  
D. Record Final Diagnosis HEP 
 
If no adjustment factor was applied, record the value from Part B as the final diagnosis HEP. If the 
adjustment factor was applied, record the value from Part C here.  
 
Final Diagnosis HEP = 0.005 
 
Part II. Evaluate Each PSF for Action 
 
A. Evaluate PSFs for the Action Portion of the Task, If Any. 
 
In this analysis, the same PSF levels as the diagnosis activity (as listed in Part I above) are used because 
the action is performed by the same MCR operators, in the same location, under the same environmental 
conditions, and in the similar time window. Therefore, the levels of eight PSFs for the action portion of this 
task are as follows: 
 
• Available time:   Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Stress / stressor:  Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
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• Complexity:  Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Experience/Training: High (Multiplier: x0.5) 
• Procedures:  Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Ergonomics/HMI: Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Fitness for Duty: Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Work Processes: Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
B. Calculate the Action Failure Probability  
 
The action failure probability is computed by a product of the basic action HEP (0.001) and the multipliers 
of all PSFs: 
Action HEP = (0.001)(1)(1)(1)(0.5)(1)(1)(1)(1) = 0.0005 
C. Calculate the Adjustment Factor IF Negative Multiple (≥ 3) PSFs are Present 
 
When 3 or more negative PSF influences are present, instead of using the equation above, a composite PSF 
score must be computed using the adjustment factor. Negative PSFs are present when a multiplier greater 
than 1 is selected. For this action by the MCR operators, because only one PSF has the negative influence, 
there is no need for considering the adjustment factor.  
 
D. Record Final Action HEP  
 
If no adjustment factor was applied, record the value from Part B as the final action HEP. If the adjustment 
factor was applied, record the value from Part C.  
 








Part III. Calculate Task Failure Probability Without Formal Dependency  
 
Calculate the Task Failure Probability Without Formal Dependency (Pw/od) by adding the Diagnosis Failure 
Probability from Part I and the Action Failure Probability from Part II. In instances where an action is 
required without a diagnosis and there is no dependency, then this step is omitted.  
 
𝑃𝑃w/od = 0.005 + 0.0005 = 0.0055 
 
Part IV. Dependency 
 
For all tasks, except for the first task in the sequence, use the dependency table and formulate below to 
calculate the Task Failure Probability with Formal Dependence (Pw/d). For this MCR task, the dependency 
is not applicable because this is the first task in the sequence shown in the HRA event tree. Therefore, the 
final HEP estimate for the MCR response in the HRA event tree is Pr (MR) = 0.0055. This HEP value is 
used in the quantification of the HRA event tree (shown in Section 5.3.1).  
M.2 Fire Brigade Response  
This section applies the “SPAR Human Error Worksheet” for the at-power operation mode 
provided in NUREG/CR-6883 [1] to estimate the total Human Error Probability (HEP) for the fire brigade 
response, represented by the top event ‘FR’ in the HRA event tree (in Section 5.3.1). The “total” HEP is 
computed as the summation of the diagnosis HEP (i.e., HEP associated with the cognitive portion of the 
task) and the action HEP (i.e., HEP associated with the execution portion of the task). For the fire brigade 
response, both diagnosis and action human errors are considered.  
  
• Initiating event: An electrical cabinet fire in the switchgear room at an NPP. 
• Basic event: The fire brigade response after receiving the fire alarm notification from the MCR 
until the manual suppression is started (the top event ‘FR’ in the HRA event tree shown in Section 
5.3.1).  
• Basic event context: An NPP at full-power operation mode. No shutdown at this stage.  
• Basic event description: This task includes the following subtasks (as explained in Section 5.3.1): 
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o Following the notification from the MCR, gather at the assembly area (Task 2.A) 
o Communicate with the MCR to get an appropriate fire preplan number (Task 2.B) 
o Wear and peer check the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (Task 2.C) 
o Leave the assembly area and move to the staging area using a vehicle (Task 2.D) 
o Arrive the staging area (Task 2.E) 
o Prepare for entering the fire room, i.e., laying out the water hose from the hose cabinet to 
the room entrance (Task 2.F) 
o Put on the Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) (Task 2.G) 
o Enter the fire room (Task 2.H) 
o Search for and locate the fire source (Task 2.I)  
• Does this task contain a significant amount of diagnosis activity? YES. In addition to the 
subtasks to prepare for manual suppression (either by the portable fire extinguisher or by the water 
hose), the fire brigade needs to conduct diagnosis and decision-making based on the case-by-case 
situation of the fire progression in the room. 
Part I. Evaluate Each PSF for Diagnosis 




Table M.2 Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) for the diagnosis portion of the task by the fire brigade 
response 
PSFs PSF Levels Multiplier Please note specific reasons for PSF level selection in this column. 
Available Time Nominal time 
1 
This human error probability is assessed 
given that the available time is longer 
than the required time. Note that timeline 
analysis is addressed in Section 5.3.1.  
Stress / Stressor High 2 High physical stress due to the fire-induced physical conditions.  
Complexity Highly complex 
5 
High complexity may arise due to (i) 
several multiple parallel tasks by several 
members that require good coordination 
and (ii) large amount of communication 
among the fire brigade members, and 
(iii) potential ambiguity of the cues (i.e., 
smoke, heat, flame, etc.) in the fire 
source search (Task 2.I)  
Experience / Training High 
0.5 
Fire drills are periodically conducted 
(e.g., at least once per quarter for each 
shift). A drill critique is held after every 
fire drill to provide the timely feedback 
to the participants.  
Procedures Nominal 
1 
The compartment-specific fire preplans 
are provided for the fire brigade. The 
instructions are formatted and worded 
consistently.  
Ergonomics / HMI Nominal 
1 
Assume that the suppression equipment 
(e.g., a portable extinguisher, water hose, 
and thermal imaging camera) is designed 
considering the human factor 
engineering.  
Fitness for Duty Nominal 
1 
Assume that the fire brigade members 
are in a food fitness for this task and 
have no negative influencing factors 
(e.g., fatigue, distraction by a personal 
issues). 
Work Processes Nominal 
1 
A three-way communication is always 
available to facilitate the remote 
communication between the MCR and 
the fire brigade members. Assume no 
negatively influencing factors, such as 




B. Calculate the Diagnosis Failure Probability 
 
The diagnosis failure probability is computed by a product of the basic diagnosis HEP (0.01) and the 
multipliers of all PSFs: 
Diagnosis HEP = (0.01)(1)(2)(5)(0.5)(1)(1)(1)(1) = 0.05 
C. Calculate the Adjustment Factor IF Negative Multiple (≥ 3) PSFs are Present 
 
When 3 or more negative PSF influences are present, in lieu of the equation above, a composite PSF score 
must be computed using the adjustment factor. Negative PSFs are present when a multiplier greater than 1 
is selected. For this diagnosis activity by the fire brigade, because only two PSFs have the negative rating, 
there is no need for considering the adjustment factor.  
D. Record Final Diagnosis HEP 
 
If no adjustment factor was applied, record the value from Part B as the final diagnosis HEP. If the 
adjustment factor was applied, record the value from Part C.  
 
Final Action HEP = 0.05 
 
Part II. Evaluate Each PSF for Action 
 
A. Evaluate PSFs for the Action Portion of the Task, If Any. 
In this analysis, the same PSF levels as the diagnosis activity (as listed in Part I above) are used because 
the action is performed by the same fire brigade members, in the same location, under the common 
environmental conditions, and in the similar time window. Therefore, the levels of eight PSFs for the action 
portion of this task are as follows: 
 
• Available time:   Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Stress / stressor:  High (Multiplier: x2) 
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• Complexity:  Highly complex (Multiplier: x5) 
• Experience/Training: High (Multiplier: x0.5) 
• Procedures:  Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Ergonomics/HMI: Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Fitness for Duty: Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
• Work Processes: Nominal (Multiplier: x1) 
B. Calculate the Action Failure Probability  
The action failure probability is computed by a product of the basic action HEP (0.001) and the multipliers 
of all PSFs: 
 
Action HEP = (0.001)(1)(2)(5)(0.5)(1)(1)(1)(1) = 0.005 
C. Calculate the Adjustment Factor IF Negative Multiple (≥ 3) PSFs are Present 
 
When 3 or more negative PSF influences are present, instead of using the equation above, a composite PSF 
score must be computed using the adjustment factor. Negative PSFs are present when a multiplier greater 
than 1 is selected. For this fire brigade response action, because only two PSFs have the negative influence, 
there is no need for considering the adjustment factor.  
 
D. Record Final Action HEP  
 
If no adjustment factor was applied, record the value from Part B as the final action HEP. If the adjustment 
factor was applied, record the value from Part C.  
 
Final Action HEP = 0.005 
 




Calculate the Task Failure Probability Without Formal Dependency (Pw/od) by adding the Diagnosis Failure 
Probability from Part I and the Action Failure Probability from Part II. In instances where an action is 
required without a diagnosis and there is no dependency, then this step is omitted.  
 
𝑃𝑃w/od = 0.05 + 0.005 = 0.055 
 
Part IV. Dependency 
 
For all tasks, except for the first task in the sequence, use the dependency table and formulate below to 
calculate the Task Failure Probability with Formal Dependence (Pw/d). In the HRA event tree (shown in 
Section 5.3.1), this fire brigade task has one precedent top event, the MCR response, which indicates that 
the fire brigade cannot start their response without a notification from the MCR. This dependency is 
explicitly addressed by the logic structure of the HRA event tree, where the failure of the top event ‘MR’ 
directly leads to the non-suppression end state (‘NS’) regardless of the outcome of the fire brigade response. 
Other than this, no dependency is expected between the MCR response and the fire brigade response 
because these two tasks are implemented by two different groups of crews in the different location and 
environment.  Therefore, the final HEP estimate for the fire brigade response in the HRA event tree is Pr 
(FR) = 0.055. This HEP value is used in the quantification of the HRA event tree (Section 5.3.1).  
M.3 Fire Brigade Subtask of Opening the Electrical Cabinet Door before Manual Suppression 
This appendix applies the “SPAR Human Error Worksheet” for the at-power operation mode 
provided in NUREG/CR-6883 [1] to estimate the Human Error Probability (HEP) for the fire brigade 
subtask of opening the electrical cabinet door before starting manual suppression. This is the subtask of 
Tasks 2.J (first suppression attempt using the portable extinguisher) and 2.K (second suppression attempt 
using the water hose), and this study assumes that the fire cannot be fully controlled if the electrical cabinet 
door is not opened before discharging the suppressant either by the portable extinguisher or by the water 
hose. Only action human error is considered because the diagnosis and decision-making are not required to 
perform this subtask.  
 
• Initiating event: An electrical cabinet fire in the switchgear room at an NPP. 
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• Basic event:  The subtask associated with the top events ‘MS1’ and ‘MS2’ in the HRA event tree 
(Section 5.3.1).  
• Basic event context: An NPP at full-power operation mode. No shutdown at this stage.  
• Basic event description: The fire brigade opens the electrical cabinet door after identifying the 
location of the fire source and before starting manual suppression. 
• Does this task contain a significant amount of diagnosis activity? NO. This action is clearly 
instructed by the fire preplan, and the cues for initiating this action (i.e., whenever the fire brigade 
identifies a fire source inside the electrical cabinet) is very clear. Hence, there is no need for the 
formal diagnosis and decision-making processes.  
Part I. Evaluate Each PSF for Diagnosis 
 
This part is skipped because, as stated, this task is dominated by the execution task. 
 
Part II. Evaluate Each PSF for Action 
 




Table M.3 Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) for the action portion of the task by the fire brigade to 
open the electrical cabinet before applying the suppressant 
PSFs PSF Levels Multiplier Please note specific reasons for PSF level selection in this column. 
Available Time Nominal time 1 
This human error probability is assessed 
given that the available time is longer 
than the required time. Note that timeline 
analysis is addressed in Section 5.3.1.  
Stress / Stressor Extreme 5 
Even higher external stress due to the 
fire-induced physical conditions is 
expected as this action needs to be 
implemented in vicinity to the fire 
source.  
Complexity Nominal 1 
This task is composed of a single 
subtask, i.e., opening the electrical 
cabinet door, and does not involve 
parallel tasks and intensive coordination.  
Experience / Training High 0.5 
Fire drills are periodically conducted 
(e.g., at least once per quarter for each 
shift). A drill critique is held after every 
fire drill to provide the timely feedback 
to the participants.  
Procedures Nominal 1 
The compartment-specific fire preplans 
are provided for the fire brigade. The 
instructions are formatted and worded 
consistently.  
Ergonomics / HMI Nominal 1 
Assume that the equipment required for 
unlocking and opening the electrical 
cabinet door is designed considering the 
human factor engineering.  
Fitness for Duty Nominal 1 
Assume that the fire brigade members 
are in a food fitness for this task and 
have no negative influencing factors 
(e.g., fatigue, distraction by a personal 
issues). 
Work Processes Nominal 1 
Assume no negatively influencing 
factors, such as inter-group conflict and 





B. Calculate the Action Failure Probability 
The action failure probability is computed by a product of the basic action HEP (0.001) and the multipliers 
of all PSFs: 
 
Action HEP = (0.001)(1)(5)(1)(0.5)(1)(1)(1)(1) = 0.0025 
C. Calculate the Adjustment Factor IF Negative Multiple (≥ 3) PSFs are Present 
 
When 3 or more negative PSF influences are present, instead of using the equation above, a composite PSF 
score must be computed using the adjustment factor. Negative PSFs are present when a multiplier greater 
than 1 is selected. For this subtask by the fire brigade, because only one PSF has the negative influence, 
there is no need for considering the adjustment factor.  
 
D. Record Final Action HEP  
 
If no adjustment factor was applied, record the value from Part B as the final action HEP. If the adjustment 
factor was applied, record the value from Part C.  
 
Final Action HEP = 0.0025 
 
Part III. Calculate Task Failure Probability Without Formal Dependency  
 
Calculate the Task Failure Probability Without Formal Dependency (Pw/od) by adding the Diagnosis Failure 
Probability from Part I and the Action Failure Probability from Part II. In instances where an action is 
required without a diagnosis and there is no dependency, then this step is omitted.  
 






Part IV. Dependency 
 
For all tasks, except for the first task in the sequence, use the dependency table and formulate below to 
calculate the Task Failure Probability with Formal Dependence (Pw/d). This subtask is considered to have 
significant dependency on the precedent fire brigade response task (i.e., top event ‘FR’) since these two 
tasks are implemented by the same group of fire brigade members in the same location and under the similar 
fire-induced environmental conditions. The dependency matrix in NUREG/CR-6883 [1] is used to 
determine the level of dependency based on the conditions of four factors: (i) crew (same or different), (ii) 
time (close in time or not close in time), (iii) location (same or different), and (iv) cues (additional or no 
additional).  
 
• Crew: Same (implemented by the same fire brigade team) 
• Time: Close in time (MS1 and MS2 are performed just after FR) 
• Location: Different (previous task is mainly implemented outside of the room, while this subtask 
is performed in a specific location inside the switchgear room) 
• Cues: Additional (this subtask is initiated by the completion of the previous task) 
 
Based on the dependency condition table provided in NUREG/CR-6883, Appendix A [1], this subtask has 
a high dependency on the previous fire brigade response. Using the dependency equation adapted from the 
THERP method [2], the conditional probability that the fire brigade successfully opens the electrical cabinet 
door, given the success of the precedent fire brigade response ‘FR’, is computed by 
 
Pr(FBCN������� | FR����) = {1 + (1 − 0.0025)} 2⁄ ≅ 0.9988 
 
where FBCN represents the failure to open the electrical cabinet door by the fire brigade. Using this 
relationship, the conditional probability that the fire brigade fails to open the electrical cabinet, given the 
precedent fire brigade response ‘FR’, is computed as: 
 




It should be noticed that this conditional probability is smaller than the unconditional HEP, quantified in 
Part III (0.0025) because the dependency increases the success probability of the subtask given the success 
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